

Public Perceptions on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia:

Evidence from Round 8 of the
European Social Survey

Public attitudes to welfare,
climate change and energy
in the EU and Russia (PAWCER)

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Public Perceptions on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia

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Introduction

Climate change is one of the most acute threats the world is facing today, and preventing human-induced climate change has become a major goal of policies internationally. Energy plays a key role in reaching such a goal, as the energy sector accounts for two thirds of total greenhouse gas emissions and 80% of CO₂ emissions (IEA 2017). If climate change is to be mitigated, energy production and consumption will have to change fundamentally - in particular, societies need to kick their fossil fuel addiction. Yet decarbonizing energy supplies is not an easy task, particularly as it has to be balanced with the vital objective of ensuring a reliable, secure and affordable supply energy for all households.

Policies to bring forth urgently needed transition to a low-carbon society cannot be implemented without public support. Hence, it is crucial to understand public attitudes to climate change, energy security and energy preferences. In citizen polls, climate change is currently ranked among the most pressing societal problems in Europe (Capstick et al. 2014). However, little is known about how citizens think about the role of energy in this context. Moreover, many studies on

these issues have focused on particular countries, and no cross-European and Russian comparison has been made previously.

The case of Russia is particularly interesting, as Russian policies have not traditionally emphasized environmental issues, and public consciousness and debate around environmental issues is not as prevalent as in most European countries (e.g. Oldfield 2017). Russia does, however, have a large impact on climate change, particularly owing to the country's vast supply of fossil energy. Russia has large reserves of both coal and natural gas - and a large share of global production. The rest of Europe is to some extent dependent on fossil fuel supply from Russia.

Unlike many other European countries, Russia has no ambitious objectives to shift to a low-carbon economy. Structurally, Russian energy system is state-owned and heavily centralized. This may, on one hand, evoke stability and feeling of security among the public, as the assets are controlled and subsidized. On the other hand, the system is very dependent on few actors and hence prone to potentially unexpected changes in different critical energy security dimensions, such as price and availability, if political power and definitions of policies are to be changed (Aalto et al. 2012).


As such, Russian citizens may be expected to place more importance on energy security and preserving a fossil economy, while giving less attention to climate change and de-carbonizing policies. Russia's unique position in terms of energy issues makes it a particularly interesting point of cross-European comparison.

The Public Attitudes to Climate Change and Energy module fielded in the eighth round of ESS is the first systematic and theory-based comparison of public attitudes to climate change and energy made across Europe and Russia. The module was broadly based on the Stern value-belief-norm model (Stern 2000), incorporating a wide range of elements that are potentially of importance in explaining how

climate change and energy perceptions are shaped (see Figure 1).

The data for the eighth round (2016/2017) of the ESS was collected in 23 participating countries using strict random probability sampling and a minimum target response rate of 70%. The data are representative of all persons aged 15 or over in the following countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), United Kingdom (GB), Italy (IT), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Iceland (IS), Lithuania (LT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Russian Federation (RU), Sweden (SE), and Slovenia (SI).¹

Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the Climate Change and Energy module (concepts in grey are part of the core ESS questionnaire)




In this report we lay out key findings from our descriptive analysis of these data. First, we look at the energy security concerns of the public in Europe and Russia. Are citizens concerned about energy security, and is dependency on fossil fuels something they worry about? Next, we ask what energy sources citizens in different countries prefer. We then move on to consider how big of a concern climate change is to citizens, and what citizens believe will be realistically done about climate change. Finally, we ask what energy policy measures citizens in different countries think should be taken to in order to mitigate climate change.

Energy

Energy security concerns

Despite the enormous importance that a secure supply of energy has for societies, energy is often “invisible”. For many citizens in Europe and Russia it is readily available, and perhaps does not cause much daily trouble or thought. Hence, energy security may not be a primary source of concern in most citizens’ lives. Nevertheless, where such concerns emerge they have a potential to steer public opinion and policy-making.

Figure 2. Concern over various dimensions of energy security (%)




Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents. Missing and DK responses are excluded. Both post-stratification and population-size weights have been applied.

Energy security is a complex and multidimensional concept. Often defined as the *uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price*,² it is commonly thought to involve 1) the *reliability* of the energy system to have sufficient reserves to meet demand, 2) the *affordability* of energy, 3) *dependency on energy imports*, the 4) *vulnerability to interruptions* of the energy supply system (e.g. through natural hazards, inadequate supply, technical failures or terrorist attacks), and 5) a *dependency on fossil fuels* (Chester et al. 2010; Demski et al. 2014). In ESS8, respondents were asked to indicate how concerned they are about these various aspects of energy security.³

As Figure 2 illustrates, citizens are generally most concerned about the affordability of energy (78% at least somewhat worried), dependency on fossil fuels (72%) and imports (67%), while vulnerability to interruptions (61%) and reliability of energy supply (40%) bring about slightly less concern. However, there are large differences between countries in what dimensions of energy security are of particular concern. In Russia, for example, concerns about affordability are close to the data average (77% at least somewhat worried), while concern over dependence on fossil fuels (62%) and particularly dependency on energy imports (45%) are somewhat lower than average.

Figure 3. Concern over dependence on fossil fuels (%)



Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents. Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

In contrast, Russians are more concerned about the reliability of energy supply (59%) and interruptions to energy supply (70%) than is the average respondent.

Next, we focus on public concern over dependence on fossil fuels, a concern we consider an important prerequisite for implementing effective climate policies. Figure 3 shows how worried about fossil fuel dependency people are in the surveyed countries.

The Portuguese, Finns, Spaniards and the French express most concern about their countries being too dependent on fossil fuels. Over 80% of citizens in these countries are either somewhat, very or extremely concerned. In Germany, Belgium, Slovenia and Great Britain, too, over three quarters of citizens worry about dependency on fossil fuels. In Iceland, worry about fossil fuel dependency is comparatively rare, yet even there 29% of respondents worry about it.

Energy preferences

We've seen that in most surveyed countries, citizens are generally quite concerned about their countries being dependent on fossil fuels. There are different technologies that can be used to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and thus help mitigate climate change. Such technologies include generating energy from nuclear power and various renewable energy sources. In many European countries, such different alternatives to fossil fuels are already widely used.

However, the actual costs, effectiveness and risks associated with these technologies are much debated, and people have varying perceptions of these technologies. To better understand such perceptions, we asked citizens about their preferences of different energy-supply technologies. More specifically, we asked how much of the electricity used

[in the respondent's country] should be generated from different energy sources, including coal and natural gas, nuclear power, hydroelectric power, solar power, wind power as well as biomass energy, which is generated from materials like wood, plants and animal excrement.

As Table 1 illustrates, there is a clear preference for electricity from renewable sources. In all the countries surveyed, there were significantly more respondents who think a large or very large amount of electricity should be generated from hydro-, solar and wind power than there were respondents who think a small or very small amount should be generated from these energy sources. Biomass appears a less well-known⁴ and somewhat more controversial source of energy than other renewables, yet attitudes towards it are relatively positive in most countries surveyed. Russia is one of the countries where renewables generally elicit least enthusiasm - however, hydropower, solar power and wind power are still viewed considerably more favourably than coal.

With regard to preferences for nuclear energy as well as coal and gas there are more definite differences between countries. Nuclear is the source of energy which is most categorically opposed. A total of 38% of respondents think nuclear energy should not be used to generate electricity at all. However, significant differences between countries emerge. In Czech Republic, where anti-nuclear sentiment is lowest, only 11% categorically oppose nuclear power whereas 48% think a large or very large amount of energy should be generated from nuclear sources. In Russia, this energy form is seen almost as favourably as in Czech Republic, as opposition to nuclear energy is mere 13% and support 38%. The share of people strictly against nuclear power is largest in Iceland, where 90% think no electricity should be generated from nuclear

Table 1. Percentage of citizens who think a large or very large amount of electricity in their country should be generated from various energy source

	Coal	Gas	Nuclear	Hydro	Solar	Wind	Biomass
AT	7	16	5	86	89	83	57
BE	4	25	11	67	84	86	47
CH	2	20	9	82	86	69	51
CZ	11	24	48	57	52	48	36
DE	5	18	3	72	87	76	38
EE	7	16	9	43	61	63	42
ES	11	22	9	78	94	93	62
FI	2	15	19	36	61	53	63
FR	5	27	16	74	83	73	58
GB	9	27	17	75	76	72	42
HU	22	31	35	70	93	86	70
IE	6	28	9	77	77	79	42
IL	25	65	28	58	78	67	41
IS	1	5	1	80	61	77	36
IT	9	33	12	70	89	81	57
LT	8	38	32	64	64	73	61
NL	2	8	6	73	90	83	51
NO	2	18	4	88	67	66	36
PL	28	45	23	77	87	82	53
PT	10	24	8	78	92	91	40
RU	28	50	38	57	53	49	26
SE	1	17	18	68	80	71	52
SI	10	23	17	61	88	83	54
Full data	13	31	19	69	78	72	45

Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents. Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

power, and less than one per cent think a large or very large amount of electricity should be generated from these sources.

Coal is the least favoured source of energy. In the countries where people are least keen on electricity being generated from coal - Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Finland - less than 2% think a large or very large amount of electricity should be generated from coal. In contrast, coal is viewed significantly more favourably particularly in Poland, Russia, Israel

and Hungary. In Russia, 28% think a large or very large amount of electricity should be generated from coal. 28% of Poles, 25% of Israelis and 22% of Hungarians are also of this opinion.

Natural gas is favoured particularly in Israel, where as many as 65% think a large or very large amount of national electricity supply should be generated from gas. Russians (50%), Poles (45%) and Lithuanians (38%) are also particularly supportive of generating electricity from this energy source.

Climate


Climate beliefs and concern

Climate change is generally a widely recognized issue globally according to numerous studies and polls around the subject (e.g. Capstick et al. 2014). The ESS data also show how the majority of Europeans agree that the climate is changing (92% of all respondents). Only in four countries the share of skeptical views reaches over 10% (Russia 18%, Israel 14%, Lithuania 11% and Czech Republic 11%). A vast majority of respondents also agree that human activity causes climate change. Only 9% of respondents think that climate change is caused mainly or entirely by natural processes.

The reality of climate change and the effect that human action has on climate are thus widely acknowledged.

We also asked how worried people in different countries are about climate change. We found that 76% of Europeans are at least somewhat worried over climate change. Quite considerable differences between countries can be detected, as the percentage of people who are worried about climate change ranges from 58% in Czech Republic, Israel and Estonia to 88% in Spain (Figure 4). Nevertheless, people who are not worried about climate change represent a minority in all the countries we surveyed.

Figure 4: Concern over climate change (%)



Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents. Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

People in Southern European countries are among those who are particularly concerned about climate change. Most of the Former Eastern Bloc states are amongst the least worried (Figure 4). Russia is placed below the average here with 64% share of worried citizens. However, differences to some of the Western European nations, such as UK and Netherlands, are not particularly remarkable, and for example Sweden has rather similar level of climate concern as Russia.

Efficacy beliefs and climate policy measures

One of the most urgent and challenging tasks in climate change discussion is to find ways to engage actors and construct solutions that would re-orientate some of current unsustainable practices. This is a particularly acute question when it comes to energy issues, as there is a need to solve the issue of fossil dependency and find alternative supply sources that are embraced across the society.

Faced with the enormous collective problem of climate change, it is not easy to remain optimistic about different actors acting efficiently to reduce climate change. If people think others will not act to reduce climate change, they may think their own actions are futile. People may also hope or wish that governments will act more efficiently to reduce climate change but doubt that governments are working efficiently to solve the problem (e.g. Drews & van den Bergh 2016). We asked how likely respondents think it is that large numbers of people will actually limit their energy use to try to reduce climate change (collective efficacy belief). We also asked respondents how likely they think it is that governments in enough countries will take action that reduces climate change (institutional efficacy belief).⁵

As Table 2 suggests, people are generally more prone to think that governments will take efficient action to reduce climate change (31% believe it likely) than they are to believe that many other people will help mitigate climate change by limiting their energy use (24% believe it likely). In general, people are quite

pessimistic. 58% of respondents believe that large-scale collective action to reduce climate change is unlikely, and 49% are sceptical of governments doing enough to solve the problem.

We found some country differences here, yet even the greatest share of optimistic beliefs was merely 36% (in Sweden and Italy) for collective action and 43% for institutional action (in Sweden and Netherlands). The most pessimistic views can be found in Germany for both collective and institutional actions (17% and 20%, respectively) (Table 2). Overall, collective efficacy is more often evaluated unlikely than it is considered likely across all the countries, and for institutional efficacy only few countries are slightly on the optimistic side (Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Israel, and Hungary). Russia is very close to the data averages for both efficacy beliefs.

These results tell a story of deficiency in current climate measures. Few people believe governments and other citizens are acting efficiently to reduce climate change. So, what should be done? One approach is to focus on personal consumption and active citizenship, but such a focus easily frames solutions as dependent on individual citizen-consumers. Another approach is to develop climate-friendly energy policies, for example by using economic disincentives and incentives, or legislative means. Governments can increase taxes on fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal, or use public money to subsidize renewable energy such as wind and solar power. They can also make laws that restrict the sale of goods that are not good for the climate, such as a law banning the sale of the least energy efficient household appliances. We asked respondents to what extent they are in favour or against these policies (in their country) to reduce climate change.

We found the economic incentive and the legislative measure are supported by well over half of the respondents: 74% of citizens are in favour of their country using public money to subsidize renewable energy, and 58% support their country banning least energy efficient

Table 2. Efficacy beliefs (%)

	Collective efficacy			Institutional efficacy		
	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely
AT	56	18	26	54	19	27
BE	51	24	25	42	21	37
CH	62	17	21	55	20	25
CZ	65	16	19	40	21	39
DE	66	16	17	65	16	20
EE	62	20	18	40	23	37
ES	59	15	25	53	15	32
FI	54	17	30	38	19	42
FR	57	23	20	52	23	26
GB	65	18	17	52	21	27
HU	59	19	22	37	23	40
IE	50	19	31	42	23	36
IL	52	19	29	38	21	41
IS	62	20	18	43	20	36
IT	47	18	36	40	20	40
LT	51	16	34	44	18	37
NL	53	18	29	38	20	43
NO	49	20	31	42	21	37
PL	57	20	23	42	22	36
PT	59	16	25	49	20	31
RU	54	20	26	46	22	32
SE	44	20	36	38	19	43
SI	67	16	17	55	20	25
Full data	58	19	24	49	20	31

Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents. Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

household appliances. However, more people are against than in favour of putting a price on pollution by increasing taxes on fossil fuels (Figure 5).

Thus, Europeans are seemingly rather willing to put political focus on renewable sources and are also supportive of the idea that technology should be as clean as possible. From the public perspective, these measures can be seen to pose no major demands on changing current lifestyles or more generally the current energy systems as such, as they frame the problem as

one of technological efficiency and supporting the 'general good', in other words issues that are commonly seen in favourable light. Indeed, placing tax on fossil fuels is a different approach, which turns the focus into how the current use of fossil within energy systems could be restricted. In this way, it would have a clear effect on citizens as well, forcing to restructure the current energy practices more profoundly.

As taxation of fossil fuels is considered a particularly effective and important climate

policy, we take a closer look at how support for this policy varies across countries. As Figure 6 shows, differences between the countries are rather notable. In Sweden, where opinion towards fossil fuel taxation is viewed most favourably, 61% are in favour and 22% are against such a policy. In Poland, where people are most reluctant to tax fossil fuels, only 15% support the policy while 60% oppose it. Higher taxes on fossil fuels are particularly welcomed in the Nordic countries and Switzerland, where they are generally more supported than they are resisted, unlike in all the other countries. The Former Eastern Bloc nations are more on the rejective side, but generally the country order is rather mixed. Russia is more on the rejective side here (43% against), with particularly large share of neutral responses (34%) and relatively few supportive ones (23%).

Climate and energy dynamics in Russia


Russia makes a particularly interesting case regarding framing climate and energy issues, based on its absence in previous public perception studies of the subject and the overall

importance and impact that Russia has on global climate and energy questions.

Our results show how Russians have relatively high public energy security worries, particularly related to the affordability and availability of energy, giving relatively much importance on the possibility of power cuts and technical failures. In turn, fossil fuel dependency is not considered a very problematic issue, and both fossil and nuclear energy are highly preferred compared to most of the other European countries. Renewable energy sources are also rather supported, but relatively less than in most of the other European countries. So, we see how energy security and preferences are framed somewhat differently than in average in Europe.


Regarding climate issues, the results show how Russians have one of the weakest climate beliefs and concern of all the studied countries. In climate action measures, the subsidies on renewables and ban on the least energy efficient electricity appliances are somewhat supported but still relatively less than in many other countries. However, supporting taxation

Figure 5. Support for climate policy measures (%)



Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents. Missing and DK responses are excluded. Both post-stratification and population-size weights have been applied.

Figure 6: Attitudes towards increasing taxes on fossil fuels (%)



Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents. Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

of fossil fuels and believe in both possible governmental and citizen climate action place Russia notably closer to the country averages than the other studied climate perceptions.

Our findings interestingly show how some of the climate action measures related to efficacy beliefs and economic restriction measure are somewhat 'climate minded'. In other words, it seems that the discrepancy between general climate worry and beliefs and energy preferences is not that notable in Russia when compared to many other European countries.

It can be that there is trust towards the centralist government in framing the energy issues

sufficiently, suggesting that climate questions are not given much importance as such, and the public worry is much more focused on energy security issues. Hence there may be no high expectations concerning stronger climate energy policies, perhaps even vice versa.

Generally, Russian climate perceptions can be considered, nevertheless, rather weak compared to many of the other countries studied here. When this is combined to rather high energy security concerns and fossil fuel preferences, Russian public perceptions can be said to reflect the current national economic and political context quite well: for example, it

is known that environmental questions have not been traditionally prioritised in Russia, and that the Russian energy system is heavily centralised, state-owned and based on utilization of fossil energy, being considered as a cornerstone of national economy, security and also identity (e.g. Oldfield 2017; Aalto et al. 2012).

At the same time there are relatively more climate minded perceptions on climate policy measures and high preference for renewables that leave the floor open also to energy transitions. However, if more acute energy framings related to security worries are not addressed properly, it is questionable whether, seen particularly from citizen perspective, such a transition would occur easily. Furthermore, from a governmental point of view, fossil fuels are likely to be very difficult to replace with any other asset that would bring along similar economic, political and cultural elements of power, at least in the short-term time span.

Conclusions

The ESS module on attitudes towards climate change and energy provides a comprehensive, theoretically grounded cross-European and Russian dataset of public attitudes to climate change, energy security and energy preferences. Particularly when used in combination with national-level context data, the module will be invaluable in seeking to better understand how individual factors, values and national circumstances drive public attitudes towards climate change and preferences for energy supply technologies and energy policies (see e.g. Pohjolainen et al. 2018).

In this topline report, we have presented a selection of key findings from the module data. One key finding is that citizens do worry about energy security beyond affordable supply and generally find dependence on fossil fuels worrisome. Citizens are more concerned about dependence on fossil fuels than they worry about dependence on energy imports, the energy system's vulnerability to interruptions and the reliability of energy supply.

Citizens' preferences for energy supply are clear: people across Europe are in favour of electricity produced from renewable sources and are generally not keen on electricity being produced from fossil sources such as coal and natural gas. However, differences between countries are notable particularly when it comes to preferences for fossil fuels.

A vast majority of Europeans and Russians believe the climate is changing and agree that human activity causes climate change. Citizens across Europe are also concerned about the climate change: in all surveyed countries there are more concerned people than there are people who are not worried about climate change. However, citizens are quite pessimistic about the efforts that governments and other people are taking to reduce climate change.

Highly favourable attitudes towards subsidising renewable energy with public money are prevalent across the surveyed countries. A majority of respondents are also in favour of regulating the market to ban consumer goods that are not energy-efficient. Increasing taxation of fossil fuels appears to be a more controversial means of environmental policy: only a third of respondents are in favour of it. The Nordic countries and Switzerland make an exception here, as they are rather strongly embracing fossil tax measure. These are also countries that are well known for their welfare society systems that are based on, among other things, high social trust and taxation cultures.

Overall, high climate concern and strong preference for both renewables and public subsidies on these energy sources would suggest that public perceptions would not be hindering the sustainable energy transitions in Europe. On the other hand, decreasing the share of fossil energy may be challenging, as national differences in socio-political situations and energy systems may affect preferences for fossil fuels and their taxation. It appears that countries across Europe and Russia have different levels of readiness to instate efficient climate-friendly energy policies, and that in constructing such policies it will be crucial to address the public's energy security concerns.

References / Further reading

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Endnotes / Sources

¹ Further details about the European Social Survey are available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

² This definition comes from the International Energy Agency, see <https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/>

³ The dimensions were measured on a scale of 1=not at all worried to 5=extremely worried, with the following questions:

- 1) Reliability: How worried are you that there may be power cuts in [country]?
- 2) Affordability: How worried are you that energy may be too expensive for many people in [country]?
- 3) Dependency on imports: How worried are you about [country] being too dependent on energy imports from other countries?
- 4) Vulnerability to interruptions: How worried are you that energy supplies could be interrupted... a) by natural disasters or extreme weather, b) by insufficient power being generated, c) by technical failures, d) by terrorist attacks. For the purposes of this report we formed a sum variable of a-d that retains the original 1-5 scale.
- 5) Dependency on fossil fuels: How worried are you about [country] being too dependent on using energy generated by fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal?

⁴ Of the energy sources surveyed here, biomass had the highest share of respondents who reported they had never heard of this energy source. It is also worth noting DK (don't know) responses were generally common for energy preferences in general.

⁵ In ESS8, both efficacy beliefs were measured on a scale ranging from 0=not at all likely to 10=extremely likely. Here, in order to make the results more easily interpretable, we interpret values 0-4 as unlikely, 5 as neutral and 6-10 as likely.

About the ESS

ESS is an academically-driven survey that has been conducted across Europe since 2002. Its dataset contains the results of 381,351 completed interviews undertaken every two years with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations.

The European Social Survey has been a European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ESS ERIC) since 2013. It continues to provide freely available cross-national data about public attitudes and behaviour over time.

ESS topics:

- Trust in institutions
- Political engagement
- Socio-political values
- Moral and social values
- Social capital
- Social exclusion
- National, ethnic and religious identity
- Wellbeing, health and security
- Demographic composition
- Education and occupation
- Financial circumstances
- Household circumstances
- Attitudes to welfare
- Trust in criminal justice
- Expressions and experiences of ageism
- Citizenship, involvement and democracy
- Immigration
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- Economic morality
- The organisation of the life-course
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23 countries participated in Round 8 of the ESS, fielded in 2016/17.

Members:

Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK

Observer:

Switzerland

Other Participants:

Finland, Iceland, Israel, Russia and Spain

Multi-national advisory groups to the ESS ERIC General Assembly are the Methods Advisory Board (MAB), Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) and Finance Committee (FINCOM).

The ESS ERIC Headquarters are located at City, University of London.

The ESS ERIC Core Scientific Team includes: GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (Germany); Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium); NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data (Norway); SCP - The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Netherlands); Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Spain); University of Essex (UK); and University of Ljubljana (Slovenia).

The National Coordinators' (NC) Forum involves national teams from all participating countries.

