Keysotes

- Prof. Bart Meuleman - Opportunities and challenges of cross-national comparisons over
time: The case of perceived immigrant threat
- Prof. Claudia Senik - Using the ESS to elicit the cultural dimension of happiness
- Prof. Jan van Deth - Big – bigger – ESS? Past, present, and future of empirical social
  research in Europe

Theme 1: Immigration

1.1 Attitudes toward immigrants
- The relation between ethnic threat and economic insecurity in times of economic crisis:
analysis of ESS 2010 data
- Racism and Christianity as the symbolic boundaries toward immigrants in the ESS
countries
- Racism and immigration policies: the mediation role of threat perceptions in a multilevel
perspective
- How do Europeans differ in their attitudes to immigration?
- Media use and attitudes toward immigration in Europe in a cross-country perspective
- European Muslim attitudes on immigration
- Applying age-period-cohort effects model for estimating rise of anti-immigrant sentiment
  in Europe
- Elections and anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe
- Benefit or burden? An exploration of attitudes toward refugees in European nations
- Is it all the same? Forms of racism and their origins reconsidered
- Measuring attitudes towards immigrants: Validity of index variables across countries
- Attitudes towards immigrants in Europe: multilevel analysis

1.2 Researching migrants’ well-being
- The (re)socialization of political culture: Immigrants’ political engagement in Western
  Europe
- What makes a satisfied immigrant? Host-country characteristics and immigrants’ life
  satisfaction in Europe
- Political integration of immigrants: Insights from comparing to stayers, not only to natives

1.3 Ethnicity and ancestry
- At least three reasons why ESS should measure ethnicity
- Ethnic minorities, national minorities and national belonging
- Origin and ethnic identity in the Jewish population of Israel
- Uncovering cultural and ethnic diversity in Europe: A new classification

1.4 Personal circumstances and attitudes to migration
- Educated Ideology
- Two dimensions of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration: Are personal
  attitudes towards migrants as individuals always in line with the attitudes towards
  migration as a phenomenon?
Table of contents

**Theme 2: Work and Family**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 The quality of work and reconciling work and family life in Europe</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Social preferences, institutions and performance in the labour market</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 The effects of entrepreneurship on well-being</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Gender aspects in work and family</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Theme 3: Health and Well-being**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Health care: causes and consequences</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Health inequalities in Europe and their social determinants</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Health, labour markets &amp; (un)employment</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Table of contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme 4: Welfare and social policy</th>
<th>72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.4 The SWB of older Europeans</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Societies, Social Change, and SWB</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Making well-being count for policy</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Public attitudes towards the welfare state and its institutions</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Parents-Offspring relations and life satisfaction</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The effects of unemployment and insecure jobs on well-being and health: The moderating role of labor market policies ................................................................. 58
The socio-political architecture of disability: How different welfare state policies affect the experience of disability and its connection with labor market participation in Europe (2002-2014) ........................................................................................................ 59
Access to Medical care depending on the experience of unemployment in different welfare regimes ........................................................................................................... 60
Unemployment and life satisfaction. Why do we observe cross-country differences? ............................................................ 61
Self-perceived health in older Europeans: Does the choice of survey matter? ........................................................................... 62
When the Old Become Lonely: Structural Determinants of Late-Life Loneliness in Europe ........................................................................ 63
Social capital as the source of subjective well-being in the late life in Central and Eastern European countries ............................................. 64
Subjective Well-being and Economic Growth in Developed European Countries ......................................................................................... 65
Cross-country variations in happiness: Trends, age differentials and anomalies ............................................................................... 66
Social and Cultural Capital in EU countries. A multi-dimensional relationship with well-being construct ........................................................................ 67
Measuring impacts of the economic crisis on well-being in Europe using a comprehensive measure .............................................................. 68
Wellbeing inequality in Europe ......................................................................................................................................................... 69
Five ways to wellbeing in Europe – who does them? ......................................................................................................................... 70
Exploring the perceived quality of society in the UK and Europe ........................................................................................................ 71
A generational perspective on the current state of the educational system in European countries ........................................................................................................ 72
Are Parents in Favour of Educational Tracking? – Educational Tracking and Parental Satisfaction with Educational Systems in Europe ........................................................................ 73
Migrant’s attitude to childcare: An explorative overview of ten migrant groups attitudes to formal childcare in the Netherlands and Denmark ........................................................................ 74
Institutional and Individual Factors in Attitudes toward Healthcare System: An East-West Comparison ..................................................................................................................................................... 75
Crime, policing, and the portability of procedural justice theory: A cross-national comparative analysis ..................................................................................................................................................... 76
Economic Conditions, Government Effectiveness and Public Attitudes towards the Welfare State ..................................................................................................................................................... 77
Welfare State Disciples: Public Benefit Reception Increases Support for Redistribution ..................................................................................................................................................... 78
The Welfare State and Redistribution Policy – Public Preferences and Actual Policy – Comparative Study ..................................................................................................................................................... 79
Generational differences between attitudes towards welfare provision. Convergence between Eastern and Western Europe? ..................................................................................................................................................... 81
Where Do Youth Follow in Their Parents’ Footsteps? College-Going Outcomes Among Young Adults in 19 European Countries ..................................................................................................................................................... 82
Differences across countries in the dispersion of life-satisfaction ..................................................................................................................................................... 83
**Theme 5: Political engagement and evaluations**

5.2 *Protest trends in post-recession Europe* .................................................................................................................. 84

- A Complex relationship: Economic crisis and political participation ............................................................... 84
- The impact of economic recession on protest participation in Europe ............................................................... 85
- Profiling the politically active: using economical, political, sociological and aspirational factors .................. 86

5.3 *The sociology of political activities* ....................................................................................................................... 89

- Youth, Inequality, and Political Participation in Hungary ...................................................................................... 89
- Disruptions in space and time: mapping generational value differences across Europe ...................................... 90
- Political participation and engagement among German adults and youths before, during, and after the global economic crisis .......................................................... 91

5.5 *Political evaluations and engagements* .................................................................................................................. 92

- Labor market risk, electoral institutions, and abstention: Is electoral participation under proportionality less equal? ................................................................................................................ 92
- Trust in the European parliament and Fiscal Transfers, the farmers and rural areas case .................................. 93
- Parenthood and the Polarization of Political Attitudes in Europe ........................................................................ 94
- Relative income and voting patterns in European countries ................................................................................. 95
- Measuring country-level partisanship with ESS data – a new approach ............................................................. 96
- Values and political behavior: perceptions of democracy and the impact of Basic Human Values on left-right voting in Europe ................................................................. 97
- Exploring the political efficacy of citizens under conditions of austerity ............................................................ 98
- Why critical is not the same as disaffected: The socio-demographic background of citizens’ support for democracy ........................................................................................................ 99

**Theme 6: Social attitudes, norms and values**

6.1 *The European project and European values: convergence or divergence?* ....................................................... 100

- Crisis, value change and convergence in Europe – the cases of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain .................. 100
- Values’ becoming as criterions of personal well-being: the cross-cultural study .................................................. 101
- Basic values and trust across Europe and European integration ........................................................................... 102
- Consumption and well-being .................................................................................................................................. 103
- Thrust thy institutions: Importance of trust in institutions in mediating public attitudes towards European integration and immigration .................................................................................. 104

6.2 *Mapping Europe: is the concept of East and West Europe still relevant?* .............................................................. 105

- Catholic, orthodox and human values in Europe ................................................................................................. 105
- Religiosity and subjective well-being: what makes the unchurched happy? ......................................................... 106
- Norms and values connected to corruption: Is there difference between post-communist countries and the rest of Europe? ..................................................................................... 107
- The cold war, culture, and welfare state attitudes .................................................................................................. 108
- Attitudes towards health systems in Eastern and Western Europe – a matter of system performance! .............. 109

6.3 *Attitudes towards homosexuality and experiences of same-sex couples* ........................................................ 110

- Country-level factors shaping views on homosexuality in Europe ......................................................................... 110
- Is there a homophobic divide across Europe? ........................................................................................................ 111
- Public opinion about homosexuality: Do the attitudes toward gay men and lesbian women differ? ................. 112
### Theme 7: Other societal challenges

7.1 European attitudes in global perspective

- Values in Europe and America: Comparing value structures, value priorities and relations of values to demographics and attitudes

- The state we’re in: Expectations and evaluations of democracy in Europe and South Africa

- An institutional trust indicator based on fuzzy logic and ideal solutions

7.2 Other societal challenges

- Intergenerational social class mobility in Europe: the role of income inequality

- Dynamics of intergenerational educational mobility across Europe

- A comparison of the determinants of childbearing intentions before and after the beginning of the economic crisis in Europe

### Author Index
Prof. Bart Meuleman - Opportunities and challenges of cross-national comparisons over time: The case of perceived immigrant threat

Centre for Sociological Research, KU Leuven

From the very start, the European Social Survey was conceived as an instrument to study how structural characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of European populations change (or remain stable) over time. Now that seven rounds of ESS data are available, countless opportunities exist to make this ambition come true. In the coming years, we will almost certainly witness a rapid increase in the number of studies simultaneously making comparisons across nations and across time.

At this point, however, the research community faces pressing questions – conceptually as well as statistically - regarding cross-national comparisons over time. Which kinds of research questions can be answered using a cross-country cross-time design, and which types of questions cannot? Which statistical models are best suited to analyse repeated cross-sectional data? Which substantive conclusions can be meaningfully drawn based on the model parameters? And which are the key threats to the validity of combining cross-national and over-time comparisons?

This presentation enters the debate on cross-national comparisons over time by engaging with these important questions. After providing an overview of possible analytical strategies, I discuss a multilevel approach for studying developments across countries. This approach not only allows separating the impact of individual and contextual characteristics. It also makes it possible to distinguish between cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of context variables, thereby providing new insights. In addition to these important advantages, however, multi-level modelling for this type of comparative research also faces several challenges. During my presentation, I discuss several important methodological and conceptual issues such as the small N problem, the absence of random sampling, the black box problem, and the issue of measurement equivalence, as well as their potential consequences.

Illustrate these concepts and methods at the example of an empirical study on the impact of economic crises on perceived immigrant threat. Building on a dynamic version of group conflict theory, this study investigates whether indicators of economic downturn are systematically related to increased levels of economic and cultural threat. For this purpose, repeated cross-sectional ESS data (2002-2012) is analyzed by means of multilevel modeling. The results provide clear evidence that growing unemployment as well as decreasing rates of economic growth instigate feelings of economic threat. A severe economic shock can produce an effect on economic threat that is similar in size to the effects of social class or political orientation. These findings illustrate the importance of distinguishing between cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of economic context.

Bio

Bart Meuleman is Associate Professor at the Centre for Sociological Research (CeSO) at the University of Leuven (Belgium). His research focuses on cross-national comparisons of value and attitude patterns, such as ethnic prejudice, egalitarianism and support for the welfare state. He is part of the Questionnaire Design Team that developed the Welfare Attitudes module that will be included in ESS round 8. He has a special interest in the application of multilevel modeling and structural equation modeling to comparative survey data. Bart is vice-president of the European Survey Research Association (ESRA), member of the Methodology Group of the European Values Study and has taught methodological courses at numerous institutions across Europe. His research was published in numerous scholarly journals, such as Annual Review of Sociology, Social Science Research, European Sociological Review, Public Opinion Quarterly, Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology and Journal of European Social Policy.
Prof. Claudia Senik - Using the ESS to elicit the cultural dimension of happiness

University Paris–Sorbonne and Paris School of Economics

There are important differences in self-declared happiness across countries of the world, even across countries of similar affluence. The European Social Survey is a perfect tool to illustrate and analyze those differences, as its national samples include both natives and different generations of immigrants. The survey allows analyzing the impact of schooling, language and other institutions that differ across regions and countries and shape cultural differences.

Bio

Claudia Senik is Professor of Economics at the Paris School of Economics and the University Paris-Sorbonne. She is also member of the IZA and of the Institut Universitaire de France. Educated at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, she received her PhD from EHESS. Her main research areas include happiness studies, political attitudes and post-transition economies, with a special interest in the subjective welfare effects of income growth and income distribution.
Understanding rapid social and political changes requires reliable data. This became painfully clear in the early 1990s when scholars from all over Europe collaborated in the ‘Beliefs-in-Government’ Project (BiG). The BiG group identified a number of methodological deficiencies and a lack of data and recommended the establishment of a truly collaborative ‘European Social Survey’ (ESS). By now, the availability of first-rate cross-national and longitudinal data provides opportunities for empirical analyses previous generations of scholars could only have dreamed of. With almost 90,000 registered users and 60,000 data downloads (January 2016) the ESS undoubtedly contributes to the realisation of these dreams considerably. Besides, the main aspects of its unique and ambitious design – repeated cross sections; core and rotating modules; focus on ‘optimal comparability’ – have been evaluated very positively. Based on this successful development of collaborative empirical social research in Europe three points will be discussed. Firstly, the origins of the ESS in the BiG-project are evident and many problems seem to be solved – yet the question remains whether the ESS meets the high expectations of the 1990s. Secondly and more importantly, the question is to what extent the ESS facilitates our understanding of social and political change in Europe. Whereas the core modules enable cross-national, comparative, and longitudinal analyses of key orientations and attitudes, the rotating modules provide information on several special topics such as immigration, health, well-being, or democracy. Does the combination of these two types of modules meets the challenges of understanding rapid social and political change both substantively and substantially? Based on the evaluation of the first two concerns the final question addressed is: do we need the ESS-as-we-know-it in the next 25 years or should major improvements be considered?

Bio

Jan W. van Deth is emeritus professor of political science and international comparative social research at the University of Mannheim (Germany) and project director at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). He convened one of the four parts of the BiG-Project, was a member of the preparatory committee ‘Blueprint for an ESS’, and was German National Coordinator for the first six waves of the ESS.
Theme 1: Immigration

1.1 Attitudes toward immigrants

Sessions organized by Anthony Heath, Nuffield College Oxford, Moshe Semyonov, Tel Aviv University, Anastasia Gorodzeisky, Tel Aviv University, and Eldad Davidov, University of Zurich

The relation between ethnic threat and economic insecurity in times of economic crisis: analysis of ESS 2010 data

1Jaak Billiet; 1Bart Meuleman; 2Hans De Witte

Centre for Sociological Research, KU Leuven1, Organization and Personal Psychology, KU Leuven2

This paper analyses the relationships between changed economic conditions and the attitude towards immigration. We analyze three questions. How are a vulnerable position on the labor market and recent changes in the individuals’ economic condition related to perceived ethnic threat? What is the role of the nation’s economic and immigration context? Are relations at the individual level between economic conditions and perceived ethnic threat affected by context variables? Data of 23 country sample of ESS round 5 (end 2010 - begin 2011) is used. At the micro level, unemployment, job insecurity, and income deterioration during past three years affect perceived ethnic threat, as predicted by group conflict theory. These effects are however rather small. Among the context variables, only Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth shows an effect in the expected direction: perceived threat seems higher in countries in which GDP growth is lower. Our design however does not allow to conclude that changes in the economic context lead to changes in attitudes towards immigrants. The significant cross-level interaction for economic growth indicates that the threat-inducing effect of unemployment is stronger in contexts where GDP growth is high. This finding contradicts our hypothesis. One could explain this by the emergence of a generalized feeling of economic insecurity in countries severely hit by the economic crisis. In these countries, strong feelings of economic insecurity – and the resulting levels of perceived ethnic threat - might be also be present among those who are employed, thereby diminishing the gap with the unemployed.

The proposed study follows up the article by Bail (2008) dealing with the concept of symbolic boundaries toward immigrants. Symbolic boundaries have been described theoretically earlier as "conceptual distinctions made by social actors that separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership" (Lamont, Molnár 2002). Bail analyzed ESS Round 1 data for 21 European countries and employed the fuzzy-clusters analysis on data from the “hypothetical immigrant” battery of items. He developed a typology of symbolic boundary configurations based on the combination of preference for six different hypothetical attributes of an immigrant: race, religion, language, culture, education, and occupation. The created typology of countries based on the preferences for described above attributes of immigrants had three "ideal types" of symbolic boundaries combination and Bail showed that European countries match into his three types rather systematically. Type A contains "new" and/or peripheral countries; type B is represented by countries with a long tradition of immigration and type C comprises of the North European countries and Switzerland. 

Our study works with only two attributes/ dimensions of symbolic boundaries: - race and religion. We are generally interested in studying the differences between European countries in terms of racism and perception of Christianity in relation to immigration. The A type countries were defined by Bail as those with the above average preferences for white race and Christian religiosity when it comes to immigrants. In our analysis we first focus on the confirmation of Bail’s configuration of symbolic boundaries in the newest ESS data (Round 7). With respect to the subject of the study we want to confirm the typology at least with two selected type of boundaries (race and religion). Preliminary analyses show that new data roughly support the original typology. Confirmed structure will be further investigated with other items from the ESS 7 questionnaire, specifically items measuring traditional racism and religiosity. The employed theoretical approach will be the contact hypothesis. We want to answer following research questions: Are type A countries more racist than type B and C countries? Within the type A, do South European countries appear less racist than East European countries, which have almost exclusively white population? Do type A countries have stronger Christian believes than type B and C countries? Do people in countries with small experience with other than Christian denomination stress the Christianity as a symbolic boundary more intensively than people from countries with greater experience with non-Christian religions? Do non-believers/atheist in countries with small experience with other than Christian religion stress the Christianity more than atheists from countries where other non-Christian denominations are more common? Is stressing the importance of Christianity for immigrants related rather to islamophobia than to the personal religious beliefs?

References:
Racism and immigration policies: the mediation role of threat perceptions in a multilevel perspective

1Alice Ramos; 2Cicero Pereira; 1Jorge Vala

Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon1, Universidade Federal da Paraiba2

One of the issues that are more salient in the immigration debate refers to national public policies. This problem has been analysed from two different perspectives: a) the characteristics immigrants should hold and their ethnic and cultural background (e.g. Lewin-Epstein & Levanon 2005; Heath & Tilley 2005); b) the importance of anti-discrimination laws concerning people perceived as belonging to different racial or ethnic origin (e.g. Hjerm 2004; Ramos, Vala & Pereira 2008). The aim of this presentation is to contribute to this debate introducing a new dimension of analysis: the role of biological and cultural racism on the opinions about public policies related to immigrants. Data from 15 countries of the European Social Survey 7 will be used. Primary analyses show that biological and cultural racism matter and are associated to the support for ethnicist criteria for immigrants’ selection (e.g. being Christian and being white), to the opposition to anti-discrimination laws towards people perceived as belonging to a different race or ethnic group, and to a restrictive policy concerning refugees’ requests. Results also show that these relationships are mediated by the perceptions of realistic and symbolic threats associated to immigrants. Interactions between the individual and the contextual level will also be tested. For this purpose we will introduce three contextual variables: the growth rate of immigrants and refugees and the political past (recent experience of authoritarian regimes vs a longer history of democratic regimes).
How do Europeans differ in their attitudes to immigration?

Anthony Heath; Robert Ford

*Nuffield College, Oxford*, *Manchester University*

This paper will provide an overview of how citizens in different European countries differ in their attitudes towards immigration. The primary focus will be on overall sympathy or hostility towards immigration (based perhaps on a scale deriving from questions B29-B31) rather than on more precise differences in attitudes towards particular types or groups of migrant or criteria for immigration.

The main aim of the paper is to explore both within-country and between-country differences in attitudes, and the interaction between them. Thus we plan to explore how supportive or otherwise of immigration are people of different age, educational level, social class and migration background. Does the usual assumption that younger, highly-educated and economically secure individuals will be more supportive of immigration hold true, and that older, less-educated and economically vulnerable individuals are more opposed to immigration?

Secondly, do we find that these patterns hold true with similar strength across Europe, or do we find that some countries (possibly western European ones such as Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands) are more socially-polarized in their attitudes, while others (possibly the Nordic countries) are more homogeneous around a relatively supportive average position, and perhaps yet others (possibly some Eastern European countries) are more homogeneous around a less supportive average?

In the light of the findings with respect to our second question, we will consider how far we can characterize countries as being more or less supportive of immigration or whether it makes more sense to say that European elites are more or less uniformly supportive of immigration whereas it is among disadvantaged groups that the cross-national variation is most evident.

Key words: Attitudes to immigration; social polarization; cross-national differences; demographic differences
In this paper we analyze the association between media use and attitudes toward immigration in European countries. This association has been empirically examined mainly in single country studies (van Klingeran, Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2015; Schlüter and Davidov, 2013; Masso, 2009), suggesting that media reports about immigration play an important role in the explanation of negative attitudes toward immigrants. However, cross-country studies analyzing these associations in Europe from a comparative perspective are very scarce.

In the current study we aim to fill this gap. We hypothesize that frequency of media use will be associated with more negative attitudes toward immigrants in different European countries. Furthermore, we expect that in countries with a higher level of media autonomy, where sensationalized news is more abundant, the attitudes toward immigrants will be more negative. We expect based on theory (Benson & Saguy, 2005) the level of media autonomy to strengthen the link between media use and negative attitudes toward immigrants.

For the empirical analysis we utilize data from the European Social Survey collected in 2014 across 22 European countries. The ESS data include measures of attitudes toward immigration and of media exposure. We operationalize exposure to media by computing the average time spent on watching TV and the average time spent on watching news about politics and current affairs. For the level of autonomy of the media we use the world press freedom index as a contextual variable. For the empirical analysis we use a multilevel modeling approach.

References:
European Muslim attitudes on immigration

Asma Mustafa; Lindsay Richards

European attitudes towards immigration have been regularly discussed at public settings, in publications and on social media; the overall observation being negative views and demands for a reduction in and restrictions on immigration. Recently, these attitudes have been heightened by two ‘Muslim’ related factors: the increased immigration into Europe by Muslims from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan etc. and fear of ‘Islamic’ terrorism conducted on home land soil, at times instigated by foreigners. Public concerns about different cultures, delayed integration and threat of home-based terrorist activities are undoubtedly influential and impact on political rhetoric.

Anecdotally, European Muslim voices are also being heard that resist further ‘Muslim’ immigration. Critical attitudes towards immigration from those who themselves were migrants or the children of migrants is not necessarily due to racism or cultural superiority; but may be in part due to fears of being targeted for abuse, harassment and discrimination due to religious visibility and being seen as ‘foreigners’ rather than being accepted as long-settled and integrated citizens. European Muslims may also fear the further competitiveness in jobs and housing at a time of limited resource availability and employment opportunities. These voices share the same discursive space as those European Muslims who welcome further immigration to Europe, and support more open policies towards immigration.

Given the potential for such attitudes to be held, this paper would use the ESS data to explore attitudes towards immigration from the perspective of Muslim Europeans; seeing if religious minority attitudes vary: Are European Muslims more or less receptive of other Muslim migrants? Do their views differ on migrants from different backgrounds? Can differences be noted based on self-defined religiousness? Furthermore, we can investigate if the drivers of anti-immigration attitudes among Muslims are similar to those in the majority population, such as age and educational attainment. Theoretical underpinnings will touch upon ‘secularisation’ theses, social identity theories (internal solidarity/belonging), and intergroup contact.

We will compare attitudes of the Muslim population to those of the majority population overall and for each country individually. This will enable examination of the extent to which the national context shapes these processes. We will use bivariate analysis for part of the analysis and a series of regression models to examine the drivers in attitudes. We will experience sample limitations, given than some European countries have low numbers of Muslims, however, the analysis will focus on countries with sample representation including France, Belgium, UK, Spain and Austria among others.
Applying age-period-cohort effects model for estimating rise of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe

1Anastasia Gorodzeisky; 1Moshe Semyonov

tel Aviv University

Social scientists have long been concerned with understanding the social mechanisms underlying emergence of prejudice and discrimination against outgroup populations. Subsequently, several alternative theoretical models have been advanced for explaining the social conditions that lead to emergence of prejudice and discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities. Among the alternative models, the theoretical framework often entitled ‘competitive threat’ or ‘group threat’ (see, Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Olzak, 1992) is perhaps the most dominant one. According to the ‘group threat’ framework fear of competition associated with either increased size of an outgroup population or depressed economic conditions is likely to prompt hostility, prejudice and discrimination against members of the outgroup populations.

Although the ‘competitive threat’ theoretical model was originally developed in the context of American society, it has been adopted and applied in a large number of studies on sources of attitudes toward immigrants in European societies (e.g. see Ceobanu and Escandel, 2010 for review of the ever-growing literature on the topic). Surprisingly, whereas the overwhelming majority of studies on the topic were conducted within a comparative cross-sectional design (e.g. Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, Gijberts, and Coenders, 2002; Schlueter, Meuleman and Davidov, 2013; Semyonov, Rajman and Gorodzeisky, 2008), only very few were carried out within a dynamic - longitudinal research design (e.g. for notable exceptions see Semyonov, Rajman and Gorodzeisky, 2006; Pichler, 2010; Mueleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2008). The scarcity of studies of overtime change is unfortunate because theoretical formulations on the rise in antagonism and prejudice toward out-group populations were cast in dynamic terms. That is, according to the ‘competitive threat’ theoretical model negative views toward out-group populations are likely to rise due to an increase in threat of competition caused by either an over-time increase in the relative size of the outgroup population, deteriorating economic conditions or shift in support for right-wing extreme nationalist parties.

In the present paper we contribute to the literature on structural sources of discriminatory attitudes toward out-group populations by applying the ‘age-period-cohort effects’ analytical model (e.g. Yang 2006, 2008; and Yang and Land, 2006); an analytical model that is more suitable for estimation of over time change in attitudes than the analytical models utilized in previous studies. It enables examination of the dynamic relations between overtime change in sources of competitive threat and rise in anti-immigrant sentiment while controlling for both differences in individual-level attributes and differences in socio-demographic composition of cohorts. Specifically, we utilize the ‘age-period-cohort effects’ model when applying it to data obtained from four waves of the European Social Surveys for 15 European countries between 2002 and 2014 to accurately estimate the dynamic relations implied by the theoretical model. By so doing, we will be in a position to better understand and delineate the ways that over time change in sources of threat affect and shape change in attitudes toward outgroup populations not only in Europe but in other societies as well.
Elections and anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe

Carolyn Keller; Philip Barker

Keene State College

Social scientists have extensively studied the political, economic and social determinants of immigrant threat. Extant literature examines the nature of immigrant threat - the difference between cultural and economic fears (McLaren 2003; Sniderman Hagadoorn and Prior 2004). Social and political psychologists tend to emphasize the size of relative groups and issues of identity as indicators for individual reactions to immigration (Quillian 1995; Schneider 2008). Finally, another area of research emphasizes demographic variation in threat levels (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).

While it has widely been assumed that these attitudes are impacted greatly by national contexts, to date, there has been little empirical research that focuses on the role that elections play in increasing levels of threat. Given the recent so-called “refugee crisis” facing Europe it becomes increasingly important to examine what role elections can play in changing attitudes about threat across countries and the role political elites may play in increasing or attenuating fears. Specifically, we ask – what role do elections play in driving immigrant fears?

In our analysis we utilize the immigrant sections of the European Social Survey from 2002 and 2014. We utilize event data to generate a variable that measures the distances between individuals’ date of interview and proximity to national elections including both presidential and parliamentary elections. Using OLS regression and logistic regression, we find that in both time periods across countries, the closer an election, the more likely an individual is to estimate a higher percentage of immigrants within their own country. Additionally, we find that economic and culture fears are raised around elections. This suggests that party platforms and politicians more generally play an important role in generating an atmosphere of fear when it comes to immigration.

Next we test a set of individual and country-level hypotheses to determine the impact of socioeconomic status and level of development on immigrant fear. On the individual level, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) find that those with higher levels of education are more favorable towards immigrants. We generate an interaction between the level of education and proximity to election and confirm that those with higher levels of education are less impacted by national level elections that those with less education. This suggests more stability in attitudes towards immigrants amongst individuals with more education.

Finally, utilizing multi-level modeling, we generate a cross-level interaction between level of development (using HDI) and proximity to elections and do not find a significant impact on immigrant threat. This suggests that regardless of variation in level of development between countries, national level elections play an important role in shaping individual attitudes towards immigrants in Europe.
Benefit or burden? An exploration of attitudes toward refugees in European nations

Yvette Young

University of Utah

The current influx of refugees into the European Union has generated a new round of speculation about the effect of immigrants on the receiving economy. While refugees may have many positive effects on the receiving nation, it is the perceived negative effects, specifically the burden they place on the receiving economy, that currently garner the most discussion and attention. In this paper, I use the immigration module for multiple waves of the European Social Survey to explore changing attitudes toward refugees. Specifically, I investigate how public perceptions of immigrant threat relate to opinions about whether governments should be “generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status.”

I rely on two theoretical perspectives to help explain attitudes toward refugees. Using a political economy perspective I argue that political structure and modes of resource allocation affect attitudes regarding refugees. Using a typology of immigrant threat I explore several different types of perceived threat—economic threat, group size, threat of violence, and cultural threat. Based on this perspective I argue that changing global political circumstances contribute to changes in the types of threat perceived by the public, which in turn, affect attitudes toward refugees. I use multilevel mixed effects models with interactions for time to explore changing attitudes toward refugees. I explore the effects of the political economy using variables for polity type, welfare state type, and the effectiveness of welfare institutions. At the country-level I control for potential sources of perceived threat. With regard to economic threat this includes controls for GDP per capita and economic inequality. With regard to threat based on group size I control for stock of immigrants as a percentage of the population. For threat of violence I include a measure of the count of terrorist events in the country in the past 5 years. To control for two potential components of cultural threat I include a measure of ethnic fractionalization and a measure of religious fractionalization. At the individual level I control for a variety of socio-demographic factors including age, gender, level of education, and income. Finally, I test the effect of people’s perceptions of threat based on economic factors, cultural difference, crime, and contact.

My preliminary findings indicate that there is substantial variation across countries that can be explained by a mix of individual and contextual factors. Contextual factors such as polity type, welfare state structure, the strength of the economy, and recent terrorist events help shape individual perceptions of immigrant threat and affect individual attitudes toward refugees. In addition, attitudes differ over time, often correlating with global and national political events. Future projects will want to compare these factors and effect of perceived immigrant threat before, during, and after the Syrian refugee crisis.
Is it all the same? Forms of racism and their origins reconsidered

Carolin Rapp

University of Bern

Taking the path-breaking publication “Forms of Racism and the Cumulative Dimension of Ethnic Attitudes” by Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993) as a starting point, this contribution tests whether different forms of racism still exist in cross-country comparison. In line with Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993), the analysis differentiates between four different concepts of “racism”, i.e. attitudes towards immigrants: aversive racism, symbolic racism, ethnocentrism and biological racism. The leading research question is if these four concepts may be distinguished and if this differentiation holds between European countries. The research question, thus, taps into the issue of concept misspecifications in the research on attitudes towards immigrants. Hitherto, attitudes towards immigrants are measured and conceptualized in multiple ways: some speak of ethnic exclusionism, others use the term ethnocentrism, and most of the publications refer to negative sentiments or attitudes towards immigrants. The problem, however, is that researcher rely on the same measurement for different concepts or different measurements for the same concepts. Accordingly, the aim of this contribution is to shed more light on the differentiation of concepts and measurement in the research on attitudes towards immigrants.

The analysis, however, goes one step further by not only asking about the differences in attitudes, but also about their origins. Accordingly, the second research question asks if different forms of racism are influenced by different factors. These factors mainly are threat perceptions, increased ethnic diversity as well as inter-ethnic contact. Both research questions are tested empirically with the help of the newest release of the European Social Survey (ESS 7). Compared to other data sets the newest wave of the ESS offers the possibility to test for different forms of racism as it explicitly asks for biological racism. This kind of attitude has been – to best of my knowledge - highly neglected in existing surveys on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.
Measuring attitudes towards immigrants: Validity of index variables across countries

Ave Roots; Anu Masso; Mare Ainsaar

University of Tartu

This study aims to contribute to the methodological discussions about measurement quality of immigration attitudes. We offer five theoretically grounded index variables for analysing the immigration attitudes across Europe using ESS database. We also estimate the measurement quality of these indicators across European countries. Previous studies have concentrated on various methodological aspects related to measuring attitudes towards immigration. However, there are only single studies about immigration attitudes (Tsai, 2002; Davidov, Meuleman, Cieciuch, Schmidt, & Billiet, 2014) that have analyzed the validity of measurement scales. As suggested in previous theoretical approaches (Castles, 2010) and in empirical studies (Masso, 2009; Davidov & Meuleman, 2012) due to the multidimensionality of the immigration attitudes using the indexes instead of single variables in quantitative analysis may be more reliable. However, as far as we know, the validity of these composite indexes in cross-country studies has previously not been studied.

Using European Social Survey 2014 data we calculate a composite index of attitudes toward immigration based on single variables and comprising five main sub-dimensions found in previous studies like attitudes towards immigration policies, ethnic prejudice (Houvouras, 2001), expected benefits related to immigration (Esses, Brochu, & Dickson, 2012), diversity of exclusion criteria (Alexseev, 2015), readiness for contacts, or social distance (Hipp & Boessen, 2012). We test the hypothesis raised in previous studies (Davidov et al., 2015) that the validity of index variables of immigration attitudes may vary across countries. First, we discuss in the paper about conceptual validity, i.e. the theoretical grounds for index composition. Second, we evaluate in the paper the measurement validity, assessing quantitatively the five indexes analyzing the relationships between index variables and background variables across countries.

There are some differences in Western and Eastern Europe. Structural Equation Models show that although in both Eastern and Western Europe being Christian and white has error covariance, in Western Europe these variables are connected to the general latent variable of the attitudes towards immigration, but in Eastern Europe being white and education are connected with the general latent variable. In Western Europe criteria for immigrants and the readiness for contact are closely linked, this is not the case in Eastern Europe. Nationality and race and the country of origin (poorer country inside or outside Europe) are linked with being white in both Eastern and Western Europe, but being Jew, Moslem and Roma is connected to being white only in Western Europe.

References:
Attitudes towards immigrants in Europe: multilevel analysis

Michaela Šedovičová

Masaryk University

This paper analyses micro and macro factors influencing formation of the attitudes towards immigrants in Europe. This research aims to combine both above mentioned levels in multilevel analysis using contact theory and measuring direct and indirect exposure of majority members to immigrants.

Its attempt is to fill a gap in research by using rotating module ESS Immigration to explain attitudes towards immigrants and their descendants through the contact theory. The aim is to answer the question, whether higher share of the foreign population in a national state and their inclusion is enough to break the negative attitudes and if answer is yes, whether it is true for all groups in society in every country. The hypothesis to be tested is that positive attitudes toward immigrants would grow in societies with more frequent contact between groups, thus personal contact with immigrants would lose its importance.

Previous researches prove that both individual characteristics and contact with the immigrants shape the attitudes towards them as seen in Bello, 2015 (political orientation, religious degree, alienation), Curtis, 2014 (identity and alienation), Moller et col., 2008 (perceived consequences of immigration), Valentova and Berzosa, 2011 (contact with outgroup members).

On the other hand, pool of researches explain attitudes on macro level through aggregated data and national statistics. This approach could be seen in Jolly and DiGusto, 2014 (foreign population share on regional level), Percival and Currin-Percival, 2010 (foreign population share on state level), Rustenbach, 2010 (foreign population share, national unemployment rate).

Eurostat data of the share of the foreign population in countries and constructed instrument measuring similarity between a job prestige of individuals with and without migratory background in each country present national level. Individual level consists of personal opinion on the impact of immigration onto a country, variety of demographic and socioeconomic control variables and actual contact of individuals with the members of out-group (question on the number of people from another country among friends and question on the number of the people from another among colleagues). All the data except Eurostat one are obtained from round first ESS database. Research uses data from 21 countries included in the first round.

To analyse the data in two level regression model, software Stata MP Version 13 is employed.

Preliminary results, that not yet include similarity index, show negative relation between share of foreigners in the country and intensity of negative attitudes held by the members from a majority.
The (re)socialization of political culture: Immigrants’ political engagement in Western Europe

1Peter Thisted Dinesen; 1Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen

University of Copenhagen

How is immigrants' political engagement shaped in the cross-pressure between the political cultures of their ancestral country and their present country of residence? In addition to its relevance for political integration of immigrants, this question taps into scholarly debates about how political culture evolves. Because many immigrants originate in countries with political cultures far removed from the culture of their present-day country, studying their political engagement can shed light on processes of cultural change and reproduction. We make two contributions in this regard. First, we study the extent to which political culture is persistent or evolves over time by examining how levels of political participation (a proxy for political culture) in the contemporary and the ancestral country correlate with immigrants present-day participation. Second, we suggest that one simple mechanism underlying the processes of (re)socialization of political culture is spatial and temporal proximity to bearers of this culture (i.e. native residents of the ancestral/contemporary country).

Our analysis is based on first and second generation immigrants in the European Social Survey round 1-6 (around 37,000 individuals) supplemented with data from the World Value Survey. Two main findings emerge. First, while somewhat inert, political culture is to a substantial extent updated: natives’ level of participation in the ancestral and the contemporary country both strongly predict participation of first and second generation immigrants. Second, the (re)socialization of a given political culture is conditioned by spatial and temporal proximity to this culture. The culture of the contemporary country matters more for second than for first generation immigrants, and for first generation immigrants having spent longer time there. And vice versa for the ancestral country. Furthermore, participation of first and second generation immigrants tracks native participation in regions within the present-day country. Finally, the influence of the ancestral country vis-à-vis the contemporary country is weakened with strength of ties with natives in the latter.
What makes a satisfied immigrant? Host-country characteristics and immigrants’ life satisfaction in Europe

Irena Kogan, Jing Shen, Manuel Siegert

University of Mannheim, BAMF

Whereas a vast body of research is devoted to examining objective conditions of immigrants’ integration, little is known about immigrants’ subjective evaluation of their life situation. Scarce comparative research (Safi 2009) shows that migrants are more satisfied in some countries than the others. However to date, research has not been able to entirely clarify why cross-country variation exists and which characteristics of the host countries determine immigrants’ levels of life satisfaction. This is where our paper sets up its major research objectives. In the current study we intend to (1) explore descriptively whether substantial differences between receiving countries exist with regard to immigrants’ life satisfaction; (2) explain these differences in terms of host-countries’ institutional characteristics; and (3) examine whether immigrants’ subjective well-being varies with immigrants’ skill levels and host-country characteristics.

From a socio-psychological perspective, life satisfaction is an evaluation process, in which individuals compare their (perceived) situations with their hopes and expectations of how the situation should be, namely, an ideal situation (Campbell et al. 1976; Michalos 1985). As far as the immigrant population is concerned, existing studies have identified three dimensions that are directly related to immigrants’ subjective evaluation process – namely, the economic condition, the extent of acceptance by the mainstream society, and the extent of cultural integration into the receiving society (Siegert 2013). These three dimensions cannot be addressed solely at the individual level. Country-level characteristics, such as quality of public goods, the nature of immigrant integration regime, and the extent of social inequality within a country, should play a role in immigrants’ self-evaluations.

Based on the data from six waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) collected from 18 European countries between 2002 and 2012, we estimated immigrants’ life satisfaction by adopting a multi-level analysis. This allowed us to differentiate impacts at the host-country level from those at the individual level. At the macro host-country level, the quality of public goods was measured by Human Development Index. Immigrants’ integration regimes in the host country were captured by two indicators: Migration Integration Policy Index and the native-born respondents’ attitudes toward immigrants (generated from the ESS). The level of economic inequality in the host country was measured by the Gini coefficient. At the micro level, we controlled for a wide range of characteristics, e.g., immigrants’ countries of origin, years since migration, age, gender, household composition, education, income, social integration, health, and perceived discrimination.

Our results show that immigrants tend to be more satisfied with their lives in countries that offer higher quality of public goods and that offer more welcoming social settings indicated by the natives’ attitudes toward immigrants rather than legal regulations. We found a remarkable trend regarding economic inequality. On average, immigrants are less satisfied with their lives in host countries with relatively high levels of economic inequality. However, highly educated immigrants tend not to perceive economic inequality of the country as an obstacle of their satisfaction. In fact, the negative influence of the country’s economic inequality on life satisfaction is significantly reduced among highly educated immigrants.
Political integration of immigrants: Insights from comparing to stayers, not only to natives

David Bartram

University of Leicester

As with other aspects of migrants’ experiences, research on immigrants’ political integration generally proceeds via comparisons to the political activity of natives. Typically, one discerns a gap between immigrants and natives and concludes that immigrants are insufficiently integrated in political terms. That angle matters – but research on this topic should give greater consideration to the “starting point” of migrants’ political engagement, i.e., their engagement prior to migration. For this angle, we can gain insight by comparing migrants to stayers in the origin countries.

This paper uses European Social Survey data to analyse immigrants in the UK and Germany, comparing to stayers in the main origin countries where sufficient data are available*. The analysis indicates that migrants moving to Germany from the specified countries experience an increase in their political participation, while migrants to the UK (from the specified countries) experience a decrease.

These outcomes are rather different from what is suggested by comparison to natives in the destination: those comparisons imply a problem of participation among immigrants in Germany but not in the UK. Changing the angle of comparison, then, has significant implications for how we perceive matters of this sort – a point likely to hold for other topics as well.

*(Ireland, Germany, and Poland for the UK, and Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, and Turkey for Germany)
At least three reasons why ESS should measure ethnicity

Lilia Dimova

Agency for Social Analyses (ASA)

Social researchers are well aware that ethnicity is among the most problematic phenomena to measure - both at national and especially at cross-national perspectives. The two widespread research approaches – demographic approach and ethnic identity approach (Gayle, Connelly and Lambert, 2015) give lot opportunities for national implementation, but face many limitations and complexities in multi-national social surveys. Despite the extensive literature which discusses the meaning and use of the term ethnicity, the terminological diversity in different countries often is seen as the main obstacle not to include ethnicity items in the research instruments for comparative surveys. At the same time, ethnicity becomes more and more crucial focal point in the new and dynamic ethno-social environment in Europe. On the basis of ESS this paper explores some lessons learn from the implementation of current approaches to measure ethnicity focusing on their strengths and weaknesses. The analyses try to shed light on the questions: should ethnic identity be measure and ethnic groups be counted cross-nationally in European context, and what could be the possible benefits for the ESS to do so.
Ethnic minorities, national minorities and national belonging

Anthony Heath; Silke Schneider

Nuffield College, Oxford, GESIS

The paper will examine the relationships between ancestry (measured by the new ESS ancestry measure) and the sense of national belonging (D22), and possibly partisanship as well. The new ancestry measure is potentially especially valuable because it allows one to distinguish national minorities or other kinds of sub-national groups (without a recent migration background) as well as migrants and the children of migrants (often described as ethnic minorities).

While people with a recent migration background (that is to say the children of migrants, although not the grandchildren) can fairly readily be identified in surveys from the country of birth of the respondent and his or her parents, national minorities without a migration background have been largely invisible in most survey research. The new ancestry measures allow us to investigate the attitudes and identities of these national minorities for the first time in a systematic way. To be sure, some ESS countries are relatively homogeneous and do not, as far as we know, have major internal cleavages between national minorities and the majority. However, in a number of countries such as Belgium, Britain, Finland, France, Spain and some of the Baltic countries there are known to be long-standing cleavages of this sort. The paper will therefore focus on those ESS countries where there are adequate numbers of respondents who indicate a national minority background. We will also compare these groups with those having a migration background (distinguishing between the first and second generations).

One main dependent variable will be strength of national belonging. Our main hypothesis is that people with an exclusively majority ancestry will report a stronger sense of national belonging than do respondents with national minority ancestry or with migration backgrounds. We also expect to find generational differences, with the second generation having a stronger sense of national belonging than the first. We may also be able to look at other dependent variables such as partisanship and support for multicultural policies.

A further interest will be to compare the patterns for people with dual ancestries (that is both a majority and a minority/migrant ancestry) with those who indicate either an exclusively majority or an exclusively minority or migrant ancestry.

Key words: ancestry; minorities; national belonging
Israel is a deeply divided society along ethno-national lines, separating the Jewish from the Arab populations, and distinguishing sub-groups within each. The proposed presentation focuses specifically on ethnic identification among Jews, who constitute the majority (~80%) of Israel's population. Israel has a long history of ethnic cleavages within the Jewish population. Most studies as well as official statistics that refer to ethnic cleavages within the Jewish community used a broad continent-based dichotomy. The common distinction is between two groups of Jews: “Ashkenazim,” whose family origin is in Europe or the Americas (including Australia and New-Zealand); and 2) “Mizrahim,” whose origin is in Asia or Africa, mostly in Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa. With the passage of time increasing numbers of Jews living in Israel are 3rd and even 4th generation for whom it is impossible to determine ethnic origin on the bases of parents’ place of birth (in official statistics Israeli-born Jews to Israeli-born fathers are assigned an “Israeli” origin). Aside from the growing difficulty of determining ethnic affiliation of the third generation, two processes are at work, eroding the ethnic distinction within the Jewish population. First, the Jewish nation-building project aims to highlight the similarities among the various Jewish groups – the common historic origin as well as the shared present and future challenges – and to downplay the difference. Second, an increasing proportion of marriages cut across the Jewish ethnic cleavage. Their offspring are of mixed (Jewish) ethnicity. This growing segment is under-identified especially in the third generation where grandparents place of birth is unknown. Finally, this "objective" measure of ethnicity assumes that one's family place of origin guides one's ethnic identification and does not permit the self-expression of ethnic identity. Data recently collected as part of Wave VII of the European Social Survey (ESS) provide a unique basis for deep probing into ethnic categories and identity in the Jewish population of Israel. Based on the migration module fielded in WAVE VII and country specific questions added by the Israeli ESS team, the data file provides detailed information of the country of origin (of the respondent, his/her parents and most importantly, grandparents) as well as several subjective indicators of ethnic identification. Employing these data we propose to provide an account of ethnic affiliation in Israel based on both "objective" and "subjective" indicators. We explore the divergence between the two types of indicators and examine their relationship to socio-demographic characteristics such as age, education, immigration generation. In addition we examine the relationship between more specific country-of-origin-based affiliation to more inclusive ones such as Jewish and Israeli ethnic identity.
Uncovering cultural and ethnic diversity in Europe: A new classification

1Silke Schneider; 2Anthony Heath

GESIS - Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences1, Nuffield College2

Cultural diversity is an important topic in comparative empirical social science research today. Individuals’ socio-cultural and ethnic origins – that are often, but not always, related to their families’ migration histories – are a potentially powerful predictor of social attitudes and behaviours. While there are fairly established instruments available for comparatively measuring individuals’ migration background in surveys, this is not the case for individuals’ socio-cultural and ethnic origins. Therefore, new approaches and instruments for measuring ethnic and cultural origins in, especially cross-national, surveys are needed.

Statistical classifications are an essential tool for comparatively coding complex social science concepts such as occupation or education in cross-national survey data. While there are numerous statistical classifications available, some of which are maintained by international UN-related agencies, there is currently no international classification for ethnic and cultural origins. In this paper, we present such a classification for European purposes. The European Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups and corresponding questionnaire item have been trialled in the European Social Survey wave 7 (2014/2015). The classification was thus developed in close consultation with the Central Scientific Team of the ESS as well as national coordinators of countries participating in the ESS.

The classification builds on the Australian Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups classification of the Australian Bureau of Statistics. This classification was transferred to match the European context, adjusting both the unit groups identified and the aggregations into broad and narrow groups. In doing this, socio-cultural proximity was given preference over geographical proximity. Also, sub-national divisions within European countries had to be added in order to faithfully code respondents’ responses (it is not the same whether a Belgian respondent mentions Flemish or Belgian ancestry).

This presentation will discuss the theoretical concepts underlying the new European classification, its structure and substantive classification criteria. It will also provide some information on implementing the classification in a survey, as well as possible theoretically guided derived variables for statistical analysis.
With the increasing levels of migration in the last decade, the anti-immigration sentiments get affected by both economic and non-economic factors. On one hand immigration is considered as an economic boon; a multicultural, inclusive and diverse society as an answer to social problems, on the other hand there are concerns about labor market competition, fiscal burden and cultural threat. Along with the macro determinants, there are differences at the individual level that affect the development of these attitudes differently. For example, anti-immigration sentiments decrease with education level and increase with age; people identifying themselves to the right of the political spectrum are more likely than others to oppose immigration. Other attributes like religion, gender, skill-level, employment status etc. also affect these attitudes.

In this paper I examine how individual differences based on ideological self-identification affect the impact of education levels on anti-immigration sentiments. Specifically, I analyze the education-tolerance relationship stating that education helps in the transformation of values held by individuals into preferences, encouraging them to have more tolerant, pro-outsider views of the world. However, if education translates the values held by individuals into preferences than the level of education should also affect the weight with which ideological self-identification affects the preference structure and the development of issue attitudes.

To explore this relationship between education and left-right self-identification on facilitating the development of issue attitudes, I use the 7 rounds of European Social Survey (ESS) conducted since 2002. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of diverse populations to contribute substantially to the development of social indicators, one of the indicators being attitudes towards immigration.

Examining the data, I find that the education-tolerance relationship does hold. Educated respondents on average are more pro-immigration compared to uneducated respondents, however this relationship does not hold for those individuals who identify themselves as right of center since people on the right of the political spectrum are more likely than others to oppose immigration. The likelihood of having anti-immigrant attitudes is independent of education levels for right oriented respondents. That is education also leads to a stronger transformation of ideological self-conceptions into preferences. The responsiveness of change in preferences due to change in ideological self-identification increases with the level of education; the educated-ideology tolerance relationship. Based on the analysis, whether education can be considered as a solution for improving anti-immigration attitudes depends crucially on the ideology or political attitudes it imparts.
Two dimensions of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration: Are personal attitudes towards migrants as individuals always in line with the attitudes towards migration as a phenomenon?

Dita Cermáková; Yana Leontiyeva

Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences

Our conference presentation analyses individual attitudes to migration by decomposing them into two levels. First “macro” level reflects the attitudes of respondents as members of the larger society and presents their view on immigration as a phenomenon which can potentially harm or benefit the whole society (on a national level). The second “micro” level presents respondents’ attitudes to migrants as individuals. Based on two different theories, we presume that the mechanisms influencing the attitudes towards migrants on two named levels are rather contrasting. The explanation of the attitudes towards migrants on what we call macro level could be provided by ethnic competition theory, which emphasizes how individuals perceive tangible and not-tangible threats posed by immigrants to the status quo of their own group. In the analysis of the attitudes on what we call micro level we apply intergroup contact theory, which represents the respondents’ attitudes based on their personal contacts with individual migrants.

Based on the presumption described above, we test our hypothesis that the attitudes toward migrants/migration cloud be contradictory on different levels, i.e. that there is a statistically significant difference in respondents’ attitudes towards migrants as individuals and migration as a phenomenon influencing the whole society. Further we suggest that real contact with migrants will be more important on “micro” level, while on “macro” level the real experience with immigrants will have less impact. Testing the ethnic conflict theory (on “macro” level) we presume that less educated respondents with lower socioeconomic status will express more negative attitudes to migration because of the perceived threat in the struggle for social goods such as social security benefits, paid jobs, social housing etc. On the contrary, when it comes to the impact of the educational achievements and socioeconomic status on the individual (“micro”) level, here we expect less significant effect explained by the fact that migrants are in many countries clusters in the lower rungs of the labour market, therefore personal contacts with them will have more universal positive impact on the attitudes of respondents with lower status towards migrants as individuals.

To analyze the attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in general we use available data from migration module of European social survey (round 7) from 14 countries. To analyze mentioned above attitudes on different levels we selected two sets of relevant questions, which reflect the attitudes towards migrants as individuals and migration as a phenomenon. Multiple regression analysis will be further used to test the presumptions about the factors influencing migration attitudes on different levels.
This article investigates the interrelated dynamics of educational attainment, job quality, economic climate and the economic and institutional context of the labour market across nineteen European countries. The data used is the European Social Survey (ESS) for 2004 and 2010. After a thorough examination of the relevant literature a composite variable that represent job quality has been constructed and used as the dependent variable in the empirical analysis. Thereafter, the method of two-step approach has been employed to capture the economic climate as well as the economic and institutional context of each country’s labour market. The evidence suggest that higher – educated enjoy jobs of higher – quality compared with their lower-educated counterparts in most countries. However, it is still unclear whether or not the economic climate can affect this relationship. In terms of context, the job quality gap between high- and low-educated is likely to be narrower in wealthy countries, while higher educational attainment is more likely to lead to a high quality job in non-flexible labour markets, as this can be shown by FT/PT employees ratio. However, the two relationships are modest in terms of statistical robustness as when tested in both 2004 and 2010 data it appears that they are statistically significant only for the latter year. This evidence calls for further analysis on this subject, where the same relationship will be tested by the use of a panel component. Nevertheless, to date, ad-hoc data, which allows the construction of a variable that can arguably represent job quality is very limited and is restricted to a cross-sectional based format.
The effect of unemployment on subsequent job quality in Europe: The moderating role of economic situation and labor market policies

Jonas Voßemer

University of Bamberg

A large literature in the social sciences has illustrated that unemployment has not only short-term but also long-term negative effects on workers’ careers (see Brand, 2015; Wachter, 2010 for reviews). However, these studies have mostly focused on earnings or employment chances without paying much attention to the non-monetary facets of job quality (see Brand, 2006; Dieckhoff, 2011 for exceptions). This is surprising given that a growing literature across different disciplines shows that job quality cannot be measured by earnings alone (e.g., Gallie, 2007; Green, 2006; Kalleberg, 2007) and that working conditions likely have spillover effects on other areas of life (e.g., Gallie and Russell, 2009). Furthermore, previous research often lacks a comparative perspective studying, for example, how countries’ economic situation or institutions moderate the effects of unemployment on job quality (see Dieckhoff, 2011; Gangl, 2006 for exceptions). Therefore, the aim of this paper is to address three research questions. First, what are the effects of unemployment on subsequent job quality and how do these effects vary by different facets of job quality? Second, how do these effects vary across countries and time? Third, to what extent do economic situation, passive and active labor market policies (PLMP, ALMP), and employment protection legislation (EPL) moderate these effects?

To offer a comprehensive analysis of the costs of unemployment, I examine five objective and subjective measures of non-monetary job quality, including authority, autonomy, job security, occupational prestige, and continuing training. The empirical analyses are guided by a micro-macro model which is based on classical economic and sociological labor market theories. To test the derived hypotheses micro data (level-1) are drawn from the ESS for the rounds 2002-2014. The ESS provides harmonized measures of past unemployment as well as a wide range of indicators of job quality for about 115,000 workers. As many of the more than 30 countries participate for several rounds, the data offer up to 150 country-rounds at the macro-level (level-2) providing sufficient information for multi-level models. Macro-data on GDP, unemployment rates, ALMP, PLMP, and EPL were drawn from the Word Bank, ILO, Eurostat, and OECD.

Methodologically, I apply two-step multi-level models (e.g., Franzese, 2005). The first step involves estimating the effect of past unemployment on job quality for each country-round separately. Depending on the measure of job quality (i.e., authority, autonomy, job security, occupational prestige or continuing training) multiple linear or logistic regression models are fitted. The estimated past unemployment-coefficients are then extracted and used as dependent variables for the macro-level models (step 2). Given the within-country variation across rounds at the macro-level, I will also estimate fixed-effects regressions in step 2.

Preliminary results show negative effects of past unemployment on the different facets of job quality (step 1). They also reveal that these effects vary substantially across countries and rounds. However, the economic situation seems not to moderate these effects to a large extent. In the coming weeks, I will continue the macro-level analyses (step 2) and examine the role of labor market policies (PLMP, ALMP, EPL) in more detail.
Work-life balance: A typology of workers

1Mario Konishi; 1Florian Dufour

HEIG-VD, HES-SO1

Reconciling work and family has become a major concern of European Union policies (McGinnity & Calvert, 2009). To date, work-life balance (WLB) has been the main object of focus in academic research. Satisfaction on this work-life balance (SWLB) has been less studied. WLB refers to conditions, perceived and/or existing, while SWLB implies expectations about what these conditions should be.

WLB is the balance between work and private life commitment. The latter includes various activities such as domestic and caring work, leisure, etc. (Gallie & Russell, 2009). WLB can be either well-balanced or unbalanced. When it is unbalanced, a spill-over from work to private life is more often observed than the reverse, which happens very rarely. An unbalanced WLB does not necessarily imply dissatisfaction about it. One can choose to have a career and feel that the job benefits of an unbalanced WLB (professional status, responsibilities, interesting job, pay, promotion opportunities) compensate for the costs in private life (not enough time or energy for family, couple, friends, leisure).

According to these two constructs of work-life balance and satisfaction, we propose a typology of workers:

1) Those for whom work and private life are well-balanced and who declare to be satisfied with their situation (the “fulfilled-in-life”)
2) Those whose work permeates their private life, but are nevertheless satisfied (the “workaholics”)
3) Those whose WLB is tipped in favour of work and are not satisfied with it (the “overworkers”; Guest 2002)

A remaining category includes the respondents who have reached a balance between work and private life but who are not satisfied with this situation. We have split this category between the “career-oriented” (4), who wish they could get more involved in their job and the “breadwinners” (5), who work primarily to make a living and wish they had (even) more spare time available.

We use the data available in the special module “Work, Family and Wellbeing” of the European Social Survey 2010. Following McGinnity & Calvert (2009), we operationalize WLB as perceived by the respondents rather than on objective indicators (work constraints, extra hours, etc). We will study the 5 category of workers in terms of work characteristics (type of profession, work and employment conditions) and private life characteristics (marital status, distribution of roles in the couples and families, children). We will pay particular attention to mediating and moderating variables. In order to take into account different institutional and cultural contexts, our analysis will cover all 27 countries participating in the ESS 2010, namely 22 EU countries, plus Norway, Switzerland, Israel, Ukraine and Russia.

References
Gendered crisis? Effects of the financial crisis on work-life conflict of working couples

1Michael Ochsner, 1Ivett Szalma

FORS1

Europe recently faced a severe financial crisis that started in late 2007 and has its effects until now. In this paper, we examine the effects of this crisis on work-life conflict of working couples. More precisely, we investigate the determinants of work-life conflict before and after the crisis thus focusing on changes of such determinants. Furthermore, we examine the impact of the crisis’ direct effects on the household and working conditions on work-life conflict. Our focus lies on gender differences of the crisis’ effects on work-life conflict of working couples.

Our previous research showed that besides the usual vulnerable groups like the unemployed and the working poor, there is emerging a new vulnerable group that has been hit by the current crisis: the high stress-level working couples. While they still have jobs, the increasing, heavy duty on work is interfering with their duties in their family lives. This presentation dives deeper into this issue and focuses on gender differences. We investigate whether men and women are experiencing the same problems reconciling their work and family lives or whether they are facing different problems. This research has policy relevance: Policy makers should pay close attention not only to those people who are out of the labour market but also to the very vulnerable who work and experience stress on different dimensions such as high pressures at the job (responsibilities, time schedules, work intensity, flexibility) as well as at home (e.g., having children, having to cut back on household budgets, or having a lack of equipment). This research will show whether policies should be tailored to gender-specific needs or whether the needs of vulnerable working couples are gender-neutral.

We use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to address our research questions. Specifically, we use the second and fifth round carried out in 2004 and 2010, i.e. before and after the financial crisis of 2008 enabling us to study the effects of the crisis (see also Polavieja, 2013). We use data from 18 countries, namely: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

We use descriptive statistics and multilevel models to investigate whether there are gender differences in the effects of the crisis on work-life conflict. Furthermore, we will examine differences between countries in such (gender) effects. This will shed light on which countries provide positive preconditions to reconcile work and family lives.
The impact of culture on the decision to retire: Evidence from Switzerland

Lionel Cottier

University of Lausanne

In this study, I explore the transition from employment to retirement between 1970 and 2000 in Switzerland and evaluate how the outcome is affected by cultural differences, using language regions as a proxy. As already shown by Brügger et al. in the context of unemployment, Latin speaking regions (French, Italian, and Romansh) behave very differently from the German speaking ones. Preliminary results using Swiss census data suggests that the same is happening in the context of retirement. Namely, there is more than a 10 percentage point difference between the two groups in the year before retirement (labor market participation: 65% for Latin, 75% for Germans). This difference holds both for males and females.

Raising retirement age has also been a hot topic in the recent years in many developed countries such as the US, the UK, Germany and Switzerland. However, the effects of such a policy change are not well understood and it seems that (financial) incentives alone cannot fully explain agents' behavior. Recently, the literature has tried to separate the impact of incentives from that of norms of behavior or preferences. An important difficulty when trying to estimate the effects of culture or preferences on a certain economic outcome is that preferences can be the result of unobserved factors (eg. institutions, legal system, etc.) which also influence the outcome of interest. A good example is the study of Moriconi and Peri, who deal with this issue by studying first- and second-generation migrants and using a country-of-origin fixed effect to capture culturally transmitted preferences.

Switzerland provides a natural solution to this problem. It is a multicultural country with several language regions, which do not necessarily coincide with cantonal borders. Thus, we can compare individuals that speak different languages but share the same institutional settings. As language is an important vector of social norms that correlates greatly with culture, the use of spatial regression discontinuity design allows me to identify its effect on retirement decision. My study thus aims to contribute to the literature in two respects. First, it aims to show how culturally transmitted preferences creates differences in labor supply given the same financial incentives. Second, it is among the first papers to provide such an analysis over 40 years, so as to highlight how these preferences evolve over time.

I use the ESS databases (mainly wave 2010 and its module on working habits) to study attitudes of Swiss workers. Two of the main questions of interest are the one concerning the ideal retirement age and the one on having a paid job but without needing the money. Results show that Germain speaking individuals tend to work longer and like working more than Latin speaking ones.
Country-specific work-retirement-cultures: a normative barrier for raising the standard retirement age?

Andreas Jansen

University Duisburg-Essen; Institute for Work, Skills and Training

The prospective impacts of the ongoing demographic change are well known and concern almost all member states of the EU. With regard to the labour market, there is widely consensus that an increase in the participation rate of older people is one of the most essential measures to cushion the anticipated outcomes of the demographic change. Thus most European societies have undergone a paradigm shift in pension policy and related labour market policies from early retirement to postponing retirement. However, an analysis of the actual labour market participation of the people aged 55 and older in Europe still shows large variances among the European countries.

Against this background one aim of the presented paper is to explain these variances by broadening the set of possible explanations by a cultural construct, namely the specific ‘work-retirement-culture’ of a country. The term work-retirement-culture is the shorthand description of social norms, values, ideals or perceptions in society that structure the ideas of the age-work-relationship. The respective hypothesis (1) is that besides differences in the particular institutional arrangements as well as differences in the labour market performances, cultural differences are a further piece of the puzzle to explain the observable differences in the labour market participation of older people. To display ‘work-retirement-cultures’, predominant societal values and norms concerning the labour market participation of older people and its coincidence with the respective employment rates of older people will be analysed using quantitative survey data of the third round of the European Social Survey. The ESS data is at present the only available data source that contains a sufficient number of indicators to operationalise the work/retirement culture properly. Logistic random effects regression analysis is used to estimate the effects of the work/retirement culture on the labour market participation of older people.

Subsequently it will be analysed, if the institutional arrangements concerning the transition to retirement are in accordance with the identified country-specific ‘work-retirement-culture’ or if there are substantial contradictions observable, which might be the result of reforms which were set independently from the cultural system. In this respect it is assumed that the amount of contradictions have increased in the course of the crisis, because most of the reform measures since 2009 have mainly been conducted due to financial pressure and not as a result of a political and societal discourse (Hypothesis 2). In contrast to the assumption of increasing contradictions between the institutional and the cultural system, one can as well assume that the work-retirement-culture functions as a barrier against reforms of the pension system that might be reasonable from a pure economic perspective, but are entirely contrary to the respective work/retirement culture (Hypothesis 3). To test both hypotheses adequately, it is necessary to do both quantitative survey data analysis using the European Social Survey (Round 3 & 5) and an analysis of the institutional arrangements as well as of the implemented reforms. While the quantitative analysis will focus on a large set of European countries, the institutional analysis will focus on three countries (Denmark, France and Slovenia).
Demographic transitions, institutions, and attitudes towards immigration: Evidence from Europe

Simone Moriconi; Giovanni Peri

Università Cattolica di Milano, UC Davis

In the last decades, European countries have experienced remarkable changes in the structure of the population, due to major demographic transitions (see World Bank “Golden Aging”, 2015), e.g. related to increased life expectancy and population ageing and increasing migratory flows, between 1970 and 2012 in core Europe. Life expectancy in core EU countries have increased by about 10 years (in EU-15 from about 70 to 80 years, on average) between 1970 and 2012. The share of population over 65 in EU-15 in 2010 exceeds 15% and is expected to approach 30% in 2060 (World Population Prospects, 2012). During this period, European countries also experienced increasing migratory flows from East to West and from South to North of Europe.

This sizeable phenomena are bringing about several concerns and fears about the societal developments its interactions with the institutional setting of European Labour markets. A general consensus exists in the literature that political, cultural factors, prejudices and stereotypes play an important role for attitudes towards immigrants (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmuller and Hiscox, 2007). On average, less educated, rightwing people would like the national government to prohibit immigrants to come and work in the country. Furthermore, the existing literature uncovers a “labor market competition” determinant of negative attitudes towards immigrants (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2012). This labor market channel presents interacts with institutions in the labor market. Negative attitudes towards immigration in OECD destinations may be induced by fears regarding the sustainability of the welfare state (see e.g. Hanson et al., 2007; Boeri and Brucker, 2005; Facchini and Mayda, 2009) and changes in the compositional amenities that natives derive from their neighborhoods, schools and workplaces (Card, Preston and Dustmann, 2002).

While this literature captures some aspects related to demographic transitions, this project provides a comprehensive study of the effect of demographic transitions and their interplay with institutions to determine, the evolution of attitudes towards migration over time. First, it analyzes the impact of demographic transition on individual attitudes towards immigration, with a specific focus on ageing of the native population, and the increasing size of the migration flows in Europe (particularly East-West). Second, it aims to investigate how demographic factors interact with the economic and labor market conditions of the country of destination. Third, it examines the time varying dimension of preferences over the period 2002--2014, which saw important institutional, economic and demographic developments in Europe.

For this project we are going to use the entire data span from the European Social Survey, which covers the period 2002-2014. We are interested in particular in the thematic module about immigration, which is administered in the first wave 2002 and in the last wave, in 2014. Along the sample we will also exploit information on attitudes towards ageism, welfare and work, which is included in the 2008 wave of the ESS and could be used to identify specific cultural traits that have some relevance for determining individual attitudes towards migration.
Institutions play a fundamental role in shaping the working life pattern of dependent labour. In the years of the great recession started in 2008, firms struggled to adopt more flexible contracts, in Italy and elsewhere, to minimize the burden of labour costs and face the ups and downs of global and local market demand. Governments in Italy progressively adopted innovative types of contractual agreements to fight long-term unemployment and facilitate the matching between historically disadvantaged labour seekers (young and women) and firms. So short-term types of contracts, in addition with permanent employment contracts, became an important instrument on the labour market. The SILER database collects the obligatory communications that a labour supplier in Italy must make to a special office when starting a contract with a new employee. The communication contains information on the employee, on the type of job and sector. Another communication must be sent when the contract ends, as well when major changes in the contractual terms arise. By collecting all the information for each single worker through many years, it is possible to reconstruct workers’ career, with the length of contracts, types of contract, and so on. The data allow for testing the efficacy of the flexisecurity model in Italy, as it can be evaluated if people can find a job without facing long periods of unemployment even when the contracts offered are not permanent. Moreover, with some degree of approximation, it becomes possible to tell exactly the length of time existing between a contract and another, a very good proxy for the length of unemployment.

The study is organized as follows. Section 1 contains the key elements in the institutional panorama featuring the labour market in Italy in recent years. Section 2 contains a description of the SILER database. Section 3 contains a quantitative analysis of people having a dependent labour contract in Emilia Romagna from at least 2008 onwards. This includes computing the distribution of the most commonly adopted contract by age, sex, industry and institutional type of contract, as well as the typical sequence of contractual forms for workers considered. A multinomial analysis allows for determining the factors that influence obtaining a certain type of contract. Section 4 concludes and illustrates the opportunities offered by further analyses, as for example exploring the need for implementing programs to develop skills and abilities in certain sectors, the behaviour of firms in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the introduction of instruments for limiting the abuse of flexible contractual forms by firms, the importance of foreign labour.
Self-improvement efforts and success in life and work

Kaleel Rahman

RMIT University

Introduction
Self-improvement refers to individuals’ generic efforts to seek knowledge and acquire skills to improve themselves in relation to their professional, personal, psychological, and other aspects of well-being. Self-improvement activities are believed to have significant impact on success in life (Wilson and Cash, 2000), entrepreneurship, and business acumen (Nair and Pandey, 2006). Although self-improvement has been examined in a variety of contexts (Seligman, 2010), systematic investigation of individuals’ self-improvement efforts warrants some attention. Self-improvement broadly relates to professional development, adult education, self-help, and personal development. Individuals generally consume self-improvement through attending courses, lectures, conferences, seminars, workshops; listening to audio visual materials; participating in social media outlets in professional or non-professional settings. Due to increased presence of social media clutter, books and magazines, and other written materials and audio visuals, individuals serious about self-improvement have a preference for some personal touch where they like to attend a live event such as a lecture, a conference or a course to consume such services (Rahman, 2014).

Research questions
The present study seeks to investigate self-improvement efforts of individuals in European nations using the European Social Survey (ESS) instrument and addresses whether self-improvement seekers systematically differ from non-self-improvement seekers in regards to life success factors and entrepreneurial characteristics. Based on theories and concepts drawn from various disciplines, we examine the following two broad areas:

- Entrepreneurial and work related variables such as self-employment, supervising responsibilities, and work autonomy, and investment income.
- Life success factors such as lifestyle, general health, education, happiness and life satisfaction.

Method
In this article, we use ESS data that has been made available. As this is our preliminary work, we used the latest wave (2014) of the survey to test the differences, treating the whole of Europe as one market. We used independent sample t-test to evaluate the differences between self-improvement seekers versus non self-improvement seekers. As needed, we also used cross tabulation to categorical variables.

The survey participants were asked an important question as follows: “during the last twelve months, have you taken any course or attended any lecture or conference to improve your knowledge or skills for work?”. Those who answered ‘yes’ to this question were considered as self-improvement seekers. Other items considered for testing, for example, included the following: How satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? (extremely dissatisfied to extremely satisfied) (B20); Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are? (extremely unhappy, extremely happy, 11 points) (C1).

Results and discussion
The following table summarises the results (we were not able to post the table, but we will present it at the conference).

Our analysis showed that about one third of the respondents are self-improvement seekers of some sort and there is no gender difference in terms of self-improvement seeking. In regards to success in life, self-improvement seekers were found to be better educated, happier, tend to watch less hours of TV, generally healthier, tend to feel less
Theme 2: Work and Family
2.3 The effects of entrepreneurship on well-being

depressed, and more satisfied with their life than non-self-improvement seekers. In regards to entrepreneurship, self-improvement seekers were found to be having more supervisory responsibilities and autonomy at work, and having better household income than non-self-improvement seekers. However, self-improvement seekers are not necessarily more into self-employment.

In future research and partly in the full paper, using the same survey instrument, we plan to address what determines self-improvement seeking, and the relationship between life success factors and entrepreneurship. We also plan to look into analysing the differences across ESS rounds, and between countries.

References
(Available upon request)
Too healthy or too busy to go to the doctor? Entrepreneurship and health services utilization in Europe

Giulio Bosio; Federica Origo; Tommaso Minola

University of Bergamo

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between entrepreneurship and the utilization of health care services in Europe. This is a relevant topic from a policy viewpoint, since underutilization of health services while employed may lead to subsequent higher mortality rates or subsequent higher health care costs. Additionally, entrepreneurship is assuming paramount importance as a career option worldwide.

Socio-economic literature has extensively studied the relationship between health insurance and health care utilization in the USA. Within this stream, empirical evidence shows that, compared to employees, self-employed in the USA have relatively low rates of health insurance coverage, but this does not seem to affect their health care utilization. These studies also find that self-employed do not significantly differ from employees in terms of health status. On the other side, there is evidence showing that self-employed are likely to be healthier than employees and that, only in the case of the self-employed, retirement significantly increases the probability of using any physician services and the number of physician visits.

Available evidence is mainly referred to the USA and to self-employment as a whole; little is known on Europe and on the utilization of health care services by entrepreneurs, as a distinctive type of self-employed. Entrepreneurs may in fact underutilize health care services, as compared to both employees and self-employed, for a number of reasons: higher opportunity costs (given the loss of output and earnings associated with absence from the workplace), binding time constraints (entrepreneurs are more likely to work longer hours), lower risk aversion. On the contrary, entrepreneurs may use their wealth to adjust medical services utilization to their professional needs, for example by using private health services (such as physician visits) at non-standard hours (such as late at night or during the weekend).

The empirical analysis is based on micro data of two waves of the European Social Survey referred to years 2004 and 2014, which contain detailed information on individual health and health care. The available data allow identifying entrepreneurs as self-employed with employees. In both waves the share of entrepreneurs who discussed about their health with either a general practitioner or a medical specialist in the 12 months before the survey is lower than that of employees, while in 2014 no significant differences emerge in the share of those unable to get a medical consultation or treatment. Entrepreneurs are more likely to report that they did not need any medical consultation or treatment in the period considered.

In studying the relationship between entrepreneurship and health care utilization, we take into account the effect of potential endogeneity, since there may be some unobserved factors (such as risk aversion, motivation, other personality traits) that may influence both the choice to become entrepreneur and the use of health care services. Hence, in order to identify the causal effect of entrepreneurship on health care services utilization, we use an Instrumental Variable approach. We investigate also the existence of heterogeneous effects by (group of) country, family status, gender and age.
Self-employment and its effects on socio-emotional well-being

1Maria Petrescu; 2Aycan Kara

Nova Southeastern University1, Indiana University Southeast, School of Business2

This study analyzes the differences regarding socio-emotional well-being as a function of the type of employment, as well as the differences in the effects of job satisfaction, work-life balance, gender and age. The analysis focuses on variations between employed individuals and two types of entrepreneurs, self-employed individuals and persons working at the family’s company.

Previous research has shown that self-employed individual have higher levels of satisfaction with their jobs, despite a significant loss of income that individuals can expect when transferring from employment into entrepreneurship (Binder and Coad, 2013; Blanchflower, 2004; Carter, 2011; Lange 2009, 2012; Shane, 2008). Regarding the relationship between self-employment and well-being or happiness, studies are not very clear. For example, Alesina et al. (2004) found a positive effect between self-employment and happiness for wealthy individuals. Overall, previous research supports the ideas that self-employed individuals are self-employed tend to be happier and more satisfied with life (Crum and Chen, 2015). From this point of view, this study focuses on the relationship between entrepreneurial positions and socio-emotional well-being. The socio-emotional well-being index measures how individuals evaluate their social status, general life situation, themselves and their social power (Bericat, 2014).

Research has also found that having a job and the number of paid work hours affect differently the subjective well-being of employees as a function of gender, with a bigger effect for women (Boye, 2009; van der Meer, 2014). In this context, researchers have also identified work-life and work-family balance important in personal satisfaction and well-being (Beham et al., 2014; Boye, 2009; Carlson et al., 2009; Pichler, 2009). In order to test the model, this study uses individual level international data from wave 6 of the European Social Survey. The Socio-emotional well-being index includes ten items that measure the four key dimensions (Bericat, 2014). Other concepts measured by using ESS include job satisfaction and the work-life balance scale (Pichler, 2009), as well as demographics. The statistical method used is structural equation modeling that also analyzes group differences between employed and entrepreneurial individuals.

Overall, the findings of this research study can contribute to enriching the literature on self-employment and entrepreneurial initiatives, as well as related to socio-emotional well-being. It can also clarify whether, even in situations that might be more stressful, challenging and less financially rewarding that traditional employment, entrepreneurs find happiness and social power. For managers, the conclusions can provide ideas on how to better motivate the employees and how to increase the entrepreneurial spirit.
The link between entrepreneurship and employment creation, productivity, and economic growth have been studied in a variety of disciplines including economics, political science, and management (Audretsch & Thurik, 2001; Van Praag & Versloot, 2007). In addition, the policymakers in The European Union have designated regional entrepreneurship levels as the primary tool for economic growth and competitiveness (Bosma & Schutjens, 2007); several initiatives such as European Regional Development, Cohesion, Business Support, have received generous funding. Macro level International Entrepreneurship (IE) studies examine the difference in levels of entrepreneurship across nations or within-nation regions and focus on the link between a variety of environmental factors and entrepreneurship (Audretsch, et al., 2002; Verheul et al., 2002). Institutional context is one of the environmental factors that have received attention. Even though nation-level studies examine this link, we know very little about this relationship when we shift our focus to regional level.

The objective of the present research is to examine the relationship between institutional context and entrepreneurship at the regional level using multilevel analysis. We will follow the macro level IE studies that describe entrepreneurship as the aggregate occupational choice (Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010; Wennekers, 2006) and measure it by percentage of workforce that is self-employed. To construct the relationship between institutional arrangements and entrepreneurship, we will use institutional economics approach (Bowen & de Clercq, 2008; Djankov, et al. 2002; Van Stel, et al., 2007). New institutional economics researchers follow Douglas North and Oliver Williamson and view institutions as endogenous, adaptable constraints which are made up of formal (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct). Formal and informal institutions affect how business is conducted. Formal institutional arrangements determine the political, economic and contractual rules whereas informal institutions are “observed in the outside world” (Wennekers, 2006: 81) and must be dealt with as a part of the cultural domain. We examine the relationship between formal institutional arrangements (such as GDP, unemployment, education) and entrepreneurship at the regional level and account for the effect of the nation level cultural differences using HLM. To test our hypotheses, we use data from European Social Survey (6th and 7th waves), Eurostat and Hofstede’s cultural dimension scores.

Our results indicate that after controlling for population density, there is a significant and positive relationship between GDP (per capita) and entrepreneurship levels whereas a significant and negative relationship was observed between education levels and entrepreneurship across 184 European (NUTS2) regions in 20 countries. Even though individualism-collectivism has received the most attention in macro IE literature, our results show no significant relationship. On the other hand, we observe a significant and negative effect of long-term orientation on regional entrepreneurship levels and a significant and positive effect of uncertainty avoidance.

For researchers it is essential to understand regional variations in entrepreneurship levels as well as the relationship between entrepreneurship levels and intuitional arrangements. Guided by research, policy initiatives focus on ways to increase entrepreneurship levels. However, if national culture has a strong effect on entrepreneurship levels, initiatives might miss their target.
Traditionally, men are considered to be the breadwinners, while woman’s main social role concerns taking care of children and the household. However, today the difference between gender roles is becoming less clear. In most of the European countries, childcare institutions and services make the household burden easier, and the traditional life pattern centered on marriage and having kids is more often regarded as only one of the possible alternatives. Women gain wider access to education and labor market. However, despite the fact that women do not have lower education as compared to men they are often less advantaged in making their career. In other words, although women manage to have rather higher level of human capital, they are unable to make full use of it in their professional activity. Hence, insufficient usage of female human capital hinders economic development. The cause of insufficient usage of women’s human capital largely lies in structure of their work values and job preferences because they have to take into other spheres of life.

The study aims at comparison of female and male work values and job preferences that in a way reflect achievement motivation in their professional activity. Furthermore, we will take into account individual gender attitudes as predictors of job preferences of men and women. Cross-cultural dataset allows us to disclose both individual and country level predictors of female and male work values and job preferences. On individual level, we assume that the discrepancy of female work values and job preferences is lower for younger generations and for those who have more egalitarian gender attitudes. On macro level, we suppose that the lower is gender inequality index (GII) and the more egalitarian average gender attitudes in a country are, the less discrepancy between female and male job preferences is. Nordic and Western European countries are expected to have less discrepancy between female and male work values and job preferences compared to Southern and Eastern European countries. The dataset is the fifth wave of European Values Study because it comprises a battery of questions of work values. Multilevel regression modeling is used. According to preliminary results, work-life balance is more important for women that reflects the fact that women meet more pressure in combining work and family life. Women more often feel difficult in combining work and family responsibilities. In addition, women have in their jobs less opportunities for advancement; they feel more often that they are not paid appropriately considering their efforts and achievements and more tired after work to do things they enjoy at home. Furthermore, women feel more family pressure because of their jobs, which indicates more negative attitudes and less understanding towards female career.
Human agency in migration: the impact of migration on social and economical development

Medea Badashvili
Thilisi State University

This paper examines the processes of recent feminization of migration from post-soviet Georgia, which has been experiencing a dramatic growth in labor migration since the collapse of Soviet Union. The recently developed economic difficulties have led to the highest levels of out-migration from Georgia. According to the last World Bank data, approximately 23 percent of Georgia’s population lives below the official poverty line. Economic crisis have been exacerbated by political turmoil and violent conflicts. The socio-economic crisis in Georgia that arose in the 1990s became the major factor leading labor migrants to the United States and Europe in research of work and subsistence. If until 1990 labor migration of women from Georgia was socially unacceptable, after 90s a significant segment of women decide to find the way out of hardship. This problem is interesting from interdisciplinary research: socio-structural, social and psychological characteristics of this problem. My paper is based on the empirical research, conducted in the United States, I will try to illustrate the changes of lifestyle underwent in several important areas, such as: their role as main breadwinners, the impact of remittances on lives of thousands of households, the changing family structure and family relationships, family values, male and female roles in family.
The cross-national incidence of labor market “outsiders”: (How) does the data source matter for understanding part-time and temporary work?

Jeffrey Dixon

College of the Holy Cross

The ostensible increase in part-time and temporary workers generates theoretical and policy debate about its causes and consequences (e.g., pay, benefits, job insecurity), but the debate is not accompanied by a critical examination of the data sources upon which claims of rising numbers of non-standard workers rest. The measurement of non-standard work—work that departs from the full-time, permanent standard, such as part-time and temporary work—varies cross-nationally, can differ across data sources, and forms of nonstandard work are not mutually exclusive. In this paper, we introduce a new, country-level dataset of non-standard work, which includes part-time and temporary work rates from the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Eurostat that researchers frequently use, as well as those we derive from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), for nearly 50 countries between 2000 and 2010 (inclusive). This dataset can be used to further define, refine and calibrate measures of part-time work and it is specifically designed to be linked to individual-level survey data on perceived worker insecurity from the ESS, ISSP, and Eurobarometer. Using this dataset, we investigate reliabilities among: 1.) OECD rates of part-time work using a 30-hour working threshold measures, OECD rates of part-time work based on countries’ “national definitions” of part-time work, Eurostat rates of part-time work usually based on respondents’ self-reports, as well as part-time rates from the ESS and ISSP based on working hours thresholds (30 and 35), and in some cases, self-reports; and, 2.) temporary work rates from the OECD, Eurostat, and the ESS. In preliminary analyses conducted with OECD, Eurostat, and ESS 2002-2010 biannual data only, we find that part-time rates derived from the ESS are highly correlated with those from the OECD and Eurostat (rmin.=0.81; rmax.=0.96), with the ESS rates based on a 35-hour threshold having the highest correlations. Calculating average differences among rates, we find that whereas ESS-derived part-time rates based on a 30-hour threshold appear to slightly underestimate rates from the OECD and Eurostat, ESS rates based on a 35-hour threshold appear to slightly overestimate rates from the OECD and Eurostat. ESS-derived temporary work rates are moderately correlated with those from the OECD and Eurostat (rmin.=0.62; rmax.=0.81), with the highest correlations in 2010. On average, the ESS-derived temporary work rates are higher than those of the OECD and Eurostat. These preliminary analyses of OECD, Eurostat and ESS thus reveal that part-time rates, variously calculated, are quite reliable. Although the transitory nature of temporary work likely accounts for at least part of the lower reliabilities of this measure across data sources, these results nevertheless raise questions about our understanding of this sub-group of “labor market outsiders” or non-standard workers. Implications will be discussed.
Public attitudes toward health care – self-interest or impact of institutions?

Mare Ainsaar; Oliver Nahkur

University of Tartu

The paper analyses the role of institutions and individual factors on health care policy attitudes.

Missine et al. (2013) argues that healthcare legitimacy consists of two dimensions: attitudes toward government responsibility and satisfaction with the health care system, corresponding to substantial and procedural justice, respectively. According to the theory of contingent consent (Rothstein, 2001), particular health care policy is perceived as legitimate if citizens regard the policy itself valuable (substantial justice), consider the actual implementation of the policy by government as in accordance with the promise (procedural justice), and believe their fellow citizens also contribute to the costs of a given policy (non or insignificant "free-riding").

Individual self-interest theory, based on the rational choice theory (Becker, 1976), assumes that individual choices are driven also by instrumental rationality and the aspiration of individual gain (Kangas, 1997). According to self-interest theory, individuals who are recipients or are at higher risk of becoming recipients of health care services, are more likely to hold positive attitudes towards health care than those who less likely receive need for those services. Also general economic vulnerability will contribute to the stronger support of state role in health care.

Another theoretical perspective emphasizes the role of cultural factors like norms and values on formation of attitudes. Justice beliefs, as norms and values concerning the material and non-material goods distribution between members of a society (Andress and Heien, 2001), can be distinguished as egalitarian and anti-egalitarian (Kluegel and Mateju, 1995). The genesis of justice beliefs are influenced by socialization processes which may differ for example according to age groups. According to Inglehart’s (1977) materialistic and post-materialistic values theory, younger age groups are characterized by post-materialistic values and they should favor value such as solidarity rather than pure self-interest.

According to ideological disposition theory, opinions about healthcare are embedded within a broad and coherent system of ideological preferences (Feldman and Zaller 1992). Two important ideologies, economic individualism and social equality (Blekesaeue and Quadagno, 2003), determine peoples’ health care attitudes. Economic individualism assumes that each individual is responsible for his or her own welfare, while social equality assumes solidaristic belief that all citizens have basic social rights. Similarly, power resources theory (Korpi and Palme, 2003) states that welfare and healthcare attitudes are influenced by class interests.

Institutional theoretical perspective focuses on welfare/ healthcare systems as institutions. In institutional approach, focusing on the institutional characteristics rather than on a general welfare or health care typology, seems more appropriate in the more recent studies (Wendt et al., 2010; Missine et al., 2013). The impact of institutional settings can be conceptualized by the model called ‘Production process of healthcare services’ (Wendt et al., 2010). The model focuses to the input (for example health expenditure, number of providers, facilities) and output (services delivered, quality of the services etc.) processes of the health care system.

ESS data from round 8 are used. Countries are classified according to the power of individual and institutional factors into clusters.
Unmet need for health care in Europe

Erlend Fjær

Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Technology and Science

Background:
Unmet need is a useful tool for explaining and measuring the use of health care services. The concept of unmet need could be defined as the differences between services judged necessary to deal with health problems and the services actually received. The aim of this study is twofold. First, we ask how unmet need will be affected by education and other social determinants of health. Second, we examine how different types of unmet need vary between countries in Europe.

Methods:
Logistic regression models are employed using data from the 2014 wave of the European Social Survey on people aged 25 to 75. Self-reported unmet need measures whether respondents have been unable to get medical consultation or treatment in the last 12 months. In line with previous research, reasons for unmet need are grouped into three categories: availability, accessibility and acceptability. Availability includes too long waiting lists, services not available when required and services not available in area. Accessibility is related to cost. Acceptability concerns personal preferences or circumstances of individuals. This includes those who could not take time off work or those who had other commitments. We control for self-reported health status, chronic conditions and depression. Socioeconomic position is measured using education and income. Among other examined health determinants include labor force status, immigration status, place of residence, general practitioner and specialist utilization and alternative treatment use.

Results:
Preliminary results show that the most frequent reasons for unmet need are waiting lists and appointment availability. Educational inequalities are present, as respondents with mid-level education generally have higher degrees of unmet need, but this does not apply to all the countries. Overall, unmet need is an issue for those with poor health, depression and chronic conditions. Unmet need due to availability is particularly a matter for the retired and those who have visited a specialist. Unmet need due to accessibility is a matter in particular for the low income and unemployed group. Unmet need due to acceptability is found to be an issue for those in paid work. No clear and consistent pattern for unmet need is found in Europe. Many variables have a contradictory effect on unmet need when examining the different subcategories of unmet need (availability, accessibility and acceptability). In some cases, these effects appear to phase each other out. This is also an argument for distinguishing between the different types of unmet need.
Comparison of alcohol consumption in European countries, and some methodological thoughts

1Celine Wuyts; 1Sara Barbier; 1Geert Loosveldt

KU Leuven1

Alcohol is part of the culture in European countries and plays an important role in most people’s (social) life, even though its harmful effects on health and general well-being are, at least superficially, common knowledge. There are a lot of occasions where alcoholic beverages are consumed (e.g. celebrations of important life events and festivities). Drinking alcohol is socially accepted, and often encouraged. According to recent WHO data, Europe is the heaviest drinking region in the world, but considerable variation in alcohol consumption exists across countries and across sociodemographic groups within countries. However, the assessment of alcohol consumption across and within countries is complicated by, and confronted with, measurement issues. Measurement error in reported consumption frequencies and amounts may result from sensitivity of the topic, poor recall of past consumption and difficulty with the definition and estimating ‘typical’ or ‘exceptional’ consumption. When the questionnaire is administered face-to-face, the interviewers are likely to contribute to measurement error (e.g. in the way they react on the respondent’s question for clarification, social desirable answers, …). As a result, part of variation within and across countries and the effect of sociodemographic characteristics may be influenced by interviewer effects. Substantive research about alcohol consumption should take these effects into account.

This paper starts with substantive research questions about how patterns of alcohol consumption, in terms of frequency and quantity consumed, vary across Europe, and how they relate to key sociodemographic background variables, age, gender, and education level. Data from rotating module on health inequalities of the seventh round of the European Social Survey (ESS7) are used. Potential interviewer effects on the alcohol consumption variables and on the estimated effects of the key sociodemographics are taken into account by allowing for random intercepts and random slopes.

A country-level comparison shows differences in alcohol consumption patterns. In some countries, people drink frequently but small quantities (e.g. the Netherlands). In others, people drink more sporadically but larger quantities (e.g. Ireland). Both the level and the frequency of alcohol consumption are higher for males than females in all countries studied. The effects of age and education level are less consistent. Even though the interviewer effects to the questions on frequency of alcohol consumption and quantity consumed are substantial in some countries, the main conclusions hold when interviewer effects are taken into account.
The reversed gender gap and the education gradient in health: A cohort perspective

Katrijn Delaruelle; Veerle Buffel; Piet Bracke

University of Ghent

In recent decades, researchers have specified the relationship between education and health for gender, thereby paying attention to the fact that both the socialization and allocation function of education may be conditioned by gender. In this research, however, we argue that such studies are not complete without considering the socio-historical context in which the gender-specific linking pathways unfold. It is hypothesized that the reversal of the gender gap in education has contributed to over-time changes in the mechanisms that link education to women’s health, and accordingly, has affected the gender differential in the education-health association. To test this hypothesis, we apply a hierarchical age-period-cohort analysis (HAPC) under the assumption of certain period effect restrictions on data from 30 countries of the European Social Survey (7 waves: 2002–2014). Analyses are based on a subsample of individuals between 25 and 85 years of age (N = 250,976) and are conducted for men and women separately. The results confirm our expectation: the gender gap in the educational health gradient can in no way be considered as time-invariant. In older cohorts, women received greater health returns to education than their male counterparts. However, along with the substantial increase in female participation in tertiary education, the favorable effect of education on women’s health has decreased to such an extent that men now generally gain greater health-related benefits from a college degree. This reversal is mainly due to the weakened socialization role of education across female cohorts. The exploratory results presented in this study may serve as a basis for future research.
Gender inequality in the household and its consequences for individual’s well-being

Piotr Michoń

Poznań University of Economics and Business

It is widely acknowledged that gender equality matters both: instrumentally – in the process of policy making needs of women and men are considered; in economy it is related to social productivity by using the potentials of all society members; and per se – it is important just as it is, it represents condition of fairness in society, an ethical issue and it is an integral part of human development. Thus gender equality leads to significant policy implications. Therefore, the targeting of gender inequality and the measurement of (in)equality levels is a high-priority topic of research with significant policy implications.

Most of the studies and reports on gender (in)equality use the popular measurements like: Gender Inequality Index (GII) and new Gender Development Measure (UNDP, since 2010); Global Gender Gap Index by World Economic Forum, Gender Equality Index (GEI) (2007-) by Social Watch, Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) by OECD etc. While these measures of gender inequality significantly contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon in different countries and cultures, focusing only on the society-level of inequalities neglects the question of how the inequalities determine the actual level of well-being of individuals, both men and women alike. A significant limitation of the currently used measurement is that they do not take into consideration of the effect of household-level gender inequality on social-level gender inequality. It is presumed that the impact is unidirectional, changes at the level of social, political and economic institutions affect the individual’s life. In this paper I focus on two-way interaction, inequalities of households and their consequences for inequalities that exist outside the family unit.

These days used indices suffer from shortcomings that limit their usefulness as a measure of gender inequality. It is simply presumed that if women’s situation relative to men improves, the gender inequality decreases, and that in turn results in increasing women’s well-being. According the existing measures we are witnessing progress when compared to men women increase their income level, labour force participation, educational enrolment, life expectancy, share of parliament seats etc. This approach, although useful, does not reveal the most important aspect of gender inequalities which is not on societal but on household level. Thus, in the paper gender inequality in household is considered in three dimensions of: income, workload and education; and it is analysed at the household level. The ESS data, waves: 1 to 5 are used for analysis I compare the couples in the households and measure its effect for individual subjective well-being. The analysis is cross-country comparison.
Do social inequalities in health and wellbeing decrease, increase or remain stable in Switzerland? A cross-sectional trend analysis (2002-2014)

Claudine Burton-Jeangros; Adrien Remund; Stéphane Cullati

University of Geneva

Background: Due to difficult socioeconomic conditions over the last years, social inequalities in health and wellbeing have increased in many high-income countries. In Switzerland, where health inequalities tend to remain limited, it is not clear whether health and wellbeing inequalities are changing or not: do they remain stable? Do they increase? Or decrease?

Objectives: To examine change in social inequalities in health and well-being over time (2002-2014) in Switzerland.

Methods: The analysis is based on waves 1 (2002) to 7 (2014) of the Swiss sample of the European Social Survey. Health was measured with two single-item indicators: self-rated health (1 very bad, to 5 very good) and being hampered in daily activities by illness or other health problems. Well-being was measured with two single-item indicators: satisfaction with life (0 extremely dissatisfied to 10 extremely satisfied) and happiness (0 extremely unhappy to 10 extremely happy). Five social factors were examined: gender, education, net household income, satisfaction with household income, and perception of neighbourhood insecurity (feeling unsafe when walking alone in local area after dark). Weighted multivariable regression analyses were conducted.

Results: Over the 2002-2014 period, educational inequalities on self-reported health and being hampered in daily activities slightly increased: respondents with high educational levels tended to report better health status over time compared to respondents with low educational levels, and the former tended to report being hampered less frequently over time. Moreover, the association between household income and happiness (higher income, higher happiness) slightly increased over time.

Some correlations between health and wellbeing with a range of social factors remained stable over time: perception of neighbourhood insecurity (feeling unsafe when walking alone after dark) was lastingly and strongly associated with low self-rated health and with being hampered in daily activities; poor satisfaction with household income was associated with poor satisfaction with life, poor happiness, and (to the exception of wave 2006) with poor self-rated health; household income was associated with being hampered in daily activities (to the exception of wave 2008). Other inequalities declined during the 2002-2014 period: women tended to report higher self-rated health compared to men until 2006, then the difference between them slightly diminished wave by wave until 2014.

Discussion: In Switzerland, health and well-being inequalities changed during the 2002-2014 period. Figures of temporal change included both increasing and decreasing social inequalities, with the first pattern (increasing inequalities) being more frequent. Long-standing, stable, social inequalities were also observed.
Inequalities in Subjective Social Status and Psychological Well-being in Europe

1Lindsay Richards; 1Marii Paskov

University of Oxford

Individuals of higher ‘social standing’ in society have better psychological well-being than those of lower standing. This pattern has been replicated, over several decades of research, with different conceptualisations and measurements of social standing including: job grade and occupation (Maheswaran et al. 2015); educational attainment (Katikireddi et al. 2012); income (Huijts et al. 2010). In addition to this range of objective indicators, frequently labelled Socio-Economic Status (SES), there is a literature focused on the role of the perceptions of social standing, or Subjective Social Status (SSS). Several studies have emphasised the importance of subjective states by showing that perceiving oneself to be low in status is detrimental to health and psychological well-being even when education, income and occupational class are controlled (Demakakos et al. 2008; Prág et al. 2015).

In this paper, we hypothesise that SSS is not only an important predictor of health outcomes at the individual level but it is also a meaningful country-level indicator of the way in which status differentiation operates in the lives of individuals within their national contexts. We argue that in countries with higher average SSS, there will be lower overall levels of psychiatric distress but also lower psychiatric distress associated with occupying a lower SES position.

In addition to mean SSS, we examine variance in SSS. We argue that variance in SSS can be interpreted as a measure of within-country social status inequality – it indicates how people within a country differ in where they think they stand in the social hierarchy. Until now status inequality has most commonly been operationalized in terms of income inequality, the assumption is that differences in incomes directly proxy differences in social status (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). This argument has inspired a great number of researchers to study the relationship between income inequality and health outcomes, thereby testing the so-called ‘status-anxiety hypothesis’. The hypothesis suggests that high social status inequality fosters anxiety and distress among individuals, which in turn translates into health problems (see O’Donnell et al., 2015). In this paper we argue that the subjective social status variable is an alternative – and in fact a more direct – measure of within country status-inequality. We argue that lower status-inequality is associated with better psychological well-being but it also weakens psychiatric distress associated with occupying a lower SES position.

We will use the CES-D battery from Rounds 6 and 7 of ESS to gauge levels of psychological well-being (pooling years to augment sample size) and will fit multi-level models allowing individual-level and country-level effects to be modelled simultaneously. We will measure SSS with the single item available in Round 6: There are people who tend to be towards the top of our society and people who tend to be towards the bottom...where would you place yourself on this scale nowadays? SES will be measured using the International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status (Ganzeboom et al. 1992) and the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) (Rose and Harrison, 2010). Education, income and other socio-demographic variables will also be added as controls.
Social Inequalities in Self-Reported Health in Ukrainian Working-age Population: Finding from the ESS

Iryna Mazhak

Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies

Framework. According to the WHO (2014), monitoring of health inequality is an essential step for achieving health equity. Many countries around the world, including EU-countries, have made significant progress to track health inequalities, using evidence-based monitoring, conduct research, and develop policies to reduce health inequalities. However, literature on social inequalities in health and social determinants of health in Ukraine is scarce, and evidence of related social/policy action on this problem is largely absent.

Methods. Data from the 2 - 6 rounds (5158 respondents at age 22-65 years) of a European Social Survey were used to examine which social determinants of health influence self-reported poor health (poor SRH) of Ukrainian working-age respondents. The data were analyzed using the IBM SPSS 22 (significance tests were used to test association between poor SRH and all variables: chi-square tests were used for categorical variables and t-tests were used for continuous variables; logistic regression was used to assess the effect of the variables on poor SRH).

Results. A chi-square test for association was conducted between the social determinants of health and poor SRH. There were statistically significant associations between all social determinants of health and poor SRH except of two of them: urbanicity (?2(3) = 0.451, p = .929), and unemployed who actively looking for job (?2(1) = 3.740, p = .053). A binominal logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of the social determinants of health (the independent variables) on self-reported poor health (a dichotomous dependent variable), where all predictors were entered into the model in one step. The logistic regression model was statistically significant ?2(42) = 1083.281, p < .0005. The model explained 39.7% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in poor SRH and correctly classified 76.4% of cases. Sensitivity was 81.5%, specificity was 67.9%, positive predictive value was 80.75% and negative predictive value was 69.03%. Of the 19 predictor variables 6 were not statistically significant, such as level of education (p = .976), participation in social activities compared to others of same age (p = .060), having anyone to discuss intimate and personal matters with (p = .223), having paid work (p = .230), being unemployed that actively looking for job (p = .685) as well as number of people living regularly as member of household (p = .836).

Males were more likely to not report their health as poor than females. Increasing age, living in countryside, worst feeling about household's income nowadays, and hampered in daily activities by health problem were associated with an increased likelihood of poor SRH.

Conclusion. Policies to improve health equity have to be informed.
And justice for all: Examining corruption as a contextual source of mental illness

Ioana van Deurzen

*Tilburg University*

The present study focuses on the relationship between corruption and mental health. I argue that corruption is a neglected yet relevant social determinant of health and health inequalities in Europe. Corruption refers to the private wealth-seeking behavior of someone who represents the state or the public authority and thus is a measure of the institutional quality and honesty in a country. I propose that corruption could be detrimental to the mental health of individuals through several mechanisms, e.g., it could act like a contextual stressor, it could decrease the general trust and social cohesion or it could increase hostility and feelings of powerlessness. Furthermore, I argue that certain groups in society will be more affected than others by corruption, i.e., low socio-economic status (SES) groups and women, and this could be an explanation for the resilient health inequalities that are still present in the European countries. In order to test these arguments, I will use the European Social Survey data collected in 2006, 2012 and 2014. By using this data, I will be able to combine a static and a dynamic approach: on each point in time I will be able to examine the cross-sectional relationship between corruption levels and mental health of different SES groups and genders. In addition, by employing pseudo-panel methods I will be able to examine the relationship between corruption and mental health through time.
An extensive corpus of knowledge has been developed in the course of few decades examining the relation between socioeconomic position and health in different societies. Few other regions have made socioeconomic inequalities in health a more debated and researched topic than Europe. However, with few exceptions, much of this research has focused on single pathways to health inequalities and specific countries. Comparison between existing studies is often constrained by limitations stemming from the use of different study populations, health measures and risk factors. The ESS7 Health module provides a unique opportunity to overcome such limitations and investigate comparatively the contribution of several risk factors in explaining socioeconomic inequalities in health across 21 European countries. This article will take full use of the module and summarize the contribution of all social determinants divided into 3 main groups: living conditions, life styles, and occupational factors for each country. Predicted probabilities estimated from a series of logistic regressions are used to report educational inequalities in self-reported health across European countries.
Introduction.
For most of people, work is an important aspect in their life. It appears to be determinant to achieve well-being. Numerous studies examined the relationship between job satisfaction and life satisfaction (Judge & Klinger, 2008). However, life satisfaction may provide a limited understanding of individuals’ well-being which arises the need for exploring more inclusive aspects of this concept. As an integrative approach of eudaemonist and hedonist views of well-being, psychological flourishing refers to an optimal human functioning associated to good feelings. Understanding psychological flourishing and how it is related to other subjective aspects of one’s life such as job satisfaction is a new promising way to study the science of well-being (Villieux, Sovet, Jung, & Guilbert, 2016).

Purpose.
As psychological flourishing provides a more integrative approach of individuals’ well-being, the present study aimed to examine its relationships with job satisfaction and individuals’ well-being. On that purpose, we investigate the relationships between job satisfaction and psychological flourishing among working population from twenty eight European countries, using the 2012 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS, Wave 6). Based on previous studies, we hypothesize that job satisfaction is positively associated to psychological flourishing across samples. Moreover, we expect moderating effects of cross-national differences on the relationship between these two variables. Additionally, we use multilevel modeling to examine the moderating effects of organizational-, and individual-level characteristics on the links between job satisfaction and psychological flourishing were examined for each country.

Method.
More than 52,000 people from twenty-eight European countries participated to the sixth wave of the ESS. Among these representative samples, we selected participants who reported to have a work. In our final sample, the labor force represented among 50% of the total population (across countries). Job satisfaction was measured based on the self report measure in a single item, psychological flourishing was evaluated considering the specify aggregation of several indicators. Thus, basing on the operational definition given by Huppert and So (2013), psychological flourishing score was calculated by combining ten features (e.g. competence, emotional stability, meaning) which reflect both hedonist and eudaemonist aspects of well-being. As a composite measure of psychological flourishing, its psychometric properties were initially investigated.

Results and discussion. We admit that job satisfaction is a significant determinant of psychological flourishing. Analyses indicated that working population reported significantly higher prevalence of psychological flourishing than the non-working population. The differences were particularly notable for the Scandinavian countries. Correlations between job satisfaction and psychological flourishing were ranged from .19 for Kosovo to .38 for France with an average of .31. Further analyses revealed moderating effects of several organizational and individual characteristics. Implications of these results for fostering psychological flourishing among individuals are discussed.
Educational attainment in a context of oversupply: does it hamper the mental health benefits of the higher educated?

1Pieter Dudal; 1Piet Bracke

Ghent University1

In recent decennia, European labor markets witnessed important changes in the supply and demand of higher educated people. After the second World War, European societies experienced a process of educational expansion which went hand in hand with increasing employment opportunities for the higher educated. However, it seems that this upgrading of the labor market was not sufficient as an oversupply of the higher educated is present in a substantial part of the European countries. Current research focusses on oversupply, as a structural labor market feature, to gain more insight in the macro-mechanisms linking education to mental health. It is suggested that this oversupply can increase job-competition between and within different educational groups and can result in negative consequences for both the lower and the higher educated. Hence, we address the question whether an oversupply of the higher educated has an influence on the association between education and mental health as we can expect that this can hamper the mental health benefits of the higher educated. In addition, we pay attention to the influence of oversupply on the mental health of the general population health.

Analysis are based on round 3 (2006), 6 (2012) and 7 (2014) of the European Social Survey. The final sample consists of 76,713 respondents aged between 20 and 65 in 25 European countries. Depression is measured using an eight-item version of the CES-D8. Educational attainment is captured by the years of full-time education completed. Since respondents are clustered in countries, we apply multilevel-modelling to answer the research questions. Additionally, a random slope for education is entered in the model as we assume that the relation between education and depression varies between countries.

Results from cross-level interactions reveal that an oversupply of the higher educated does not influence the association between education and mental health implying that an oversupply does neither reduce or widen the educational gap in depression. Additionally, results show a negative effect of oversupply on the mental health of the general population. This indicates that in countries with an oversupply of the higher educated, people are experiencing less depressive complaints. Results are discussed in the light of the modernization of European labor markets and suggestions for further research are stipulated.
The effects of unemployment and insecure jobs on well-being and health: The moderating role of labor market policies

Jonas Voßemer; Michael Gebel; Kadri Täht; Marge Unt; Björn Högberg; Mattias Strandh

University of Bamberg, University of Tallinn, University of Umeå

Over the last two decades, globalization, organizational restructuring, labor market flexibilization and deregulation are thought to have strongly increased workers’ risk to experience unemployment and job insecurity. Against this background, social scientists across different disciplines have examined the consequences of these profound changes for individuals’ health and well-being. For instance, in the last fifteen years studies on the effects of unemployment on health (see Wanberg, 2012 for a recent review) have been complemented by research about the consequences of temporary employment for workers’ well-being (see De Cuyper et al. 2008, Virtanen et al. 2005 for reviews). However, although a lot has been learned about why and how unemployment and to a lesser extent insecure jobs negatively affect individuals’ health, less attention has been paid to factors that buffer or exacerbate these consequences. Specifically, few previous studies have taken a comparative perspective allowing addressing questions about the moderating role of welfare states regimes or labor market policies (see Bambra and Eikemo, 2009 for an exception). The few studies that have addressed such questions have mostly focused on the effect of unemployment on well-being and its moderation through passive labor market policies (PLMP) (see O’Campo for a review). However, based on theories about how unemployment and job insecurity negatively affect health, it is surprising that the moderating role of other labor market policies such as active labor market policies (ALMP) or employment protection legislation (EPL) has been largely ignored (see Wulfgramm, 2014; Scherer, 2009 for exceptions). In particular, empirical evidence on how the effects of insecure jobs on health and well-being vary across countries and times is rare. Therefore, we address the following research questions: First, what are the effects of unemployment and insecure jobs on health and well-being? Second, how do these effects vary across countries and time? Third, how do passive and active labor market policies (PLMP, ALMP) as well as employment protection legislation (EPL) moderate these effects?

Based on a synthesis of previous theories (Nordenmark and Strandh 1999), we highlight two key mechanisms that link unemployment and job insecurity with health and well-being. This allows us to derive hypotheses about how labor market policies (PLMP, ALMP, and EPL) moderate these mechanisms and accordingly the health and well-being effects of unemployment and insecure jobs. To test our hypotheses, we use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from all rounds (2002-2014) as it offers high quality information on employment status and working conditions as well as health (subjective health) and well-being (life satisfaction, happiness). Macro-data on ALMP, PLMP, and EPL are collected from Eurostat and the OECD. Combining data from all rounds of the ESS results in a sample of roughly 100,000 persons (micro-level) and more than 100 country-rounds at the macro-level. Besides a higher number of macro-level observations, using all rounds also allows to use within-country variation over time in order to estimate fixed-effects regression models controlling for time-constant unobserved country characteristics. Methodologically, we apply both two-step as well as simultaneously estimated multi-level models.
The socio-political architecture of disability: How different welfare state policies affect the experience of disability and its connection with labor market participation in Europe (2002-2014)

Josephine Foubert

Ghent University

Disability is a complex phenomenon that reflects the interaction of a health condition or impairment with the organization of the physical and social environment. This implies that what it means to be disabled varies across time, cultures and societies. In contemporary welfare state practices and social policy definitions, one’s disability status is not only seen as a function of one’s health condition, but it is foremost tied to one’s ability to participate in the labor market. Despite the central gatekeeping role of welfare state institutions in defining disability as a status, the research on the disability, work and welfare state policy nexus is still in its infancy. In this paper, I seek to examine whether two different welfare state policy aspects, namely out-of-work benefit generosity and investments in active labor policy, affect the perception of disability, and whether this effect is equal for people with different labor market positions. In contemporary politics more generous out-of-work benefits have been problematized in respect of providing insufficient incentives to work and creating laziness. Generous disability benefits in particular are considered as mechanisms for early labor market exit and a pull into disability for persons with weaker labor market attachment. As a response, a lot of countries have activated their social security systems or reinforced investments in so-called active labor market policies (ALMPs). Higher investments in ALMPs could signal the importance of work as a norm in society and lower the tendency to report a disability. Both differences in investments levels across countries as well as changes within the welfare state policies of a country are taken into account. Macro-level data is derived from the ESPROSS database available on Eurostat. Based on seven waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2014), preliminary binomial logistic multilevel analyses based on 25 European countries and 7 different waves indicate that a person’s tendency to report a disability is not only a personal matter, but can also be explained by country and period characteristics. For instance, while controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and self-rated health status, people have a higher tendency to report a disability in 2014 compared to earlier waves. Moreover, higher ALMP investments are associated with a higher chance of reporting a disability. This effect is equal for people with different labor market positions. More generous out-of-work benefits also seem to trigger a self-rated disability. However, this effect is only true for people who are unemployed or non-active on the labor market. These results show the role of welfare states in shaping and producing the experience of disability in Europe. Moreover, in the light of recent austerity politics, they could signal the ‘disabilization’ of unemployment, as reporting a disability might be an alternative way to receive the necessary welfare state support.
Access to Medical care depending on the experience of unemployment in different welfare regimes

Ave Roots

University of Tartu

Health inequalities between employed and unemployed has been widely studied and found that unemployed have systematically lower health status (although it is not clear whether they have worse health as a result of the influence of unemployment or unemployment is the result of health problems). Inequalities in access to health care depending on the employment status have not been studied much. This research will fill this gap. If the differential access of the unemployed is confirmed then it also solves partly the causality issue, showing that unemployment has impact on health (in this case indirect through health care access). Not only unemployment itself, but also the context where unemployment occurs has its’ impact. Different welfare regimes have different opportunities and restrictions and therefore we are studying the impact of unemployment on health care access in the context of different welfare regimes. The welfare regime types are used by Eikemo et al (2008): Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, Southern European, Bismarckian and Eastern European. We hypothesized, that in Bismarckian, Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European welfare regime unemployed have less access to health care. The reasons are the following: in Bismarckian regime the entitlement to health care access is very much labour market based, Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European states are very liberal and much depends on the personal resources of the individual.

We used European Social Survey 2014 data, where there was the special bloc of health and health care. The exemplary country for Anglo-Saxon regime was Ireland, Bismarckian were Germany and the Netherlands, Scandinavian was Sweden and Eastern was Estonia (the data for any Southern country is unfortunately not available yet). We found that being currently unemployed does not influence access to medical care during last 12 months in any country (controlling for age, gender, subjective general health status, hampering health problem, citizenship, immigration status, marital status, feeling about household’s income, having children at home, the type of the place of residence and life satisfaction). Whereas earlier unemployment influences the access to medical care in Anglo-Saxon Ireland and Eastern European Estonia. In Ireland people who have been long term unemployed and being unemployed earlier than last 5 years (before the economic crisis) and in Estonia being unemployed during the economic crisis (during last 5 years) have more likely not received medical consultation when needed. In Ireland, if the working conditions (working hours and work control etc) were added to the model then the difference between working people with and without unemployment background disappears. In Estonia this difference disappears when agency is added to the models. In Summary it is found that only in liberal countries (Anglo-Saxon Ireland and Eastern European Estonia) where personal resources have a very important role, unemployment in the past decreases access to health care.
Unemployment and life satisfaction. Why do we observe cross-country differences?

Dominik Buttler; Piotr Michoń
Poznań University of Economics

The detrimental effect of joblessness on individual well-being, life satisfaction or happiness has been the subject of many studies and is relatively well recognized (usually in the context of Western economies) as an additional, non-pecuniary cost of unemployment (Winkelmann, 2014). However, the strength of the relationship between the employment status and life satisfaction varies considerably among countries (Michoń, 2015). Relatively little is known about what forces drive these discrepancies. The aim of the proposed paper is to identify the macro factors influencing the strength of the relationship between the employment status and the level of individual satisfaction or happiness. In other words, we try to answer why in some countries the decrease of the individual level of life satisfaction due to the unemployment is bigger than in the others. The possible macro factors to be considered are, for example, the unemployment rate, the level of the employment protection, the design of the labour market institutions, the societal attitudes towards work, the social norms.

In the empirical part of the paper we apply the two-step regression procedure developed by Woessmann (2004). In the first step we use the micro data from the European Social Survey and regress the individual life satisfaction on the employment status (controlling for other variables). This procedure allows to estimate the strength of the relationship between the employment status and the life satisfaction separately for each country and for each year covered in ESS. In the second step the estimated country-level coefficients become dependent variables regressed on the macro factors potentially influencing the strength of the relationship between the employment status and life satisfaction. These independent variables measured at the country level will be taken from various sources of data, e.g. World Value Survey, OECD Employment Database, ILOSTAT Database.

Literature
3.4 The SWB of older Europeans

Sessions organized by Piet Bracke, Ghent University

Self-perceived health in older Europeans: Does the choice of survey matter?

1Simone Croezen; 2Alex Burdorf; 2Frank J. van Lenthe

Department of Public Health, Erasmus MC, University Medical Center, Rotterdam1,2, Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP, The Hague1

Background: Cross-national comparisons of health in European countries provide crucial information to monitor health and disease, to describe health inequalities within and between countries and to inform policy and research priorities. However, variations in estimates might occur when information from cross-national European surveys with different characteristics are used. We compared the prevalence of very good or good self-perceived health across ten European countries according to three European surveys and investigated which survey characteristics of these surveys contributed to differences in prevalence estimates of health.

Methods: We used aggregate data from 2004/2005 of respondents aged 55-64 years from the European Social Survey (ESS), the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Across the surveys, self-perceived was assessed by the same question with response options ranging from very good to very bad.

Results: Despite a good correlation between the surveys (intraclass correlation coefficient: 0.77), significant differences were found in prevalence estimates of very good or good self-perceived health. The survey response, sample size and survey mode contributed statistically significantly to the differences between the surveys. Multilevel linear regression analyses, adjusted for survey characteristics, showed a higher prevalence of very good or good self-perceived health for SHARE (+6.96, 95% confidence intervals: 3.14, 10.8) and a lower prevalence (-3.12, 95% confidence intervals: -7.11, 0.86) for ESS, with EU-SILC as the reference survey. Furthermore, the agreement in health estimates between surveys varied across countries, making country-specific comparisons between surveys less reliable.

Conclusion: Three important health surveys in Europe showed substantial differences for presence of very good or good self-perceived health. These differences limit the usefulness for direct comparisons across studies in health policies for Europe.
When the Old Become Lonely: Structural Determinants of Late-Life Loneliness in Europe

Linda Ejlskov

Aalborg University

With a growing ageing population it is crucial to gain insights into how societies can increase the number of healthy and disability-free years of life. In that regard, loneliness is viewed as a serious impediment to healthy ageing. Studies show that loneliness is associated with being less physically active, higher rates of alcohol abuse, a greater risk of obesity and sleep deprivation as well as worse cognitive functioning. Thus, loneliness is an important theme for both researchers and policymakers in terms of improving the quality of life and physical health in old age.

Previous studies have mainly focused on individual-level determinants for loneliness. However, recent developments in the literature suggest that in addition to individual determinants, where you live matters for the risk of being lonely. Studies have documented large variations in the prevalence of late-life loneliness across countries and geographical regions and the reason for a great deal of the variations is still unclear. Several theoretical explanations of contextual influences on the susceptibility for feeling lonely have been put forth but only a few of the proposed contextual determinants for loneliness have been tested. Thus, more cross-country comparative research is needed in order to disentangle the mechanisms underlying loneliness in older age.

The aim of this study is to expand upon the current body of literature on cross-country variations in late-life loneliness. Several country- and regional level determinants of late-life loneliness in Europe are investigated. A three-level cumulative mixed model analysis is performed on 10,166 individuals from 23 European countries using data from the 6th wave of the European Social Survey. Using the information theoretic approach, the analysis indicates that considering the region in which the individuals live as well as the country adds to the understanding of geographical variations in late-life loneliness. The more complicated model including both countries and regions are 14.6 times more likely to be the best model given the data. Additionally, extending the scope beyond culture to other contextual determinants adds to our understanding of variations in late-life loneliness across nations and regions.

Both the information theoretic approach and the standardized coefficients indicate that the most important predictor of late-life loneliness is the level of freedom (-0.30 (SE=0.06)) and equality (-0.30 (SE=0.06)) in a country followed by that country’s health expenditure (-0.26 (SE=0.07)) and the wealth of the specific region (-0.21 (SE=0.06)). Based on these results, the previous focus on culture as the sole determinant of variations in loneliness across countries is questioned and a theoretical explanation for the found associations is put forth.

This analysis provides evidence that the context in which we live in terms of health spending, safety, freedom and wealth matter for the likelihood of feeling lonely when we get older. For this reason, when creating policies to alleviate late-life loneliness and thus improving both the quality of life and health of the elderly, improving contextual country- and regional level determinants might be more effective compared to smaller and more individual-targeted policies.
Social capital as the source of subjective well-being in the late life in Central and Eastern European countries

Anna Ermolina

Higher School of Economics

This research aims to explore the importance of social capital for subjective well-being (SWB) in the late life in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The study investigates (1) what forms of social capital have the most significant impact on SWB in the late life and (2) whether SWB benefits of social capital are individual or collective at the national level.

A large number of factors have been examined as the determinants of the elderly’s SWB. Along with gender, age, health, education and income, social integration and social relations are associated with high levels of SWB in the late life. Recent studies use a multidimensional concept of social capital including social networks, interpersonal trust, reciprocity. Social capital consists of structural and cognitive components. The structural dimension contains extent and intensity of associational links or activity whereas the cognitive component covers perceptions of support, reciprocity and trust.

There is still existing disagreement whether social capital is a collective attribute or an individual feature. Previous studies observe the outcomes of social capital both at the individual and aggregate levels but there is no clear explanation regarding their interaction.

This research is based on the European Social Survey (2012). Its sample consists of 8,867 individuals 50 years and over from Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Ukraine. The study adopts the multilevel approach of Subramanian et al. (2002) and Poortinga (2006) to explore cross-level interactions of social capital and happiness, life satisfaction and subjective health as SWB measures. A number of socio-demographic variables are included: age, sex, the number of household members, marital status, children living in a household, education, employment status, type of living area. Structural component of social capital presents the elderly’s participation in political or voluntary organizations or events whereas cognitive component relates to social trust. Receiving and providing help from/close people are also considered as the part of social capital. Ordinal regression models are constructed for happiness, life satisfaction and subjective health. Multilevel regression procedures are used to model the two-level structure of individuals at the first level nested within 9 CEE countries at the second level.

Considering socio-demographic differences, the individual social trust and social activity are strongly associated with the elderly’s SWB. Receiving and providing help from/to close people both at the individual and national levels are also related to SWB in the late life. The beneficial effects of receiving/providing help from/to close people on subjective health seem to mainly apply to high-trust individuals. These results correspond to the findings of Subramanian et al. (2002) and Poortinga (2006) that social environment does not automatically lead to SWB. The outcomes of social capital are determined by individual characteristics, in particular social trust. Thus, more trusting individuals benefit from their social environment.

Key words: the elderly, subjective well-being, social capital, social activity, social trust, social support
Subjective Well-being and Economic Growth in Developed European Countries

Vladimir Mentus

Institute of Social Sciences

The aim of this paper is to examine the validity of Easterlin paradox, the thesis that the lack of a long-term relationship between economic growth and changes of subjective well-being within populations. Specifically, it has been analyzed whether economic growth within 11 developed European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland) in the period 2002-2014 was followed by increase of subjective well-being of their populations. According to Easterlin paradox although there is positive correlation between economic growth and subjective well-being in the cross-section and short-term, in the long-term (ten years, at least) the correlation does not exist. In economics and sociology this has been an object of dispute for a long time.

Thus far, researches have fairly neglected the fact that, because of the law of diminishing marginal utility, relationship between economic growth and subjective well-being should be dependent on level of economic development. The relationship should not be identical in cases of less developed, and more developed countries. For this reason, only developed countries are examined here, for which data are available.

Data about the economic growth originate from World Bank, and data about subjective well-being are derived from European Social Survey. Subjective well-being was measured via single-item question regarding the self-rating of general happiness. This question was asked in all seven waves of survey, every two years since 2002. Correlation analysis shows that during the observed period there is no relationship between the means of countries’ economic growth and the change rates of means of subjective well-being – more growth does not imply more happiness. Paired samples t-tests show that while there was a significant rise of countries’ GDP per capita in 2014 in comparison with 2002, there was no significant change of subjective well-being. Additionally, cross-sectional data from 2002 and 2014 show that economic growth is not a sufficient condition for the rising of subjective well-being.

Explanations concerning these results will be offered in the discussion. In brief, they could be derived from relative income hypothesis, theory of hedonic adaptation/set-point theory, aspiration level and law of diminishing marginal utility. Exposed results therefore confirm the validity of Easterlin paradox and give support to the utilitarian idea of shifting the developed countries policies main aims - from maximizing economic growth to maximizing subjective well-being of their populations.
Cross-country variations in happiness: Trends, age differentials and anomalies

Marion Burkimsher

University of Lausanne

The question “Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?” has been fielded in all 7 waves of the ESS. Many correlates with “happiness” have been looked at in wide-ranging studies, but the cross-country and age differentials, and the trends in these over time, have been critically examined to a lesser extent. This study aims to analyse these underlying variations. Data from the 18 countries which had data from at least 6 waves were analysed.

Age differentials
A clear conclusion on differentials by age was reached. In the stable western European countries the average happiness level was almost identical for seniors (50-69), middle-aged (30-49) and young (18-29). However, in the Eastern European countries, where overall happiness was lower, seniors recorded significantly lower happiness than young people.

Cohort differentials
Do people generally become happier as they get older? We looked at 3 cohort bands and the conclusion was that, averaging all the countries, there was generally stability over time. However, the oldest cohort (1939-1954) did show a slight increase in happiness as they aged from 48-63 in 2002 to 60-75 in 2014. However, is this simply a selection effect? Could it be that those in poor health (who generally tend to be more unhappy) are not sampled as they die in this period of life, leaving only the happier and healthier members of the cohort?

Time trends
Most age groups in most countries showed (remarkable?) stability in average happiness levels – even through the recession of 2008 and thereafter. However, young people (but not older) in the following countries showed a significant decrease in happiness over the 2002-2014 period: Hungary, Portugal and France. In Ireland all age groups were hit hard by the recession, although life was looking up again by 2014. The following countries saw an increase in mean happiness for all age groups over the 2002-2014 period: Poland, Estonia, Germany (after 2006) and, to a lesser extent and only for the over 30s, Slovenia.

Country differentials
In general the average happiness level of the Eastern countries is lower than the Western European countries, and the Southern European countries are lower than the Northern Europeans. Denmark consistently scores highest on happiness measures, with Norway, Finland and Switzerland not far behind. In our (limited) sample Hungary consistently gets the lowest scores. There is a correlation of happiness with GDP per person (country rank rather than absolute measure) but some countries are anomalous: Poland and Spain are happier than would be predicted, but Ireland and Portugal are less happy. The question of whether the happiness level of French-speakers in France, Belgium and Switzerland is subdued by the French language (perhaps caused by interpretation of the question wording) is investigated. It would appear that it is a country-dependent, rather than language-dependent, issue, with France having less happy citizens than would be expected.
This study aims to develop a baseline analysis to compare social and cultural Capital, and the well-being dimension of EU countries by ESS data. According to Bourdieu’s theory, these sociological constructs are multi-dimensional. Three types of cultural capital indeed should be distinguished: Embodied cultural capital consists of both consciously acquired and passively “inherited” features that characterize ways of being and feeling; Objectified cultural capital consists of physical and owned objects; Institutionalized cultural capital consists of institutional recognition, mostly in the form of academic credentials or qualifications held by an individual. Regarding the Social Capital, it concerns some dimensions like personal relationships, social network support, civic engagement, trust and cooperative norms. While both economic and sociological theories of social capital explicitly recognizes it as a multi-dimensional concept, in most empirical applications the definition of social capital is largely data driven and limited by the very narrow range of proxies that the chosen data set contains; for example Alesina and La Ferrara [2000] use only membership in voluntary organizations, from the US General Social Survey and Kan [2007] uses only a measure of whether or not people think there is someone living nearby that would help them in an emergency, from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. For these reasons it would be too reductive and even erroneous to develop a single numeric index for each of these three dimensions, as done by several studies [Khawaja, Mowafi 2006; Putnam 2001]. Our work aims to represent a “snapshot” study on the 2014 EU Countries ESS Data, in which we argue through a process of explorative analysis for categorical variables called MCA – multiple correspondence analysis – it will be possible not only to find possible relationships between the dimensions mentioned above but also seek out countries with similar profiles to each other.
3.6 Making well-being count for policy

Sessions organized by Eric Harrison, City University London

Measuring impacts of the economic crisis on well-being in Europe using a comprehensive measure

Felicia Huppert; Áine Maguire; Eduardo Garcia Garzon; Kai Ruggeri

University of Cambridge

Well-being is a sustainable condition that allows the individual or population to develop and thrive. It is the combination of feeling good and functioning well; the experience of positive emotions such as happiness and contentment as well as the development of one’s potential, having some control over one’s life, having a sense of purpose, and experiencing positive relationships. Often in economic or political research, population well-being is assessed using a single item about life satisfaction or happiness. Yet, well-being is a multi-dimensional construct, and cannot be adequately assessed in this manner. The measurement of population well-being should therefore be of critical concern for all those engaged with policy, as it is often policy which can ultimately exert a critical influence on the lives and well-being of a population, and in particular, the economic crisis has regularly been considered for its impact on well-being in Europe. Using data from the well-being module of the 2006 and 2012 rounds of the European Social Survey, levels of flourishing using an existing framework were tested in 21 countries. This framework allows for testing individual dimensions of well-being as well as looking at a more comprehensive level, which revealed very interested patterns within and between national outcomes as well as for specific demographic groups. Descriptive approaches also highlight specific areas of improvement and concern. These insights are vital for policymakers to consider when developing relevant approaches to ensuring well-being of a population in such circumstances and not simply focusing on GDP. While it may have been assumed that the recession experienced in the past decade had a directly negative impact on the prevalence of those flourishing, these results support similar findings that the actual impact is far more nuanced.
Wellbeing inequality in Europe

1Annie Quick; 1Saamah Abdallah

New Economics Foundation1

This paper explores the nature and drivers of inequality in wellbeing across Europe. We used the first six rounds of the European Social Survey (from 2002 to 2012), taking the question on life satisfaction in the core as the measure of wellbeing. Firstly, we describe two forms of inequalities in wellbeing across Europe: inequality between population groups (according to age, income, ethnicity and education); and overall inequality across the population (measured using the mean pair distance of life satisfaction within a country). We find that there is a high level of variation between countries in both types of wellbeing inequality.

Secondly, we attempt to identify what factors at the country-level can explain variation in overall inequalities in wellbeing. We explored a range of 28 potential variables including economic factors (such as GDP per capita, unemployment rate, economic freedom and inflation), measures of government expenditure on different categories, measures of governance, and measures of other inequalities (e.g. GINI, gender inequalities). We used multilevel modelling so as to separate the effects between countries and those that work over time. We found that: higher GDP and lower unemployment are both associated with lower inequality in wellbeing over time; countries with better governance tend to have lower inequalities in wellbeing on some measures, and these findings tend to stay significant even after controlling for employment and GDP; and higher levels of economic freedom is associated with higher wellbeing inequality, though this effect reduces when controlling for GDP and unemployment (suggesting that GDP and unemployment are either mediators or confounders in this relationship).

Our descriptive and associational findings both suggest that high inequalities in wellbeing are not inevitable and inequalities in wellbeing may be amenable to policy particularly regarding governance.
Five ways to wellbeing in Europe – who does them?

Saamah Abdallah

_New Economics Foundation_

The five ways to wellbeing were developed based on a review of evidence gathered in the UK government’s 2008 Foresight Project on Mental Capital and Wellbeing. The aim was to identify five actions that are simple, universal, which anyone can do on an individual level, and for which there is some evidence of an association with wellbeing. They are Connect, Be Active, Take Notice, Keep Learning and Give.

In this paper we analyse data from Round 6 of the European Social Survey, which included a question related to each of the five ways. We look to identify patterns of five ways behaviour across Europe, looking at differences between countries, between age groups, genders and levels of education. Differences in five ways participation, based on all four of these variables, are can be very substantial.

We also look at how these patterns intersect, for example, identifying countries where the gender gaps are larger, or those where education plays less of a role. We also confirm the association between five ways behaviours and wellbeing, measured using life satisfaction.

This paper presents these findings, and explores their policy relevance. It also considers the limitations of the research and makes recommendations for further research.
Exploring the perceived quality of society in the UK and Europe

1Eric Harrison; 1Rima Saini; 1Nadine Zwiener

City University London

In this research, we are interested in gaining a deeper understanding of how people view the society in which they live. We call these perceptions - peoples’ satisfaction and trust in the people and institutions which govern society and the outcomes they achieve - ‘perceived quality of society’ (PQOS). A better understanding of this area can better equip policymakers to identify those subgroups of the population that have negative perceptions of their society, and consider suitable responses. While there is a welcome increase in attention to personal wellbeing, combining this with a better understanding of perceptions of the quality of society can be valuable: after all the policy solutions to create and maintain 'good lives' (reflected in increased individual life satisfaction) may be quite different from those leading to the ‘good society’. Therefore, it is necessary to contextualise wellbeing not only as personal, but as a social and institutional phenomenon. This focus – on external evaluations of society as well as internal reflections of wellbeing and happiness - requires due investigation to get a more holistic picture of the phenomenon of wellbeing. The paper addresses the following questions:

Is there a difference in peoples’ perceived quality of society over time and between countries? How do perceptions of the quality of society differ for different sub-groups of the populations? What drives perceptions of the quality of society? How are measures of personal, subjective wellbeing related to perceptions of the quality of society? How does the UK fare compared to the rest of Europe with regards to peoples’ perceptions of the quality of society?
Theme 4: Welfare and social policy

4.2 Parents-Offspring relations and life satisfaction

A generational perspective on the current state of the educational system in European countries

1Sandra Gilgen; 1Rolf Becker

University of Bern

Owing to drastic economic developments in the 20th century and the accompanying educational expansion (Hadjar and Becker 2009), we assume that evaluations of the educational system differ across cohorts. The expected differences are assumed to stem not only from structurally imposed diverging experiences in and with the educational system but also from differing world views along generational lines (Mannheim 1964; Ryder 1965). Bearing in mind, the difficulties of cross-sectional analysis, we draw upon the integrated data from the European Social Survey (ESS) round 6 (2012). In a first step, generational effects on the degree of satisfaction with the educational system are assessed using linear regression and controlling for among others; sex, educational background, individual social mobility and the type of school system. Results from preliminary analyses show that generally speaking, the effect of cohort is non-linear, with the youngest showing the highest opinions on the educational system of their respective country. Those born in the second half of the 1950s, thus the group most likely to just have missed out on the benefits of the educational expansion, seem to be the least satisfied with the current educational system. When controlling for school type, non-tracked school systems fare better than tracked or semi-tracked systems, though this effect is partly due to the effect of the prevailing welfare state type. Having a child living at home and attitudes toward equality are further predictors of school system satisfaction. In general though, there is a difference in the perception of the educational system between the sexes, with women being more critical than men. This effect depends on the generation, with some cohorts showing wider gaps between women’s and men’s perceptions than others. Also, education is a better predictor of satisfaction with the educational system for women than for men.

In order to further correct for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level, in a next step, we estimate fixed effects models (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 221–227), which allow for the differentiation of within- and between-effects (Cameron and Trivedi 2010). This means that we can account for structural country-level effects and individual effects on the perception of the educational system. First results stress the importance of country-effects (between-effect), which account for almost 20% of the variance in opinions concerning the educational system. The results offer valuable insight on the causes of differing evaluations of the respective educational systems in European countries across cohorts and thus allow for the inference of specific policy implications.


Cameron, Adrian Colin, and P. K. Trivedi. 2010. Microeconometrics Using Stata. College Station, Tex: Stata Press.


Are Parents in Favour of Educational Tracking? – Educational Tracking and Parental Satisfaction with Educational Systems in Europe

Peter Muhlau; Simone Schneider

Trinity College, University of Dublin

‘Educational tracking’ (or ‘streaming’ or ‘ability grouping’) is a highly controversial feature of educational systems. Empirical research consistently shows that ‘educational tracking’ increases inequalities in educational performance in general and that ‘tracking’ amplifies the effect of social background on educational outcomes (Hanushek and Woesmann, 2006; Schütz et al., 2008; Dunne 2010; Horn, 2009; Bol and Van Werfhorst, 2013). Moreover, high ability and more advantaged students appear to gain little if any by ‘educational tracking’ while the prospects of low ability and more disadvantaged students are seriously damaged. Nonetheless, and despite its dysfunctionality, ‘educational tracking’ persists in many European countries. This raises the question on parents’ satisfaction with the school system and their resistance towards reform processes. In this paper, we examine how ‘educational tracking’ affects parents’ satisfaction with the educational system in European countries. We assume that parents evaluate the educational system according to its overall performance: the better the system performance and the lower the educational tracking, the higher the satisfaction with the system. Competing hypotheses are formulated with regard to the effect of parents’ education: (i) according to the self-interest principle (benefits for own children), better educated parents are more in favour of tracking systems, (ii) while the enlightenment principle (benefits for society) predicts that better educated parents are less in favour of tracking systems. To test our hypotheses we use all waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2012). We focus on parents with children between 6-18 years of age living in 23 European countries. Information on educational systems is gathered from various sources (e.g. Dunne, 2010; Bol and Van Werfhorst, 2013; OECD various). Preliminary results show that parents in countries with strong ‘educational tracking’ are on average less satisfied with the educational system. In line with the enlightenment hypothesis, better educated parents are less satisfied with the education system, even more so, if they live in countries with ‘strong educational tracking’. Thus, the satisfaction gap between better and worse educated parents widens in countries where education selects and streams students at an early age or where strong curricular differences between tracks exist.
Migrant’s attitude to childcare: An explorative overview of ten migrant groups attitudes to formal childcare in the Netherlands and Denmark

1Verena Seibel; 2Troels Fage Hedegaard

University of Konstanz1, University of Aalborg2

Attitudes to childcare have been examined in a number studies, both nationally and comparatively, but never with migrants in focus. This is quite surprising given that migrants should be some of the main beneficiaries of the social investment strategy, of which formal childcare serves as an important pillar. Therefore we in this article examine whether migrants prefer to organize childcare formally or informally, whether they want to increase or decrease public spending on it, and whether they are satisfied the childcare services produced in the country? These three dimensions of attitudes to childcare are examined using the MIFARE-survey, which was collected in 2015 among natives and ten migrant groups in Denmark and the Netherlands (N=7319). The results show that migrants tend to follow the overall attitudes to childcare in the country, while generally being more positive towards formal childcare. In terms of explaining gaps in attitudes both between migrants and natives, and between countries, the existing explanations in the literature of self-interest and gender values, however, mostly come up short. For the presentation the results will be compared against the ESS-survey (2006), on attitudes to satisfaction with childcare, as this survey forms the “gold standard” in comparative surveys on attitudes to childcare (e.g. De Tavernier 2015, Mischke 2013). We will therefore discuss whether similar or different overall patterns can be found between the general ESS survey and a more specialized migrant survey and why.
Institutional and Individual Factors in Attitudes toward Healthcare System: An East-West Comparison

1Tamara Popic; 2Simone Schneider

University of Lisbon1, Trinity College Dublin2

More than two decades after the fall of communism, Eastern European countries are relatively similar to their Western counterparts in the levels of social, economic and institutional development. Both groups of countries are also becoming increasingly exposed to structural challenges put on their welfare states - new demands created by an ageing population, immigration and globalization at a time of fierce budgetary constraints. These developments underpin the importance of people’s attitudes toward welfare state, as welfare reforms become urgent, and raise the question if and why differences in attitudes between the East and the West still persist.

While attitudes towards the welfare state, and redistribution in particular, are well explored in Western Europe, research on welfare attitudes in Eastern Europe still lags behind. This paper aims to deepen research on East-West differences in welfare attitudes and investigates the role of both institutional and individual factors on the formation of welfare attitudes in Eastern and Western Europe. It analyses attitudes towards the health system - given that healthcare is the second largest welfare sector after pensions, and concentrates upon two questions: Can institutional differences explain differences in attitudes between Eastern and Western Europe? What role do individual socio-economic or socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, gender or class, play in explaining East-West differences in attitudes towards health system?

The paper argues that East-West differences in attitudes towards the health system (quality of health services, efficiency of the system, government responsibility) are largely due to institutional forces, such as type of healthcare system (Social Health Insurance or National Health System), share of public financing, and other institutional performance indicators (quality of governance). With the exception of age, individual characteristics of the respondents, such as gender and social class, are expected to affect attitudes in the East and West very similarly.

The empirical analysis is based on the fourth round of the European Social Survey. Preliminary results of multi-level regression analysis show that Eastern Europeans evaluate the quality and efficiency of health system in their country significantly lower than Western Europeans, while no differences can be found in the government’s role to provide health care. Furthermore, while institutional factors seem play a significant role in accounting for these differences, they require further analyses.
Crime, policing, and the portability of procedural justice theory: A cross-national comparative analysis

Jonathan Jackson

LSE

Why do people cooperate with the police and comply with the law, and how should justice institutions and crime-control policies be best designed? This presentation presents findings from a cross-national study designed to test Tyler’s procedural justice theory in diverse social, legal and political contexts. 27 countries took part in Round 5 of the European Social Survey, which included a module of 45 questions designed to test normative and instrumental motivations to cooperate with legal authorities and comply with the law. The module was also replicated in a nationally representative sample of US citizens. A key focus throughout my presentation is a discussion of the meaning, measurement and motivating force of trust and legitimacy in the context of the police and law.
Economic Conditions, Government Effectiveness and Public Attitudes towards the Welfare State

Shlomo Mizrahi

*Ben Gurion University*

Public support for the welfare state constitutes an essential part of understanding the politics of the welfare state as well as the stability of welfare regimes. The literature suggests a wide variety of structural, sociological, ideological and personal factors that may influence and explain public attitudes towards the welfare state. However, most of them do not refer explicitly to specific economic and political conditions as determinants of attitudes towards the welfare state.

This paper presents research directions that expand the current literature in three main regards. First, we suggest concentrating on the ways in which citizens perceive various aspects of reality rather than on the objective measures of these aspects. For example, as measured by objective indicators, the level of unemployment or institutional quality may be low but citizens may believe they are high. We maintain that these subjective perceptions of reality, which express people’s mental models, shape their attitudes towards the welfare state. Second, we explain citizens’ attitudes towards the welfare state by focusing on their evaluations of the economic conditions of disadvantaged populations and government effectiveness in their country. The current literature tends to neglect these variables in general and their subjective measurement in particular. Third, we narrow the concept of the “welfare state” to mean government responsibility for disadvantaged populations. We believe that explaining attitudes towards this minimal aspect of the welfare state may reveal the core factors that determine attitudes towards a wide variety of social-economic variables.

To explore our hypotheses we use data from the 2008 European Social Survey (Round 4), which includes 56,752 observations from 26 European countries.

The study demonstrates that popular perceptions about the standard of living of disadvantaged populations in society play a critical role in shaping public attitudes towards the welfare state. We argue that because the welfare state provides a safety net for difficult times, people interpret reality in terms of the existing economic conditions of disadvantaged populations when formulating their preferences for the welfare state. If they deem the situation for the disadvantaged acceptable, the majority of the population regards the welfare provisions as adequate. In other words, citizens believe that an efficient and well-managed government that treats all sectors and populations equally takes good care of the disadvantaged. Hence, they believe that the standard of living of disadvantaged populations goes hand in hand with effective government. Under these conditions preferences for government intervention to improve welfare outcomes decline.

The complex picture that emerges from this study shows that perceptions about economic conditions interact with perceptions about government effectiveness in shaping attitudes towards redistribution. These relations may explain a major paradox: Why does deterioration in the economic conditions of disadvantaged populations not always trigger popular demands for increased government intervention? The answer suggested here is that the public may view the government as relatively effective and therefore believe that the standard of living of disadvantaged populations is relatively good although objectively they deteriorate.
Welfare State Disciples: Public Benefit Reception Increases Support for Redistribution

Peter Thisted Dinesen; Bolette Danckert; Kim Mannemar Sønderskov

University of Copenhagen1, Aarhus University2

Recent research suggests that becoming unemployed increases support for the welfare state, which is typically viewed as evidence for the impact of self-interest motives on individuals’ political attitudes. Taking this finding as point of departure, this paper examines whether the reception of public benefits increases individuals’ support for redistribution. We investigate the issue by analyzing a panel survey linked with detailed public records on individuals' reception of public benefits in Denmark. In line with expectations, we find that reception of various public benefits – unemployment benefits, student aid, and public pensions – significantly increases support for redistribution. Moreover, using a quasi-experimental research design, we show that the effect decreases when individuals stop to receive benefits. Collectively, our analyses support an extended role for self-interest in explaining political attitudes toward the welfare state. Yet, mechanisms related to acquiring new information stemming from the experience of receiving public benefits (e.g. learning about the economic hardship of getting by on these) may also explain part of the observed effect.
This study focuses on the subject of public preferences concerning the welfare state and redistribution, and actual policy. There is a mismatch between public preferences and policy in this field in some countries. That is, in some countries the public shows high demand for redistribution policy, but the government's social spending is low or vice versa. This study is a comparative study which aims to examine the interaction between public preferences and policy, as reflected in social investment indexes and GINI index, and the factors that shape this interaction. The proposed sources for the gap between public preferences and policy are: social capital, ethnic heterogeneity, low level of perceived government effectiveness and high level of corruption. The study uses panel data from 24 OECD countries, from different years (1990-2012). Public preferences were measured by 3 surveys:
- European Social Survey (ESS)
- World Value Survey (WVS)
- International Social Survey Program (ISSP).

Policy outcomes:
- Gini index – after taxes and transfers (OECD data).
- Modified GINI (Malul, Shapira & Shoham, 2013)
- GINI difference (before and after taxes and transfers).

Policy intentions:
- OECD social spending indexes:
  - Government Social Spending, % of GDP
  - Government Social Spending per Capita

The study has 2 phases: 1. measuring the gap between public preference and actual policy. 2. Regressions assessing the factors affecting this gap. We calculated 2 kinds of gaps: 1. between preference and policy intentions (measured by social spending). 2. between preference and policy outcomes (measured by the level of income inequality).

The relationship between the factors was examined using panel linear regression. The dependent variable was the gap, defined in the first stage. The independent variables were: social capital (measured by value surveys), ethnic heterogeneity (measured by ethnic fractionalization index), government effectiveness (measured by World Bank index) and corruption (index taken from "Transparency international").

Results showed that most countries have small gap between public preference and actual policy. A few countries (like Greece, Israel and Portugal) showed negative gap, where social spending is lower than the public preference. Other countries (like Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg) showed positive gap, where public spending is higher than the public preference. Government effectiveness and corruption were the main factors affecting the gap, but in some regressions social capital also had an effect on the gap.

It seems that a gap between public preferences and policy does exist in some countries. Another interesting finding is that this gap was also found in social-democratic countries, but in the opposite direction. That is, the government spends more than the public demand. Government effectiveness and corruption were found as the main factors affecting the gap. That is, the public may not demand a policy, because they don't believe in the government's ability to perform.
This paper investigates the dynamics of support for income redistribution in Europe between 2006 and 2012. It addresses whether there is substantial parallelism or increasing polarization in preference change across opinion groups in times of economic crisis.

The issue of whether aggregate opinion trends are mirrored among all strata of the population has long fuelled debates in public opinion research. While survey data from the General Social Survey clearly support the ‘parallel publics’ thesis for the American case, not much has been done in the European literature to disentangle aggregate trends so as to assess shifts and changes among various subpublics.

Attitudes toward redistribution are key to explore how group preferences evolve, and if they move evenly in the face of increasing economic turmoil. The Great Recession may indeed have had a differential impact on how opinion groups perceive social priorities and constraints weighing on government action. Do all Europeans claim for more state protection in order to preserve social cohesion? Are some subpublics responding to increasing austerity and to sluggish growth by calling, conversely, for less redistribution?

Using pooled data from the ESS for twenty-two countries, the findings presented in this paper add a critical piece to the puzzle of opinion moves in tough times. We begin with an over-all picture of how attitudes toward income redistribution (gincdiff variable) have evolved in the European Union and in a few neighbouring countries from 2006 to 2012. In line with the latest research on popular reactions to the Great Recession, we show that net support for redistributive policies is much more moderated and steady in social democracies of Western and Northern Europe.

Then we turn to subgroup variations. We use multilevel modeling to examine whether various subpublics have been moving in sync since 2008. Building on recent studies employing multilevel analysis to measure opinion change over time with cross-national data, we design three-level models to account for the fact that individuals are clustered in countries and that countries are also nested in ESS waves. Estimating ordinal logistic models, we find that group opinions do not shift differently over time at the national level.

We also scrutinize the extent to which aggregate opinion moves are driven by subgroups likely to be more responsive to changes and to outside stimuli (i.e., the wealthy, the most educated and the most politically aware). The results highlight that no subpublic significantly contributes to the overall change more than the others, thus providing strong evidence for the ‘parallel publics’ thesis in times of economic hardship.

In closing, we address the linkage between support for redistribution and macroeconomic indicators. Our findings emphasize that changes in support for redistributive policies are more likely to be disconnected from rising inequality in mature welfare states, suggesting that welfare generosity has mitigated the effects of the economic crisis on public opinion. Whereas aversion to income differences has dramatically increased in many Eastern and Mediterranean countries, more mature welfare states in Europe have somehow curbed the surge in public support for redistributive policies.
Generational differences between attitudes towards welfare provision. Convergence between Eastern and Western Europe?

Michael Ochsner; Erika Antal; Ivett Szalma

Population ageing and shifts in family patterns increase needs for welfare provision, while the pressures of globalization on national competitiveness restrict the capacity to finance expansive welfare policies. Europe has been facing this problem of the contradiction between economic efficiency and social support for some decades now, at least since the transformation of the socialist countries to a market economy that increased globalization and economic pressures on the welfare state.

More than two decades after this transformation, a new generation emerged that has been brought up in a globalized world led by economic principles whereas the older generation has been socialized in (more or less) comprehensive welfare states. This is especially evident in the post-socialist countries where the older generation was socialised in a regime where the state ensured a workplace for all its citizens and a younger generation has made completely different experiences on the labour market and with the state than their parents’ generation.

The aim of this research is to analyse whether young people – socialized mainly in a globalized market economy – have different views concerning the role of the state in the welfare system than the older generations in Eastern and Western Europe. Specifically, we investigate whether there is a convergence between Eastern and Western Europeans’ attitudes towards the role of the state in the sense of a less pronounced difference between young Eastern and Western Europeans than between older Eastern and Western Europeans. Is there a cohort effect on attitudes (Inglehart, 2008) or do people adapt to institutional settings (Demartini, 1995)?

We use the fourth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) for the analysis, which contains data for 27 European countries and Israel. It was administered between autumn 2008 and spring 2009 and contains a rotating module that focuses on attitudes towards the welfare state. We use Latent Class Analysis to identify clusters of attitudes towards the role of the state in welfare provision, differentiating between the ideal welfare state (what role the state should take in resolving some social issues) and the effects of the welfare state (perceived economic and social consequences of the welfare state in the respondents’ countries).

The policy relevance of this research lies in revealing the sets of attitudes people of different generations have towards the welfare state differentiating between what role the people want the government to take in welfare matters and what effects they see the welfare state has on society and economy. Is the welfare state a phase-out model as a new generation emerges that adheres to market principles? Or has the retrenchment of the welfare state already reached the peak that the people are ready to accept? Furthermore, given increasing mobility and European integration, it sheds light on differences and commonalities between Eastern and Western Europeans’ attitudes towards welfare policy, fostering knowledge on possible ways for cooperation on policy issues.
4.2 Parents-Offspring relations and life satisfaction

Where Do Youth Follow in Their Parents’ Footsteps? College-Going Outcomes Among Young Adults in 19 European Countries

Katie Baird

University of Washington

This paper develops novel indicators of the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment across a range of European countries. It does this by measuring the college-going decisions of recent cohorts of 25 to 35 year olds in nineteen European countries by calculating the relative likelihood of their obtaining a college degree based on whether or not their parents are college-educated. The analysis is based on combining two to four waves of European Social Survey (ESS) data, depending on the country, in 19 nations: Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, the UK, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the Ukraine.

The study’s purpose is to quantify differences across Europe in the extent to which higher education has been equally available to those with different socioeconomic markers, to examine trends over time, and to explore factors that might account for the cross-national variation observed in a recent cohort of young adults.

The results update prior estimates of country differences in the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment by examining the most recent cohort of young adults. The study also focuses exclusively on college-going outcomes rather than the entire range of possible levels of educational attainment. Typically about 40 percent or more of young adults in European nations now attain college degrees; whether or not one attains this status thus has gained singular economic, social, and policy relevance.

The paper’s results find that the intergenerational transmission of college status has weakened substantially over time. We can trace this decline to the degree to which different countries expanded higher education over the last several decades. Specifically, we find that greater expansion corresponds with larger increases in the likelihood that those without a college-educated parent will attend college.

Assessing college-going outcomes among the most recent cohort of college graduates (those born between 1971 and 1989), the paper finds noticeable variation across nations in the association between this generation’s college status and that of their parents. The association is lowest in Nordic countries, and largest in select eastern and southern European nations. Overall the analysis finds among our 19 countries that parents’ college status is more closely related to their children’s college status in countries with lower levels of college-enrolment, where higher education relies more on private rather than public dollars, and where the cognitive skills acquired during compulsory education are more closely related to youths’ socioeconomic background. Collectively these factors account for over 50 percent of the variation in the intergenerational transmission of college status among countries that this study measures.
Differences across countries in the dispersion of life-satisfaction

Daphne Nicolitsas

University of Crete

European Social Survey (ESS) data on life satisfaction suggest that in some countries life satisfaction is consistently lower than in other countries. Furthermore, the dispersion of life satisfaction appears to be higher in counties in which average life satisfaction is low (see Figure below).

The paper, which follows Hamermesh's (2001) work on job satisfaction, proposes an explanation for cross-country differences in the dispersion of life satisfaction. More specifically, the hypothesis being tested is that dispersion is lower in countries in which the discrepancy between the outcomes of individuals' lives and their expectations is low. A number of descriptive characteristics appear to be consistent with this hypothesis. First, cross-country differences in the dispersion of life satisfaction are lowest for younger individuals. Young individuals have not yet had enough time to become disillusioned. Second, the dispersion of life satisfaction appears to be lowest in countries which feel there is “justice” in society. Justice in society is being proxied by, for example, the extent to which individuals perceive court decisions to be impartial.

A more formal test of the hypothesis put forward here is formed by first proxying the discrepancy between outcomes and aspiration by the difference between actual income received and the income predicted by using observable individual characteristics (fitted income) and then finding whether this measure is correlated with life satisfaction. The fitted income is based on a regression of income on demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status), on the productive characteristics of individuals (education, occupation, sector of activity), on job features (hours of work, size of firm). Preliminary results suggest that the hypothesis put forward cannot be rejected.
The aim of the present study is two-fold. The first part, investigate the changes in the political participation among social classes in Europe after the economic crisis through a longitudinal analysis of all ESS round. The second part is to build a structural equation model in order to explain how the participation is changed before and after the economic crisis. The experience of countries adjusting (at the beginning) in the wake of the global crisis of 2008 has awakened many debates related to the political economy and social costs of adjustment. Among these the effect of the austerity on political participation levels. Some theory holds that in times of economic crises, citizens exit the political participatory sphere due to a lack of social capital and resources to engage in it. However, according to theories of economic deprivation in political behavior, recent studies, underlined that there is a direct link between the experienced economic hardship and the political participation, and more precisely the protest political participation. However, is it so simple to explain political participation? In our opinion we don’t need to consider only the economics variable to predict the citizens politics behavior but we should also consider other variables like education, political trust, social trust and social capital. The reason is that the crisis didn’t affect just people economic condition but also their trust in political institutions, in democracy, and more in general to the next. This study aim to consider simultaneously all these factors to explain political participation and to register how much the weight of this factor change the participation across the time before and after the end of economic cycle in European countries caracterised by different welfare systems.
The impact of economic recession on protest participation in Europe

Francesca Vassallo

University of Southern Maine

Since the global economic crisis in 2008 many European countries endorsed new austerity measures, while citizens across the continent have become increasingly vocal against their political leaders. New protest activities have developed as citizens experience the hardship of the economic cuts made by governments. This last wave of unconventional political participation has reinforced previous interpretations in the political behavior literature that specific, life change events are critical in fostering a new understanding of political activism. As the severe economic crises of previous decades have highlighted, economic challenges bring out a stronger voice among citizens, a type of participation that is often unconventional and anti-systemic, and yet it becomes an opportunity to make positive changes through reenergized activism.

This paper plans to study the relationship between the negative economic situation present in Europe over the last few years, the declining economic conditions of the populations and the sudden increase of protest as a means of political expression. The study employs an empirical approach, including data from multiple waves of the European Social Survey (2008-2014), to assess possible long term changes in the intentions and actual unconventional participation of citizens affected by the economic crisis in Europe. Both objective economic indicators and subjective interpretations of the effects of the economic crisis are useful variables to assess and predict peoples’ involvement in unconventional actions, contentious activism and new protest movements.

Some of the main questions answered in the paper are: has unconventionality increased among political activists across European countries? Is this wave of protest, in its multiple forms, connected to the European economic crisis directly? Are the new shape and intensity of protest activities a new long term phenomenon or just a temporary reaction to the financial instability experienced by citizens? Does economic instability lead to new demands and expectations in policy making?

Ultimately, the study plans to assess whether the link between economic wellbeing and unconventionality in political participation has changed after the 2008 global financial crisis. If a recent literature on political behavior has focused more consistently on wealth in countries as a proxy for the selection of protest activity, the economic events and financial policy decisions in Europe over the last few years may have emphasized a return to economic deprivation as an underlining motivation for contentious politics.
Profiling the politically active: using economical, political, sociological and aspirational factors

Kevin Cheng

Tung Wah College

Generally, activists are identifiable by their agendas, educational background and their activities. A form of activism, motivated by concern and care for the next generations were found to be a salient theme and source of commitment for environmental activists. According to Horwitz (1994), environmental activists are people "... involved in the leadership of environmental organization, ..., activities involving the law, lobbying, and writing". They are also identified as people who actively participating in a range of environmental issues such as recycling and waste management, pollution, land use planning, etc. A number of studies have look into the profiles that mark a political figure. Some have tie political ideology with personality. A portrait of a political conservative suggest conservatives are more dogmatic and intolerant of ambiguity; higher in needs for order, structure, and closure; lower in self-esteem; higher in fear of threat and loss; and prefer less complex modes of thinking. Others added personal control, responsibility, optimism, religiosity, need for closure, openness to experience, dogmatism, authoritarianism, work ethic, belief in a just world, and conscientiousness. The present study explores the profile by identifying the personality, attitudinal and value markers.

Variables and trends on political activism are reported and compared in this study. The data is based on 254,420 data of the ESS from 2004 to 2012. In separate nominal regression analyses (by year), factors associated with political demonstration and political petition are explored. Considerations and discussions are made on the type of analyses appropriated, such as analytical methods that account for data type and cultural differences between nations or regions. A profile sketch on what politically engaged individuals are like and what drives their engagement behaviors, based on economical, social, and political antecedents of political engagement, are also outlined. Comments based on concurrent regional and/or continental events provide the context in which the trends are interpreted and explained.
Urban Continent, Urban Activism? Social & Political Activism in the Contemporary European Union

Matthew Schoene

Davidson College

The European Union is currently embroiled in a protest wave, with citizens taking to the streets in droves to protest, austerity, high unemployment and political dissatisfaction, among other issues. While protests remain the most visible form of activism, they are far from the only way in which citizens express dissatisfaction. What motivates people to become involved in social or political activism? There is an impressive body of literature on the determinants of activism, but this work rarely studies activism in a comparative framework (with some notable exceptions, e.g. Dalton 2008). Comparative work is crucial to our understanding of this phenomenon, especially in the EU where continental policy sometimes exists uneasily with domestic priorities. In this paper, I examine what factors influence the likelihood of participation in four different forms of activism: wearing a protest badge, boycotting a product, signing a petition and participating in a demonstration. Using the 5th wave of the European Social Survey, multilevel mixed-effects regression models indicate that resources and urban status best predict the likelihood of participation, but the magnitude of these effects differs for different outcomes. I conclude with a discussion about European activism, urban society and social movement tactics.
Representational and extra-representational political participation at times of economic crisis. Changes across time and social groups in Europe

Mario Quaranta

This paper aims to investigate whether and how the recent economic crisis has changed the patterns of political participation of European citizens. The literature on the topic underlines that changing economic conditions might affect citizens’ everyday life, especially when the change is sudden and unexpected, as it happened in Europe. Hence, the question: does the economic crisis produce more or less participation? This paper argues that the change in the economy might lead to two different participatory reactions. On the one hand, citizens may withdraw from representational forms of participation, such as voting and party engagement, as they see parties and the traditional forms of representation as inadequate to protect their interests. On the other, citizens may turn to forms of extra-representational participation – or protest – such as demonstrations, as alternative means to voice their discontent and express their preferences. The paper also addresses another question: how does the crisis affect the patterns of participation of different social groups? The literature on participation has often stressed that some social groups defined by individual characteristics, such as gender, education, income, working condition, have different patterns of participation. Nevertheless, much less is known about the potential effect that economic changes might have on their likelihood of engagement. Thus, the recent economic crisis represents a great opportunity to explore this issue. It could be expected that the economic crisis might ‘activate’ the extra-representational participation of ‘marginal’ groups, while it might ‘depress’ their representational participation. Indeed, the economic crisis, mainly worsening the condition of disadvantaged groups, may act as a positive or negative stimulus for the different modes of participation of European citizens. The paper will address the research questions applying mixed models to the European Social Survey cumulative data file (rounds 1 to 6).
Youth, Inequality, and Political Participation in Hungary

Daniel Oross; Péter Róbert; Andrea Szabó

Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Social Sciences

Young Europeans’ political responses to the economic crisis have been neither uniform nor overly promising for the future of democratic Europe. We seek to identify potential causal relationships between increasing labor market inequalities for the youth and their political attitudes and choices for political participation (e.g., expanding forms of both traditional and non-traditional forms of political participation as well as emerging alternatives). In doing so, we gain insights into the condition of youth unemployment, labor market inequalities, and the future of youth participation in European democracy.

Although politicians and academics have pointed to the fact that young people are increasingly disengaged from conventional politics and papers have been published about different aspects of this topic, young people’s perspectives and generational differences are rarely taken into account simultaneously. Is there a generational cleavage concerning labor market inequalities and perspectives on engagement among young people and adults?

This paper approaches the topic of adults and young people on engagement from the aspects of political sciences and sociology. We aim to characterize the consequences of youth economic and employment conditions on political engagement. Our paper focuses on Hungary that has struggled with tenacious youth unemployment.

Disruptions in space and time: mapping generational value differences across Europe

Bence Ságvári

Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences

The rather simplistic notion of understanding young people as a monolithic generation across countries needs to be questioned. The advent of rapid social and technological changes has led to significant differences between age groups not more than a few years apart. Furthermore, even a given age group shows diversity in how members of the group experience all these changes. The assumption that the ‘middle-classification’ (a general increase in living standards) leads to an increase in free time and lifestyle choices is only observable in certain groups of young people in favorable social positions. The past two and a half decades have seen a polarization of life chances among youth generations, based on family background and location, income situation, level of education, social capital, and access to technology. There is a growing gap in Europe between groups of young people at the opposite ends of life chances: those who are able to join to global education and career networks, and those who get hopelessly stuck in their local disadvantaged communities. Between the two extremes, a diversified ‘middle class’ of young people is confronted with various risks and challenges shaping their basic notions on the functioning of society.

Countries of East-Central Europe are still often considered as a single unit in terms of their basic social characteristics. However in a closer look this assumed unity is rather questionable. Using data from the consequent waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and other cross-national surveys, I argue that regarding young people’s social trust and other primary indicators of values and attitudes these differences increased to such an extent that divide East–Central Europe into distinct blocks and thus provide explanatory power for understanding diverging paths of economic and social development. In accordance with the theories of trust and generational values, the permanent erosion of social and institutional trust in some countries of the region could be a major issue. Evidence suggests that low levels of trust also have a major implication for both national and European politics by strengthening disappointment and passivity or extremism on both sides of the political palette.
Citizens’ participation and engagement in the political process count as a ‘conditio sine qua non’ of any democratic system. Therefore, it is not surprising that every discussion about the well-being of democracy is strongly linked to debates and complaints about citizens’ disengagement and alienation from politics. In this context, especially young people have been identified as the major driving force behind decreasing participation rates and growing disenchantment with the political sphere. Yet, several reasons speak against the proposition that it is (solely) the young who are to blame for the apparent decline. First, the reported decrease seems to mainly affect institutionalized forms of political participation, such as involvement in traditional party politics and voting at elections. Non-institutionalized forms of participation, such as protests, demonstrations, and boycotts, apparently find more support from young people. Second, some research casts doubt on the conjecture of receding political engagement among youths altogether. For example, data from the Socio-economic Panel Study (SOEP) suggests the stability of political engagement among 17-25 year olds over time with some cyclical ups and downs around general elections. Third, following the financial crisis in Europe, we may expect a renewed interest in political issues and a revival of political activism, counteracting the alleged decline in political participation and engagement. This kind of ‘re-politicization’ should be especially pronounced for young people as they are likely to be affected more strongly by the negative externalities of the crisis (e.g., unemployment, uncertain future prospects). These reasons call into question the proposition that it is predominantly the young who are responsible for the allegedly growing levels of political apathy. Against this background, we (re-)investigate the question of youth political participation by looking at different data sources and various forms of political engagement covering the years 2002-2014. Using linear and logistic regression as well as IRT models, we analyze the levels, trends, patterns and antecedents of political participation and engagement to determine differences and similarities (1) between German adults and youths as well as (2) before, during, and after the global economic crisis in order to investigate the re-politicization hypothesis. We focus our analysis on Germany as it is known for its comparatively high levels of ‘Politikverdrossenheit’ (especially among young people) and has been least affected by the economic crisis. It thus establishes a particularly hard case for the re-politicization hypothesis: If we find evidence for growing participation and engagement rates during times of crisis here, we should also find it for individuals from countries that have been affected more strongly by the crisis. We mainly rely on data from the German sample of the first seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and complement our analysis with other well-trusted, high-quality data sources such as the SOEP and the German General Survey (ALLBUS) to corroborate our results and make sure that our findings are not driven by specifics of the sample frame or methods of data collection.
Labor market risk, electoral institutions, and abstention: Is electoral participation under proportionality less equal?

Dominik Schraff

University of St. Gallen

This article provides a comparative perspective on the effect of labor market risk on individual abstention probabilities. While it often is suggested that proportional electoral systems are more representative, we argue that proportionality amplifies inequalities in participation along the lines of labor market divides. This is because labor market risk creates a robust pattern of political alienation that holds across different electoral systems. As political parties’ mobilization efforts focus on voters who are easiest to mobilize, the larger number of parties under electoral proportionality primarily leads to additional mobilization among the well-off, low labor market risk voters. In line with this argumentation, we find that proportional systems’ lower aggregated abstention rates are a result of additional mobilization among low risk voters. Majoritarian systems, on the other hand, have higher abstention rates in the aggregate, yet abstention probabilities are much more equally distributed across the electorate. These findings have important implications for our view of the representativeness of proportional systems. Moreover, the results suggest that we have to re-think some of the standard arguments on electoral abstention in majoritarian countries.
A central topic in the research about the public opinion towards the European Union is whether or not there are differences in attitude between individuals or groups who relatively enjoy benefits from the European integration and the rest of the EU citizens. The current research tests this issue using a difference-in-difference approach.

A prominent sub-group that enjoys direct benefit from the EU policy is farmers. The objective of preservation and management of natural resources which accounts for approximately 40-50 percent of the annual EU budget in the 2007-2013 multiannual framework, includes mainly direct aid to farmers and rural development.

In the current research we tested whether the farmers and the inhabitants of rural areas have a different degree of trust in both the European and local parliaments than individuals residing in other areas.

The database we used is a combination of the European Social Survey data during the period of 2002-2012, the Eurostat data and the European commission data. This combination allowed us to use variables at three different levels: the personal level, the regional level and the country level. Thus, for each individual answering the survey, we were able to determine the level of trust in different institutions; whether or not she is a farmer; if she lives in a rural area (calculated as the rate of the employees in the agriculture industry in that region); and what is the amount of agricultural transfers her country receives from the EU.

To test the research hypothesis we focused on two exogenous shocks that happened during the survey period which were likely to have influenced the trust individuals place in the EU - the enlargement of the EU and the global financial crisis. These exogenous shocks produced a natural experiment, and provide an opportunity to use a difference-in-difference approach to test whether the change in attitude of farmers and the rural areas inhabitants was different from the change of attitude of the rest of the population. By using data from countries that joined the EU during the survey period, we could test whether the differences in the level of trust between the farmers or the rural areas inhabitants and the rest of the citizens changed after joining the EU. The financial crisis provides another opportunity to test the attitude of farmers and rural areas inhabitants compared to other areas, before and after the crisis.

The results suggest that inhabitants of rural areas have a higher level of trust in the European parliament and in the country’s parliament than the rest of the population. The enlargement of the EU indicates that after joining the EU, the trust levels of rural areas are significantly higher than those of other areas. This result suggests the possible existence of externalities of the European transfers to agriculture - being an inhabitant of rural area, even when not benefitting directly from European aid, may still impact ones attitude towards the European parliament. However, this effect is not significant when looking at the impact of the world crisis.
Parenthood and the Polarization of Political Attitudes in Europe

1Susan Banducci; 2Laurel Elder; 3Steve Greene; 1Dan Stevens

University of Exeter1, Hartwick College2, North Carolina State University3

Becoming a parent can affect the lives of men and women by introducing salient new social roles and identities, altered social networks, and tighter constraints on financial resources and time. Even though modern family life has evolved in many important respects, parenthood continues to shape the lives of men and women in very different ways. Given that parenthood can change the lives of men and women in profound, and profoundly different ways it seems parenthood would bring about changes in the way women and men think about politics and policy issues. Using data from the Fourth wave of the European Social Survey, we investigate how parenthood, and the distinctions of motherhood and fatherhood, influence attitudes. Our findings suggest that parenthood can have a polarising effect on attitudes and that the polarising effect is most evident in countries where there is less support from the state for parental responsibilities.
Do high income individuals vote systematically differently than poor individuals? Has the increase in income inequality over time widened this discrepancy? Is the same true for all European countries? As populist and extreme political parties appear to be gaining ground in Europe, have any of the above patterns broken down? This paper uses data from all European Social Survey rounds to answer the above questions and investigates in particular the extent to which the answers to the above questions depend on individuals’ interest in politics and their trust towards politicians. The issue has been investigated for the USA (see, for example, Gelman et al., 2010) who find that there is no clear relation between income equality and class-based voting.

Taking rounds 5-7 together we find that around 7.6% of people with household income in the lowest decile identify themselves as being left (scoring 0 or 1 on the 11-point scale). The same percentage in the highest decile of household income is just 3.7%. On the other hand, we find that around 5.4% of people with household income in the lowest decile identify themselves as being right (scoring 9 or 10 on the 11-point scale). The corresponding figure for the highest decile of household income is 6%. This pattern holds across age groups and household size. The first impression thus is that being extreme left is closely related with income while being extreme right is not so closely connected to household income.

Being classified as left-wing also appears to have increased in recent rounds with the support from individuals with low income households that have increased significantly. The correlation between being left-wing and the size of household income is not as strong in all countries. In some countries (e.g. Czech Republic) the correlation appears very strong while in others (e.g. Slovenia) there appears at first sight to be no correlation.

Initial results suggest that the birth cohort (defined as follows: cohort 1 (<1935) – cohort 2 (1935-1939) – cohort 3 (1940-1944)... cohort13 (>1989) ) is a relevant dimension: While the proportion of rich people declaring to be right-wing rises rather steadily across cohorts, the proportion of rich people that identify themselves as left-wing increases until the 6th cohort (people born between 1955 and 1959) and declines thereafter, except for a sharp upturn in the youngest cohort.

The proportion of poor people declaring to have a left-wing position is also highest in the 6th cohort and rather oscillating since then, whereas the share poor people identifying themselves as right-wing largely declines across cohorts, except of a slight tendency to rise in the younger cohorts.

The above are a crude first approximation of the issue of interest. Multilevel analysis taking into account demographic characteristics of individuals (e.g. gender, age), productive characteristics of individuals (e.g. education, occupation etc) and other cultural features (e.g. religion) have to be conditioned upon in order to understand the mechanism driving any remaining correlation.

References
Several recent studies investigating voting behavior defined partisanship as a cue in political information processing, which helps voters to harmonize and integrate new information with existing beliefs. This leads to a biased opinion formation, a somewhat prejudiced or blind attitude toward new political information. Without doubt, there is a normative element in this kind of definition. While the absolute lack of partisanship in opinion formation is not achievable, nor desirable, excessive partisanship is generally meant as a negative feature of one’s political thinking or activity.

While many scholars focus on this aspect of partisanship, the most widely used measurement methods are still based upon electoral volatility, formal institutional linkages to parties, or on being-close-to-a-party questions. Such indicators tell little or nothing about the extent of partisan bias in voters’ opinion formation. Moreover, comparative studies about voting behavior, which use these traditional methods, regularly find that Eastern European voters are less partisan than Western European voters are. On the one hand, this difference is generally attributed to their shorter democratic experience, on the other, to the negative connotations that partisanship still has in these post-communist countries. Either way, these results contradict to the day-to-day experience of many Eastern European citizens, intellectuals and scholars.

This paper aims at elaborating a new method for measuring partisanship with ESS data, which can be used for the purpose of country-level comparisons. This method relies on the differences of how opposition parties’ voters and governing parties’ voters view and evaluate political institutions. It uses the 6th round of ESS data about institutional trust and evaluation of the functioning of the political system. The aim of this methodological innovation is to create a new method for measuring partisanship, which serves better for an international comparison and is more in line with the above presented, bias-generating face of the concept.

The country-level results obtained with the new method present a rather different pattern compared to the existing rankings: Central-East European and Southern-European voters are strongly partisan on an average, while Northern-European voters are weakly partisan. Measuring this way, partisanship is negatively correlated with important factors as trust in political institutions, the number of effective parties and with the level of fractionalization of the party system, political-economic stability, or economic performance of the country.

In addition, the new country-level results are negatively correlated with the results based on the proportion of those who felt themselves closer to one party than to the others. This implies that formerly used methods focus on a certain aspect of partisanship, but are immune to another and very important aspect of the phenomenon.
Values and political behavior: perceptions of democracy and the impact of Basic Human Values on left-right voting in Europe

1Alexander Seymer; 2Joakim Kulin

University Salzburg1, University Stockholm2

This study addresses the role of basic human values in political behavior cross-nationally, more specifically by investigating the impact of values on left-right voting in a European context. According to democratic theory, the (democratic) political process is ideally responsive to citizens’ needs and preferences (Teorell 2006). Hence, the goal of democracy is to aggregate individual needs and preferences into collective political choices (Miller 1992). Indeed, people hold concrete opinions on political issues and support specific political alternatives, yet previous research shows that these preferences are often driven by deeper and more fundamental value orientations among the public (Caprara et al. 2010). In fact, several studies suggest that basic values lend a great deal of coherence to political orientations (Piurko 2011; Schwartz et al. 2013). Values represent the most basic and abstract human motivations, occupying a central position within an individual’s personality (Schwartz 1992; Hitlin 2003). They emanate not only from universal needs of individuals, but from requirements for groups to survive and prosper as well as to coordinate socially (Schwartz 1992:4), and as such they hold particular relevance to democratic processes. Certainly, if democracy is to be considered responsive to citizens’ needs and preferences, democratic processes and political institutions inevitably have to (at least to some extent) promote the values embraced by the public. If this is the case, individuals holding for instance egalitarian values should generally be more likely to support social democratic or leftist/socialist parties who promote and pursue egalitarian policies, whereas individuals holding traditional values should be more likely to support conservative parties that pursue policies aimed at preserving established social roles and structures. However, this seemingly trivial stipulation comes with a caveat: The quality of democratic institutions differs cross-nationally (Rothstein and Teorell 2008), thereby potentially undermining their perceived efficaciousness. If citizens are satisfied with how democracy works and trust in its institutions, it is more likely that they will turn to democratic politics in order to promote the values they embrace. Based on the theory of basic human values, we study the relationship between four core value types (self-transcendence/self-enhancement and openness to change/conservation), corresponding to two fundamental dimensions of political ideology, and left-right voting. We use multi-group structural equation modeling (MGSEM) and data from the ESS (round 6) to estimate the effects of values on voting probabilities across European countries. In order to explain cross-national differences in the values-voting link, we study the moderating influence of perceived trust in and satisfaction with democratic institutions. While the results show that all four value-types matter for Europeans when deciding on whether to vote left or right, different values matter across national contexts. Meanwhile, democratic trust and satisfaction explain some of the cross-national variation, in particular with regard to the effects of self-transcendence values (helping people and treating them equally). The impact on voting is considerably stronger in countries where people generally have more trust in democratic institutions and where people are more satisfied with how democracy works.
Exploring the political efficacy of citizens under conditions of austerity

1Finbarr Brereton; 2Linda Fox-Rogers

University College Dublin1, University College Dublin2

Since the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, the political and economic context in many contemporary European democracies has been radically transformed, generating much scholarly attention. Much of the analysis has focused on the policy responses of nation states which can be broadly characterised as the rolling out of tough austerity measures underpinned by public spending cuts, rising taxes, and the privatisation of state assets. Several scholars have argued that the widespread adoption of austerity measures essentially represents more neoliberalism to fix a neoliberal crisis (Fraser et al., 2013). More importantly however, is the fact that such policy responses signify a shift towards ‘deepening neoliberalism’ as they have mainly been imposed by large scale institutional arrangements which are working to frame the activities of actors and institutions within specific neoliberalised politico-institutional parameters (e.g. IMF, EU, WTO etc.). While the socio-economic manifestations of austerity measures have been well documented (see e.g. De Sousa et al., 2014), less consideration has been given to the effects of deepening neoliberalism on the attitudes of individual citizens regarding their perceived ability to influence the political sphere.

Political efficacy focuses on what motivates to participate, and refers to the sense of self-confidence and the ability to influence the political process (see e.g. Olsson, 2014). This paper seeks to redress this gap by exploring whether the political efficacy of individual citizens has been eroded as policy decisions are increasingly imposed by external actors. More specifically, our analysis seeks to identify whether feelings of powerlessness over individuals’ ability to influence politics has become more pronounced in countries that have struggled to retain more sovereignty over their regulatory and policy responses to the crisis than others. Political efficacy is operationalised using new variables introduced in ESS R7, namely B1a “Political system allows you to have a say in what government does” (i.e. internal efficacy) and B1c “Political system allows people to influence politics” (i.e. external efficacy). Ideally, data analysis would focus on countries that were subjected to formal EU/IMF conditionality i.e., Portugal, Ireland and Greece (PIG) as these countries have embarked on programmes of austerity including reduced public spending, increased taxes and privatisation. Comparisons would then be made to i) countries who have been impacted by the crisis but where formal EU/IMF conditionality did not take place (i.e. Italy and Spain) and ii) countries which did not suffer austerity as a result of the financial crisis e.g. Germany and UK. However, country analysis in this context is currently restricted to Ireland and Germany as ESS R7 data for Portugal, Spain and the UK has not yet been released and Italy and Greece did not participate in Round 7. Additionally, as variables B1a and B1c were introduced in R7, data exists for one round only and hence a comparison to previous rounds is not possible. Therefore, comparisons will be inter and intra country, rather than temporal. Analysis of how political efficacy varies amongst individual level variables will also be conducted to examine if feelings of political efficacy and powerlessness are spreading throughout a wider cohort of society (i.e. younger, well educated, males etc.).
Why critical is not the same as disaffected: The socio-demographic background of citizens’ support for democracy

Lea Heyne

*University of Zurich*

Why are citizens dissatisfied with democracy? The “critical citizens” literature supposes that dissatisfaction is caused by a combination of high expectations and critical outlooks on politics amongst citizens with above-average education and political interest, leading to high levels of electoral and non-electoral participation. The pessimistic approach, in contrast, assumes that dissatisfied democrats are not confident about or interested in politics, but simply more alienated, and can rather be labelled “disaffected democrats”, given their low social status and missing involvement in the political system. Notably, the difference between the two interpretations is based on the underlying assumption on how dissatisfaction evolves. This paper analyzes the causes of dissatisfaction more carefully in order to be able to judge its normative dimensions. I argue that only if dissatisfaction is caused by structural conditions and hence an expression of disaffected citizens’ feeling left behind by society, it is a threat to democratic legitimacy, as it means that the causes of dissatisfaction are beyond the reach of actual democratic improvement. To test this claim empirically, I use structural equation modeling (SEM) with data for 29 countries from the European Social Survey 6 to analyze whether citizens’ attitudes towards democracy are directly or indirectly affected by their socio-structural attributes – their position in society, education, income etc. I assume that the socio-structural position influences satisfaction with democracy directly (the higher the position, the better the satisfaction) as well as indirectly (the higher the status, the higher both expectations and evaluations).
Crisis, value change and convergence in Europe – the cases of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain

José Casanova

CIES- Lisbon Institute University-ISCTE

With the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the imminent global financial breakdown in 2008, the immediate State financial aid for threatened banks and financial institutions raised public debts in most countries. Some States in the European Union found rising difficulties for financial funding, having to face the need to ask for financial support from international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission, that required national economic adjustment programmes.

Although involving some national differences, in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – all Eurozone countries – those programmes had destructive effects on Welfare State and employment, decreased medium income, consumption and investment, spread poverty and degraded life conditions of the middle classes. This was followed by internal political and social confrontations, accusations toward other European countries and the European Union/Eurozone authorities, the questioning of justice, solidarity and norms in the European Union, and distress in the Eurozone. Recent elections in those four countries show a common move to left-wing parties and the introduction of radical politics in Parliaments that may reflect an ideological turn involving changes in values and attitudes.

In this paper we assess this symbolic-ideological shift by studying changes in these four countries on political attitudes, attitudes toward the European Union (following previous work by R. Inglehart, C. J. Anderson, B. F. Nelsen), and Human Values (considered by S. H. Schwartz as lasting values, which allow us to find if changes on values in these countries are structural). Do these four countries converge to a common path in political attitudes and values diverging from the rest of Eurozone and European Union countries? Do these four countries converge in attitudes toward the European Union that might endanger its cohesion? Do states belonging to the Eurozone altogether diverge from the rest of the European Union countries in those values and attitudes?

A longitudinal and transversal analysis using the SPSS is performed, involving data from all the European Union countries surveyed on ESS Rounds, mainly on Rounds 1 (2002), 4 (2008) and 7 (2014). With longitudinal scrutiny we evaluate trends in values and attitudes, and with transversal examination we compare values and attitudes between those four countries, the other Eurozone states, and the rest of the European Union countries.

To observe political attitudes we concentrate on trust in politicians (Round 7, variable B5) and ‘left’-‘right’ placement (variable B19). To examine attitudes toward the European Union we focus on trust in the European Parliament (B7) and attitude toward further European unification (B28). To analyze Human Values we use the theory of S. H. Schwartz and respective variables in Supplementary Questionnaire, Section H of ESS.

We, then, discuss the results of present investigation within the frame of the principles and objectives of the European Social Model in order to assess the effectiveness of this model and to draw policy recommendations.
Values have received considerable attention in both research and practice in recent years. The concept of values was derived from Allport who working on them in the 1930s, it’s generally acknowledged that attitudes have their foundation in values, and has constantly developed over the past years. One of the most popular definitions of values is “the consistent, personal assumptions we make which underpin our attitudes” (Hayes, 1993). Yet the study of values is, by comparison, almost absent in this field. Except for the work done by Rokeach and his colleagues in the 1970s (Rokeach et al., 1971; Rokeach and Cochrane, 1972), the study of values has mainly been diverted off into applied field such as political and cross-cultural psychology research (Feather, 1970; Rim, 1970; Rokeach, 1973; Hofstede, 1980; Segall at al., 1990; Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz at al., 2000). Schwartz's (1992) theory of universals and structure of basic values, defined as desirable goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives. Thus, values are socially approved verbal representations of basic motivations (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz proposed ten distinct types of values (self-direction, stimulation, achievement, benevolence, hedonism, universalism, power, security, conformity, and tradition) deemed to be comprehensive antecedents of motivations common to people across cultures. Extant research has provided considerable support for this theory (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995) but their relation to well-being is less studied (Romanyuk, 2013). In fact, very few studies have taken in consideration the relation of values and well-being and specifically in cross-national comparisons (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000).

As mentioned above, personality values are closely linked with human well-being in respondents within and outside of job or study occupation. However, there is not much literature on their potential overlap. Therefore, investigating these types of values allows for a more comprehensive understanding of relations of motivational antecedents to psychological well-being across various cultural groups. To this end, we present in this research a comparative perspective of the relationships between values and subjective well-being by extending the available research in cross-cultural research.

This study investigated relations of personal values and subjective well-being in three countries of post-soviet space. We examined how values predict life satisfaction of 230 Romanian, 234 Macedonian and 230 Ukrainian respondents who provided data on personality values (PVQ, Schwartz, 1994) and life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985). Hypothesized direct relations of types of values to well-being based on “healthy” (self-direction, stimulation, achievement, benevolence, universalism) and “unhealthy” (power, security, conformity, tradition) values were tested in each sample. Results showed that a) Ukrainians compared to their Macedonian peers reported higher scores on all values except for power; b) conformity and security values correlated with well-being, as predicted, but only in the Macedonian sample. Results partly supported our hypotheses regarding the values conducive to well-being among respondents in these countries. Findings are discussed in terms of values’ predicts for well-being of youth in Romanian, Macedonian and Ukrainian contexts. The prospective of future research is cross-cultural comparison with ESS data for Romanian and Ukrainian samples.
Basic values and trust across Europe and European integration

Pepijn Van Houwelingen

*The Netherlands Institute for Social and Cultural Research*

This article will provide an overview with regard to the similarities and differences in basic values across Europe among which for example attitudes towards immigrants, income inequality, homosexuals, tradition, religion and the degree of identification with one’s own country versus (further) European integration. Which countries or regions in Europe have similar value patterns? And which (group of) countries are rather different? Are we able to distinguish ‘value clusters’ within Europe? And have these clusters changed during the last decade?

As far as European integration is concerned not only differences in basic values but also differences in levels of trust can be an impediment for (further) integration. A lack of trust in government (for example) can not only be a result but also a cause of corruption because people will be more tolerant towards tax evasion. Therefore a similar overview will be given with regard to differences and similarities in (institutional) trust levels across Europe. What (cluster of) European countries appear to enjoy high levels of trust? And have trust levels converged during the last decade?

Trust in national parliaments and European parliaments will also be compared as a proxy indicator for the possibility of (further) European integration. Which European countries tend to trust their own parliament more than the European parliament and vice versa? Has this changed during the last decade?

Finally, differences and changes in basic values, political and social trust and trust in the national and European parliaments will be viewed and analysed in a comprehensive manner so as to be able conclude whether or not Europe has integrated over the last decade as far as those basic values and social and political trust is concerned and where possible cleavages within Europe can be found.
Consumption and well-being

1Maria Petrescu; 2Aycan Kara

Nova Southeastern University1, Indiana University Southeast, School of Business2

This research study analyzes the effect that different material and consumption variables have on the socio-emotional well-being of consumers. The analysis focuses on the relationship between consumer materialism, hedonism, social conformity, reference income, media usage and consumer well-being at regional level, considering the NUTS regions of the European Union.

Previous research has found that income is positively correlated with both happiness and life satisfaction, while reference income (generally in the same location, age and education group) has a negative effect on individual well-being, according to the relative utility hypothesis (Caporale et al., 2007; Easterlin, 1995; Georgellis et al., 2009; McBride, 2001). However, in specific cultures, such as some Eastern European countries, research found evidence that reference group’s income exerts a positive influence on individual happiness and life satisfaction, showing that individuals use this information in order to form expectations about their future economic situation (Caporale et al., 2007). This is why this analysis also has a cultural and regional focus in the analysis of the conceptual model.

Other studies found that the salience of income and comparison income depends on one’s intrinsic values and personal beliefs, including whether it is important for respondents to be rich and own expensive things; to show abilities and be admired; to seek respect from others, variables included in the ESS (Georgellis et al., 2009). This study also takes into consideration the tendency for materialism expressed by this variable, as well as the hedonism and social conformity values as presented by Schwartz (2003). Regarding media use, studies have shown that specific types of communication can impact judgments and have long-term effects, can affect consumerist tendencies and consumers’ evaluation standards of prestige and personal success (Besley, 2008; Burroughs et al., 2002; O’Guinn and Shrum, 1997).

Research has shown that cultural heterogeneity varies across countries and most countries face cultural differences between their regions (Kaasa et al., 2013, 2014). The ESS includes respondents from all regions of a particular country and it includes not only country level data (NUTS0), but also regional level information (NUTS1 and NUTS2). In order to test the conceptual model and potential cultural differences, the study uses regional level data from the ESS and regression analysis. The Socio-emotional well-being index includes ten items that measure the four key dimensions: social status, general life situation, self and social power (Bericat, 2014). Other concepts measured by using ESS include hedonism and social conformity, which use the Schwartz (2003) values index, while materialism uses a variable present in the survey (Georgellis et al., 2009). Reference income is based on geographical location, age and education group (Caporale et al., 2007; Georgellis et al., 2009).

The results of this study can contribute to the literature regarding well-being and the impact that materialism and consumerism have on overall happiness. The analysis also places the model in a cultural framework that provides further information regarding regional characteristics.
Thrust thy institutions: Importance of trust in institutions in mediating public attitudes towards European integration and immigration

Elif Naz Kayran

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies -IHEID

What are the main explanatory factors of the growing Euroscepticism and anti-immigration stance in European societies? This is a crucial and timely question to ask, as the apparent lack of harmonization in key areas of EU governance is argued to be the cause for some of the key crises facing Europe such as the financial and refugee crises (Drudi et.al. 2012; Lavanex 2001). In the post Eurozone crisis context, policy-proposals from the EU level are facing strong resistance from the member states in a wide range of issue areas. In addition to national level opposition, there is an emerging anti-EU voting group within the European Parliament. There are strong negative positions taken with regards to further integration in the immigration policy area and admission of more immigrants and humanitarian refugees. Overall, this study will contribute to both the literature on public attitude towards Europeanization and immigration, but also to European governance choices and policy-making in EU level through testing the extent of importance of institutional trust for the future of European integration and immigration flows.

The aim of this study is to answer this important societal question with the usage of ESS 6 and ESS 7 waves, with a baseline control year from the ESS 4. It is hypothesized that in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the failure of European institutions to contain the crisis, the consequent nationalization of negative externalities, and the austerity paradigm decreased the trust in European institutions. The paper will argue that trust in European institutions is a crucial determinant factor regarding attitudes towards out groups (Crepaz 2008; Henderson 2008; Rohrscheider 2002). This argument will be tested by using two types of out groups in the form of immigrants and further Europeanization of policy areas. The Euroscepticism stance of today encompasses most European countries and this puzzling potential convergence of public attitudes towards further Europeanization and immigration require further attention from a large-N comparative perspective.

The main explanatory variable of this study will be trust in European institutions. Trust in other political institutions will, also, be controlled for using ESS and Eurobarometer data. Response variables will be public attitude towards immigration and public attitude towards further European integration. In the literature, Euroscepticism have been measured with many different operationalizations such as opposition to the European project itself, individual resentment to European citizens or negative opinions towards the values and structure of the European Union (Boomgarden et.al. 2010; Serricchio et.al. 2013). Based on the theory of the paper, operationalization of the Euroscepticism variable as attitudes towards further European integration will be the most fruitful approach because understanding the position of European governance and institutional trust lies at the core of the paper's central research question. Attitude towards immigration will be operationalized through ESS questions on whether the respondent answers for more, less or no further immigration in his/her country. This operationalization will be controlled with the respondent’s perception of the number of immigrants in the country, as an alternative measurement. Several control variables will be introduced, such as political position, socio economic position, employment situation, education level and gender of the respondents, which will be taken from ESS data. Important macroeconomic indicators of the country will, also, be controlled for taking the data from OECD and Eurostat.
Catholic, orthodox and human values in Europe

Paula Lousão; José Casanova

Lisbon University Institute – ISCTE1, CIES-Lisbon University Institute-ISCTE2

Previous research work by R. Inglehart show correlations between religion and values across the world, and S. H. Schwartz verified differences in Human Values between Eastern and Western European countries. Although Protestantism has also a significant presence in Europe, Eastern and Western Europe have been traditionally differentiated, in cultural terms, on the basis of the distinction between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity. With the contemporary structural changes in Eastern Europe, the integration of some of these countries in the European Union, the European secularization process and the current cultural globalization, differences between Catholic and Orthodox population may be changing, and these changes may be apparent on their values. In this paper we study Human Values among Catholic and Orthodox European population with the objective of assessing if and how the relation between religion and values has been changing in Europe, and if the distinction between Catholic and Orthodox religiosity differentiate current Human Values significantly in this part of the world. A diachronic and synchronic analysis using the SPSS is performed, involving data from all the European countries surveyed on ESS Rounds (including, in Rounds 3/6, the Russian Federation, a country that is considered partly European). Diachronic analysis is mainly based on data from Rounds 1 (2002), 3 (2006) and 7 (2014) of the ESS, and synchronic analysis is focalized on Round 7 (2014).

To evaluate the significance of the relation between religion and values, we compare it with the influence of social characteristics and contexts on Human Values. The relation with religion is evaluated by religiosity (Round 7, variable C9) and, for those who identify themselves with Catholic or Orthodox religion (variable C10), by the degree of religiosity (variables C13, C14 and C15). To analyse Human Values we use the theory of S. H. Schwartz and respective variables in Supplementary Questionnaire, Section H of ESS.

Two indexes are further created. The first differentiates countries that are mainly Catholic from those that are essentially Orthodox. With this, we try to understand, as an example, if Orthodox respondents living in Catholic European countries have different values from the Orthodox population living in Orthodox European countries. The second index distinguishes countries that belong/don’t belong to the European Union, in order to estimate if the integration in the European Union is correlated with changes in the relation between religion and values in Orthodox countries that integrate the European Union.

For the social characterization of respondents we use variables from F2 to F61 (Round 7), mainly respondent’s sex (variable F2), the year he was born (F3), area of living (F14), education (F15, F16), situation in relation to work (F17c), occupation’s situation in work (F21, F22, F24, F25), the type of organization in which he works (F32), occupation (F33), experience of unemployment (F36), income (F40, F41) and ancestry (F61).
Religiosity and subjective well-being: what makes the unchurched happy?

Ádám Hámori

Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary

This paper aims at scrutinizing the relationship between subjective well-being and religiosity. Earlier research into social functions of religion suggested that there has been a clear and consistent positive link between religiosity and happiness even when controlled for socio-demographic background. The existence of the link has been empirically evidenced in different contexts, which has been explained by diverse mechanisms both on the theoretical and empirical levels: by economical utility, meaning-giving or compensation functions of religion, quiescence found in prayer, personality traits, and so on. In their 2010 paper, Lim and Putnam emphasized the significance of group membership and participation in social networks regardless of one’s denominational affiliation in the USA. In a recent paper (in press) based on the secondary analysis of 2010 ESS data I concluded that in terms of happiness, it has been worthwhile to belong to a major religious community also in Europe. However, contrasted to the findings of Lim and Putnam, it did matter which tradition one belonged to even when controlling for social background, country of residence and different kinds of social involvement.

The research problem is whether religious and non-religious people in contemporary CEE-countries differ regarding their happiness and subjective well-being. The key questions are 1) whether people affiliated with denominational groups are happier than unchurched respondents, 2) whether religious practice and congregational belonging matter in subjective well-being, and 3) whether social involvement itself is equally important for the happiness of non-religious people. All seven consecutive waves of the European Social Survey since 2002 included comparable indicators of subjective well-being, social exclusion, religion, social participation and personal values. Moreover, the survey has been conducted in several Central and Eastern European countries. To answer the questions, multi-variate statistical methods are applied including indicators of religious identity, religious behavior, social status and social involvement.
Norms and values connected to corruption: Is there difference between post-communist countries and the rest of Europe?

Kristyna Chabova

Academy of Sciences, Institute of Sociology

This paper is looking at theoretical approaches linking norms and values to corruption and then tests these approaches on the data from the ESS and the WB focusing specifically the differences between post-communist countries and the rest of European countries. Author concludes that even 25 years after the fall of the iron curtain the values connected to corruption are still different in post-communist countries. However, there is no significant difference concerning the norms about corruption between post-communist countries and the rest of Europe, which might signify positive future development in a fight with corruption in post-communist countries.

Political corruption is defined as “the misuse of public office for private financial gain” (Triesman, 2000). According to many authors corruption decreases the quality of the public office in many areas and can be a trigger to civic unrest (Brown et al., 2011; Pellegrato, 2012). Corruption is not only dangerous to the society, but is also dangerous from an economic point of view because it can be a barrier to the economic growth (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 1999). Even though corruption in Europe in general is very low, post-communist European countries are an exception with levels of corruption consistently high.

Majority of authors argue that norms linked to corruption in post-communist countries are different than in countries, which have never experienced communist rule (Fisman & Miguel, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). During communism, being corrupt became the norm, and even after 25 years after the fall of iron curtain, this norm had not been changed yet. However, this paper doubts this hypothesis; understanding corruption as a norm is not more widespread in post-communist European countries than in the rest of Europe, the opinion that corruption is wrong seems to be universally shared.

Second set of theories is connected to values for which the author uses the Schwartz theory of values. The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) is one of the most widely used by researchers for studying individual differences in values (Schwartz, 2012). Values connected to security are higher in post-communist countries compared to the countries, which have never experienced communist rule. The model also shows that higher levels of security values in interaction with communist history are connected to higher levels of corruption.

For the analysis the author uses OLS regression with 29 countries, all in Europe, 10 have a communist past and the rest (19) do not. The European Social Survey (ESS) and World Bank (WB) data are used as the sources for the dataset. To analyse the norms concerning corruption, data from ESS, 2004 are used, specifically the question on the acceptability of bribery. For the values analysis the author uses Schwartz’s Values Survey, which is included into all ESS waves, Control of Corruption by the World Bank is used for the corruption variable and finally, ESS and WB are used for the control variable (GDP, religion,...).
The cold war, culture, and welfare state attitudes

Nate Breznau

Mannheim Centre for European Social Research

This paper considers the historical division of European and Eurasian societies into state controlled socialist economies versus state regulated liberal economies. These two sets of countries waged an ideological war with one another, and in doing so they engineered top-down social institutions. These institutions became so deeply embedded in society that they are still evident more than two decades after the collapse of Communism and market transitioning. These two worlds of social institutions provide an opportunity to investigate the role of culture in social policy preferences. Using the European Social Survey’s 2008 ‘Welfare State Module’ this paper tests for measurement invariance in the constructs of welfare state attitudes across Eastern and Western Europe. It finds that individuals have different understandings of what a government is and does that frame the cultural meaning of survey questions regarding social welfare policy. Welfare state attitude researchers struggle with cultural values as an independent variable because it is difficult to quantify. Also, they face difficulty constructing parsimonious theories that account for the megalithic concept of culture and its impacts on social welfare preferences (van Oorschot 2007; Pfau-Effinger 2005). This study provides no solution to the quantification-of-culture conundrum. Instead, it seeks to identify concrete examples of cultural productions that should shape social welfare attitudes and in doing so finds one way that culture can be shown to shape welfare state attitudes. The results are much as expected: the meaning of government and what a “state” is differs between East and West, and the ‘Eastern-ness’ of this meaning is stronger in countries that were under a socialist/Communist system for longer periods of time where a government is culturally understood to be more of a totalitarian entity.
Attitudes towards health systems in Eastern and Western Europe – a matter of system performance!

1Simone Schneider; 2Tamara Popic

Trinity College Dublin1, University of Lisbon2

Attitudes towards the welfare state and health systems in particular still vary largely between Eastern and Western Europe. Past research indicates that Eastern Europeans are far more critical towards the system and less satisfied with its political/public institutions than Western Europeans. It has been argued that these differences between Eastern and Western Europeans are due to the legacies of communism (cradle-to-grave welfare states), double transition (to capitalism and democracy) and still inferior performance of Eastern systems. However, empirical studies that explain these divergent patterns in attitudes are rare and call for more research into the topic. This paper investigates attitudes towards the welfare state, in particular attitudes towards healthcare, in Eastern and Western Europe two decades after the fall of communism. It studies whether the gap in attitudes towards healthcare between the East and the West still exists and if so, whether it is due to differences in the (i) perceived performance of the healthcare system (equality of treatment, efficiency of health system), (ii) expectations on the government’s role to provide health care, and/or (iii) contextual forces (prevalence of sick people, burden of older people on/for health services) (see Figure 1). The empirical analysis is based on the fourth round of the European Social Survey using structural equation modeling techniques and multilevel mediation analysis. Preliminary results show that Eastern Europeans evaluate health services in their country significantly lower than Western Europeans, even after controlling for various socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics at the individual level. Further, at the micro level, an individual’s perceived performance of health services (efficiency and equality of treatment) together with an individual’s expectation on the government’s role to provide health services significantly affect how individuals rate the quality of the health services in their country. Multi-level mediation analysis reveals that it is not the expectation on government’s role in healthcare, but rather the perceived performance (here: the efficiency of health services and the equality of treatment) that fully mediates the difference between Eastern and Western attitudes towards health care. Hence, our preliminary results indicate that perceptions of the system matter to shape people’s attitudes. East-West differences can be fully explained by differences in the perceived efficiency and equality of treatment of services. In other words, the perceived performance of the health system (less efficiency, more inequality) explains why Eastern Europeans are more critical towards the health system than Western Europeans.
Across the globe people differ substantially in the extent to which they disapprove of homosexuality. Several European nations, including Sweden and the Netherlands, legalized same-sex marriage in the 2000s, and have relatively high levels of acceptability. Conversely, there are some nations where European residents have been a lot less supportive. Over the last 15 years scholars have examined the national-level forces shaping cross-national public opinion, with some factors being examined to a much greater extent than others. Almost every paper written on cross-national attitudes about homosexuality tends to assess the influence of economic development, often finding an effect. There is, however, an array of other country-level factors that may be important, but have received a lot less attention. These alternative influences include gender and economic inequality, education, and the number of nonprofit organizations within a nation.

Individual-level research shows, for example, that people who are more likely to value traditional gender roles are less likely to support homosexuality. By allowing for same-sex relationships, homosexuality may be viewed as challenging conventional gender roles where the two sexes are seen as having clearly defined social roles (Whitley Jr 2001). One the one hand, the level of gender inequality within a nation could shape cross-national attitudes by promoting the view that men and women have essential traits and traditional gender roles are normative. Conversely, factors like democracy, economic development and the level of religiosity within a nation may shape overall levels of gender inequality. If so, then gender equality and support for homosexuality may be the result of these other processes.

Somewhat similarly, economic inequality could affect attitudes. When there is a wide gap between the rich and poor, residents may feel that they do not have a lot in common with others, leading to less generalized trust. High levels of economic inequality could decrease generalized trust and limit the sense of commonality that residents feel with each other (Uslaner and Brown 2005). Despite this rationale, there is also good reason to think that it would not have an influence. When people are exposed to diverse ethnic, religious, and economic groups, they may learn that people who appear different may not be particularly threatening, leading to more tolerance. Any effects that economic inequality may have on threat or decreased generalized trust may be off-set by the positive influence of diversity on increasing tolerance.

Using hierarchical modeling techniques, the current study examines whether a more diverse array of country-level factors (i.e. gender and economic inequality, education, and the number of nonprofit organizations) shapes attitudes, and whether they have a direct effect or indirect influence through other forces like democracy, religion, and economic development. The European Social Survey will provide the individual-level measures. The macro-level variables will be created by aggregating some of the individual measures (i.e. education) and drawing on country-level data from other sources, like the World Bank. The findings will provide insight into some of the understudied reasons why nations vary so substantially in their level of support for homosexuality.
Is there a homophobic divide across Europe?

Judit Takacs; Ivett Szalma

MTA TK - Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences1, FORS2

According to the late Igor Kon (2010), a leading Russian researcher on sexuality sexual minority rights can contribute to the well-being of all citizens, and homophobia can be seen as a litmus test for democracy in Russia. In the present paper we attempt to apply this litmus test not only in Russia, but also in other European countries. Our main research question is whether there are any signs of convergence between Western and Eastern parts of Europe a quarter of century after the political system changes in the Eastern parts of Europe.

The empirical base of the study is all rounds of the European Social Survey data set (from Round 1 in 2002 to Round 7 in 2014), focusing especially on a key variable measuring the agreement level with the statement that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. In order to measure more than one dimension of homophobia and a longer time period we will also examine the European Value Study dataset which contains the following two variables to measure homosexuality- and homophobia-related attitudes between 1981 and 2008. One was an acceptance question to be answered on a 10 point scale asking Please tell me … whether you think the following ideas can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Homosexuality. The other question was the following: On this list are various groups of people (including people with a criminal record; people of a different race; left wing extremists, heavy drinkers, right wing extremists, people with large families, emotionally unstable people, Muslims, immigrants/foreign workers, people who have AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, Jews, Gypsies, Christians) – could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?

For data analyses, descriptive statistics and explanatory models will be constructed by applying multilevel mixed effect linear regression models. Our preliminary results show that there are still significant differences between the Eastern and Western parts of Europe regarding social attitudes towards gays, lesbians, “homosexuals” and “homosexuality”. However, we can observe that there was a significant increase in levels of acceptance of homosexual neighbours between 1990 and 1999 in post-socialist countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland. At the same time, on the basis of the examined ESS data we cannot find similar tendencies.
Public opinion about homosexuality: Do the attitudes toward gay men and lesbian women differ?

1Lisette Kuyper; 2Elena Sommer; 2Sarah Butt

Netherlands Institute for Social Research / University of Amsterdam1, City University London2

Ever since the first ESS round, the ESS questionnaire includes an item measuring the attitudes towards homosexuality in Europe: ‘gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish’. This item is often used in academic and applied studies examining changes and pan-European differences in the attitudes toward homosexuality. Notwithstanding the frequent use of the item, it received some criticism. One of the main points of criticisms is that the item includes gay men and lesbians in the same item, while the attitudes towards both groups might actually differ. In general, the attitudes towards lesbian women are more positive than the attitudes towards gay men. However, the differences in attitudes also depend on the topic at hand and the gender of the respondent. The current study tries to contribute to the debate about the effect of the gender of the target (i.e., the person being rated) in items measuring attitudes towards homosexuality by using the data from the omnibus pre-tests of the new modules of the ESS round 8 questionnaire. The omnibus pre-tests are no representative population studies and their estimates cannot be taken as prevalence indicators at population level. However, the omnibus pre-test data do allow for an in-depth examination and validation of new topics and items that will be included in future ESS questionnaires. The omnibus data from 2015 included several items measuring the attitudes towards homosexuality (should be free to live their own life; equal rights same-sex adoption; end friendship with homosexual friend) and used a split-ballot design allowing for separate analyses of the attitudes towards gay men and lesbians, gay men, and lesbian women. The pre-tests were conducted in three countries: UK, Portugal, and Hungary. In terms of the social context of homosexuality, these countries can be seen as relatively tolerant, moderate, and relatively intolerant European countries. By examining the differences in attitudes towards these groups for three different items among both male and female respondents, more insight is gained into the effects of the gender of the target, the respondent, and the topic at hand.
Values in Europe and America: Comparing value structures, value priorities and relations of values to demographics and attitudes

Shalom Schwartz

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow

The 2012 General Social Survey in the United States included the 21-item Human Values Scale of the ESS. This provides the first opportunity for comparing Europe and the USA on the ten basic values in the Schwartz theory and examining similarities and differences. I will compare the GSS data with those from the 2012 round of the ESS. For comparative purposes, I will split the countries in the ESS into several regions (e.g., English-speaking, West European, Scandinavian, Mediterranean, East Central European, and East European). The paper will first assess whether the 21 value items form the theorized basic values in the USA that have been supported in previous ESS analyses. It will also test whether these ten values are organized in the same motivational circle of conflicts and compatibilities that gives coherence to value systems according the value theory. Next, I will present the hierarchies of value importance for the different groups and discuss similarities and differences in what is more and less important, comparing the US primarily with the English-speaking, West European, and Scandinavian countries. I will then investigate relations of the values to various socio-demographic variables (e.g., age/cohort, gender, education, religion, income) and consider how consistent these relations are across the USA and European regions. Finally, I will examine relations of value priorities to religiosity, political orientations, and acceptance of diversity, again comparing the USA with the European regions. Because some of the demographic and attitudinal variables were measured differently in the ESS and GSS, some comparisons with the USA will have to focus more on trends than precise statistics.
Theme 7: Other societal challenges
7.1 European attitudes in global perspective

The state we’re in: Expectations and evaluations of democracy in Europe and South Africa

1Benjamin Roberts; 2Sarah Butt; 2Rory Fitzgerald; 1Jare Struwig

Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)1, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys (CCSS) , City University London2

In 2014, the commemoration of two decades of post-apartheid rule in South Africa and the staging of the fifth national elections prompted considerable debate regarding the quality and performance of democracy in the country. There has also been mounting disquiet about public discontent with the nature and pace of change, as well as the intensification of protest action and unrest experienced in recent years. In many respects, such developments are by no means exceptional and reflect debates taking place in many other democracies around the world, including in Europe. Despite the impressive expansion of democracy experienced globally between the mid-1970s and mid-2000s, there have emerged increasing signs of stagnation, decline and even democratic breakdown in a number of democracies over the last decade. The 2008 economic crisis, a resurgence in authoritarianism, processes of globalisation, as well as a shifting geopolitical context all pose particular challenges for countries. In particular, it has the potential to erode citizens’ confidence in the performance or practice of democracy and their commitment to democratic norms (Ferrin & Kriesi, 2014; Plattner, 2015). This has resulted in a lively exchange about whether or not democracy is currently experiencing decline or recession. Set against this context, it is important to gain a better appreciation of what citizens expect of democracy, how closely their evaluations of performance approximate or diverge from such ideals, and the extent to which such orientations vary across different types of democratic regime and between different groups within societies.

This paper uses data from the in-depth module on public attitudes to democracy included in Round 6 of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2012/13) as well as its replication in Round 12 of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS, 2015). The availability of such data provides a unique opportunity for a detail examination of the attitudes of South African citizens in comparative perspective, thus enabling us to contrast the experiences in this country over past 20 years with that of new and more established democracies across Europe. Specifically, South African attitudes to democracy will be compared to two other new democracies of the 1990s (Poland and Russia), in addition to an early first third-wave country (Spain) and two longstanding democracies of western and northern Europe (Britain, Sweden). These nations were chosen to ensure diversity in terms of macro-level quality of democracy ratings, geographic regions, and number of years of stable democracy. Apart from comparing the structuring of people’s expectations and evaluations of democracy across these case studies, the analysis pays particular attention to class and generational variation, since sizeable cleavages in this respect are likely to pose considerable risks to the long-term health and stability of democracy in future. The paper concludes by reflecting on the extent to which the presence of ‘democratic deficits’ among these publics signifies a retreat in democracy or whether Norris (2011) was right in suggesting that it instead implies the emergence of a more critical citizenry committed on holding key institutions of democracy and their representatives to account.
An institutional trust indicator based on fuzzy logic and ideal solutions

Juan Carlos Martin; Concepción Román; Christian Stalin Viñan

University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, UTPL

The analysis of trust in the governments and the authorities and has been a source of study in recent years, especially by the impact it has on facilitating economic growth and stability in developing countries. In this work, we will make an analysis of a country like Ecuador using data from an adapted survey of the European Social Survey. A synthetic indicator of confidence of citizens of Ecuador in institutions is obtained applying a fuzzy logic based method and the degree of similarity to ideal solutions. This analysis is based on six different dimensions, namely: (1) The City Hall; (2) The Judicial System; (3) The Politicians; (4) Political Parties; (5) The National Parliament; and (6) the United Nations. The results obtained for the country, the nine provincial conglomerates and the gender segments will be examined and analysed.
Intergenerational social class mobility in Europe: the role of income inequality

Marii Paskov; Erzsébet Bukodi; Brian Nolan
University of Oxford

Social mobility has emerged as one of the most important policy agendas in many advanced societies. Income inequality is often put forward as a potential threat to social mobility (the so-called “Great Gatsby Curve”) and the role of other institutional factors in promoting or threatening social mobility is being increasingly debated. Until now, however, empirical research has had limited success in identifying the impact of specific economic or institutional features – such as income inequality – in determining the rates and the patterns of intergenerational social mobility. One of the reasons is the fact that comparative data on intergenerational social mobility are scarce and suitable data have started to emerge only recently.

Against this background, the main objective of this paper is twofold. First, we will provide high-quality comparative overview of both absolute and relative rates of social class mobility in a large number of European countries. Second, we contribute to the recent debate on the role of macro-economic and institutional factors in affecting the rates of social mobility. More specifically, we will give a cross-sectional account of the relationships between absolute and relative rates of intergenerational class mobility and income inequality, but also considering other potentially relevant contextual factors that might affect social mobility (e.g. income gaps between different groups of the population or labour market institutions or welfare state generosity). In addition, we will investigate whether or not changes in overall income inequality within countries are related to changes in the rates of intergenerational class mobility across cohorts – i.e. we will provide a dynamic account of the relationships between income inequality and social mobility.

For our purposes, we will use pooled data from the European Social Survey (ESS) (2002-2010). The ESS makes it possible for us to construct comparable measures of class of origin and destination for a large number of European countries. We define social class via the European Socio-Economic Classification (ESEC) that is based on a concept of employment relations, and is specifically designed to facilitate comparison across countries. We will mainly use log-linear and log-multiplicative models, along with other methods to analyse contingency tables.

We believe that our analytical approach will provide a comprehensive and rounded picture of intergenerational social mobility in Europe.
Dynamics of intergenerational educational mobility across Europe

1Oguz Oztunali; 1Orhan Torul

Bogazici University1

In this study, using the combined data from the first seven waves of European Social Survey, OECD's Survey of Adult Skills and Eurostat's Adult Education Survey for more than 350000 respondents from more than 30 European countries, we explore the dynamics of intergenerational educational mobility for cohorts born in the period covering 1930-1985 across European countries. In contrast to the recent studies this literature, such as Hertz et al. (2007) and Schneebaum et al. (2015), in which mobility is defined as the coefficient of correlation between descendants' and parents' years of education, we explore mobility dynamics along the dimension of highest degree of educational attainment and define intergenerational mobility as "a child's probability of attaining a different level of education compared to his/her parents". Diverging from the previous studies by not imposing a linear relationship between parent and descendant education, and estimating this relationship via logit regressions enables us to explore the dynamics of intergenerational education in more than one dimension, that is we can observe intergenerational educational mobility dynamics for each level of parental education. Our preliminary results indicate that while the evolution of intergenerational educational persistence over time varies across European countries, a pattern indicating increasing persistence seems to be common among Easter European countries.
A comparison of the determinants of childbearing intentions before and after the beginning of the economic crisis in Europe

Lydia Veronica Palumbo; Emiliano Sironi

European Doctoral School of Demography, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

We used data from the second and the fifth rounds of the European Social Survey, which were conducted respectively before (2004) and after the beginning of the Great Recession (2010), in order to investigate whether the crisis has affected the intentions of having a child in the three years that followed the time of the interview. Hence, we implemented a multilevel regression model, combining micro and macro level predictors of childbearing. We did not find evidence of a generalized decline in the intentions of having a child, but we noticed that the effect relied on the type of employment status of the individuals. Those who were unemployed seemed to be less intentioned to have a child after the beginning of the crisis, while the effect resulted uncertain for temporary employees.
Author Index

A
Abdallah, Saamah ................................................................................................................................. 69, 70
Adamczyk, Amy .................................................................................................................................... 110
Ainsaar, Mare ........................................................................................................................................ 19, 46
Andersen, Rasmus F. ......................................................................................................................... 21
Antal, Erika ............................................................................................................................................... 81
Asri, Ankush ............................................................................................................................................ 28

B
Badashvili, Medea .................................................................................................................................. 44
Baird, Katie .............................................................................................................................................. 82
Balaj, Mirza ................................................................................................................................................ 55
Bambra, Clare ............................................................................................................................................ 55
Banducci, Susan ....................................................................................................................................... 94
Barbier, Sara ............................................................................................................................................ 48
Barker, Philip ........................................................................................................................................... 16
Bartram, David ....................................................................................................................................... 23
Becker, Rolf .............................................................................................................................................. 72
Billiet, Jaak ............................................................................................................................................... 9
Bosco, Maria G .......................................................................................................................................... 37
Bosio, Giulio ............................................................................................................................................... 40
Bracke, Piet ............................................................................................................................................... 49, 57
Brereton, Finbarr .................................................................................................................................... 98
Breznau, Nate .......................................................................................................................................... 108
Buffel, Veerle ......................................................................................................................................... 49
Bukodi, Erzsébet ..................................................................................................................................... 116
Burdorf, Alex .......................................................................................................................................... 62
Burkinshier, Marion ............................................................................................................................... 66
Burton-Jeangros, Claudine ..................................................................................................................... 51
Butt, Sarah ............................................................................................................................................... 112, 114
Buttler, Dominik .................................................................................................................................... 61

C
Casanova, José ......................................................................................................................................... 100, 105
Cermáková, Dita ........................................................................................................................................ 29
Chabova, Kistyna ..................................................................................................................................... 107
Cheng, Kevin .......................................................................................................................................... 86
Chyliková, Johana .................................................................................................................................... 10
Coenders, Marcel ..................................................................................................................................... 13
Cohen, Yinon ........................................................................................................................................... 26
Cottier, Lionel .......................................................................................................................................... 34
Cristini, Annalisa ...................................................................................................................................... 95
Croesen, Simone ...................................................................................................................................... 62
Cullati, Stéphane ..................................................................................................................................... 51

D
Danckert, Bolette ..................................................................................................................................... 78
Davidov, Eldad ......................................................................................................................................... 13
De Falco, Ciro .......................................................................................................................................... 67, 84
De Witte, Hans ......................................................................................................................................... 9
Delaruelle, Katrijn ...................................................................................................................................... 49
## Author Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dimova, Lilia</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinesen, Peter T.</td>
<td>21, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixon, Jeffrey</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dudal, Pieter</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dufour, Florian</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eikemo, Terje A.</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejlskov, Linda</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elder, Laurel</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermolina, Anna</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitzgerald, Rory</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fjaer, Erlend</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford, Robert</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foubert, Josephine</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox-Rogers, Linda</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gakopoulou, Vaia</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia Garzon, Eduardo</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gebel, Michael</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilgen, Sandra</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonthier, Frédéric</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorodzeisky, Anastasia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene, Steve</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hámori, Ádám</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison, Eric</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heath, Anthony</td>
<td>12, 25, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedegaard, Troels F.</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heyne, Lea</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Högborg, Björn</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huppert, Felicia</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, Jonathan</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jansen, Andreas</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kara, Aycan</td>
<td>41, 42, 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayran, Elif N.</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keller, Carolyn</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogan, Irena</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konishi, Mario</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kromydas, Theocaris</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulin, Joakim</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuyper, Lisette</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leontiyeva, Yana</td>
<td>10, 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewin-Epstein, Noah</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loosveldt, Geert</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lousão, Paula</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Author Index

### M
- Maguire, Áine......................................................................................................................................................... 68
- Malul, Miki.......................................................................................................................................................... 79
- Martín, Juan C...................................................................................................................................................... 115
- Masso, Ana......................................................................................................................................................... 13, 19
- Mazhak, Iryna.................................................................................................................................................... 53
- McNamara, Courtney........................................................................................................................................ 35
- Mentus, Vladimir.............................................................................................................................................. 65
- Meuleman, Bart............................................................................................................................................... 9
- Michoń, Piotr.................................................................................................................................................. 50, 61
- Minola, Tommaso........................................................................................................................................... 40
- Mizrahi, Shlomo......................................................................................................................................... 77, 79
- Moriconi, Simone............................................................................................................................................ 36
- Muhla, Peter.................................................................................................................................................... 73
- Mustafa, Asma................................................................................................................................................ 14

### N
- Nahkur, Oliver.................................................................................................................................................. 46
- Nicolitsas, Daphne......................................................................................................................................... 83, 95
- Nolan, Brian.................................................................................................................................................. 116

### O
- Ochsner, Michael............................................................................................................................................ 33, 81
- Origo, Federica................................................................................................................................................. 40
- Oross, Daniel.................................................................................................................................................. 89
- Oztunali, Oguz............................................................................................................................................... 117

### P
- Palumbo, Lydia V........................................................................................................................................... 118
- Paskov, Marii............................................................................................................................................... 52, 116
- Patkós, Veronika............................................................................................................................................... 96
- Pereira, Cicero............................................................................................................................................... 11
- Peri, Giovanni................................................................................................................................................ 36
- Petrescu, Maria.............................................................................................................................................. 41, 103
- Popic, Tamara............................................................................................................................................. 75, 109

### Q
- Quaranta, Mario.............................................................................................................................................. 88
- Quick, Annie.................................................................................................................................................. 69

### R
- Rahman, Kaleel............................................................................................................................................... 38
- Ramos, Alice.................................................................................................................................................. 11
- Rapp, Carolin................................................................................................................................................ 18
- Remund, Adrien............................................................................................................................................. 51
- Richards, Lindsay......................................................................................................................................... 14, 52
- Róbert, Péter................................................................................................................................................ 89
- Roberts, Benjamin....................................................................................................................................... 114
- Román, Concepción.................................................................................................................................... 115
- Romanyuk, Lyudmyla.................................................................................................................................. 101
- Roots, Ave...................................................................................................................................................... 19, 60
- Ruggeri, Kai.................................................................................................................................................. 68

### S
- Ságvári, Bence................................................................................................................................................. 90
- Saini, Rima................................................................................................................................................... 71

---

3rd International ESS Conference 2016, abstract book 121
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schnaudt, Christian</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schneider, Silke</td>
<td>25, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schneider, Simone</td>
<td>73, 75, 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoene, Matthew</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schraff, Dominik</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz, Shalom</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šedovičová, Michaela</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seibel, Verena</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semyonov, Moshe</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seymer, Alexander</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharony, Chen</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shayo, Moses</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen, Jing</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siegert, Manuel</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sironi, Emiliano</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soboleva, Natalia</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sommer, Elena</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sønderskov, Kim M.</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovet, Laurent</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevens, Dan</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strandh, Mattias</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struwig, Jare</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surkov, Pavlo</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szabó, Andrea</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szalma, Ivett</td>
<td>33, 81, 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Täht, Kadri</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takacs, Judit</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torul, Orhan</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trezza, Domenico</td>
<td>67, 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unt, Marge</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vala, Jorge</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valeriani, Elisa</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Deurzen, Ioana</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Houwelingen, Pepijn</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Lenthe, Frank J.</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassallo, Francesca</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vávra, Martin</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viihan, Christian S.</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voßmer, Jonas</td>
<td>31, 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldman, Shamam</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weinhardt, Michael</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuyts, Celine</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, Yvette</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zenasni, Franck</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Author Index

Zwiener, Nadine ................................................................. 71