English title: Different goods, different effects: exploring the effects of generalized social trust in large-N collective action

Author(s): Kim Mannermar Sønderskov -

Language: English

Type: Journal article

Year: 2009

Abstract

Does generalized social trust help solve large-N collective action problems? This paper argues so, offering a novel explanation for the relationship: People tend to cooperate if they expect others to be cooperating, which implies that people holding generalized social trust more readily cooperate in large-N dilemmas because they expect that most people will cooperate. The paper tests the explanation in a rigorous design. The analyses show a positive, robust effect of generalized social trust on public good provision, but no effect is found in a joint product situation. This supports the hypothesis, indicating that trust specifically enhances cooperation in collective action dilemmas.

Volume: 140

Issue: 1

From page no: 145

To page no: 160

Refereed: Yes

DOI: 10.1007/S11127-009-9416-0

Journal: Public Choice

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