Is this application for a new or a repeat module

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New module</th>
<th>Repeat module X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Proposed title for the Module

Run module on “Europeans’ understandings and evaluations of democracy”

Abstract (Max 250 words)

There are four major changes in European democracies that call for a repeat module on democracy: 1) New political forces have come to ‘storm the democratic stage’; 2) Referendums – the essential instrument of direct democracy – have troubled both the European democracies and the European Union; 3) For many Europeans, the European Union has become the ‘enemy’; and 4) A generation of ‘outraged’ youth has appeared in Europe, as a consequence of the several crises that have affected European democracies.

The European Social Survey is best placed to measure these changes and their implications for European democracy. The first rotating module was fielded in the midst of one of the worst global economic crises, with severe consequences for European democracies (amongst which those we mention above). The repeat module is scheduled in 2020/1, a perfect time span to assess the direction in which democracies are moving following the economic crisis of the early 2010s. By measuring changes in Europeans’ attitudes to democracy within and across countries, the ESS will address one of the most crucial themes of today.

Principal Applicant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mónica Ferrín</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Research fellow</td>
</tr>
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<td>Institution</td>
<td>Collegio Carlo Alberto</td>
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<td>Address for</td>
<td>Piazza Arbarello 8</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Please refer to the application checklist on the reverse before submitting your application.

Checklist for Stage 2 applications for Round 10 QDTs

Please ensure that your application includes:

- A completed Stage 2 application cover sheet - Mark on the cover sheet whether you are applying for a new or repeat module
- The main body of the application (max. 20 sides A4) including sections covering:
  - The rationale for fielding the module on the ESS in 2020/21
  - How the module can be implemented on the ESS
  - Team expertise and experience
  - Dissemination plans
- Bibliographic references (max. 3 sides A4)
- CVs (max. 2 sides A4 each) for up to five proposed QDT members, including contact details

Please also ensure that:

- Your application is in PDF format (other formats will NOT be accepted)
- It is written in Arial font size 11 pt
- Page margins are at least 2cm
- All pages are numbered
- All sections of your application are combined into a single document
- The proposed team includes people from at least three ESS countries (including an ESS ERIC member or observer country)
1. **Rationale**

There are four major changes in European democracies that call for a repeat module on democracy.

1. New political forces have come to ‘storm the democratic stage’ (The Guardian, March 2018). Southern Europe saw the forming and upsurge of Syriza, Podemos, M5S, and Ciudadanos, which profoundly transformed the party systems of their countries; parties that have mobilized based on calls for democratic renewal. Central and Eastern Europe saw the rise of right-wing populist governments, which put into question basic elements of liberal democracy. While the electoral elements remain largely intact, civil rights are curtailed, creating what the Hungarian Prime Minister Orban himself calls an “illiberal democracy”. Some pundits and scholars have indeed come to the conclusion that these countries might be experiencing a ‘backsliding’ of liberal democracy. Many Western European countries, too, have witnessed a surge of populist movements and parties. These parties not only demand policy changes and criticize elites; many of them also lobby a different model of democracy. Key questions are to be answered: Have Europeans’ views of democracy changed since 2012 concomitant with the changes in the context? Do we witness the rise of a new model of democracy among the Europeans? What views of democracy do the supporters of these new political actors adhere to, and to what extent is dissatisfaction with democracy among the citizens the driving force of their votes? 3) Is the optimistic assessment of the citizens’ views of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe that we obtained in 2012 still valid, or do we have to come to a more pessimistic assessment by now?

2. Referendums – the essential instrument of direct democracy – have troubled both the European democracies and the European Union. The 2015 Greek referendum as well as the Brexit referendum are major cases in point, as they produced unprecedented outcomes. The use of the referendum in Catalonia has put referendums under scrutiny again. At the time when populist parties call for direct participation of “the people” in political decision-making, the plebiscitary use of referendums and its non-anticipated outcomes is seriously put into question in the European Union. But how do European citizens see these events? Direct democracy was given high credit in 2012 when ESS Round was fielded: is this still the case today? And who and where is more likely to endorse direct democracy?

3. For many Europeans, the European Union has become the ‘enemy’. While “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2005) and Euroskepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013) are not a new phenomenon, today the EU’s democratic legitimacy seems to have reached a low point (e.g.Laffan 2016; Angelis 2017; Trauner 2016). The EU is indeed being accused of damaging European democracies, but also of being non-democratic itself. Lately, while the EU is trying to impose sanctions to the so-called “illiberal democracies”, Poland and Hungary have further defied the EU by claiming that their voices are not sufficiently heard nor represented at the European level. Considering that the EU is the standard-bearer of democratic values, these attacks might further undermine democratic support among Europeans. Is the liberal democratic consensus indeed dwindling in Europe?

4. A generation of ‘outraged’ youth has appeared in Europe, as a consequence of the several crises that have affected European democracies. There is increasing concern about the fact that younger generations have become alienated from mainstream politics in Europe (Sloam 2014). Some scholars interpret this political estrangement as a sign that there is an increasing decline of support for democracy among younger generations (Foa and Mounk 2016), especially in the countries more affected by the economic crisis (Ferrín 2017). Others portray young Europeans as supporting and willing to participate in the democratic life, but impeded by existing democratic
institutions that leave them out of the system (Cammaerts et al. 2014; Sloam 2014). Whatever the correct interpretation (see the critiques by Alexander and Welzel; Norris; and Voeten 2017 in the Journal of Democracy), the fact is that European democracies are seriously put into question if younger generations are excluded by the political system. A key question is therefore whether a decline in democratic support is taking place among the young and to what extent it is preoccupying.

The European Social Survey is best placed to measure these changes and their implications for European democracy. The first rotating module was fielded in the midst of one of the worst global economic crises, with severe consequences for European democracies (amongst which those we mention above). The repeat module is scheduled in 2020/1, a perfect time span to assess the direction in which democracies are moving following the economic crisis of the early 2010s. By measuring changes in Europeans' attitudes to democracy within and across countries, the ESS will address one of the most crucial themes of today. The assessment of European democracies is indeed at the core agenda of both politicians and scholars, who have become fully aware of the importance of the citizens in supporting democracy (IDEA 2017). From the European Union, a number of actions have been dedicated to increase European citizens' political participation, awareness of the EU institutions, and to address problems of democratic legitimacy (e.g. the “Europe for Citizens” programme 2014-2020; the Rights, Equality and Citizenship programme 2014-2020; Citizens’ Dialogues). H2020 includes a number of programs dedicated to fostering citizenship and improving governance in Europe (Work Programme “Europe in a changing world – Inclusive, innovative and reflective societies – e.g. the call H2020-SC6-GOVERNANCE-2018-2019-2020 – includes a forthcoming topic on Trust in governance). The OECD has also pointed to the citizens’ trust in institutions as one of the main drivers of democratic governance throughout the world (OECD 2017) and even the World Bank has elaborated a strategic framework for mainstreaming citizens’ engagement (Manroth et al. 2014). European National governments also have to address citizens’ discontent with their democratic systems. The academic community echoes these concerns and a large number of studies has been published on Europeans’ support for democracy. Within this context, we expect at least four main contributions from the repeat module. We expect the repeat module

- to provide answers to key questions relevant to scholars and policy makers alike, as described in the previous paragraphs.
- to address one of the major shortcomings in current research on support for democracy: the lack of a stable and consistent set of indicators to measure citizens’ attitudes on democracy across time (Magalhaes 2018; van Ham et al. 2017). This will lead to more reliable conclusions about citizens’ support for democracy and its behavioural consequences than hitherto possible.
- to contribute theoretically and empirically to the current academic debate on populism. The ESS Round 6 module was mainly focused on the model of liberal democracy, with added items on social democracy and direct democracy. We intend to further expand the theoretical framework to include ‘competing’ views of democracy, in particular those advocated by the populist actors.
- to contribute to survey methodology. So far, repeated measures of democratic support have been limited to the classic ‘satisfaction with democracy’ single indicator, which has proved to be problematic for both cross-country and cross-individual comparison (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001; Linde and Ekman 2003; Ferrin 2016). Repeating the democracy module will allow for double-checking the validity of the indicators used in ESS Round 6. Ultimately, this could set the ground for proposing a set of multi-item indicators that could be established in the future as ‘standard’ measures of support for democracy (in the ESS core or elsewhere), in the long run potentially complementing/replacing the classic measures that have proved to be problematic.
to contribute to the political debate on the future of democracy in Europe. ESS Round 6 on
democracy has had high political impact (ESS ERIC Impact Study 2017). Considering the
changes occurred in Europe since 2012, the repeat module is likely to take centre stage to
an ever greater degree in the European debate.

2. Theoretical approach

The ESS Round 6 module on democracy (ESS-6 from now on) introduced and combined two
theoretical innovations: the distinction between views (‘how democracy should be’) and
evaluations of democracy (‘how democracy actually is’); and the use of a multidimensional concept
of democracy, encompassing a large set of democratic attributes. This theoretical frame has
proven to be fruitful to provide a better understanding of Europeans’ views and evaluations of
democracy. It has contributed both to the literature on the quality of democracy and to the
literature on political support. The repeat module will replicate the same theoretical framework,
expanding on ESS-6.

Briefly referring to the Question Module Design Template of ESS Round 6, our theoretical
framework derived from a critical review of the classic Eastonian concept of political support
(Easton 1965, 1975) and later developments of the concept (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999, 2011). In
particular, we attempted to provide conceptual and measurement clarity in relation to the two main
problems of the concept of democratic support: the distinction between diffuse and specific
support; and the ambiguity of the concept of democracy. Norris (1999) resolved the problem of
distinguishing between diffuse and specific support by affirming that diffuse support is the ‘idea of
democracy’; while specific support refers to the ‘evaluations of democracy’. In a further step, she
uses the concepts of ‘aspirations’ and ‘evaluations’ in a similar way (Norris 2011). Building on her
work, we have distinguished between views and evaluations of democracy, which we believe are
much easier to identify empirically. “Views of democracy refer to the citizens’ normative ideal of
democracy, their ideas about what democracy should be. Evaluations of democracy, instead, refer
to citizens’ assessment of the way the democratic principles have been implemented in their own
country.[…] it is the comparison between the democratic ideals and the actual functioning of
democracy that makes for a judgment of a democratic regime” (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016,10).

Regarding the ambiguity of the concept of democracy, we have addressed the existing critique
related to the assumption that citizens might have different conceptions of democracy (Schedler
and Sarsfield 2007; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Bratton 2010), which previous
indicators of democratic support did not take into account. We therefore provided a precise
definition of democracy with a set of dimensions and sub-dimensions. This allowed not only to
come up with a set of indicators that fully matched the theoretical frame, but also to capture
different notions and evaluations of democracy among the Europeans. The empirical analysis of
ESS-6 has provided further refinement of our concept of democracy, by clearly distinguishing three
models of democracy the Europeans endorse (and combine): the liberal model, the social model
and the direct democracy model.

This proposal builds upon this theoretical framework, but expands on the concept of democracy, in
order to include ‘competing’ views of democracy. We hence address an issue that we were not
able to tackle with ESS Round 6: the fact that citizens might affirm democratic principles and yet at
the same time be supportive of non-democratic values (and vote for populist parties, for example)
(see Magalhaes 2018 for a similar critique). In order to do so, we re-evaluate the three democratic
models in the light of the existing trade-offs that are inherent in any democracy (Boschler and
Kriesi 2013).
2.1 The liberal model of democracy expanded by ‘competing’ views of democracy

Liberal democracies are indeed characterized by trade-offs between the principle of freedom, and the principles of political equality and popular sovereignty; or between the liberal and the electoral process components of liberal democracy. As an example, on one side of the trade-off we can find the desirable property of governments and political leaders being fully responsive to the interests and the "will of the people"; whereas on the other side of these trade-offs we find other desirable features that might limit and constrain governments’ responsiveness and popular sovereignty such as the rule of law, or the protection of minorities’ rights. Populists tend to exploit these trade-offs that are inherent to contemporary liberal democracies to propose ‘competing’ models of democracy (Canovan 1999, 2004).

Three elements in particular are common in the populist discourse and impose a number of trade-offs between different democratic dimensions: people-centrism, anti-elitism and unrestricted popular sovereignty (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). Populists have a radical conception of “the people”, who is understood as homogeneous, pure and virtuous. “The people” embody the general will and exercise popular sovereignty without any limit. Antithetic to “the people” is the elite, a corrupt minority that holds most power positions in society and works solely for their own benefit. Implied is yet another characteristic common to populist parties: anti-pluralism. Since “the people” embody the general will, there is no room in the populist views for the existence of a variety of interests and/or social and political groups in society. These elements constitute the basis of the populist critique to the liberal model of democracy (and to mainstream parties as its main representatives), which is framed as the “tension between the power of the people on the one hand (the popular/populist will), and, on the other, the constitutionalist provisions which protect the citizen from the government, and the arbitrary exercise of power” (Meny and Surel 2001, 8). Populists exploit therefore one of the main democratic trade-offs, namely, that between responsiveness and responsibility (Mair 2013), and question the model of liberal representative democracy.

Populists contest European democracies as strict defenders of “democracy by the people” (Mény and Surel 2000; Meny and Surel 2002). As a consequence, the populist model of democracy is characterized by an extreme view of vertical accountability, where only voters can hold politicians accountable and, at the same time, decision-makers fully explain and justify all their actions and decisions to citizens. As a consequence, this view of democracy disregards fundamental liberal principles like horizontal accountability mechanisms or ‘checks and balances’ and denies the possibility that decision-makers can be held accountable by stakeholders other than citizens. Populists advocate extreme responsiveness, against mainstream political parties whose responsible acts do not respond to “the people” general will (Mair 2002, 2009, 2013). The populist model of democracy has indeed a restricted view on who should be represented: “the people” and its general will are the sole genuine subject of representation; contradicting the pluralist model of democracy, by which all different interests in society (including different minority groups) have to be represented in parliament. This contradiction is inherent in the trade-off between majority vs. proportional representation. A restricted view of representation applies also to the agent of representation: populists, in their ideal conception of the people combined with their anti-elitism, oppose “the people” to the elites as representatives. Whereas in liberal democracies representation is put in the hands of an elite selected through competition, populists advocate direct representation by the people (see below on direct democracy). In a sense, this contradiction reflects the classic distinction between the trustee vs. the delegate model of representation (Eulau et al. 1959). The trustee model, by which a group of “enlightened/expert” trustees puts into practice what is best for society, contradicts the delegate model whereby the representative should clearly act as delegate of “the people”, representing the common will in the parliament.
Table 1 The liberal democracy model and its trade-offs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION*</th>
<th>TRADE-OFFS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law (RL):</td>
<td>Rule of law vs. responsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the enforcement of legal norms.[…] the capacity, even if limited, of authorities to enforce the law”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom (F):</td>
<td>Vertical accountability (control by “the people”) vs. Horizontal accountability (control by the institutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“set of rights and liberties available to the citizens in a given society. […] which should be equal for everybody.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical Accountability (VA):</td>
<td>Horizontal accountability (control by the institutions) vs. Vertical accountability (control by “the people”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the mechanism through which the people control their representatives, and the obligation of the representatives to be responsible to the citizenry for their actions.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal accountability (HA):</td>
<td>Horizontal accountability (control by the institutions) vs. Vertical accountability (control by “the people”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the obligation of the elected political leaders to ‘account’, to be responsible, to answer for their political decisions to other institutions or collective actors”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness (RESP):</td>
<td>Responsiveness (the will of the people) vs. Representation (the elites – responsibility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the mechanism through which politicians take into account citizens interests and desires.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation (REPR):</td>
<td>Representation (the elites – responsibility) vs. Responsiveness (the will of the people)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| “the translation of votes into policies that represent people’s choices. It is the inclusion of citizens’ preferences into the political arena.” | Delegate model vs. trustee model  
Majority vs. proportional |
| Competition (C):                        | One common interest vs. different interests      |
| “Competition guarantees that elections are free, open, and fair; and that the leaders are successfully replaced in the government.” |                                                |

*Definitions are taken from the Question Module Design Template of ESS Round 6

2.2 The social model of democracy: promoting social justice

The social model of democracy takes as its point of departure the classic Marshallian view that the state has social responsibilities for its citizens, namely to ensure a minimum of social welfare. This view has been taken to include social equality (SE) as a dimension of democracy, based on the fact that, in order to be politically equal, social and economic differences ought to be reduced to a minimum (O’Donnell 2004). The fundamental dimension of the social model of democracy is social equality, which is defined as “the elimination of social and economic differences that would stand in the way of the exercise of political equality.” (Question Module Design Template of ESS-6). Equality is composed of two sub-dimensions, namely 1) the reduction of social differences among the citizens (social equality); and 2) the guarantee of a minimal standard of living to all citizens (economic security). In the repeat module, we would like to add a new sub-dimension that takes into account the sharp economic crisis that has affected most European democracies and the extent to which democracy was unable to avoid and/or confine the crisis (which is at the root of most citizens’ discontent with democracy). The third sub-dimension builds on the idea that for an
effectively working, just and transparent democracy one needs to have a set of socially approved and formally legitimized set of norms, rules and procedures that control wild market forces (Linz and Stepan 1996). Economic governance guarantees that the government is able to limit the adverse economic consequences derived from the market to its citizens.

2.3 The direct democracy model: expanding citizens’ participation

Finally, the direct democracy model focuses on the participation dimension (PAR), that is to say, “the entire set of behaviours [...] that allows women and men, as individuals or group, to create, revive or strengthen a group identification or try to influence the recruitment of and decisions by political authorities” (Question Module Design Template of ESS-6). The referendum, in this case, is the instrument that is more often put into force so that citizens take political decisions directly. The direct democracy model is expanded in the repeat module, such as to include ‘competing’ views of democracy. In particular, we consider the fact that populists frequently advocate for unrestrained and unmediated democracies where the people are fully sovereign to decide directly on most policies through direct democracy, and decision-makers are fully responsive to the interests of the people. “Populist actors usually support the implementation of direct democratic mechanisms, such as referenda and plebiscites. [...] Hence, it can be argued that an elective affinity exists between populism and direct democracy, as well as other institutional mechanisms that are helpful to cultivate a direct relationship between the populist leader and his/her constituencies. To put it another way, one of the practical consequences of populism is the strategic promotion of institutions that enable the construction of the presumed general will.” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 17). In order to take care of this, we include an additional sub-dimension to capture the trade-off of “the people” vs. the politicians taking decisions.

3. Implementation

3.1 Basic design of the module

The design of the ESS-6 proved to be adequate to measure Europeans’ understandings and evaluations of democracy. Despite the complexity of the concept of democracy, analysis of the data showed that the items provided reliable and comparable measures of individuals’ views and evaluations of democracy. There are a number of findings that speak for the quality of the data:

- The consistency of democratic views across Europe: with little deviations, there is a shared (and hierarchical) understanding of liberal democracy among Europeans (Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta 2016). The same scale (views) of liberal democracy is found in each and every one of the countries sampled by the module.
- There is a strong correlation between Europeans’ evaluations of the different attributes of democracy and expert evaluations of democracy (World Bank data, Democracy Barometer, etc.) (Kriesi and Saris 2016).
- The data allowed for an empirical assessment of the classic indicators of support for democracy (Alonso 2016; Ferrin 2016).
- ESS Round 6 data allowed for a clear theory and systematic measure of democratic legitimacy (Wessels 2016)

Based on these findings, we intend to use the same empirical design in the repeat module. As such, for each of the sub-dimensions of democracy we will use two items, one for views and another for evaluations:
VIEWS ITEMS:

*Using this card, please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in general, that…*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all important for democracy in general</th>
<th>Extremely important for democracy in general</th>
<th>(Don’t know)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>04</td>
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<td>06</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EVALUATIONS ITEMS:

*Using this card, please tell me to what extent you think each of the following statements applies in [country]*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does not apply at all</th>
<th>Applies completely</th>
<th>(Don’t know)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
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<td>02</td>
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<tr>
<td>03</td>
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<td>08</td>
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<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Difficulties of ESS-6

We are however aware of a number of problems of ESS-6 items, which we would like to reflect upon and avoid in the repeat module.

**Satisficing**: Because of the high normative load of the concept of democracy, a problem of the views items in ESS-6 is satisficing\(^1\). The mean importance of almost all views items is above 8, and variance is relatively low both within and across countries. The strategy of Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta (2016) has partially solved this problem from an analytical point of view (Kriesi et al. dichotomize the 11-points scale, such as 0 equals 0-9, and 1 equals 10). The resulting scales (liberal democracy, social democracy, and direct democracy scales) are empirically robust and compare well cross-nationally, and we are therefore happy with this solution. Yet the use of the original scales is somewhat problematic due to the lack of variance. Due to the centrality of the 11-points scales in our module, this is a concern we would like to raise for advice to CST. A potential solution we can think of is to further emphasize the introduction of the views items such as to remind the interviewees that “There are no right or wrong answers so please just tell me what you think.” (part of the introduction to the views items in the ESS-6). We also propose to include a single choice item in the repeat module, so that respondents choose the most essential characteristic of democracy (see below). This item would potentially allow for weighting of the importance items.

**The trade-off format.** For a number of items we have chosen a different format, as they deal with sub-dimensions of democracy that imply a theoretical trade-off. Respondents are first presented with a forced-choice question that requires them to choose between two opposing alternatives. This question filters the respondents into two groups that are routed to answer the views and evaluation items of the option they have chosen:

\(^1\) As 11-points scales in general, the views items suffer also from over-reporting, as respondents tend to use extreme values when answering survey questions (see Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta 2016, footnote 9, page 74).
Apart from a better theoretical matching, this format has the advantage of reducing satisficing and over-reporting in the views items. There are however two problems we ought to address. Firstly, the number of missing cases – either because people choose the category “it depends” or because they do not answer (DK, refusal and no answer) – is very high for some items (range of missing data is 14.4-17.2%), especially in some countries (more than 30% missing cases in most Central and Eastern European countries). Secondly, these items cannot be combined with the other three scales, since the pattern of answers is totally different due to the format. Although there are alternative ways in which these items can be used in combination with the other three scales (see, for example Linde and Peters 2018; Rosset, Giger, and Bernauer 2016), the fact is that these items tend to be less used. Being aware of these problems we still would like to keep at least of the trade-off items, which we believe is relevant from a theoretical point of view (see below). We would however like to do further testing, and eventually propose an experiment for pre-testing, to ensure methodological quality.

**Data quality varies across countries.** Considering that the ESS is expanding geographically, we would like to propose a close scrutiny of ESS-6 such as to detect potential fieldwork solutions for the cases that have proven to be more problematic in terms of item non-response or satisficing.

### 3.3 Changes in the repeat module

Considering what we have learnt from ESS Round 6 and the new questions that have arose since 2012, we propose a number of changes for the repeat module: 1) Reduce the liberal democracy items to the core, based on the results of ESS round 6, to have space for the addendums; 2) Introduce additional items for ‘competing’ views of democracy; 3) Introduce additional items for social and direct and participatory democracy; 4) Introduce an additional item on the most important aspects of democracy, to correct for satisficing.
We justify each of these changes in detail in the following lines. But a note is needed before we start, due to the strict limits imposed by ESS for Round 10. ESS-6 counted 41 items (two of them included in the core questionnaire). Considering that the number of items is now limited to 30 items, we had to reduce substantially the number of items such as to include a few new ones.\(^2\) We believe we have successfully managed to reduce the number of items without excessive costs in terms of loss of information. We are however very open to the suggestions of ESS CST on this issue.

3.3.1 *Reducing the liberal democracy items to the core*

The liberal democracy scale resulting from ESS-6 was composed of 12 items. We propose to reduce the number of items of the liberal dimension to 6, based on the following criteria (ordered by importance)\(^3\):

**Criteria 1**: To ensure conceptual and empirical consistency. At least one item per dimension is included. Empirically, we have tested that the new liberal democracy scale has also good fit, considering that there is sufficient variance in the degree of difficulty of the items included in the scale (Table 2 in compares the fit of the original scale with the new one – Mokken scaling with the dichotomous items as in Kriesi et al. 2016).

**Criteria 2**: To avoid empirical redundancy of the items. Some items are both conceptually (they belong to the same sub-dimension) and empirically (there is a strong correlation between them) very close. Of each pair of items with correlation $\geq 0.50$, we have dropped one of them. Criteria 1 has however primacy over criteria 2, so that only items that did not endanger conceptual and empirical consistency have been dropped.

**Criteria 3**: To ensure comparability of the items across countries.

**Criteria 4**: To limit item non-response. Some of the items had high non-response rates. Within the limits of criteria 1 to 3, we have dropped items with DK higher than 7%.

Table 2 shows the original (column 2) and reduced scale (column 4), and the reasons for dropping each of the items in the repeat module.

\(^2\) For this reason, we have not been able to include an additional item on the EU level, as proposed in Stage 1.

\(^3\) It is mostly the views items that drive the selection of the items, to ensure conceptual consistency.

\(^4\) Exceptions are not noted here.
Table 2 The liberal democracy model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>ESS-61</th>
<th>%2</th>
<th>Repeat Module</th>
<th>Reasons for dropping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RL</td>
<td>E10. that the courts treat everyone the same</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>E1. that national elections are free and fair</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>E11. that the courts are able to stop the government acting beyond its authority</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>E6. that the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Empirical redundancy (E1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>E14. that the government explains its decisions to voters</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Empirical redundancy (E12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>E12. that governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job5</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPR</td>
<td>E7. that the rights of minority groups are protected</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>E5. that the media are free to criticize the government</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Empirical redundancy (E1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>E4. that opposition parties are free to criticize the government</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Empirical redundancy (E1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>E3. that different parties offer clear alternatives to one another</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>E2. that voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Lack of cross-national comparability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPR</td>
<td>E16. that politicians take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>DK high. Lack of cross-national comparability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>54.673</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loevinger H</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach’s α</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Only the views items are detailed in the table
2 Position in the hierarchy

3.3.2 Introducing additional items for ‘competing’ views of democracy

Relevant research has been conducted on the measurement of citizens’ populist attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Akkerman, Zaslove, and Spruyt 2017; Castanho Silva et al. Forthcoming; Schulz et al. 2017; Steiner and Landwehr 2018). Building on these attempts, we propose to include one new item to uncover populist views of democracy. We propose two

5 E14 (that the government explains its decisions to its voters) could be used as an alternative to this item.
alternative wordings for the item, based on previous findings. Here we count with the experience of two members of the team, who have tested a large number of items (including those of Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; and Schulz et al. 2017) in more than 10 countries (Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States). We would however need to pre-test the new item to adapt it to the format of the repeat module and ensure cross-country comparability. The populist model of democracy is a combination of the new item and the items on responsiveness (E36-E40) and the items on the type of representation (E41-E45). If it is possible in terms of space constraints and data quality, we would like to keep the trade-off format of E36-E40 (responsiveness), as it uncovers one of the core populist trade-offs. We propose an alternative wording for E41-E45 (representation), with the standard format of the module (see Table 3).

Table 3 The populist democracy model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REPR</td>
<td>repr(_\text{new}) that there is a large majority for a policy decision (GESIS 2017; Steiner and Landwehr 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESP</td>
<td>E36-E40. The government should change its planned policies in response to what most people think VS. The government should stick to its planned policies regardless of what most people think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESP</td>
<td>pop(<em>\text{newa}) that the politicians follow the will of the people (similar to Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; and Schulz et al. 2017) pop(</em>\text{newb}) that the politicians always listen closely to the problems of the people (similar to Castanho Silva et al. Forthcoming)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.3 Introducing additional items to the social and direct democracy scales

Considering the extended theoretical framework, we propose repeat E13 and E15 of the social democracy model and add one more item to the scale. The direct democracy model is composed by E8 and a new item. Tables 4 and 5 present the two models.

Table 4 The social democracy model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>E15. that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>E13. that the government protects all citizens against poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>se(_\text{new}) that the government is able to respond to the economic needs of the country (without any constraints)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The ESS core contains the same item (B26 in ESS-6), with a 5-points scale. For the sake of comparability, we would like to keep E15 and the 11-points scale.
Table 5 The direct democracy model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>that the people and not the politicians make our most important policy decisions (similar to Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Schulz et al. 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly on referendums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.4 Introducing an additional item on the most important aspect of democracy to weight the views items

We propose to include a new item that asks respondents to choose the dimension of democracy they consider is essential in a democracy. We believe this item will allow 1) correcting for satisficing and over-reporting of the views items; and 2) providing an additional tool to test the validity of the items in ESS-6.

Table 6 presents several examples that have been used with similar purposes in national and cross-national surveys, with different formats, wordings, and response categories. Each of these items has advantages and disadvantages, and some of them have a high degree of difficulty for the respondents. We therefore would rely on the advice of the ESS CST for selecting this item (and possibly also pre-testing it). There are two main aspects that need to be taken into account: 1) the number of response categories offered to the respondents; and 2) where the item is introduced in the questionnaire. As for the number of response categories, there is a trade-off between the number of categories that can be offered to the respondents in order to keep the task relatively easy, and the ideal number of dimensions we would like to ask about.6 Regarding the position of the item in the questionnaire, special attention ought to be paid so that it neither contaminates the answers of the repeat module nor it gets influenced by the previous questions.

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6 A potential way to solve this trade-off is to offer to the respondent only the dimensions he/she has given importance ‘10’ in the views items. However, this solution is also problematic if the respondent has scored 10 many items. In that case, CAPI would be needed in all countries.
Table 6 Examples of the most important aspect of democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>Response categories</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In few words, what does democracy mean for you? (open-ended)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>LAPOP 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People often differ in their views on the characteristics which are important for a democracy. If you only choose one of the characteristics on the list, which one would you choose as most essential to a democracy (closed-ended, 1 response only)</td>
<td>12 response categories</td>
<td>Global barometer waves 1 &amp; 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People often have different viewpoints regarding the most important features of democracy. From this list, choose the feature that you think is the most important in a democracy. (closed-ended, 1 response only)</td>
<td>6 response categories</td>
<td>Spain: CIS 2701; 2790. Portugal: SEDES 2009 (Magalhaes 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We’d like to ask you about some things that are important for our society, such as... All five of these ideas are important, but sometimes we have to choose between what is more important and what is less important. On the next few screens, we will show you these ideas in sets of three. For each set, please use the mouse to indicate the idea that you think is most important of the three, and also the idea that you think is least important of the three (closed-ended, pairwise choice)</td>
<td>5 response categories (Note: a definition is provided for each category)</td>
<td>Ciuk and Jacoby 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.5 Additional changes in the repeat module, final list of items and complementarity with the ESS core questionnaire and ESS multilevel data

The freedom dimension was measured by a trade-off item in ESS Round 6 (E31-E35). In order to free space and considering the problems related to the trade-off items discussed above, we propose to use only items E34 and E35 – with the option “those who hold extreme political views should be prevented from expressing them openly” – in the repeat module. 16.4% of respondents of ESS-6 have chosen this option in the forced-choice question (E31). This group of respondents is significantly less supportive of democracy than the respondents who are in favour of complete freedom of expression. We expect therefore that the views item will not only capture the extent to which respondents consider that freedom is important in a democracy, but also illiberal conceptions of democracy.

In addition, we propose to drop E9 – on immigrants’ right to vote – for two reasons. First, it has the highest item non-response (with the exception of E16, see Table 2) of all views’ items, something we already anticipated, and that prevented us from including the corresponding evaluation item in...
ESS-6. Second, the ESS core contains a set of items on attitudes to migrants that – especially considering the relevance of the topic for the populist parties – proxies quite well respondents’ attitudes to the immigrants’ inclusiveness in the system.7

Due to space constraints, we feel obliged to drop B18b and B18c (these two items were included in the core questionnaire in ESS-6) in the repeat module. Panel data from the Spanish case (Torcal, Martini, and Serani 2016) seem to suggest that these two items perform better than the classic indicators in measuring support for the idea of democracy in general. However, to meet the 30-items limit, we have decided not to repeat these items. Table 7 presents the complete list of items of the repeat module (31)

Table 7 Final list of items of the repeat module

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repeat items</th>
<th>Applicable equivalent items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1/E17.That national elections are free and fair</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3/E19.That different parties offer clear alternatives to one another</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7/E23.That the rights of minority groups are protected</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8/E24.That citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly on referendums</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E10/E25.That the courts treat everyone the same</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E11.That the courts are able to stop the government acting beyond its authority</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E12/E26.That governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E13/E27.That the government protects all citizens against poverty</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E15/E29.That the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E36-40.The government should change its planned policies in response to what most people think vs. The government should stick to its planned policies regardless of what most people think/</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partially repeat items and new items</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fnew.Those who hold extreme political views should be prevented from expressing them openly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reprnew.That there is a large majority for a policy decision</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>popnew-that the politicians follow the will of the people</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>popnewb.- that the politicians always listen closely to the problems of the people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>senew.- that the government is able to respond to the economic needs of the country (without any constraints)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parnew.- that the people and not the politicians make our most important policy decisions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most essential characteristic of democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total partially repeat and new items</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total repeat items</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total partially repeat and new items</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NUMBER OF ITEMS OF THE REPEAT MODULE</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 A preliminary analysis confirms indeed that E9 is related B29-B30 of ESS-6, two of the items on attitudes to migrants. By face-validity, the new items on migration included in ESS-8 (see Table 8) are even closer to E9 than B29-B30 of ESS-6.
Finally, Table 8 includes the items of the ESS core questionnaire that contribute to our module. Apart from the migration items mentioned above (C33-C44), there are other items in the ESS core that fit perfectly well the repeat module. B2 to B5 tap into political efficacy, which comes close theoretically to anti-elitism, one of the elements of the populist discourse. Similar items have in fact been used as a measure of anti-elitist attitudes (Castanho Silva et al. Forthcoming; Schulz et al. 2017). We expect therefore these items to be linked to (and complement) the populist model of democracy. Items B6 to B12 measure trust in institutions, a basic (in)dependent variable in our study. Items B13 to B22 refer to different forms of political participation, fundamental to observe whether changes in democratic attitudes relate to changes in political participation. Items B23 to B25 constitute a major discriminant variable in our project, as they provide information about the party respondents feel closer to. Finally, B30 is the classic “satisfaction with democracy” indicator. The number of items included in Table 8 indicates that there is high complementarity between the repeat module and the ESS core questionnaire. Table 8 includes also the type of ESS multilevel data we will benefit the most for the analysis of ESS-10, in order to explain changes in democratic attitudes across time and contexts. In addition to that are needed in order to measure change in democratic attitudes across different contexts. In addition to those referred to in Table 8, we would like to collect detailed macro data of the party system.

Table 8 Complementarity of the repeat module with the ESS core

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESS core</th>
<th>ESS multilevel data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B2. How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3. How able do you think you are to take an active role in a group involved with political issues?</td>
<td>Composite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4. And how much would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like you to have an influence on politics?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5. And how confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6-B12 How much do you personally trust each of the institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B13 Did you vote in last [country] national election?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B15-B22 During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Political participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B23 Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B24 Which one?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B25 How close do you feel to this party?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B30 Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C33. How important do you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here? … have good educational qualifications?*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34. How important do you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here? … come from a Christian background?*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C35. How important do you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here? … have work skills that [country] needs*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C42. The government should be generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C43. Most applicants for refugee status aren’t in real fear of persecution 64 in their own countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C44. Refugees whose applications are granted should be entitled to bring in their close family members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Institutions
* Plus variations of C36 to C41
Note: all questions from the core questionnaire are taken from ESS Round 8

3.3.6 Potential problems of the repeat module

We have already addressed throughout the text some of the difficulties of the repeat module. Let us address here two additional potential risks. The first one is that relevant information is lost by dropping some of the items of ESS-6. Our analyses suggest that this is not the case for the liberal democracy scale, but we would like to hear the opinion of CST on this issue. The second risk is that changes are so profound that democratic scales cannot be compared across the two rounds (this notwithstanding, we still will be able to compare the items separately, so the risk becomes relatively little). Although this is a potential risk, we believe that in itself this result would be a relevant finding that could be interpreted in two ways: either citizens’ attitudes to democracy are not as stable as suggested by previous literature or there has been an amazing change in how Europeans view democracy.

4. Team expertise and experience

The team is composed of a group of excellent scholars with large experience in designing, and analysing survey data on public opinion and political participation. With a few exceptions related to conflicting interests, the original team is applying again for a repeat module, with a few new names that add expertise on the measurement of populist attitudes. Even if only five applicants are formally signing the petition (see attached CVs), all members of the team have a record of collaborating as a team with ESS Round 6 and are committed to the proposal. The team is composed by 16 scholars of different nationality, which contributes to add on geographical expertise to the project.

Besir Ceka (Davidson College) is about to embark on a new book project on trust in institutions in Europe based on a multi-faceted application of the concept of relative deprivation. Recently he co-authored a paper with Pedro Magalhães entitled “Do the Rich and the Poor Have Different Conceptions of Democracy? Socioeconomic Status, Inequality, and the Political Status Quo” which is under review. Methodologically, most of his work has used multilevel modelling with survey data, so his research experience would be well suited to analysing the data from the repeat module.

Mark N. Franklin is Professor Emeritus at Trinity College Connecticut. A past Fulbright Scholar and Guggenheim Fellow, he has published some twenty books and scores of high-profile chapters and articles on such matters as representation, political economy, and the behaviours and attitudes of elites and mass publics. He will bring a lifetime of experience to the project, especially his expertise in dynamic modelling of complex causal processes.

Radoslaw Markowski is professor of political science in the Center for the Study of Democracy (Director) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, and PI of the Polish National Election Study. He specializes in comparative politics, democracy/democratization, party systems and electoral studies. He has published extensively in peer reviewed journals, among other in Electoral Studies, Party Politics, Political Studies.

Sergio Martini is currently Research Fellow at the “Research and Expertise Centre for Survey Methodology” and a member of the “Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences” research group at the same University. He specializes in public opinion formation, comparative political behaviour and methodology, in particular survey and experimental methods. He has participated in
several projects concerned with the design and collection of panel survey data and survey experiments on political attitudes and voting behaviours in Southern European countries (e.g. CiuPanel).

**Leonardo Morlino** is professor and director of the International centre on Democracy and Democratization at LUISS (Rome). He is one of the leading scholars in democratic theory and democratic quality, and has played a major role in involving Italy in ESS-6.

**Irene Palacios** has recently defended a thesis entitled ‘Making Democratic Attitudes Work: The effect of institutions on Europeans’ aspirations and evaluations of democracy’ at the European University Institute (Florence). Using the ESS-6 module of questions, in the thesis she elaborates a comprehensive framework on the multifaceted connections that exist between institutions and individuals’ democratic aspirations and evaluations of democracy. The thesis constitutes the most detailed study combining institutional and attitudinal characteristics that exists up to now, and its results are currently under revision in top academic journals.

**Pedro Riera** is an associate professor at the Department of Social Sciences of the University Carlos III of Madrid since 2017. His research interests include political institutions, electoral behaviour, comparative politics, quantitative methods, and political attitudes. His research has been published in *Comparative Politics, European Journal of Political Research, West European Politics, Political Behavior, and Party Politics*, among others. He has collaborated in the elaboration of other mass surveys before and he has a long record of publications that use survey data.

**Willem Saris** has taught at the University of Amsterdam (1983-2006), the ESADE School of Business (2005-2009), and Universitat Pompeu Fabra (since 2009). His main specializations are structural equation modelling and the methodology of survey research, fields in which he has published extensively. As a member of the central coordinating team of the European Social Survey he became laureate of the Descartes Research Prize in 2005 for the best scientific collaborative research. In 2009 he received the Helen Dinerman award from the World Association of Public Opinion Research (WAPOR), in recognition to his lifelong contributions to the methodology of public opinion research. He was awarded the European Survey Research Association’s "2013 Outstanding Service Prize" at ESRA's last Conference that took place in Ljubljana, on July 2013.

**Mariano Torcal** is the current President of the Spanish ESS National Commission. Spanish National Coordinator of the ESS between 2002-2012, Co-director of RECSM, Member of the Scientific Commission of the Comparative Survey “Las Américas y el Mundo 2010” (CIDE, Mexico), Member of the 2016/17 LAPOP AmericasBarometer Planning Caucus, PI of different national survey projects in Spain, and active collaborator of other Comparative Survey Projects such as the Comparative National Election Project (CNEP). He was a contributor in the collaborative effort to design the Democracy module of the ESS6, from which he has produced various scholarly outputs.

**Alexander Trechsel** has held the Swiss Chair in Federalism and Democracy at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. From 2012 to 2015, he was Faculty Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University and a Faculty Associate there since 2015. Since the autumn term of 2016, he works as full professor for political science at the University of Lucerne. He coordinated the European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the EUI, one of the first observatories of democracy in Europe.
Bernhard Weßels is professor of political science at Humboldt University Berlin and deputy director of the research unit "Democracy and Democratization" at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. He is project director of the German Longitudinal Election Study and of MARPOR, the manifesto project, and a number of smaller projects. He has widely published on attitudes and political behavior and was team member of the democracy module of the ESS 2010. His research focuses mainly on changing patterns and problems of democratic legitimacy and right-wing populism.

5. Dissemination

Considering the nature of the topic of the repeat module, the dissemination plan has two key objectives: 1) to raise awareness about the importance of the role of the citizens in European democracies, and hence to engage the public in the democratic debate; and 2) to reach a large number of publics. Accordingly, the dissemination strategy envisages different types of activities, and it is organized around four target audiences: the research and scientific community; the political actors and stakeholders; the European youth; and the wider public. In order to maximise the impact of the findings, we would like to coordinate the different activities with ESS ERIC. We briefly described the planned activities for each of the target groups and the expected timeline:

Target group 1: Research and scientific community
1. To publish an edited repeat volume that will focus on changes of democratic attitudes over time, following the publication with Oxford University Press on *How Europeans view and evaluate democracy* (edited by Ferrín and Kriesi) (expected date: 2023).
2. To submit at least one publication in a high impact academic journal (expected date: 2022). In addition, considering the number and quality of the research team members, we expect that the number of publications using ESS-10 data in top scientific journals will be substantial, as the record of publications with ESS Round 6 module data attests.
3. To use ESS-10 data to teach. ESS-6 data have been extensively used in teaching at university. The geographical spread of the research team is even greater now than in 2012, which will allow reaching a larger number of students (expected date: after ESS-10 data become available).
4. To organize a session at the ESS Conference, to foster visibility of the module amongst the academic community (expected date: 2022)
5. To organize a session for the ECPR Joint Sessions on the topic (expected date: 2023)

Target group 2: Political actors and stakeholders
1. To present the findings of ESS-10 in the EP and national parliaments. Findings from ESS Round 6 were presented in the European Parliament and in several national parliaments. We plan to repeat the experience with ESS Round 10, ideally increasing the visibility of these events, in cooperation with ESS ERIC. (expected date: 2022/2023)
2. To organize an event in coordination with OECD to show up the main findings of ESS-10. The PI has been highly involved in disseminating ESS-6 results to international organizations such as OECD and World Bank. She is currently member of the OECD expert group advising on the measurement of trust. The event shall be organized in collaboration with ESS ERIC also (expected date: 2023).

Target group 3: The European youth
1. To start-up the project “Democracy at school” (tentative title), with ESS-10 as the main tool. The PI is already in contact with school teachers from five EU member states, who are
willing to launch the project through eTwinning (https://www.etwinning.net/en/pub/about.htm) (expected time: 2024).

2. To propose the organization of an event with DG Education, Youth, Sport and Culture. We are aware that this proposal might be unrealistic. Yet, considering that the repeat module addresses one of the main concerns reported by the European Youth Strategy 2019-2027, we believe it can be of high interest for the European Commission.

**Target group 4: The wider public**

1. To develop a social media strategy to reach the wider public (in coordination with ESS ERIC, expected time: 2021)

2. To disseminate major findings in print, radio, and digital media outlets (expected time: from 2021)

We expect to obtain additional finding for dissemination through Collegio Carlo Alberto (the home institution of the PI), where a yearly fund is available that supports conferences and workshops engaging both researchers and stakeholders. In addition, several members of the team (amongst which the PI) have participated in the call H2020-SC6-Governance-2018-2019-2020, with a project that integrates perfectly into the theoretical frame of the repeat module ESS Round 10. If successful, the two projects would exploit synergies both in terms of dissemination, and data analysis.
6. Bibliographic references


Magalhaes, Pedro. 2009. “A Qualidade Da Democracia Em Portugal: A Perspectiva Dos Cidadãos.”


Torcal, Mariano, Sergio Martini, and Davide Serani. 2016. “Crisis and Challenges in Spain: Attitudes and Political Behavior during the Economic and the Political Representation Crisis (CIUPANEL).”


7. CVs of five QDT members

**PRINCIPAL APPLICANT: MÓNICA FERRÍN**

**CURRENT POSITION**
2015—Date  Research fellow, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin
Piazza Arbarello 8, Turin, Italy
monica.ferrin@carloalberto.org

**PAST POSITIONS**
2013—2017  Academic associate, University of Zürich
2012—2013  Postdoctoral fellow, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin

**SELECTED PUBLICATIONS**


2018 ‘Is it simply Gender? Format, Content and Time in Political Knowledge Measures’. *Politics & Gender*(with Marta Fraile and Gema García-Albacete)

2018 **Others Alike. Citizenship in Segmented Societies and the Lessons for the EU.** Edward Elgar (editor, with Francis Cheneval)


2018 ‘Accommodating Rivalling Claims to Citizenship’. In Seubert, Sandra and Frans Van Waarden (eds.), **Barriers to European Citizenship.** Edward Elgar (with Francis Cheneval)


2018 ‘EU-citizenship: Model to other Regions and Vice-versa?’. In Seubert, Sandra, Van Waarden, Frans and Olivier Eberl (eds.), **Reconsidering European Citizenship: Contradictions and Constraints.** Edward Elgar (with Francis Cheneval)


2016 **How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy.** Oxford University Press (editor, with Hanspeter Kriesi).


**MOST RECENT FUNDED RESEARCH PROJECTS (PI AND ASSOCIATE RESEARCHER)**


2014/2017  *bEUcitizen – All rights reserved? Barriers towards European CITIZENship*. 7th Framework Programme, European Commission (6,490,312€). PI: Francis Cheneval

2014  *REsCEU – Reconciling Economic and Social Europe*. ERC Grant (2,496,904€). PI: Maurizio Ferrera

2013/14  *EUandI – European Elections*. European University Institute. PI: Alexander Trechsel

2012/16  *GENPOL – A Study of inequalities between men and women in levels of political knowledge, political interest and political behaviour in Spain*. Financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competition (35,000€). PI: Marta Fraile

2012/13  *How much do Spaniards know about politics and economy? An analysis of inequalities between men and women*. Financed by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2012-2013. PIs: Mónica Ferrín, Marta Fraile, Gema García-Albacete

2012  *The Media Profiler*. Centre for Pluralism and Media Freedom, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. PI: Pier Luigi Parcu


**AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS**

2014  Juan Linz Prize for the best PhD thesis in Political Science 2013, by the Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales (CEPC), Spain

2012  National Award for the best Survey Questionnaire Proposal at Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Open competition)

2011  Visiting grant, WZB Berlin. Spanish Ministry of Science

2008/12  Fellowship of the “Salvador Madariaga” Program for pre-doctoral studies by the Spanish Ministry of Science and the European University Institute

**PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE**

*Member of committees/ Research consultant:*

- Event *Europe in a Changing Word – inclusive, innovative and reflective society in Horizon 2020*, University of Turin; Compagnia San Paolo; Italian Ministry of education, university and research, Turin, September 28, 2016
- The Engine Room - NGO ([https://socialtechcensus.org/](https://socialtechcensus.org/)). 01/07/2012 - 31/07/2012
- European University Institute. 2008-2013 (occasional)
- Escuela Galega de Administración Pública. 03/2006 – 08/2008

*Expert member:*

- List of experts of the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Since 22/08/2016
CO-APPLICANT 1: HANSPETER KRIESI

CURRENT POSITION
2012—Date  Stein Rokkan Chair at the European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
Via dei Roccettini 9
50014 S. Domenico di Fiesole
hanspeter.kriesi@eui.eu

PREVIOUS POSITIONS
2008-09  Fellow at the Robert-Schumann Centre of the EUI, Florence, Italy
2005-12  Director of the NCCR “Challenges to democracy in the 21st century”
2002-5  Director of the CIS – Center for comparative and international studies, University of Zurich/ETHZ
2002-12  Professor for comparative politics, Institute of Political Science, University of Zurich
2000-01  Research professor at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
1995-98  Director of the Department of Political Science at the University of Geneva
1995-96  Invited professor at the Luigi Einaudi Chair of European and International Studies at Cornell University, Ithaca N.Y.
1995-03  President of the group of experts for the Priority program “Demain la Suisse” of the Swiss National Science Foundation
1994-02  Member of the scientific board of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
1991-95  Editor in Chief of the Swiss Annual Review of Political Science
1988-02  Full professor for comparative politics and Swiss politics at the Department of Political Science, University of Geneva
1984-88  Full professor for collective political behavior, University of Amsterdam
1980-86  Private-docent at the Phil I Faculty, University of Zurich
1979-84  Assistant at the Department of Conflict Research, University of Zurich
1977-79  Habilitation-scholarship from the Canton of Zurich
1975-80  Lecturer at the Institute of Sociology, University of Zurich
1975-76  Assistant at the Institute of Sociology, University of Zurich
1972-74  Scientific collaborator at the Preparatory stage of the University for Educational Sciences, Aarau

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
2016  Kriesi, Hanspeter and Mónica Ferrín, How Europeans view and evaluate democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press
2016  Hutter, Swen, Edgar Grande and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.). Politicizing Europe. Integration and mass politics. Cambridge U Press
2016  Hernandez, Enrique and Hanspeter Kriesi. Turning your back on the EU. The role of Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections, Electoral Studies
2015 Kriesi, Hanspeter and Takis Pappas, European populism in the shadow of the great recession, Colchester, ECPR Press
2013 Kriesi, Hanspeter; Lavenx, Sandra; Esser, Frank; Matthes, Jörg; Bühmann, Marc; Boschler, Daniel, Democracy in the age of globalization and mediatization, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century
2012 Kriesi, Hanspeter; Grande, Edgar; Dolezal, Martin; Helbling, Marc; Hölinger, Dominic; Hutter, Swen; Wüst, Bruno, Political Conflict in Western Europe, Cambridge UP, Cambridge/New York, Cambridge University Press
2010 Kriesi, Hanspeter, Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values, West European Politics, vol. 33, no.3, pp.673-685

GRANTS

AWARDS
2017 Mattei-Dogan Prize, ECPR, Oslo
2016 Francqui chair 2015-2016, ISPO, University of Leuven, Belgium
Co-applicant 2: Claudia Landwehr

Current position

University professor of public policy
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Georg-Forster-Gebäude
55099 Mainz, Germany
Tel.: +49 6131-39-25568
Landwehr@politik.uni-mainz.de

Previous positions

Since 2011 University professor of public policy, Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz
2008-2011 Schumpeter Fellow, Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main
2010 Stand-in professor for political theory, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
04/05 2009 Visiting scholar, Ethics and Health Program, Harvard University
2007-2008 Postdoctoral fellow, political science, Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main (Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Rainer Forst)
01/02 2007 Visiting scholar, Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences
2004-2007 Junior research fellow, political science, University of Hamburg (Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Katharina Holzinger)

Selected publications

2018 Steiner, Nils D. and Claudia Landwehr: Populistische Demokratiekonzeptionen und die Wahl der AfD. Evidenz aus einer Panelstudie. [Populist conceptions of democracy and voting for the AfD. Evidence from a panel survey], Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS), online first, DOI: 10.1007/s11615-018-0083-y
2015 Landwehr, Claudia: Democratic meta-deliberation: towards reflective institutional design, Political Studies, 63 (S1), 38-54.

Major research projects (Third-party funded)

2016-2019 „Anxieties of democracy“, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG), 360.765 EUR
2008-2014 „Decision-making procedures and distributive effects“, funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, 532. 900 EUR
MAJOR PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES AND COMMISSIONS OF TRUST

since 2014  Board member, Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft (German Political Science Association)
since 2017  External member, Senate Competition Committee, Leibniz-Gemeinschaft
2015-2017  Head of department, political science, Johannes Gutenberg-University of Mainz
CO-APPLICANT 3: LEVENTE LITTVAY

CURRENT POSITION
2014 — date Associate Professor of Political Science at Central European University
Nador u. 9.
Budapest, H-1051, Hungary
littvayl@ceu.edu

PREVIOUS POSITIONS
Visiting Professor, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel (August 2013) /
Visiting Scholar, Washington State University, Pullman, WA, USA, Department of Political Science (while on sabbatical: Jan 2011 – Aug 2011)
Faculty, McDaniel College Budapest (Fall 2009)
Visiting Faculty, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Psychology (2007 – 08), Zagreb Croatia
Visiting Lecturer, ELTE, English Language Social Science Program (2007 – 08)
Visiting Lecturer, ELTE, Center for Political and International Studies (2007 – 08)

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
Forthcoming Bruno Castanho Silva, et. al. and Levente Littvay “Presenting a Cross-Nationally Validated Populist Attitudes Scale” [in the above]
2013 Levente Littvay, Júlia Métneki, Ádám Domonkos Tárnoki, Dávid László Tárnoki. The Hungarian Twin Registry. Twin Research and Human Genetics 16(1).
2012 Leslie Hayduk, Levente Littvay. “Should researchers use single indicators, best indicators, or multiple indicators in structural equation models?” BMC Medical Research Methodology 12:159.
GRANTS, AWARDS AND DISTINCTIONS

External Grants Secured
2013, 2015 International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP). To organize CEU SUN Summer University course on political psychology. ($5000 + $4000 USD)
2013 CUPESSSE: Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneurship: Family Values and Youth Unemployment in Europe. 2013 FP7-SSH-2013-1 - Collaborative projects (Large-scale integrated research projects) / COOPERATION. (€362,894.32 EUR)
2011 International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP). To organize the “Political Psychology Networking Conference for the Post-Communist Region” ($5000 USD)
2011 American Political Science Association International Scholars Travel Grant ($1000 USD)
2008 American Political Science Association International Scholars Travel Grant ($790 USD)

External Grants Under Review
ERC Consolidator Grant. POPSTOP: Stopping Populism Through Mitigating its Negative Consequences (€1,199,911 EUR for 3 years)
H2020 POPCON: Mitigating Populism’s consequences. CEU as lead with Erin Jenne, co-written by Bruno Castanho Silva and Nina Wiesehomeier with contributions from the entire team. (€2,995,551.25 EUR Total, €998,956.25 for CEU)

Competitive Internal Grants Secured
2017 CEU Intellectual Themes Initiative – Comparative Populism (€147,490 EUR) –
2017 CEU Intellectual Themes Initiative – Text Analysis Across Disciplines (€22,400 EUR)
2011 CEU Academic Events Fund co-funding for the Political Psychology Networking Conference for the Post-Communist Region. (€5570 EUR)
CEU 20th Anniversary Postdoctoral Fellowship secured for the Political Behavior Research Group to advertise a post-doc position for 2012-2014. (€48,000 EUR)
CEU 20th Anniversary Postdoctoral Fellowship secured for the Center for Network Science to advertise a post-doc position for 2011-2013. (€48,000 EUR) – Multiple
CEU Research Support Scheme Grants (€5000 EUR each)

Awards and Distinctions
Fernand Braudel Senior Fellowship, European University Institute, Firenze, Italy (2019)
(Inaugural) CEU Distinguished Teaching Award
CO-APPLICANT 4: ENRIQUE HERNÁNDEZ

CURRENT POSITION

2017 — date Postdoctoral Fellow, Political Science Department
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Department of Political Science 08193 – Bellaterra
Spain
Tel. (+34) 935 812 411
enrique.hernandez@uab.cat

PREVIOUS POSITIONS

2016 PhD in Political and Social Science, European University Institute.
2013 MRes in Political and Social Science, European University Institute.
2012 MA European Master in Government, Universitat Konstanz.
2011 MA Master of Research in Political Science, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH PROJECTS

- Political Change in Spain: Populism, Feminism and New Dimensions of Conflict (2018-2021). Project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. Member of the research team.
- Motivación para el servicio público, rendimiento objetivo y satisfacción de los ciudadanos (2018-2022). Project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. Member of the research team.
- Populist Attitudes in Spanish Public Opinion (2017-2018). Project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. Member of the research team.

SELECTED GRANTS, FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

- 2017 Best Book Chapter Award. Awarded by the Spanish Political Science Association.
- Fellowship of the “Salvador de Madariaga” program for graduate studies at the European University Institute (2012-2016). Spanish Ministry of Education.
- Postgraduate studies grant (2011-2012). SA NOSTRA Caixa de Balears