Exploring public attitudes, informing public policy

Selected findings from the first nine rounds
When considering new policies, governments in the past were often ignorant of their citizens’ preferences and needs. Now European governments have a source for counteracting that ignorance.

Professor Sir Roger Jowell CBE
Co-founder of the European Social Survey
EXOGENOUS SHOCKS AND CITIZENS’ SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES

Takis Venetoklis (University of Turku) asks whether empirical evidence collected by the ESS either side of the 2008 crisis can help us better understand what the social effects of COVID-19 might be.

To what extent did the financial crisis of 2008 affect levels of individual satisfaction with governments in general and three policy areas in particular: the economy, health services and education? This is investigated by analysing approximately 195,000 responses from 14 countries collected across all nine rounds of the European Social Survey (2002/03 - 2018/19).

In regression models, the so called Interrupted Time Series design was implemented. On aggregate, there was a decrease of satisfaction with the government and the economy immediately after the 2008 crisis, but an increase for health and educational services. Longer term, satisfaction gradually increased for all the four indicators examined. In separate regressions of the data from each of the 14 countries, a consistent pattern of behaviour emerges. Where the short-term effect on satisfaction was negative, the long-term effect was positive, and vice versa.

The switch, from short-term negative to long-term positive effect, could be attributed to the successful efforts of governments to correct the immediate adverse effects of the crisis. On the contrary, some individuals seeing the problems other countries faced, applauded their own government’s short term performance in handling the crisis. With the passing of time however, they gradually became more critical.

An example of the aforementioned analysis is shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 depicts the percentage change in satisfaction levels with the government for each of the 14 countries immediately after the 2008 crisis, between 2008/09 and 2010/11. Figure 2, on the other hand, shows the growth rate of satisfaction with the government before the crisis (2002/03 to 2008/09 - purple bars) and after the crisis (2010/11 to 2018/19 - blue bars).

Hence, the comparison of pre- and post-crisis growth rates can help us evaluate the long-term effects of the crisis. In both figures, the effect on satisfaction is classified as neutral (O) negative (N) or positive (P) and ranked accordingly based on magnitude.

The motivation for the aforementioned analysis is two-fold. First, it is due to the COVID-19 global crisis which resembles somewhat the events of 2008, but on a much wider and severer scale. Governments are now under immense pressure to solve several problems, such as economic, health and education issues without delay. At the same time, both governments and other public sector officials are constantly being judged on how they are handling the unprecedented calamity generated by this exogenous shock.

Thus, examining not only the overall performance of governments during the 2008 crisis but also how they fared particularly in these three vital policy areas - the economy, health services and education - may provide a baseline for comparison with the respective levels generated by the current COVID-19 crisis. Second, and at a more theoretical level, policies influence people’s wellbeing and behaviour.

Economic policies in particular play a vital role, especially in the light of exogenous events. Governments need feedback mechanisms (e.g. through satisfaction surveys) from citizens on their merits and faults. This feedback in turn influences future policy planning and implementation. Hence, and irrespective of the COVID-19 or the 2008 crisis, examining how governments perform is of academic interest in itself.
EVALUATIONS OF DISTRIBUTIVE AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE MATTER FOR POLITICAL TRUST

Caroline Hahn (GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences), Elias Heppner and Christian Schnaudt (University of Mannheim) find that more positive evaluations of distributive and procedural justice foster political trust, and the impact is particularly strong in countries that suffer from high corruption and an unequal resource distribution.

Adherence to basic principles of distributive and procedural justice establishes an essential prerequisite for democratic legitimacy and the viability of democratic systems. In the long run, democratic systems will only thrive if they grant citizens equal access to the political process and provide societal outcomes that are considered just and fair by the general public.

To assess such claims empirically, research analysed the relationship between citizens’ justice concerns and legitimacy beliefs. Relying on a unique set of newly developed survey items fielded in the Justice and Fairness module of ESS Round 9 (2018/19), the study provides innovative insights concerning the impact of distributive and procedural justice evaluations on citizens’ trust in political institutions and authorities.

For evaluations of distributive justice, the study shows that citizens with more favorable evaluations concerning equality of opportunity and income fairness are more trustful of political institutions and authorities. With regard to procedural justice evaluations, the authors find that political trust is highest among citizens who feel that government is responsive to their needs, gives them a say in political decisions, and relies on transparent decision-making processes.

Overall, the study concludes that, when it comes to political trust, citizens’ justice evaluations matter most where principles of distributive and procedural justice are most severely compromised. Evidently, these findings entail important implications concerning the general viability of modern democratic systems, which are discussed in more detail in the original publication.

UNCERTAINTY AND CULTURE

Pantelis Kostis and Kyriaki Kafka of the Department of Economics at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens assessed ESS data from Round 1-9 (2002-19) to assess the effects of uncertainty on cultural values change.

The change of cultural values over time is an issue that concerns, among other things, economic, as this change is responsible for the reform of the economic, political and social life of societies. Cultural change should be considered an evolutionary process based on Darwin’s theory, in which some cultural values become more common and others are lost. The general observation about the change in cultural background is that it remains relatively stable over time ‘under normal conditions’. The fact that the cultural dimensions and consequently the cultural background remain stable ‘under normal conditions’ leaves much room for reflection and control of these conditions. The Eurozone has suffered much from the 2008 crisis and many of its members adopted adjustment programmes, significantly changing the function of the economies and the general living conditions. The aim of the present paper is to investigate the effects of uncertainty on cultural values change. The main hypothesis examined is whether conditions such as those related with the global financial crisis of 2008 have led to changes in behaviours and values and thus to the cultural background of the societies.

To investigate the relationship between uncertainty and culture, an unbalanced panel dataset, for the Eurozone countries for the period from 2002/03 to 2018/19, is used. The choice of the time period under consideration is determined by the availability of data regarding culture, based on the ESS waves that have been released during that period. The analysis uses a two ways fixed effects analysis (FE), which allows the economy-specific heterogeneity using a different constant term per economy and can be estimated using the standard least squares method (OLS). In addition, time dummies for each wave are included in order to incorporate in the analysis time effects that are common to all countries in the sample. In addition, cluster robust estimates of the standard errors were taken into account in order to control for the correlation and heteroskedasticity for each economy.

In order to construct the Economic Uncertainty Index, daily data of high capitalization stock indices are used for the countries under analysis. Also, as a proxy for global uncertainty, an index is calculated that expresses the Global Stock Market based on the daily prices of the largest stock markets (USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Eurozone, United Kingdom, Japan, China, Hong Kong, India) as the weighted average based on the GDP of each economy (GDP at current prices) as derived from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. The main conclusions of the empirical analysis are the following:

a) Uncertainty significantly affects the cultural background of the societies and leads to its change.

b) The effects of uncertainty on culture start two years after an uncertainty shock has occurred.

c) The effects of uncertainty on specific cultural values reveals significant effects on all Schwartz’s cultural values. However, the effect is the highest for the dipole ‘conservatism and autonomy’ and the smallest for the dipole ‘mastery vs harmony’.

d) When uncertainty is high, this leads to higher levels of hierarchy (authority, humbleness), self-direction (independent thought and action), stimulation (excitement, novelty and challenge in life), affective autonomy (pursuit of actively positive activities: pleasure, exciting life) and mastery (ambition and hard work, daring, independence, drive for success) which means their life’s harmony is disrupted, at least two years later.

THE DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECT ON SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING

Timo Gnambs (Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories) investigated subjective wellbeing using pooled data, broken down by which day the interview took place.

Subjective wellbeing describes an individual’s thinking and feeling about his or her life as a whole which can profoundly shape one’s perceived quality of life. Happy people who are more satisfied with their lives typically report better health, more rewarding social relationships with others, and are frequently even more successful in their jobs. However, people’s perceived wellbeing also depends on momentary context conditions. For example, people’s mood, that is, their current emotions experienced in a given situation can affect well-being ratings at a given moment. Interestingly, mood tends to follow a systematic 7-day cycle across the week: mood is frequently worst on Monday (colloquially referred to as ‘Blue Monday’), improves during the following days, and reaches a peak on Friday or Saturday. Presumably, this pattern results from different expectations of upcoming events. While more stressful and potentially unpleasant work activities are expected at the beginning of the week, more pleasant leisure activities are expected near the end of the week. Given these daily fluctuations in mood across the days of the week, it was expected that people’s ratings of satisfaction and happiness with their lives would follow a similar pattern in representative samples from nine rounds of the ESS (2002/03 - 2018/19). However, in contrast to expectations, differences in wellbeing ratings across the day of the week an interview took place were negligible. Because the 408,637 respondents were not randomly assigned the day an interview took place, the distribution of the number of interviews across the course of a week was slightly uneven. But even after accounting for potential selection effects, no substantial day of the week effects were observed.

Although slightly lower ratings were observed on Sundays, the obtained effects were trivial. The day of the week explained less than 0.01% of the observed differences in life satisfaction and happiness ratings. These findings provide little evidence that the interview day has a meaningful impact on subjective wellbeing research in cross-sectional, social studies.
EMPLOYMENT PRECARIOUSNESS AND THE UNIONISATION OF YOUNG WORKERS ACROSS EUROPE

Jannis Böhm (University of Twente) analysed our Round 9 (2018/19) dataset to examine the prevalence of trade union membership amongst respondents in 19 countries. As well as assessing membership by age group, the research also assessed the likelihood of belonging to a trade union amongst those with insecure jobs.

While unions remain influential political and economic stakeholders, the decline of union membership rates over the last decades is a well-documented phenomenon. Discussions about the exclusivity of unions towards labour market outsiders and the increasing average age of union members are becoming more prominent.

Using micro-level data from Round 9 collected in 19 countries, it was researched to what extent there is an age gap between young and old workers in trade union membership in European countries. In a second step, it was tested if the age gap is a result of more precarious working conditions among young workers.

The results show that a sizable age gap regarding membership exists in nearly all included countries. On average 14% of young workers are union members, while medium-aged and older workers have unionization rates of 21% and 23%, respectively.

The lowest membership rate of young workers is found in Czechia (1.58%) but it is closely followed by Poland (1.6%), Estonia (2.19%), and Italy (2.78%). On the other end of the spectrum are the high membership rates in Norway (36.72%), Belgium (40.88%), and Finland (52.94%).

The largest relative age gap can be observed in Poland. Here, old workers are 8.4 times more likely to be union members than young workers.

To test whether precarious employment conditions are the driving force behind these age-based differences in membership rates, a measure for precariousness was constructed along the dimensions of income insufficiency, work autonomy, and contract type.

Young workers more often have limited contracts or no contract at all, as well as lower autonomy over their working conditions. However, they do not show higher insufficiency of income than other age groups.

By comparing two models in logistic regression, it was found that precariously employed workers are less likely to be trade union members.

This finding is the strongest regarding contract types as workers with limited contracts or no contracts are 1.4 times less often union members. However, no statistical evidence was found that the age-based differences in union membership can be explained by accounting for employment precariousness.

Another explanation for this dynamic could be the lack of knowledge about trade unions and their services among young workers. Additionally, young workers and precariously employed workers might be coined by distrust towards the established labour market and its institutions.

They wish for upward social mobility but if they do not perceive unions to improve their lives in meaningful and sustainable ways, membership among young people will continuously decline. Trade unions, therefore, face the increasingly difficult challenge of adapting to the new challenges young workers face in the labour market such as the gig-economy or platform work.

THE DECLINE OF EDUCATIONAL HYPERGAMY IN EUROPE

Dávid Erát (Institute of Social and Media Studies, Department of Sociology, University of Pécs) explored data from all nine rounds of the ESS and found that women are more likely to attend higher education than men, resulting in a uniform increase in the female educational advantage. Partner selection based on socioeconomic attributes is often examined in scientific literature, as it is an indicator of social stratification, an avenue of social mobility, and a potential determinant of wellbeing. While theories are divided on the specific aims of individuals looking for a partner, the role of the available pool of partners (called the relationship market) is often highlighted as a crucial factor in deciding who someone forms a partnership with. As such, it can be proposed that changes in the composition of the relationship market are associated with changing mating patterns. Focusing on education, our research aimed to examine how women’s emerging educational advantage is linked with the decline of educational hypergamy (unions in which women have a higher level of education than men). Using data from all available rounds of the ESS, but restricted to respondents aged 25-55, we first examined the relative educational attainment of women and men in seven different birth cohorts. We constructed a simple index of female educational advantage (F-index): this index represents the probability that a randomly chosen male and female the latter has the higher level of education, with 0.5 indicating equality. Employing this index is beneficial as it takes into consideration all levels of education simultaneously.

Looking at the oldest cohort (born in or before 1954), 21 out of the 27 examined nations displayed varying degrees of male educational advantage (F > 0.5). However, by the youngest cohort (born in or after 1980) the picture became very different; in all countries except Switzerland, women gained the upper hand regarding completed education (F > 0.5).

We observed especially high degrees of female educational advantage in the youngest cohorts of Poland (0.67), Estonia (0.68), Slovenia (0.69). Overall, it can be concluded that in Europe, women are generally more highly educated than men. This means that men have a higher probability to meet women with higher education than themselves when looking for a partner, and the opposite is true for women. Based on the previously detailed mechanism, this restructuring of the relationship market might be associated with lower levels of hypergamy. To examine this assumption, we calculated another index (H-index) which represents the prevalence of hypergamy in a given country, with values under 0 indicating that there are more hypogamous (unions in which women have a higher level of education than men) couples than hypergamous ones.

Similarly to the changes in women’s educational advantage, the prevalence of hypergamy decreased, and in 23 nations it became less frequent than hypogamy (H < 0) by the youngest cohort. Only Austria (0.17), Switzerland (0.26), Slovakia (0.29) and Germany (0.37) were found to be lagging behind the common trend. Finally, inspecting the two indices together showed a clear trend for both the oldest and youngest cohorts: as women’s educational advantage increased, the prevalence of hypergamous unions decreased.

An important finding is that by the cohort of those born in or after 1980, women had a clear educational advantage over men and hypergamy was overtaken by hypogamy in 23 out of 27 European nations – confirming previous results of the field. Altogether, the findings suggest that the restructuring of the relationship market due to women’s growing educational lead is associated with changing patterns of partner selection, and that educational hypergamy for women is becoming increasingly infrequent in Europe.
WHAT AFFECTS POLITICAL TRUST? A STUDY OF CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Jonna Toresten (Malmö University) examined ESS Round 9 (2018/19)
Quality of Government and social trust indicators to assess whether this had an effect on levels of political trust

Political trust, which can be described as the trust citizens have for their political system, is something that almost every state seeks. Hence, what affects political trust amongst citizens is a continuous discourse, both in the academic field and the broader political sphere. Despite this, it is not a given how a state ought to gain political trust from its citizens. Previous studies have found that political trust is gained from its citizens based on both cultural and social aspects, as well as the expectations the citizens have towards the state.

Drawing knowledge and inspiration from previous studies, this study set out to examine how two aspects, namely Quality of Government, and social trust, could affect political trust in citizens within all the countries included in ESS Round 9 (2018/19). The study furthermore focused on the measurement of political trust to the political institutions, namely the parliament and the political parties.

The result of the analysis for each of the countries showed that Quality of Government (measured by three items on fairness of political participation, the government taking into account the interests of all citizens and transparency of political decisions) and social trust had a continuous significant effect on citizens’ political trust throughout the study. It could be concluded that a higher social trust affected political trust positively in almost every country examined. This can hence be argued to be a general trend. However, the analysis also produced results which pointed to further complexity in specific cases.

When analysing Norway’s citizens’ political trust towards their parliament, two out of three variables representing social trust could be concluded to not have a significant effect on political trust. As the third social trust variable had a significant effect on Norwegian citizens’ political trust towards political parties, the aspect cannot and should not be disregarded as an important aspect.

The social trust aspect should be further examined and explored in Norway’s case regarding political trust. The same can be said regarding Hungary, where one of the social trust variables tested regarding political trust towards political parties produced a significant negative effect, in other words, pointing towards a higher social trust leading to a lower political trust. While this is the only occurrence of a significant negative relationship and hence going against the established larger trend, this should also be further explored in future studies.

While social trust has been established to have a general positive effect on citizens’ political trust, it is Quality of Government that has the biggest positive effect. Throughout the analysis, aspects of Quality of Government such as transparency, fairness, and a lack of corruption could be concluded to lead to a higher political trust amongst citizens.

In other words, a state which is perceived to be transparent, fair, and overall well-functioning can be argued to have earned the trust of its citizens. It is therefore not unimaginable that an opposite relationship can also be theorised based on the result. A state with perceived high corruption, lack of transparency and fairness can be theorised to have a negative effect on citizens’ political trust.

Lastly, by conducting a structural equation modelling analysis, it could be concluded that the effect of the Quality of Government variables was mostly direct, meaning that they affected political trust directly and not indirectly through social trust. However, some indirect effect was also discovered. The result hence also showcased that Quality of Government also had a positive effect on general social trust. This longer relationship requires further future studies.

In summary, there exists a strong general positive relationship between Quality of Government and political trust as well as between social trust and political trust. Both aspects have strong individual effects, but it has also been established that a high perceived Quality of Government can lead to higher general social trust which also affects political trust positively, in varying degrees.
EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION

Gianmaria Bottoni and Stefan Swift (City, University of London) analysed the mean score for each country over the past four rounds (20012-19) on whether European integration has gone far enough.

In each round of the survey, respondents are asked whether European unification has gone too far or should go further. Answers are given on an 11-point scale from 0 (unification already gone too far) to 10 (unification should go further).

The highest mean score was found in Albania during Round 6 (8.1) and the lowest amongst Austrian respondents in Round 7 (3.8). In the most recent round of the survey, 19/29 countries received mean scores greater than the mid-point of the scale (5).
DOES UNEMPLOYMENT INCREASE OR DECREASE ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION?

Analysis of our data collected in Round 4-8 (2008-17) at the regional level was assessed by Leo Azzollini (University of Oxford) to explore whether electoral participation is affected by employment status.

In this paper, we extend the framework of unemployment scarring to study electoral behaviour, addressing three questions: do past experiences of unemployment scar electoral participation? Does the unemployment rate at different macro-levels increase or decrease voter turnout? Finally, does the macro-level unemployment rate moderate the micro-level effect?

We test these hypotheses relying on the Multilevel Round 4-8 (2008-17) of the European Social Survey, which integrate individual characteristics with contextual variables, such as the unemployment rate at the country, NUTS1 (macro-region) and NUTS2 (region) levels. We fit to this data logistic regressions with country and year Fixed Effects, country-cluster robust standard errors, and design weights, including the appropriate contextual unemployment rate for each specification.

In conclusion, extending the framework of the scar effects of unemployment to electoral outcomes can further illuminate the relationship between social stratification and political behaviour, which is crucial in contemporary Europe, where lower turnout rates and rising ethno-nationalist forces are prominent.
INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN VARIOUS DOMAINS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Anthony Heath (University of Oxford) and Silke Schneider (GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) assessed our data on migrants in Rounds 7 and 8 of the ESS (2014–17), finding that there are clear structural disadvantages for many, yet cultural assimilation is the norm.

Recent research by Anthony Heath and Silke Schneider examined the integration of ethnic minorities with a migration background across Western European countries using data from ESS Round 7 and 8 (2014–17). Ethnic integration was conceptualized broadly, with indicators covering structural, cultural, political, civic and social integration.

As is common practice, they compared first, second and third (and higher) generation minorities, i.e. respondents who migrated themselves, who have at least one migrant parent, and those who had no direct or indirect migration experience. This assumes that the longer ago the migration happened in terms of generations, the more integrated the individual.

However, they also compared individuals claiming a non-indigenous ancestry with respondents claiming indigenous ancestry only, using a new measure available in the ESS since Round 7 developed by Anthony Heath, and checked whether generational integration is faster for some ethnic groups than for others.

Results show that with the exception of citizenship acquisition and homophobic attitudes, all origin groups integrate at pretty much the same speed. For citizenship, unsurprisingly, migrants with autochthonous ancestry (such as destination country nationals born in former colonies and other ‘returnees’) are in a highly advantageous position. However, all other groups catch up until the third generation, with those of non-European descent being fastest. For cultural integration, which was measured using progressive attitudes towards homosexuals and female employment, as expected, there are more traditional attitudes amongst first generation migrants with Middle Eastern, North African and Central Asian, Sub-Saharan African, South-East European and South and South-East Asian and East European backgrounds. After two to three generations, these groups have assimilated and hold similar attitudes to the majority population though (see figure left). In contrast, migrants from other Western European countries or North America and Australasia hold more progressive attitudes than the autochthonous. These groups are also more politically active. Political disengagement is in contrast highest amongst those of Caribbean, South-East European, East Asian and East European descent.

For the structural and social integration indicators, Middle Eastern, North African and Central Asian, Sub-Saharan African and East European origin consistently leads to the strongest disadvantages (note that education was held constant, just as age and sex, in all analyses): They are more often unemployed or low skilled (here also Latin American origin is a disadvantage), have lower household incomes (see figure above - Caribbeans are also strongly affected), live in more ethnically diverse neighbourhoods (which affects...
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also Caribbeans, East Asians and South/South-East-Asians), and less often have no immigrant friends.

These disadvantages do not disappear for the second or third generation, and progress does not differ across groups. Social integration appears to be the most ‘difficult’ integration domain, with all groups facing disadvantages compared to the autochthonous (see figure above), with the West, North and South-European-origin groups however integrating by the third generation. This research allows the following conclusions.

Firstly, while different origin groups mostly integrate at the same ‘generational’ speed, they have highly different starting points. Therefore, just looking at generational differences hides a lot of differentiation and especially the strong disadvantages that some migrant groups face. Secondly, it is worth differentiating within the large European group of migrants: Migrants from South-East and Eastern Europe sometimes face substantial disadvantages as well, even if less so than the most disadvantaged non-European groups. Finally, while in those areas where immigrants themselves can actively integrate (such as cultural, political and civic integration), where integration is largely complete by the 2nd or 3rd generation, in the structural (especially income) and social domains, where a welcoming attitude by the majority population and its institutions is needed, disadvantages are stickier. Migrants often must face initial educational and more long-lasting social class origin disadvantages in addition to ethnic disadvantages. 

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, CULTURAL BACKLASH, AND SUPPORT FOR FAR-LEFT AND FAR-RIGHT PARTIES

Ian McManus (Emerson College) considered ESS data collected over the first eight rounds (2002-17) to understand the motivations that underpin voter support for far-left and far-right political parties

Support for far-left and far-right political parties has been on the rise across Europe in recent years. This political polarisation originates from a series of crises facing countries that have led to considerable social and economic instability.

Events such as the 2008 Global Economic Crisis and the 2015 European Migrant Crisis created ‘windows of opportunity’ for radical parties to tap into voter frustrations with mainstream policies, parties, and institutions. Although radical party voters share a distrust and dissatisfaction with mainstream political institutions and actors (see figure on page 25), the motivations underpinning voter support for far-left and far-right parties are markedly dissimilar.

Ian McManus collected data from eight successive European Social Survey rounds (2002-17) across fifteen countries to analyze the demand-side preferences of far-left and far-right voters. Findings from this research demonstrate that while far-left voters are more attentive to socio-economic issues, centered around redistributive and egalitarian concerns, far-right voters are more focused on socio-cultural issues, related to national identity, culture, and immigration.

Understanding which issues motivate support for far-left and far-right parties is important as shifts in public opinion over the perceived significance of key issues are likely to have different effects on the political fortunes of radical parties.

Although socio-cultural issues were significant for far-right party support, socio-economic issues were less influential. For example, satisfaction with the economy and support for the belief that the government should do more to reduce differences in income were not significant concerns for far-right voters.

By comparison, respondents who agreed that the government should do more to reduce income differences were 187% more likely to vote for far-left parties. The results also suggest that radical party supporters on the left and right hold very different sentiments about the importance of traditions and customs as well as the perceived cultural and economic impact of immigrants on society.

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While far-right supporters hold negative attitudes about the economic and cultural impact of immigration, far-left supporters are more likely to perceive immigration as having positive social and economic effects. This reflects differences between left-wing cosmopolitan attitudes and right-wing nativist beliefs. The findings of this work show that not only do far-left and far-right voters view issues, such as immigration, differently, but that these voting groups are fundamentally motivated by dissimilar concerns. These divergent motivations reflect differences in the degree to which each voting base is focused on socio-economic versus socio-cultural concerns. This distinction is important as it suggests that socioeconomic issues play a smaller role than often assumed in far-right party support.

Understanding far-left and far-right voter differences is vital to identifying what gives radical parties their appeal and power. Such analysis provides insight into the potential impact of radical parties on European democracies going forward. ESS data provides valuable information that allows for a more careful analysis of how radical party support is tied to voters’ attitudes on key socioeconomic and sociocultural issues.

MIGRANTS’ SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING IN EUROPE: DOES RELATIVE INCOME MATTER?

Italian-based academics, Manuela Stranges (University of Calabria), Daniele Vignoli (University of Florence) and Alessandra Venturini (University of Turin) analysed all nine rounds of ESS data (2002-19) to explore the relationship between migrants’ subjective wellbeing and relative income.

In this article, we contribute to the study of Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) across Europe by testing the role of migrants’ relative economic position, compared with relevant reference groups. We operationalise migrants’ ‘relative income’ by defining two measures of economic distance that compare a migrant’s position with the average of two reference groups: natives and migrants, grouped by gender, age, educational level, actual country of residence and area of origin. We used the cumulative dataset of the ESS from 2002 to 2018, evaluating SWB using the question on life satisfaction: ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ measured on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied). We first used the complete ESS dataset of 318,044 individuals (272,230 natives and 45,814 migrants) to form in-sample reference groups and compute relative income measures for migrants. Then we conducted our analysis on the migrants’ sample, estimating ordinary least squares models. At least four findings have emerged. First, we note that as the disadvantage between the migrant and the reference groups becomes smaller, eventually becoming an advantage, the migrant’s life satisfaction increases. This result holds even after controlling for absolute income. In contrast with some authors (Hendriks and Burger, 2018; Clark et al., 2008a, 2008b; Easterlin, 2004; Clark and Eikle, 2011; McBride, 2001), but in line with others (Melzel and Muffels, 2012; Caporale et al., 2009), we find that absolute income has a stronger association with migrant’s SWB than the relative income. Second, we find that migrant income relative to natives shows a stronger relationship with SWB than income relative to other migrants, a result that holds when looking at various subgroups. Consistent with the existing literature (Liu et al., 2019; Prilleltensky, 2012; Gelatt, 2013; Fiske, 2011; Delhey and Kohler, 2006; Clark et al., 2011; Luttmer, 2005), we assert that upward comparisons [to natives] lead to more critical evaluations than downward comparisons [to migrants].

Third, we individualise relevant group-specific differences. Results show that, for second-generation migrants, who have lived in the receiving country and society throughout their lives, with a consequent rise in expectations and aspirations, the relationship between relative income and SWB is higher than for first-generation migrants, regardless of whether the income comparison is with natives or migrants. Differences also emerge by level of education; the relationship between relative income and SWB is higher for those who have the highest level of education. Better-educated migrants have more contact with natives, and therefore may have higher expectations and aspirations and, in turn, may be more sensitive to their relative position in comparison with their reference groups. On the contrary, less-educated migrants tend to socialise inside their ethnic communities, a pattern that influences their perceptions (De Palo et al., 2007).

Finally, we explore the role of subjective measures, at both individual (feelings about household income) and societal (feelings about the socio-economic-institutional conditions in the host country) levels, finding that these variables are important mediators in the relationship between relative income and SWB.

A clearer understanding of distance from reference groups is necessary for designing policies favourable to migrants’ integration into their host country.
ROUND 1  2002/03
- Citizenship
- Immigration

ROUND 2  2004/05
- Work, family and wellbeing
- Health care seeking
- Economic morality

ROUND 3  2004/07
- Personal and social wellbeing
- The timing of life

ROUND 4  2006/09
- Attitudes to age and ageism
- Welfare

ROUND 5  2010/11
- Work, family and wellbeing in recession
- Trust in justice

ROUND 6  2012/13
- Personal and social wellbeing
- Understanding and evaluations of democracy

ROUND 7  2014/15
- Health inequalities
- Immigration

ROUND 8  2016/17
- Climate change and energy
- Welfare

ROUND 9  2018/19
- Justice and fairness
- The timing of life

ROUND 10  2020/21
- Understandings and evaluations of democracy
- Digital social contacts in work and family life

CORE TOPICS IN ALL ROUNDS
- Crime
- Democracy and politics
- Human values
- Immigration
- Media use
- National and ethnic identity
- Perceived discrimination
- Religion
- Social exclusion
- Social trust/trust in institutions
- Subjective wellbeing
- Socio-demographics

PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES

9 ROUNDS
1. Belgium
2. Finland
3. France
4. Germany
5. Hungary
6. Ireland
7. The Netherlands
8. Norway
9. Poland
10. Portugal
11. Slovenia
12. Spain
13. Sweden
14. Switzerland
15. United Kingdom

4 ROUNDS
28. Greece
29. Iceland
30. Croatia
31. Latvia

3 ROUNDS
26. Austria
27. Czechia
28. Denmark

2 ROUNDS
23. Albania
24. Luxembourg
25. Romania
26. Turkey

1 ROUND
22. Kosovo
23. Montenegro
24. Serbia

MEASURING ATTITUDES SINCE 2002
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY

Key milestones in 20 years of the European Social Survey

1995

The development of the ESS was led by Professor Sir Roger Jowell (UK) and Professor Max Kaase (Germany) at the European Science Foundation (ESF).

2001

Launched in 2001 with funding from the European Commission, the first round of the survey was conducted in 2002/03.

2005

The ESS became the first social science project to win the annual Descartes Prize for Excellence in Scientific Collaborative Research, awarded by the European Union (EU).

2013

Following an application submitted by the UK on behalf of 15 founding countries, the ESS was awarded European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) status by the European Commission.

2016

The ESS ERIC was recognised as an European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) Landmark project.

2020

Awarded the Lijphart/Przeworski/Verba Dataset Award by the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association (APSA).

2021

Annual research by the University of Ljubljana (Slovenia) using Google Scholar found that 5,429 English-language academic publications were based on analysis of ESS data (2005-20).

2022

More than 200,000 people have registered to view or download our data.

ESS DATA, RESOURCES AND PUBLICATIONS

The ESS is a major research infrastructure with freely available data to inform academic, policy and public debate on a wide range of social, moral and political issues in Europe. Join over 195,000 other people who have accessed our survey data for free and find out about our resources.

The European Social Survey (ESS) has undertaken 430,870 face-to-face interviews since Round 1 was fielded in 2002/03. All the documentation and data - collected over the subsequent waves up to and including Round 9 (2018/19) - is available to download or view online (europeansocialsurvey.org).

The ESS became a European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) in 2013, meaning all participants contribute to the budget of the infrastructure. Ahead of Round 11, the project has the highest number of Members of any ERIC (ERIC) in 2013, meaning all.

The ESS became the first research infrastructure to win the annual Descartes Prize for Excellence in Scientific Collaborative Research, awarded by the European Union (EU).

Exploring Public Attitudes:
Informing Public Policy

This booklet is the fourth in the series of reports that bring together academic research that rely on our data. Issue 1 included analysis of our data collected from Round 1-3; Issue 2, Round 1-5 and Issue 3, Round 1-7.

The Human Values Scale:
Findings from the ESS

Our report includes analysis of data collected through the Schwartz human values scale. The 21-item scale is a series of statements developed by Shalom H. Schwartz (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) to better understand the moral values of respondents.

Topline Results

Based on our rotating module subjects, we have now produced eleven issues in our Topline Results series of publications. All eleven issues are available to view or download on our website:

1. Trust in Justice (also available in Croatian and Finnish)
2. Welfare Attitudes in Europe (also available in Croatian, Cypriot Greek, Turkish and Ukrainian)
3. Economic Crisis, Quality of Work and Social Integration (also available in Serbian)
4. Europeans’ Understandings and Evaluations of Democracy (also available in Albanian, Bulgarian, German, Italian, Lithuanian and Slovak)
5. Europeans’ Personal and Social Wellbeing (also available in Albanian, French, Hungarian, Italian, Lithuanian, Russian, Slovak, Slovene and Swedish)
6. Social Inequalities in Health and their Determinants (also available in Danish, French, German, Irish Gaelic, Lithuanian, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovene and Spanish)
7. Attitudes towards Immigration and their Antecedents (also available in Finnish, French, Georgian, German, Hebrew, Lithuanian, Norwegian, Slovene and Spanish)
8. The Past, Present and Future of European Welfare Attitudes (also available in Bulgarian, French, German, Lithuanian and Spanish)
9. European Attitudes towards Climate Change and Energy (also available in French, German, Lithuanian, Slovak and Spanish)
10. Justice and Fairness in Europe (also available in Albanian, Bulgarian, French, German, Italian and Lithuanian)
11. The Timing of Life
The European Social Survey is a European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ESS ERIC) that provides cross-national data about public attitudes, beliefs and behaviours.

If you have a general enquiry about the European Social Survey or would like to find out more, please contact ESS HQ based at City, University of London:

+44 (0)20 7040 4907
ess@city.ac.uk
europeansocialsurvey.org
esswellbeingmatters.org
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June 2022