

Chapter 8

Shifts in Governance

Suggestions by

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8.1 A Proposal

8.1.1. *From National States to Supranational Institutions*¹

There is a strong view in international and comparative politics and public administration that holds that as a result of the spectacular rise of internationalization and globalization the nation state is in retreat (Ruggie 1993). The enormous increase in interdependence on a world-wide scale during the last few decades has seriously weakened the efficacy of the nation state. This applies *a fortiori* to the nation states that make up the European Union (EU). Although the EU was initially set up by these states for the very reason that they wanted to cope with the negative effects of increasing interdependence (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1998), it is widely accepted that the member states of the EU have lost large portions of their autonomous policy making capacity (Sørensen 1999: 602).

An important issue, hotly debated in the current literature on European integration, is to what extent the member states, as the classic *international* actors, have had to make way for *transnational* and *supranational* actors? To what extent are policies decided at the European level? What policy making capacity do national states still have? If national power has shifted to other levels, who controls this relocated power? This issue can be approached analytically by distinguishing the following three levels: the *constitutional level*, the level of *European Union policy arenas*, and the *national level* (see Peterson 1995).

For the *constitutional level* we limit ourselves to the observation that the European Union is a supranational organization, but that the establishment of the institutions (Council of Ministers, Commission, Parliament, Court of Justice and European Central Bank), as well as the decision rule, qualified majority voting, which should guarantee this supranationality, still rests on intergovernmental bargains. The decisions taken at this level define the (formal) institutional setting of the various day-to-day European policy arenas.

On the level of *day-to-day European policy making* intergovernmental bargains define for each policy area which actors can take part in the decision making process. They define the scope of the measures that can be taken as well as the decision rules that should be applied. They have resulted in a complex political system in which different rules apply to different policy areas. Sometimes the European Parliament is involved; sometimes it is not; sometimes the European Court of Justice has jurisdiction; sometimes it has not. In other words, the intergovernmental bargains create different policy arenas that operate under different formal and informal rules with different consequences for how to ensure accountability. In addition, they set different constraints and opportunities to those actors and, accordingly allocate responsibilities variously as a result of which the accountability problem increases in complexity.

¹ This text is taken from Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2001).

These formal and informal institutions of policy-setting and policy-shaping at the European level influence the capacity and, conceivably, the autonomy for policy making at the *national level*. At this level, European integration can be seen from two points of view. On the one hand, European integration may enhance the capacity of national institutions to deal with the effects of economic internationalization; on the other hand, it may exert pressure on the member states to adapt to European rules and regulations and thus may affect the national institutional framework of policy making. We underscore the need to study the impact of European integration on national institutions in this dual manner, because this helps to avoid mistaken simplifications about the unidirectional decline of national institutions, national policy autonomy and accountability.

As regards the problem of democratic accountability in the multi-level European system: One of the most interesting observations is that the governments of most member states, the major nationally based political parties that are pro-European, as well as their members of the European Parliament officially affirm that the European Union suffers from a *democratic deficit*. The complaints can be grouped under the following headings (see Pijpers 1999):

1. *Insufficient influence of European citizens* on the process of European integration itself, especially on the outcomes of Intergovernmental Conferences. Important issues are the extent to which national governments that prevail at this (constitutional) level can be held accountable nationally for the decisions made in the international setting and the extent to which European elections can be (or should be) “upgraded” so as to include issues relating to constitutional decisions.
2. *The Council shirks democratic control* as neither the national parliaments nor the European Parliament have sufficient instruments of political control; the issue is at what level (national or supranational) additional mechanisms of democratic control can or should be introduced that enhance the level of accountability.
3. *The lack of transparency of European institutions*, as a result of the deficient public nature of Council decision making and the phenomenon of “comitology”, that is, ‘the review of Commission decisions by committees of national government officials, which decide whether or not the Council needs to be involved in the decision making process’ (Steunenberg and Schmidtchen 2000: 15). One issue is whether and to what extent democratic accountability is frustrated in comitology or whether and to what extent deliberation in the area of comitology in fact represents a new form of supranational democratic governance unique to the *sui generis* polity of the European Union (Neyer 2000; Eriksen and Fossum 2000).
4. *The lack of a European public debate* and a *truly European electoral struggle* with real consequences for the distribution of power and majority decision making in Europe. One major issue is whether and to what extent European politics can and should be based on anything else than a system that maximizes consensus in the European Parliament and among the member states (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999b), with the possible drawback of a loss of responsiveness and accountability.

5. *The necessity and relevance of a democratic European constitution.* One important issue concerns the question whether the European Union needs a constitution in order to ensure its democratic quality, that is to say whether the intergovernmental way of European integration (particularly expansion and institutional deepening) must be replaced by a democratic method involving the citizens and their elected representatives in the European Parliament and the national parliaments. Another issue involves the question to what extent the “constitutionalization”, that is to say the ‘transformation of the EC from an international regime, founded on the precepts of international law, into a multi-tiered, quasi-federal polity’ has already in fact already occurred (Stone Sweet 2000: 160) under the aegis of the European Court of Justice.
6. *The intransparency of implementation and enforcement.* The European Commission is mostly not responsible for the implementation and enforcement of its own rules and can hence also not be held accountable for the observation of the rules by European subjects. Responsible are national government agencies, but to whom are they accountable? To EU-level institutions, or to national institutions that control national governments?

8.1.2. *Multi-level Governance*

The notion of multi-level governance has a dual history. One development is found in International Relations theory where the concept can be seen as the modernized successor of the original regime concept that was introduced in the mid-1970s.² An international regime is 'a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (Krasner 1983: 2). Multi-level governance, then, applies to the policies carried out in various European policy areas. While *governance* refers to both the substance of policies and to the balance of power that can be inferred from this, *multi-level* indicates that not only public, but also private actors (firms, pressure groups) can exert influence at various levels, both vertically (at the European, national and subnational level) and horizontally (in various sectors, including the market sector).

The other historical ancestor of the multi-level notion came from comparative public policy analysis as developed in comparative political science and public administration (see Wallace and Wallace 1996; Peterson 1995; Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Richardson 1996a, 1996b; Marks *et al.* 1996a; Mazey 1996; Bulmer, 1994,1998; Pierson 1996; Hurrell and Menon 1996; Rhodes and Mazey 1995). This approach developed in response to the state-centric approach, which treats policy making in the European Union as a two-level game and is epitomized in the work of the liberal inter-governmentalist school (Moravcsik 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1998). This school³ explains European integration – defined as policy co-ordination between nation states – as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. The core assumption is that the state is a unitary and rational actor. The behaviour of the state is constrained by domestic pressures and the strategic environment. European integration is explained in three stages. The first step is national preference formation which is defined by the interaction between state and society (pressure from domestic actors, especially in the socio-economic realm). Economic interests are more important than geopolitical interests. The second step is intergovernmental analysis of inter-state negotiations. Given national preferences, the outcomes of international bargaining between states are determined by the preferences and bargaining power (defined as an asymmetrical interdependence) of states. There are three determinants of interstate bargaining power: 1) unilateral policy alternatives (threats of non-agreement); 2) alternative coalitions (threats of exclusion); 3) the potential for compromise and issue linkages. The final step concerns the choice of international institutions. In his early study Moravcsik (1993a) argued that states choose supranational institutions in order to reduce transactions costs and strengthen the state itself in a two-level-game. In his latest book Moravcsik (1998) explains the choices to "pool and delegate" sovereignty to international institutions as efforts by governments to constrain and control one another and to enhance the credibility of commitments. Supranational institutions thus resolve incomplete contracting problems. States opt for pooling and delegation when they seek to commit other governments – perhaps also

² Here we base ourselves on Hasenclever *et al.* (1997) and Verbeek (2001).

³ A complete overview of the development of theories of integration is found in Erdogan (2000) and can be made available upon request.

their own future governments – to particular future policies, the details of which are uncertain (Moravcsik 1998: 485).

The major criticism by multi-level theorists of the state-centric approach is directed against the model of politics across autonomous levels (Marks *et al* 1996b). The European Union is rather conceptualized as a single, multi-level polity:

'The point of departure for this multi-level governance (MLG) approach is the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels. Member state executives, while powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the European polity. States are not an exclusive link between domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining in the EU. Instead of the two level game assumptions adopted by state centrists, MLG theorists posit a set of overarching, multi-level policy networks. The structure of political control is variable, not constant, across policy areas' (Marks *et al* 1996b: 41).

Because of the stress on policy networks that are organized across policy areas and government levels, the body of multi-level governance literature is directly linked to the governance-as-network literature discussed above (see Héritier 1993, 1999). In fact, one of the most important recent contributions to the literature by Kohler-Koch and Eising (2000) prefer to speak of *network governance* in the European Union rather than multi-level governance. As said, we will pay special attention to this type below in this essay.

8.1.3. *Legitimacy and Accountability*

Governance and government means ruling. And ruling is intimately linked to *legitimacy*. This central concept has been well defined by Schmitter (2001: 2):

‘Legitimacy is a shared expectation among actors in an arrangement of asymmetric power, such that the actions of those who rule are accepted voluntarily by those who are ruled because the latter are convinced that the actions of the former conform to pre-established norms. Put simply, legitimacy converts power into authority – *Macht* into *Herrschaft* – and, thereby, establishes simultaneously an obligation to obey and a right to rule.’

One should add, that the ruled have in principle the power to change the rules by which to measure the rulers. This definition implies that the requisite criteria for legitimacy are the following: 1) those who rule have to be identifiable, and known to the ruled; 2) similarly, the ruled have to be identifiable, and known to the rulers; 3) both share norms, which presupposes at the very least that these norms are known to both; 4) the ruled have to be convinced (or trust) that the rulers abide by the shared norms; 5) there must be institutions that provide for – again legitimate – settlement of disputes over the interpretation of these norms, and over whether the rulers have abided by them.

The norms that provide the basis for legitimacy can differ. They can refer to procedures of decision making (e.g. legality), substantive criteria of justice, performance of the rulers and what they have (the effectiveness and efficiency of their measures). The trust of the ruled in the rulers can have its base for instance in reputation, charisma, expertise, and past performance. However, in the end the ruled have to be “convinced” that the rulers lived up to the expectations, that they interpreted the rules rightly, and that they performed. This implies that the rulers have to do some explaining and that the ruled have the chance to sanction the rulers if they feel that these have not delivered upon their promises. We call this democratic accountability, which is hence crucial to legitimacy.

That implies that *accountability* is paramount to governance. It is part of the very definition of what is considered to be “good governance”, both in government and corporate affairs. In International Relations one finds the issue of the “accountability gap” as most transnational actors can hardly be held responsible for their actions. Democratization and accountability are also an increasingly important legal issue as democracy is crystallizing as a norm of international law. Another concern is whether and to what extent the New Public Management has an unfavourable impact on public accountability. Similar critical arguments emerge in the debate on the status and operation of networks in public administration, while the issue of accountability in the multi-level governance system of the European Union is obviously inextricably interwoven with the problem of the notorious democratic deficit.

Accountability refers to the process of holding someone answerable and responsible for performance (Romzek 2000). Being responsible is used in the sense of ‘political, moral,

or legal liability (or in all of these senses) for the results, mostly harmful, of a given form of behaviour or event' (Bovens 1998: 25). Bovens (1998: 29–31) elaborates the criteria for accountability-as-responsibility⁴ as *transgression of a norm* (a person's act breaks a norm), *causal connection* (there is a causal relation between the act and the outcome or event for which one is held to account), *blameworthiness* (a person could have acted otherwise), *the relationship with the agent* (the one held accountable is not necessarily the actor, but has a close relationship with him or her).

⁴ Bovens defines this as passive responsibility as opposed to active responsibility, that is responsibility as a virtue (having a sense of responsibility), specified by the following criteria: an adequate perception of threatened violations of a norm, consideration for consequences, autonomy, conduct based on a verifiable and consistent code, taking role obligations seriously (Bovens 1998: 32–8).

8.1.4. *Consequences: Problems of Governability and Accountability*

The shifts in governance patterns in both the public and the private sector have one major consequence in common: the governance capacity might be affected; and traditional institutions of checks and balances on power and of accountability could very well become obsolete, or at the very least less effective. These would be issues for investigation.

Would governance through complicated networks in which permanent bargaining goes on, and where hierarchy has become less important, not loose in governability, in the capacity for resolute decision making? It may be that such a system gains in its capacity for building consensus under certain circumstances. But among whom? And at what costs? How can such networks participate in yet higher-level networks, when they have difficulty with speedy decisions, which may be required as input at a higher level?

Can policy making in complicated, abstruse and intransparent multi-level network structures still be controlled by traditional checks and balances, such as the (often already relatively problematic) dualism between government and parliament, by federalism, or by judicial review at the national level? Traditional institutions try hard, but often this appears a bit forced. Symbolic for the anguish has been the appeal of one German Land against the Maastricht Treaty – in casu the German federal government handing over more competencies to European institutions – for the German *Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof*. It just served to illustrate that federal systems within federal systems find it increasingly difficult to manifest themselves. One could ask whether the principle of ministerial responsibility is not rapidly becoming meaningless, when policy decisions are taken more and more in complicated and relatively intransparent multi-level networks of EU- and member-state bureaucrats. Can ministers really be held accountable for this? Is that not merely formal fiction? And would the most effective solution to such problems still be to try to make traditional institutions of political control work better, such as dualism in politics (exemplified by directly elected prime ministers or mayors); or to introduce institutions of control that may be new to this country but have been tried elsewhere, such as the referendum?

If traditional institutions of the voice option in politics may become obsolete, so may be the case with the institutions of the exit option in private business. Can competition in the market place still play the role of major checks and balance on economic power, when firms have to co-operate more and more to share knowledge of products and markets in order to be able to innovate (Jorde and Teece 1990; Nooteboom 2000)? Further specialization, outsourcing (division of labour in the market place), and consequently the development of more and more complicated long-term customer-supplier relations in industry points to the need of co-operation as against competition. Specialization also produces all kinds of new market niches, in which highly specialized companies may acquire some market power. Seen in this light: is not the recent reinvigoration of a strict competition policy, with a new competition law and a new competition authority, the NMa (in the Netherlands), very much akin to the stereotypical army preparing for the last war fought? Is strict competition still the most

appropriate manner of controlling for the abuse of economic and monopoly power? Or do we need new instruments of control of economic power in the era of the network economy?

8.1.5 Questions for the core module on “Multilevel Governance”

There are many different aspects of the shift in Governance which could be interesting for the ESS. We have chosen for two aspects which seem to be most relevant and have led to a lot of discussion in different countries. The first topic is the acceptance of the people in Europe of the shift in governance to the European level. This topic is relevant because the power has shifted for a large part to the European level and ‘legitimacy converts power in authority’ (Schmitter 2001:2). For example, after the treaty of Maastricht, it was clear that the population did not agree with the decisions made at that meeting and this led to a crisis in the EU. The second topic concerns the satisfaction of the people with the checks and balances at the European level. This issue is important for more or less the same reason. As we have mentioned above for the legitimacy of the shift in governance it is important that people see that the democratic controls are sufficient. Otherwise people might question the legitimacy of the shift of government to the EU level if they are satisfied with the democratic controls in their own country.

For the above argument it follows that in this study two important factors for the perception of the legitimacy of the shift in governance are studied.

We have added to this study a proposal for a third set of questions concerning the acceptance of the shift of governance to the UN given its important in recent years and its possible rule in the future.

Legitimacy of shifts in governance

In order to measure the acceptance of EU governance we suggest to use a set of questions used in the Eurobarometer 54. In this questionnaire 25 issues are presented. We have chosen 5 items out of the 25. The 5 are chosen in such a way that they are approximately equally distributed on the scale of support for decision making by the EU governments together (see the numbers in brackets behind the stimuli). The question is formulated as follows:

Question 1-6

Now we would like to ask questions about decision making in Europe

Could you tell me for each of the following fields whether, according to you the National government should make the decisions or all EU governments together ?

<i>Decision mainly by</i>	
<i>National</i>	<i>all EU governments</i>
<i>DNK</i>	<i>together</i>
<i>government</i>	

Foreign Policy (69%)

Support for regions in economic difficulty (60%)

Accepting refugees (51%)

Agriculture and fishing policies (48%)

Juvenile crime prevention ((43%)

Education (32%)

Here 6 items have been specified. The extra item is Agriculture. This item was added because it is a field where the EU makes the decisions already for a long time but nowadays this policy is not supported by a majority. We do not know if this is new due to the crisis in the agriculture or an old phenomenon. That makes this item attractive to include. It is however not necessary for the scale mentioned below.

Index for acceptance of EU Governance

We suppose that these items will form an cumulative scale. This can be tested by the Mokken scale procedure. In that case the number of choices for the EU will be a good measure for the acceptance of EU governance.

Satisfaction with the democratic control of power at the different levels

We are not aware of any questions asked about this topic. There is only the very weak question about the satisfaction with democracy as it functions in your country. Therefore we would like to ask the following three questions for the different levels of governance.

The next questions concentrate on "the democratic control of the government by the parliament. If the control is too weak there exists the risk of misuse of power by the government. If the control is too strong there exists the risk that no decisions will be made.

Question 1

As you know in our country the decisions of the government are controlled by the parliament which is elected in free elections. The parliament has the right to decide that a decision made by the government should not be implemented. The parliament has also the right to force the government to resign.

How do you evaluate the democratic control in this case. Express your evaluation in a number between 0 and 10 where

0 = very bad

5 = neither bad nor good

10= very good

Question 2

*In the European Union the European Commission is preparing the major decisions. The European parliament has the right to force the whole European Commission to resign but it **does not** have the right to decide that a decision should not be implemented.*

How do you evaluate the democratic control in this case. Express your evaluation in a number between 0 and 10 where 0 = very bad, 5 = neither bad nor good, 10= very good

These two questions should not be combined but it seems likely that people who support the national systems and not the European system are less in favor of European governance.

8.2. Comments

The following EU questions were suggested:

*Now we would like to ask questions about decision making in Europe
Could you tell me for each of the following fields whether, according to you the National government should make the decisions or all EU governments together ?*

	Decision mainly by	
	National government	all EU governments together
DNK		

Foreign Policy (69%)

Support for regions in economic difficulty (60%)

Accepting refugees (51%)

Agriculture and fishing policies (48%)

Juvenile crime prevention ((43%)

Education (32%)

Discussion

SQP gave the following prediction with respect to the reliability, validity and total quality of these questions:

Item	reliability	validity	method effect	total quality
1	.53	.69	.31	.36
others	.50	.80	.20	.40

The quality of these questions is not very good, especially the reliability is rather low. Using them in a scale and computing a total score will improve the reliability considerably.

With respect to the content of the questions Jan Beyer suggested:

I have quite some problems with the Eurobarometer question(s) and this question in particular (so this is not a critique vis-à-vis WK). Deciding with 'all members together within the EU' (note the general word 'members'... who are these?) can mean anything. It can refer to both supranationalism, i.e. all member-states have a say, but can vote by qualified majority, and intergovernmentalism, i.e. all member-state governments decide by unanimity. The crucial point is whether national governments loose control over Euro-level decision-making, for instance by increasing the powers of the European Parliament or by more majority voting in the Council. Given the deficiencies of Eurobarometer, the ESS could be an opportunity to test a more accurate question. Why not work with these two extremes... something like this...

Could you tell me for each of the following matters whether, according to you, all national governments should agree on common European policies or whether, there has to be one European government which can decide on these matters .

I agree with the idea to include 'agriculture', a relevant policy field, not only because of the budget. The argument might be strengthened or improved. Agricultural policy will change profoundly, and has already changed a lot (because a majority favours such a change). Export oriented subsidies will be phased out in the middle and long run (even for sensitive sectors such as sugar) and direct income support for farmers will become more important. Thus when people say that they are in favour of supra-national policies in the field of agriculture, we have to be very careful. Is it a support for the old system, or a support for the reform that is unfolding for the moment?

The other five items are chosen because they are equally distributed on the support scale. This is nice. Yet, in how far can we believe the distribution generated by Eurobarometers phone surveying? I am not a specialist in this, but I tend to be sceptical. In addition, it is strange that substantive reasons are used for including agriculture, but there are no substantive reasons given for the other policy fields in the questionnaire. Where is 'environment', the example of cross-bordering policy-problems (you have it in 7.1.5.3., but why not here)? Why education, a policy field in which the EU has no big say and where a quasi consensus exist in keeping it like this? Why not 'social policy', a sensitive issue linked to fiscal harmonisation, cross-bordering solidarity and national welfare state arrangements? Why 'juvenile crime prevention' (what about adult crime) and not just 'fighting crime', which is more general?

His comment was taken into account so that a question has been formulated that gives a better indication of what should be done according to the people. However his question asks about the decision making mechanism while this question is meant to measure on what level the decision should be made. This is a slight difference. May be the following formulation would be better:

Could you tell me for each of the following matters whether, according to you, the decisions on these matters should be the responsibility of our national government or of the European commission in Brussels deciding for the whole of the EU .

He also suggests alternative issues. This is a point that requires further attention.

After some discussions about the different level of government to be mentioned , the formulation of the question and the items to be presented the following formulation of the question and items was chosen for the pilot study:

CARD D1: Some policies are decided at a national level, others at a European level, and others at a wider international level, such as by the UN. Using this card, at which level do you think policies should be decided about ... **READ OUT AND CODE ONE ON EACH LINE**

	<i>National level</i>	<i>European level</i>	<i>Wider international level</i>	<i>(DK)</i>
<i>D1 ... protecting the environment</i>	1	2	3	8
<i>D2 ... fighting against organised crime</i>	1	2	3	8
<i>D3 ... reducing unemployment</i>	1	2	3	8
<i>D4 ... agriculture</i>	1	2	3	8
<i>D5 ... defence</i>	1	2	3	8
<i>D6 ... social welfare</i>	1	2	3	8
<i>D7 ... taxation</i>	1	2	3	8
<i>D8 ... aid to developing countries</i>	1	2	3	8
<i>D9 ... immigration and refugees</i>	1	2	3	8
<i>D10 ... interest rates</i>	1	2	3	8

This question was not seen as a definite form of the question because it was never asked in survey research in this way.

Concerning "Satisfaction with the democratic control of power at the different levels" the following three questions for the different levels of governance.

The next questions concentrate on "the democratic control of the government by the parliament.

If the control is too weak there exists the risk of misuse of power by the government.

If the control is too strong there exists the risk that no decisions will be made.

Questions 1

As you know in our country the decisions of the government are controlled by the parliament which is elected in free elections. The parliament has the right to decide that a decision made by the government should not be implemented. The parliament has also the right to force the government to resign.

How do you evaluate the democratic control in this case. Express your evaluation in a number between 0 and 10 where

0 = *very bad*

5 = *neither bad nor good*

10= *very good*

Question 2

*In the European Union the European Commission is preparing the major decisions. The European parliament has the right to force the whole European Commission to resign but it **does not** have the right to decide that a decision should not be implemented.*

How do you evaluate the democratic control in this case. Express your evaluation in a number between 0 and 10 where 0 = very bad, 5 = neither bad nor good, 10= very good

Item	reliability	validity	method effect	total quality
1	.85	.98	.02	.83
2	.85	.87	.13	.74

The reliability and validity of these two questions is rather good. This is a consequence of the long introductions and the 10 point scale.

With respect to the exact specification of the question Jan Beyers has important remarks. He wrote:

Question 2 is a confusing question, especially because the European Parliament does have co-decision powers in quite some policy fields. Thus what is implied in the question is misleading. The EP cannot directly decide on the content of a Commission proposal, but it can (and has done it several times), under the co-decision procedure, veto a Common Position of the Council, which is based on a previous Commission proposal. What is said about the resignation of the Commission is correct (however, it complicates the question). In general, this question gives the impression that the European Parliament has not very much to say, at least it suggests that it has less to say than its real legislative powers are. In addition, the questions contains two different things. On the one hand, it suggests that the EP has no legislative powers (which is not true) and, on the other hand, it has controlling powers (which is correct). How to evaluate this balance of power? I am afraid that such a question will be difficult to understand for an average respondent.

Given the complexity of this issue and tack of time the CCT decided not to include this topic in the core questionnaire of the ESS at this moment.

Results of the pilot study

In the table below the results obtained in the pilot studies in the UK and the Netherlands are presented.

CARD D1: Some policies are decided at a national level, others at a European level, and others at a wider international level, such as by the UN. Using this card, at which level do you think policies should be decided about ... READ OUT AND CODE ONE ON EACH LINE

	<i>National level</i>	<i>European level</i>	<i>Wider international level</i>	<i>(DK)</i>
<i>D1 ... protecting the environment</i>	UK35.3%	6.9%	54.9%	2.9%
	NL 22.2%	21.8%	53.5%	2.4%
<i>D2 ... fighting against organised crime</i>	UK41.8%	13.2%	42.8%	2.3%
	NL19.3%	28.9%	50.9%	1.0
<i>D3 ... reducing unemployment</i>	UK 75.46%	11.7%	10.6%	2.3%
	NL66.3%	27.9%	5.1%	0.7%
<i>D4 ... agriculture</i>	UK54.0%	26.5%	14.6%	5.0%
	NL 42.3%	46.0%	7.8%	3.9%
<i>D5 ... defense</i>	UK47.36%	18.4%	30.5%	3.8%
	NL 21.3%	4.06%	30.1%	2.7%
<i>D6 ... social welfare</i>	UK 72.5%	11.9%	12.3%	3.3%
	NL 69.4%	23.0%	5.9%	1.7%
<i>D7 ... taxation</i>	UK 78.9%	12.7%	4.0%	4.4%
	NL 68.7%	26.7%	2.9%	1.7%
<i>D8 ... aid to developing countries</i>	UK23.8%	15.5%	55.9%	4.8%
	NL 13.4%	23.0%	62.1%	1.5%

D9 ... <i>immigration and refugees</i>	UK	47.6%	15.2%	34.0%	3.1%
	NL	27.4%	35.0%	36.4%	1.2%
D10 ... <i>interest rates</i>	UK	74.6%	13.5%	6.7%	5.2%
	NL	40.8%	38.1%	13.0%	8.1%

This table shows that the results in the two countries are quite different ; the Dutch population being more internationally oriented than the British people. On the other hand we see that ordering of the items is rather similar and that in both countries a numbers of items are rather homogeneously evaluated as national issues especially; social welfare, taxation and reduction of unemployment. Otherwise the position of the items on the continuum from 0% to 100% is rather different but that will be even more different for other countries. Given the obvious reason for the equal score for the three items mentioned above it seems not necessary to use all three in the ESS but only one.

Another issue that was raised during the pilot study was that some decisions can also be made on local level. This is for example the case in the UK and Germany. Therefore it is necessary to introduce a fourth level in the definite question.

Final choice

On the basis of the arguments mentioned above it was decided to use the following formulation of the question with only 8 of the 10 items from the pilot study.

CARD D1: *Policies are decided at various different levels. Using this card, at which level do you think policies should mainly be decided about ...*

READ OUT AND CODE ONE ON EACH LINE

	<i>International level</i>	<i>European level</i>	<i>National level</i>	<i>Regional or local level</i>
(DK)				
D1 ... <i>protecting the environment</i>	1	2	3	4
D2 ... <i>fighting against organised crime</i>	1	2	3	4
D3 ... <i>agriculture</i>	1	2	3	4
D4 ... <i>defence</i>	1	2	3	4
D5 ... <i>social welfare</i>	1	2	3	4
D6 ... <i>aid to developing countries</i>	1	2	3	4
D7 ... <i>immigration and refugees</i>	1	2	3	4
D8 ... <i>interest rates</i>	1	2	3	4