4TH INTERNATIONAL ESS CONFERENCE
TURBULENT TIMES IN EUROPE:
INSTABILITY, INSECURITY AND INEQUALITY
UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM
15-17 APRIL 2019
We would also like to thank the Organizing committee of the ESS conference for their valuable input and engagement: Hajo Boomgaarden; Eric Harrison; Pedro Magalhães; Irena Kogan; Jackie Scott; Angelika Scheuer and Stefan Swift.

We are grateful to the GESIS organization team for their support: Heike Antoni; Julia Drzevitzky; Holger Heuser; Selina Hermann; Kerstin Hollerbach; Stephan Pierau and all student assistants.
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Welcome to the 4th International European Social Survey Conference at the University of Mannheim.

I would like to thank the ESS Conference organising committee - led by our wonderful colleagues at GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences - for their efforts in arranging what looks certain to be an impressive programme. My gratitude also extends to the University of Mannheim for agreeing to be our hosts for this year’s conference.

With over 150 academic papers based on our data being presented in over 30 sessions on a wide range of subjects, this conference promises to showcase some fascinating research all based on the ESS. The conference reflects just some of the output from the over 130,000 registered users of the data and the almost 4000 publications to date which have included ESS data in their narrative.

During the 3rd International ESS Conference in Lausanne, Switzerland, during 2016, I was delighted to see our survey data used in such innovative and fulfilling ways. The research shined a light on key social issues affecting ordinary people and more generally informs how policy could be amended or implemented to lead to a brighter and happier future across Europe.

With our National Coordinators and colleagues in the Core Scientific Team we spend the majority of our time working for the European Social Survey undertaking the tasks associated with designing the questionnaire, supporting the collection of fieldwork in up to 30 countries and curating the data. It is wonderful for those of us involved on the production side of the ESS to see how the data is used with academic rigor and such great care. The theoretically driven research arising from use of the ESS infrastructure is a source of great pride for us all.

Since the last conference, we have released our Round 8 (2016/17) dataset, and a cumulative file for all eight rounds is available to view or download on our website.

I am particularly looking forward to seeing some presentations at the conference based on our Round 8 rotating modules on climate change and welfare. This latter module was repeated from Round 4 (2008/09) and it will be interesting to note the changes or stability in the attitudinal data over an eight year period. The climate change module addresses one of the most urgent grand challenges that we face. In addition the sessions on the CRONOS web panel ‘proof of concept’ demonstrate the preparations ESS is undertaking to prepare for a survey future on-line.

We are in the field in almost all of the 31 countries who have confirmed participation in Round 9 (2018/19) of the ESS and it is of note that we now have the most full national members (24) of any European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC). The first release of Round 9 data will follow before the end of 2019. During 2019 we will also be launching an internal review of the ESS to ensure that we remain at the forefront of cross-national survey research and that we continue meet the needs of existing and future users. We are also conducting a review of our Core questionnaire and will be giving you all an opportunity to feed into that process soon.

Thank you for attending this year’s conference - I look forward to seeing some familiar faces and meeting others for the first time. We hope that the ESS continues to inspire and support you in your work and that the infrastructure continues to serve you well into the future.
WELCOME FROM THE LOCAL ORGANISERS

OSH RAT HOCHMAN AND CAROLINE HAHN (GESIS) AND IRENA KOGAN (UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM)

As your local hosts, it is our pleasure to greet you all to the fourth International European Social Survey Conference in Mannheim. Although GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences has assumed the role of the German National Coordinator only recently, we feel as if we were, always, members of the ESS family, and we are delighted to host the 2019 ESS Conference in Mannheim together with our colleagues from the University of Mannheim.

About a year ago, the organising committee met for the first time to develop the vision for this conference, and since then we have been engaged in its realisation. As underlying themes, the committee decided to focus on recent challenges facing Europe, such as growing inequality within and between European societies as a result of the economic crisis, increased immigration fostering cultural and national insecurity among large segments of the population, and as a result of these developments, an emerging skepticism towards established political parties and institutions as well as mainstream media. The fourth International ESS conference will showcase research that uses ESS data to address these and other issues. The organizing committee wanted to provide a meeting place for users of the ESS from all over Europe and beyond, who will have an ideal environment to exchange and develop research ideas that will bring the data to good use.

Unlike previous ESS Conferences, we decided this time to add a methodological aspect to the agenda. This addition will allow scholars who use ESS Data for methodological research to present their work, to showcase some of the outstanding work done by the ESS experts themselves, and to increase exchange between methodological and substantive researchers.

As your hosts, we are pleased to present you some of the authentic and unique sides of Mannheim and its culture: we will have the conference reception at the Mannheim Schloss (Palace), built between 1720 and 1760, and the conference dinner in a local brewery. If you feel like exploring more of what the city and region have to offer, please consult the brochures we planted in your conference bags.

Should you need more and other information, we are happy to assist you and are available for you throughout the conference at the reception desk. You may also download the conference app which provides helpful guidance regarding the conference and the city.

We want to take this opportunity to thank the members of the conference organising committee, the session organisers, the ESS ERIC team, the GESIS conference team, and everyone else that made the conference possible. We wish you a fruitful and successful conference and an enjoyable stay in Mannheim.
ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

MAIN CONFERENCE VENUE
UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM

1 Universität Mannheim
  Fakultät für Mathematik
  und Informatik
  B6, 23-29, Bauteil A, EG
  68131 Mannheim

The main conference venue is
the Faculty for Mathematics and
Information, part of the University
of Mannheim.

This venue will host the vast
majority of the conference
proceedings, including the
welcome address, keynote
speeches, parallel sessions
and coffee breaks.

The faculty building is an
18-minute walk from Mannheim
train station.

2 Universität Mannheim
  Mensa am Schloss
  Bismarckstraße 10
  68161 Mannheim

Lunch during the first two days
of the conference (Monday 15
April and Tuesday 16 April) will
be served at the University of
Mannheim Mensa, a 5-minute
walk from the main venue.

Conference participants will
receive two lunch tickets when
they receive their name badges
at the conference registration
desk on Monday 15 April. Simply
present your ticket at the Mensa
to receive a lunch of your choice, a
soft drink and dessert.

On the third day (Wednesday
17 April), a packed lunch will be
provided.

3 Mannheimer Schloss
  Bismarckstrasse
  Central Palace Building
  68161 Mannheim

Our Welcome Reception will be
held at the Mannheim Baroque
Palace from 6.30pm on Monday
15 April.

A short walk from the main
conference venue, the reception
will take place in the Gartensaal
(Garden Hall). This prestigious
space was used for glittering
receptions and court festivties.

When Mannheim was founded in
1606, the Friedrichsburg fortress
was on the site of the Baroque
Palace. This served as alternative
residence for the Elector, one of
the most important princes of the
Roman Empire.

The palace dates to the 18th
century when Elector, Karl Philip
III, had confessional controversies
with the inhabitants of his capital,
Heidelberg. As such, he decided
to make Mannheim the Palatinate's
new capital in 1720. Karl Philip
construct the palace as his
residence on the site of the old
Friedrichsburg.

The location of venues for the ESS
Conference are shown on a more detailed
map of Mannheim (page 58-59).
CONFERENCE DINNER
TUESDAY 16 APRIL | 7.30PM
EICHBAUM BRAUHAUS

4 Eichbaum Brauhaus
Käfertaler Strasse 168
68167 Mannheim

The second day of the ESS Conference will conclude with the official conference dinner at Eichbaum Brauhaus, situated to the north of the Neckar River.

The local brewery is a 40-minute walk or a 20-minute tram journey from the main conference venue. It is located around 200 metres from the tram stop, Bibienastrasse.

There are two tram lines that stop at Bibienastrasse:

- Line 2 departs from Rathause. Board a tram in the direction of Feudenheim and disembark at Bibienastrasse.
- Line 7 departs from outside the Baroque Palace (Schloss). Board a tram in the direction of Vogelstang and disembark at Bibienastrasse.

Both tram lines also depart from Parade Platz in central Mannheim.

The Eichbaum beer brewing company was founded in 1679 by Mannheim’s Councillor Jean du Chêne. This translates to ‘oak tree’ in English or ‘Eichbaum’ in German.

The brewery will host conference participants for a three-course meal and a complimentary drink. The cost of the dinner was included in the price of your conference registration - a ticket will be provided.
THE CONFERENCE
INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS
PRACTICAL INFORMATION

GETTING TO MANNHEIM FROM FRANKFURT AIRPORT

Trains depart for Mannheim from Terminal 1 of Frankfurt Airport approximately every 30 minutes. There is a bus and train service that connects passengers from Terminal 2 free of charge.

There are two rail stations in Terminal 1. Trains to Mannheim depart from the long-distance train station (Fernbahnhof).

Deutsche Bahn operates trains in Germany. Train tickets can be purchased online from their website: www.bahn.com.

Tickets can also be purchased at any train station using the multi-lingual ticket machines provided. It is possible to purchase tickets using cash or debit/credit card. We recommend buying flexi price tickets in advance - these allow you to travel on any train during the day and allow greater flexibility in case of delays.

Please check information boards at the train station before you travel.

GETTING TO THE VENUE FROM MANNHEIM TRAIN STATION

The conference venue is a 20-minute walk from Mannheim train station.

Alternatively, delegates can take a 10-minute bus journey from the bus station located directly in front of the main entrance of the train station. The number 60 bus in the direction of Pfeifferswörth departs every 20 minutes. The nearest stop to the conference venue is Universität West.

TRAVEL IN MANNHEIM

The City boasts an extensive public transport system of buses and trams. A single-journey ticket for the bus or tram costs €1.80, though it might be worth purchasing a day ticket - or three-day ticket - for your stay in Mannheim. Tickets can be purchased with cash or credit/debit card from ticket machines across the city. Please ensure to validate your ticket in the machines provided on the bus or tram.

Local taxis can be ordered from Taxi Zentral Mannheim by calling +49 621 444 0444. This taxi company can facilitate English language requests. The MyTaxi app also works in Mannheim: https://mytaxi.com.

PARALLEL SESSIONS

Presentations should take between 15 to 20 minutes depending on the number of presenters in the session. Session organisers are asked to ensure there is enough time for discussion.

Paper presenters should ensure that their presentation is uploaded to the computer in the correct room before the parallel session begins. Paper authors must bring their slides in PowerPoint or PDF format on a portable device. This should be deposited on the computer before your session starts.

POSTERS

Posters for the session on Monday 15 April should be created in A0 format (33.1 x 46.8 inches). These should be deposited to the reception desk prior to lunch on the first day.

WORKING AREA

We have arranged for one spare room to be available for use throughout the conference: Room 301 on the third floor.

WIFI

WiFi Network: conference
Password: ESS_2019
ABOUT MANNHEIM

DIE QUADRATESTADT
THE CITY OF SQUARES

Mannheim is a city in southwestern Germany in the state of Baden-Württemberg. It has approximately 315,000 inhabitants and is located at the confluence of the Rhine and the Neckar rivers. It is unusual among German cities in that its streets are laid out in a grid pattern, leading to its nickname die Quadratestadt (City of the Squares). The city's slogan is "Leben. Im Quadrat" (Life Squared).

The civic symbol of Mannheim is der Wasserturm (The Water Tower), a Romanesque structure completed in 1886. The 18th century Mannheim Palace now houses the University of Mannheim. The city is home to major corporations including Daimler, IBM, Unilever, and Siemens and, according to Forbes magazine, was ranked the 11th most inventive cities worldwide.

Mannheim is a hotspot of multiculturalism with a lively mix of nationalities and cultures.

More information about Mannheim can be found from the Mannheim Tourist Office website: www.tourist-mannheim.de/en/Stadtportrait.

MANNHEIM: TOP SITES

Baroque Palace: see page 6.

Kunsthalle: Museum of Contemporary and Modern Art beside the Wasserturm, newly renovated in 2018.

Little Istanbul: Little Istanbul is located at Marktplatz and is the home of the Turkish community in Mannheim.

Reiss-Engelhorn Museum: the REM houses a permanent exhibit on world cultures.

Wasserturm (Water Tower): The landmark is located on the elegant Friedrichsplatz.

MANNHEIM: BARS AND RESTAURANTS

Mannheim has many affordable bars and restaurants with a variety of cuisines.

Bars

Hagestolz, Jungsbuschstrasse 26: the ideal Saturday night hang out spot for students.

Murphy’s Law, Kaiserring 10: a real Irish Pub.

Roof Bar, Q7 27: If its cocktails you want, this is the place to be.

TapRoom Jungsbusch, Beilstrasse 4: a craft beer joint with a large selection of beers in the student area of Jungsbusch.

Zentrale, N4: a cozy German bar.

Restaurants

Alter Simpl, P4, 8: Traditional German/Central European cuisine.

Azteca Restaurant, N1: Mexican restaurant.

Dachgarten, O5 9: Modern kitchen.

Da Rosario, T3, 21: Italian restaurant.

El Lobo Tapas, Lange Rotterstrasse 62: Tapas Bar.

Restaurant Bangkok, Goethestrasse 16: Thai restaurant.

Restaurant Istanbul, H1: Turkish restaurant.

Rheinterrassen, Rheinpromenade 15: a cozy German restaurant with traditional fayre.
KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

FRANCESCA BORGONOVI
SENIOR ANALYST - MIGRATION AND GENDER, OECD

Francesca Borgonovi is a Senior Policy Analyst at the OECD where she has been responsible for analysis and developmental work in the PISA and PIAAC, the OECD-led large-scale assessments. Her research agenda focuses on gender and socio-economic disparities in academic achievement, student engagement and motivation, the outcomes of migrant and language minority students as well as the role of education in shaping trust and attitudes towards migration. Before joining the OECD, Francesca was based in the Department of Social Policy and in the Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Francesca has been Adjunct Professor at the Paris School of International Affairs at SciencesPo (Paris) and held visiting positions at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley and the London School of Economics. From June 2019 she will be on research leave to University College London.

LARS LYBERG
PROFESSOR EMERITUS STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY

Lars Lyberg, Ph.D., is former Head of the Research and Development Department at Statistics Sweden and retired Professor at the Department of Statistics, Stockholm University. Currently he is affiliated with Inizio, a research firm in Sweden. He is the founder of the Journal of Official Statistics (JOS) and served as Chief Editor for 25 years. He is chief editor of Survey Measurement and Process Quality (Wiley, 1997) and co-editor of Total Survey Error in Practice (Wiley, 2017), Survey Methods in Multinational, Multiregional, and Multicultural Contexts (Wiley, 2010), Telephone Survey Methodology (Wiley, 1988) and Measurement Errors in Surveys (Wiley, 1991). He is co-author of Introduction to Survey Quality (Wiley, 2003). He chaired the Leadership Group on Quality of the European Statistical System and chaired the Organizing Committee of the first European Conference on Quality in Official Statistics, Q2001. He is former president of IASS and former chair of the ASA Survey Methods Section. He is a fellow of the American Statistical Association and the Royal Statistical Society and elected member of the International Statistical Institute. He received the 2012 Waksberg Award and the 2013 Helen Dinerman Award. Currently he is a member of the Technical Advisory Boards of PISA for Development and PIAAC.
Jowell-Kaase Early Career Researcher Prize 2019

In January, Mark Visser of Radboud University was announced as the recipient of the Jowell-Kaase Early Career Researcher Prize 2019. As winner of the prize, Visser will deliver a keynote speech during the conference and will receive €1,000 in prize money.

All five members of the Prize Committee unanimously agreed that the 2019 Jowell-Kaase Prize should be awarded to Mark Visser of Radboud University (Nijmegen, Holland).

The prize - named after Professor Sir Roger Jowell and Professor Max Kaase, the founders of the ESS - recognises excellence in the field of comparative social research by a promising new researcher from any social research discipline.

The Prize Committee was appointed by the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) of the ESS, in collaboration with the conference organisers, in consultation with Professor Kaase.

Professor Terje Andreas Eikemo, Professor Christian Staerkl, and Professor Anu Realo (Chair) acted as members of the Prize Committee on behalf of the SAB of the ESS. Members of the Prize Committee also included Professor Michael Breen (Chair of the ESS General Assembly) and Dr Oshrat Hochman in her capacity as organiser of the 4th International ESS Conference.

Mark Visser
Radboud University

As of September 2016, Mark Visser is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Radboud University, Nijmegen (the Netherlands). After obtaining his Bachelor degree in Sport, Health and Management at the HAN University of Applied Sciences in 2008, he went on to obtain a Bachelor degree in Sociology cum laude (2010) and a Research Master degree in Social and Cultural Science cum laude (2012) at Radboud University. He received the best Master thesis award 2012 of the Research Master Social and Cultural Science, which also won him the Radboud University Study Award 2011-2012 in the Faculty of Social Sciences. In September 2012, Mark started working as a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Radboud University and the Interuniversity Center of Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS), resulting in his dissertation on inequality among older workers. His research interests include the life course perspective, older workers, social capital, social inequality and the welfare state.
CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

MONDAY 15 APRIL

9-9.45AM: REGISTRATION + COFFEE
• Faculty for Mathematics and Information foyer, University of Mannheim

9.45-11AM: PLENARY SESSION
• Professor Dr. Thomas Puhl, the Rector of the University of Mannheim
• Professor Dr. Christof Wolf, the President of GESIS-Leibniz institute for the Social Sciences
• Professor Rory Fitzgerald, Director of ESS ERIC
• Keynote Speech: Lars Lyberg, Professor emeritus Stockholm University

11.20AM-1PM: PARALLEL SESSIONS
• A3: Determinants and correlates of party choice (Angelika Scheuer, room 101)
• B1: Links between intergenerational social mobility and individuals’ attitudes and behaviours (Alexi Gugushvili, room 102)
• D2: Religion in a cultural diverse Europe (Jolanda van der Noll, room 103)
• E3: Welfare attitudes and their political implications in a changing world (Nathalie Giger & Hanna Schwander, room 104)
• G3: Re-examining political efficacy using the ESS (André Pirralha & Sarah Butt, room 204)

1-2.30PM: LUNCH
• University of Mannheim Mensa

2.30-4.10PM: PARALLEL SESSIONS
• A1: Electoral participation in a turbulent era (Andrés Santana, room 101)
• C1: Public attitudes towards climate change (Christina Eder & Keith Smith, room 103)
• D3: The refugee crisis in Europe (Liza G. Steele & Nate Breznau, room 104)
• F1: Bridging ESS and EVS to study social attitudes, norms and values in a troubled Europe (Ruud Luijkx, Loek Halman & Vera Lomazzi, room 204)

4.10-4.30PM: COFFEE BREAK
• Faculty for Mathematics and Information foyer, University of Mannheim

4.30-5.30PM: POSTER SESSION
• Faculty for Mathematics and Information foyer, University of Mannheim

6.30-8.30PM: WELCOME RECEPTION
• Mannheim Baroque Palace
CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

TUESDAY 16 APRIL

9-10.40AM: PARALLEL SESSIONS
• B3: Working in more flexible labor markets (Daphne Nicolitsas, room 101)
• C3: Public attitudes towards welfare, climate change and energy in Europe and Russia (Michael Ochsner, Angelika Scheuer, Anna Andreenkova, Wim van Oorschot & Pekka Jokinen, room 102)
• D4: Ethnic and cultural diversity and integration (Anthony Heath & Silke Schneider, room 103)
• F3: Using survey data to measure country level characteristics (Marta Kolczynska & Tadeusz Krauze, room 104)
• G2: Democratic values in comparative context (Sandy Marquart-Pyatt & Aaron Ponce, room 204)

10.40-11.20AM: COFFEE BREAK
• Faculty for Mathematics and Information foyer, University of Mannheim

11.20AM-12.30PM: PLENARY SESSION
• Keynote Speech: Francesca Borgonovi (Senior Policy Analyst, OECD)

12.30-2PM: LUNCH
• University of Mannheim Mensa

2-3.40PM: PARALLEL SESSIONS
• A2: Unequal political participation in Europe (Gema Garcia-Albacete, room 101)
• B5: How to measure the changes in European attitudes towards lesbians and gays? (Judit Takács & Ivett Szalma, room 102)
• E2: Welfare solidarity during turbulent times: Eastern vs. Western Europe (Dimitri Gugushvili, room 103)
• F4: 2020 Vision: Concise results from the European Social Survey (Stefan Swift, room 104)
• G4. Populism in Europe (Angelika Scheuer, room 204)

3.40-4.20PM: COFFEE BREAK
• Faculty for Mathematics and Information foyer, University of Mannheim

4.20-5.20PM: PLENARY SESSION
• Presentation of the 2019 Jowell-Kaase Early Career Researcher Prize

7.30PM: CONFERENCE DINNER
• Eichbaum Brauhaus
CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

WEDNESDAY 17 APRIL

9-10.40AM: PARALLEL SESSIONS

- A4: Political participation in an era of instability, insecurity and inequality (Iasonas Lamprianou & Marios Vryonides, room 101)
- B2: Attitudinal consequences of social in-equalities in Europe (Jule Adriaans & Peter Valet, room 102)
- B4: Gender norms and cultural factors in the division of labor among couples and work-life conflict (Ivett Szalma & Michael Ochsner, room 103)
- D5: Attitudes towards foreigners in Europe (Alice Ramos, room 104)
- E1: Welfare state legitimacy in times of crisis and austerity: Between continuity and change (Tijs Laenen, Bart Meulemann & Wim van Oorschot, room 204)

10.40-11.20AM: COFFEE BREAK

- Faculty for Mathematics and Information foyer, University of Mannheim

11.20AM-1PM: PARALLEL SESSIONS

- B6: Monitoring patterns of social mobility in the changing social and economic environment (Anna Ludwinek & Tadas Leoncikas, room 101)
- C2: Public perceptions of climate change and energy security (Wouter Poortinga, Lorraine Whitmarsh, Gisela Böhm, Stephen Fisher & Linda Steg, room 102)
- D1: ESS: Immigrants in European societies (Anastasia Gorodzeisky & Moshe Semyonov, room 103)
- G1: Opinion, policies and policymaking. The reciprocal relationship between the public and policy outcomes since 2002 (Nate Breznau & Lyle Scruggs, room 104)
- F2: Generating new insights from the ESS probability based on-line web panel (Rory Fitzgerald & Gianmaria Bottoni, room 204)

1PM: LIGHT LUNCH (TAKEAWAY)

- Faculty for Mathematics and Information foyer, University of Mannheim
POSTER SESSION
MONDAY 15 APRIL
4.30-5.30PM


P.2. Chui, Helena: Whether religion makes people happy depends on its majority-minority status

P.3. Lübbe, Christiane: What makes people deny the existing evidence of a man-made climate change?

P.4. Wysmulek, Jakub: Values and attitudes toward immigrants in Central Europe

P.5. Pastrnáková, Veronika & Bozogáňová, Miroslava: Immigrants and how we perceive them: Are immigrants changing the face of Europe?

P.6. Wehl, Nadja & Zoch, Gundula: "Conflictive Preferences"? Values, gender ideologies and self-interest in childcare provision and unemployment benefits preferences of parents and the unemployed

P.7. Kaasa, Anneli: Culture and subjective well-being: Evidence from European regions

P.8. Kázmér, Ladislav: Does the societal level of gender inequalities affect inequalities in smoking as well? Cross-national evidence from 21 European countries.

PARALLEL SESSIONS
MONDAY 15 APRIL
11.20AM-1PM

A3: DETERMINANTS AND CORRELATES OF PARTY CHOICE
SESSION ORGANISER: ANGELIKA SCHEUER (ROOM 101)

• A3.1. Zhuchkova, Svetlana & Rotmistrov, Alexey: Multivariate associations in predicting electoral behavior: comparison of CHAID, log-linear analysis, and multiple correspondence analysis
• A3.2. Goubin, Silke; Hooghe, Marc; Okolikj, Martin & Stiers, Dieter: Ruining the principles of democracy: Economic voting and inequality
• A3.3. Pellicer, Manuel: (Dis)affection and electoral behaviour: New parties’ emergence as a "safety-valve"
• A3.4. Schnaudt, Christian & Stecker, Christian: Immigration and integration as "flash issues": How the refugees crisis has altered electoral behavior in Europe
• A3.5. Koivula, Aki & Sivonen, Jukka: Exploring the impact of occupational class and immigration attitudes on the vote for right-wing populists in Finland and Sweden

B1: LINKS BETWEEN INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND INDIVIDUALS’ ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS
SESSION ORGANISER: ALEXI GUGUSHVILI (ROOM 102)

• B1.1. Gugushvili, Alexi & Zhao, Yizhang: Intergenerational class mobility and depressive symptoms in Europe
• B1.2. van der Veer, Sabine & Ganzeboom, Harry: Student funding regimes and social inequality in enrollment in tertiary education
• B1.3. Creighton, Matthew; Capistrano, Daniel; da Silva Pedroso, Monika; Collins, Micheál & O’Connel, Phillip: The role of intergenerational mobility in shaping attitudes toward immigrants
• B1.4. Schuck, Bettina & Shore, Jennifer: Does experiencing intergenerational mobility shape democratic support?
• B1.5. Mauritti, Rosário; Nunes, Nuno; Romão, Ana Lúcia; da Cruz Martins, Susana; do Carmo Betelho, Maria & Firmino da Costa, António: Configurations of social inequality in Europe: A system of indicators
D2: RELIGION IN A CULTURAL DIVERSE EUROPE  
SESSION ORGANISER: JOLANDA VAN DER NOLL (ROOM 103)  
• D2.1. van der Noll, Jolanda & Ali Isani, Mujtaba: European Muslims: Perceived discrimination and its effects on trust in political institutions  
• D2.2. Ponce, Aaron & Marquart-Pyatt, Sandra: The welfare state, religion, and anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe  
• D2.3. Biolcati Rinaldi, Ferruccio; Ladini, Riccardo & Vezzoni, Cristiano: Attitudes towards immigrants and individual religiosity in Italy: A cumulative study on ESS and EVS data  
• D2.4. Gorodzeisly, Anastasia & Semyonov, Moshe: Unwelcome immigrants: Do levels and sources of opposition to immigration vary across groups?  
• D2.5. Jeannet, Anne-Marie & Dražanová, Lenka: Attitudes towards immigration across age cohorts: Assessing compositional, behavioral, and value-based explanations

E3: WELFARE ATTITUDES AND THEIR POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD  
SESSION ORGANISERS: NATHALIE GIGER & HANNA SCHWANDER (ROOM 104)  
• E3.1. Gonthier, Frédéric: More loyal or more critical? The middle class and the welfare state in times of rising insecurity  
• E3.2. Baranowski, Mariusz & Jabkowski, Piotr: Basic income and social structure. Comparative analysis of 23 countries based on the European Social Survey Round 8  
• E3.3. Giger, Nathalie & Schwander Hanna: The politics of employment centered family policy: linking preferences and electoral gains  
• E3.4. Zmerli, Sonja: The support of a basic income across Europe: Disentangling micro- and macro-level correlates  
• E3.5. Grand, Peter; Fink, Marcel & Tiemann, Guido: The determinants of welfare chauvinism – material self-interest or value-based?

G3: RE-EXAMINING POLITICAL EFFICACY USING THE ESS  
SESSION ORGANISERS: ANDRÉ PIRRALHA & SARAH BUTT (ROOM 204)  
• G3.1. Rump, Maike & Zwiener-Collins, Nadine: The interaction of (perceived) corruption and social deprivation on external political efficacy  
• G3.2. Pirralha, André & Butt, Sarah: How comparable is Political efficacy in Europe? A measurement invariance approach  
• G3.3. Oross, Dániel & Szabó, Andrea: Changing factors of political interest in turbulent times – the role of internal and external political efficacy in different regions of Europe
PARALLEL SESSIONS
MONDAY 15 APRIL
2.30-4.10PM

A1: ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN A TURBULENT ERA
SESSION ORGANISER: ANDRÉS SANTANA (ROOM 101)

• A1.1. Brils, Tobias; Muis, Jasper & Gaidytė, Teodora: Dissecting electoral support for the far right. A comparison between mature and post-communist European democracies
• A1.2. Pospíšilová, Jaroslava: Electoral accountability deficit in the Czech Republic
• A1.3. Gaasendam, Chris: Social democracy and its competitors: Patterns of cross-country variation in Europe
• A1.4. Noordzij, Kjell; van der Waal, Jeroen & de Koster, Willem: Does cultural liberalism in politics shape the education gap in political trust?
• A1.5. Santana, Andrés and Zagórski, Piotr: A revolt against the cities? Urban-rural divide, support for the right-wing populist parties, and turnout in Western and Central and Eastern Europe

C1: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS CLIMATE CHANGE
SESSION ORGANISERS: CHRISTINA EDER & KEITH SMITH (ROOM 103)

• C1.1. Matczak, Piotr: Impact of basic human values on the opinion about climate change in the European countries. Evidence from the European Social Survey Round 8
• C1.2. Fisher, Stephen D.; Böhm, Gisela; Ogunbode, Charles A.; Poortinga, Wouter; Steg, Linda & Whitmarsh, Lorraine: The politicisation of climate change attitudes in Europe
• C1.3. Bouman, Thijs; Verschoor, Mark; Steg, Linda; Böhm, Gisela; Fisher, Stephen D.; Poortinga, Wouter; Whitmarsh, Lorraine & Albers, Casper J: When worry about climate change leads to climate action and policy support
• C1.4. Kulin, Joakim & Johansson Sevā, Ingemar: Nationalism and climate change denial in Europe: How nationalist and rightwing populist parties shape beliefs about climate change
D3: THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN EUROPE
SESSION ORGANISERS: LIZA G. STEELE & NATE BREZNAU (ROOM 104)

• D3.2. Cichocki, Piotr & Jabkowski, Piotr: Universalism and security – normative struggle to shape European attitudes towards immigration
• D3.3. Van Hootegem, Arno; Meuleman, Bart & Abts, Koen: Attitudes towards refugee policy in a divided Europe: A multilevel analysis
• D3.4. Zavratnik, Simona; Broder, Živa & Falle Zorman, Rebeka: "Us and them": Trends in Slovenian public opinion on migration in ESS (2002-2016)
• D3.5. Cavalli, Nicolò & Charitopoulou, Effrosyni: The impact of the 2013 Lampedusa shipwreck on attitudes and policy preferences towards migration: Evidence from a natural experiment in Italy

F1: BRIDGING ESS AND EVS TO STUDY SOCIAL ATTITUDES, NORMS AND VALUES IN A TROUBLED EUROPE
SESSION ORGANISERS: RUUD LUIJKX, LOEK HALMAN & VERA LOMAZZI (ROOM 204)

• F1.1. Malnar, Brina: Informing cross-survey cooperation: Exploring patterns of academic usage in four general purpose surveys
• F1.2. Lomazzi, Vera & Luijx, Ruud: A first comparison of questions from the European Values Study and the core module of the European Social Survey
• F1.3. Ortmanns, Verena & Schneider, Silke L.: Comparing the measurement of educational attainment in ESS and EVS
• F1.4. Biolcati, Ferruccio & Molteni, Francesco: Using cumulative datasets to study religious change in Europe: a focus on ESS and EVS
• F1.5. Matejková, Alexandra: Gender differences in the importance of work and family roles in Slovak Republic: Concepts about "ideal" family relationships in ESS and EVS comparison
PARALLEL SESSIONS
TUESDAY 16 APRIL
9-10.40AM

B3. WORKING IN MORE FLEXIBLE LABOR MARKETS
SESSION ORGANISER: DAPHNE NICOLITSAS (ROOM 101)

• B3.1. Collins, Micheál; Capistrano, Daniel; Creighton, Mathew & O’Connell, Philip: Job security in Ireland before and during austerity
• B3.2. van Deurzen, Ioana; Bekker, Sonja & Burkert, Johanna: Temporary employment and depression in Europe: Looking behind the pooled data
• B3.3. Rudys, Valentinas: Life-cycle approach to informal work in Europe
• B3.4. Scheuring, Sonja; Fauser, Sophia & Gebel, Michael: The effect of fixed-term employment on well-being: Disentangling the micro-mechanisms and the moderating role of social cohesion
• B3.5. Ermolina, Anna & Kareva, Daria: Formal vs. informal social activity: what is more beneficial for the middle-aged and elderly subjective well-being in various countries

C3. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS WELFARE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY IN EUROPE AND RUSSIA
SESSION ORGANISERS: MICHAEL OCHSNER, ANGELIKA SCHEUER, ANNA ANDREENKOVA, WIM VAN OORSCHOT & PEKKA JOKINEN (ROOM 102)

• C3.1. Ochsner, Michael; Ravazzini, Laura; van Oorschot, Wim; Gugushvili, Dimitri & Fink, Marcel: Solidarity with vulnerable groups: Differences and commonalities between Russia and Europe
• C3.2. Ochsner, Michael & Andreenkova, Anna: Assessing the comparability of two ESS core items between Russia, Germany and Switzerland
• C3.3. Andreenkova, Anna: Political ideology and public attitudes toward climate change in Russia and in Europe
• C3.4. Demski, Christina; Poortinga, Wouter; Whitmarsh, Lorraine; Böhm, Gisela; Fisher, Stephen; Steg, Linda; Umit, Resul; Jokinen, Pekka & Pohjolainen, Pasi: Explaining cross-country differences in concern about energy security
• C3.5. Sivonen, Jukka & Kukkonen, lida: How do attitudes toward climate policy instruments vary in Europe? An examination of institutional and individual-level factors
**D4: ETHNIC AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND INTEGRATION**

**SESSION ORGANISERS: ANTHONY HEATH & SILKE SCHNEIDER (ROOM 103)**

- D4.1. Heath, Anthony & Schneider, Silke: The integration of ethnic minorities in European societies
- D4.2. Xu, Xinwei: How far are we apart? A relational mapping of symbolic ethnic boundaries using opinion surveys
- D4.3. Čermáková, Dita & Hamplová, Dana: Migrants' human values in Europe in the first and second generation
- D4.4. Krejcova, Eva & Sauger, Nicolas: Resilience or Change? Political attitudes of intra-European migrants
- D4.5. Raijman, Rebeca; Hochman, Oshrat & Davidov, Eldad: Sources of opposition to immigration: The Israeli case

**F3: USING SURVEY DATA TO MEASURE COUNTRY LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS**

**SESSION ORGANISERS: MARTA KOLCZYNSKA & TADEUSZ KRAUZE (ROOM 104)**

- F3.1. Gugushvili, Alexi & Kaiser, Casper: Intergenerational social mobility and mortality in Europe
- F3.2. Witte, Erich H.; Stanciu, Adrian & Boehnke, Klaus: The distribution approach and the averaging approach: A tale of two methodologies meant to measure value preferences at the culture level
- F3.3. Romero, Xavier & Van Hauwaert, Steven: The structure of demand for redistribution and its influence on governments
- F3.4. Schmidt, Katja: Why are attitudes towards immigrants changing? An analysis of structural and cultural determinants for Germany and the UK from 2002 to 2016

**G2: DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT**

**SESSION ORGANISERS: SANDY MARQUART-PYATT & AARON PONCE (ROOM 204)**

- G2.1. Gaižauskaitė, Inga: Culture of (dis)trust in the Baltic States, 1990-2018
- G2.2. Hahn, Caroline & Schnaudt, Christian: Citizen-elite congruence, political allegiances and political support in Europe
- G2.4. Plecitá, Klára: Lost in transition, found in recession? Satisfaction with democracy in Central Europe before and after economic crises
PARALLEL SESSIONS
TUESDAY 16 APRIL
2-3.40PM

A2: UNEQUAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE
SESSION ORGANISER: GEMA GARCIA-ALBACETE (ROOM 101)

• A2.1. Kołczyńska, Marta; Wysmulek, Ilona & Lavryk, Denys: Status inconsistency and political engagement in Europe: Analysis of ESS rounds 4-8
• A2.2. Kirbiš, Andrej; Friš, Darko; Bajc, Gorazd; Tavčar Krajnc, Marina; Javornik Krečič, Marija; Tement, Sara & Lamot, Monika: The impact of health on political participation: A multilevel analysis of 20-country European Social Survey data
• A2.3. Mogi, Ryohei & Arpino, Bruno: The association of childlessness and voting turnout in 23 countries
• A2.4. Haußner, Stefan: Impact of unequal turnout on election results - evaluation of traditional and new applications
• A2.5. Weiß, Julia: The influence of the economic crisis on the political participation of young adults in Europe

B5: HOW TO MEASURE THE CHANGES IN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS LESBIANS AND GAYS?
SESSION ORGANISERS: JUDIT TAKÁCS & IVETT SZALMA (ROOM 102)

• B5.1. Adriaenssens, Stef; Hendrickx, Jef & Holm, Johanna: The sexual mores of class: How occupational experience moulds homonegativity
• B5.2. Xia, Weiqian: Secularity and politicization: How religious contexts shape the impact of same-sex marriage and partnership legislations on public attitudes towards homosexuality in Europe
• B5.3. Coenders, Marcel & van Beusekom, Gabriel: Changes in attitudes towards gays and lesbians: Support for general principles versus specific objections
• B5.4. Dotti Sani, Giulia M. & Quaranta, Mario: Shifting attitudes towards homosexuality in Europe: Exploring changes in individual heterogeneities across time and space
• B5.5. Takács, Judit & Szalma, Ivett: Democracy deficit and homophobic divide in 21st century Europe
E2: WELFARE SOLIDARITY DURING TURBULENT TIMES: EASTERN VS. WESTERN EUROPE
SESSION ORGANISER: DIMITRI GUGUSHVILI (ROOM 103)

- E2.1. Breznau, Nate: Culture or capital? Institutions of welfare state attitudes in Greater Europe
- E2.2. Bašná, Kristýna & Petrúšek, Ivan: Welfare state and great recession: Changes in attitudes towards redistribution in post-communist countries and the rest of Europe
- E2.3. Grajczjár, István; Örkény, Antal & Nagy, Zsófia: The effect of socio-economic changes on attitudes towards different types of solidarity - a changing European landscape
- E2.4. Roosma, Femke & van Oorschot, Wim: Between hope and fear? Regional and social dividing lines in attitudes towards a Social Europe
- E2.5. Piterová, Ivana & Výrost, Jozef: An outline of personal (psychological) profiles of four welfare attitudinal types based on the ESS Round 8 data

F4: 2020 VISION: CONCISE RESULTS FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY
SESSION ORGANISER: STEFAN SWIFT (ROOM 104)

- F4.2. André, Stéfanie; Kraaykamp, Gerbert & Sellies, Paul: Part-time employment among men: The interplay between country’s gender culture, legal entitlements to part-time work and individual’s gender role attitudes
- F4.3. Montes Nebreda, Andoni: Working hours mismatch and mental health in Europe
- F4.4. Capistrano, Daniel; Creighton, Mathew; Collins, Micheál & O'Connell, Philip: Can ESS data be used to monitor the UN Sustainable Development Goals?
- F4.5. Schanze, Jan-Lucas & Halbherr, Verena: A brief guide on if and how to survey institutional residents

G4. POPULISM IN EUROPE
SESSION ORGANISER: ANGELIKA SCHEUER (ROOM 204)

- G4.1. Gattig, Alexander & Engel, Uwe: Two of a kind? Similarities (and dissimilarities) of left-wing and right-wing populist parties across Europe
- G4.2. Elff, Martin: Class voting, working class turnout and the rise of populism
- G4.3. Dimova, Lilia: Dynamic of Europeans’ tolerance to "others"
PARALLEL SESSIONS
WEDNESDAY 17 APRIL
9-10.40AM

A4: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AN ERA OF INSTABILITY, INSECURITY AND INEQUALITY
SESSION ORGANISERS: IASONAS LAMPRIANOU & MARIOS VRYONIDES (ROOM 101)

- A4.1. Polovyi, Mykola: Forecasting of structurally-demographic threats to political stability in Eastern European members of the EU till 2025
- A4.3. Le Corre Juratic, Morgan: Dimensions of conflict, party polarization, and electoral turnout in Western European democracies
- A4.4. Vasilopoulou, Sofia & Halikiopoulou, Daphne: Europe as a breach of the social contract: A model for explaining the rise of the far right at times of crisis
- A4.5. Scheuer, Angelika: Vote intention in hypothetical EU membership referendums

B2: ATTITUDINAL CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN EUROPE
SESSION ORGANISERS: JULE ADRIAANS & PETER VALET (ROOM 102)

- B2.1. Langsæther, Peter Egge; Goubin, Silke & Haugsgjerd, Atle: Class and crisis
- B2.2. Schöneck-Voß, Nadine & Akaeda, Naoki: The 2008/09 economic crisis and eight years thereafter
- B2.3. Ilieva-Trichkova, Petya & Boyadjieva, Pepka: Fragile sociality: Inequalities in access to non-formal adult education and social trust
- B2.4. Bruns, Patricia & Pohlig, Matthias: Class, Values and Euroscepticism: Which social milieus support or oppose European integration?

B4: GENDER NORMS AND CULTURAL FACTORS IN THE DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG COUPLES AND WORK-LIFE CONFLICT
SESSION ORGANISERS: IVETT SZALMA & MICHAEL OCHSNER (ROOM 103)

• B4.2. Kromydas, Theocharis: Educational attainment as a determinant of division of work-life balance within couples across Europe: A gender analysis in a contextual perspective
• B4.3. Soboleva, Natalia: Gender attitudes and achievement motivation across Europe (the evidence of ESS data)
• B4.4. Carriero, Renzo: Disentangling the role of culture in the gender division of household labor. Evidence from Europe’s immigrants
• B4.5. Kanas, Agnieszka & Muller, Katrin: Immigrant women’s labour force participation: The importance of gender ideologies

D5: ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS IN EUROPE
SESSION ORGANISER: ALICE RAMOS (ROOM 104)

• D5.1. Bell, Andrew & Piekut, Aneta: An age-period cohort analysis of attitudes to immigration in Poland
• D5.2. O’Connell, Philip J.; Capistrano, Daniel; Collins, Micheál & Creighton, Mathew: Attitudes to immigrants in Ireland: Trends in immigration and the business cycle
• D5.3. Barfort, Sebastian; Hobolt, Sara B. & Rodon, Toni: Labor market competition and opposition to immigration
• D5.4. Ramos, Alice: Immigration by the lens of nationals and immigrants: Self-interest, solidarity, autochthony and moral determinants

E1: WELFARE STATE LEGITIMACY IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND AUSTERITY: BETWEEN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
SESSION ORGANISERS: TIJS LAENEN, BART MEULEMANN & WIM VAN OORSCHOT (ROOM 204)

• E1.1. Baute, Sharon & Meuleman, Bart: Public attitudes towards a European minimum income benefit: Diverging interests within and across EU member states?
• E1.2. Rossetti, Federica: Two sides of the same coin, or more? Europeans’ preferred balance between social rights and obligations of the unemployed
• E1.3. Grand, Peter; Fink, Marcel & Tiemann, Guido: Allowed to turn down. The determinants of attitudes towards demanding active labour market policies
PARALLEL SESSIONS
WEDNESDAY 17 APRIL
11.20AM-1PM

B6: MONITORING PATTERNS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THE CHANGING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
SESSON ORGANISERS: ANNA LUDWINEK & TADAS LEONCIKAS (ROOM 101)

- B6.1. Traini, Claudia: Stratification of education systems – direct effect of social origin on occupational attainment
- B6.2. Wielers, Rudi & Van der Meer, Peter: Beyond incentives: Why we want to keep on working even if we don’t need the money
- B6.3. Israel, Sabine: From insecurity to vulnerability? An analysis of limited contracts, recurrent unemployment and financial instability as drivers of health problems among young adults
- B6.4. Akaeda, Naoki: Social trust and well-being inequality due to stratification

C2: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY SECURITY
(SESSION ORGANISERS: WOUTER POORTINGA, LORRAINE WHITMARSH, GISELA BÖHM, STEPHEN FISHER & LINDA STEG (ROOM 102)

- C2.1. Roberts, Benjamin; Struwig, Jarè & Radebe, Thobeka: Generation of change? South African attitudes towards climate change and energy in comparative perspective
- C2.2. Poortinga, Wouter; Whitmarsh, Lorraine; Steg, Linda; Böhm, Gisela & Fisher, Stephen: Climate change perceptions and their individual-level determinants: A cross-European analysis
- C2.3. Marquart-Pyatt, Sandra; Qian, Hui; Houser, Matthew K. & McCright, Aaron M.: Climate Change and Energy Views and Actions: Evidence from the European Social Survey
- C2.4. Pohjolainen, Pasi; Kukkonen, Lida; Jokinen, Pekka; Poortinga, Wouter; Fisher, Stephen; Räsänen, Pekka; Ogunbode, Charles A. & Böhm, Gisela: A comparative perspective on the determinants of environmental citizenship in Europe
D1: ESS: IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES
SESSION ORGANISERS: ANASTASIA GORODZEISKY & MOSHE SEMYONOV (ROOM 103)

• D1.1. Kilpi-Jakonen, Elina & Tuominen, Minna: Language spoken at home and integration across multiple dimensions among the European second generation
• D1.2. Stanciu, Adrian: Horizontal transmission of elderly stereotypes from native population to immigrants: A multi-theory exploration across 29 countries
• D1.3. Igarashi, Akira: Compatibility of ethnic and national identifications under multicultural policies
• D1.4. Yang, Keming: Loneliness among immigrants in European countries

G1: OPINION, POLICIES AND POLICYMAKING. THE RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND POLICY OUTCOMES SINCE 2002
SESSION ORGANISERS: NATE BREZNAU & LYLE SCRUGGS (ROOM 104)

• G1.1. Breznau, Nate: Simultaneous feedback and positive returns across Europe: Public opinion and social policy
• G1.2. Sieben, Inge & Coenders, Marcel: Political climate and polarization in negative attitudes towards migration in Europe
• G1.3. Ivanov, Grigor; Lippényi, Zoltán & Przepiorka, Wojtek: Explaining populist support: The interplay of economic conditions and mainstream party strategy
• G1.4. Scruggs, Lyle: Political partisanship, social vulnerability and climate change

F2: GENERATING NEW INSIGHTS FROM THE ESS PROBABILITY BASED ON-LINE WEB PANEL
SESSION ORGANISERS: RORY FITZGERALD & GIANMARIA BOTTONI (ROOM 204)

• F2.1. Ainsaar, Mare; Soidla, Indrek; Vovk, Tina; Kurdija, Slavko; Doušak, May; Humphrey, Alun & Villar, Ana: Why young people do (not) participate in panel surveys?
• F2.2. Doušak, May & Kurdija, Slavko: Predicting participation rates in web panel (ESS Cronos case)
• F2.3. Sommer, Elena & Bottoni, Gianmaria: Challenging items for smartphone survey completion in the probability-based CROss-National Online Survey (CRONOS) panel
• F2.4. Lomazzi, Vera; Maineri, Angelica Maria & Luijkx, Ruud: Studying the priming effect of family norms on gender roles’ attitudes: An experimental design
• F2.5. Sibley, Elissa & Fitzgerald, Rory: Differential sample composition in face-to-face versus online surveys: Evaluating the impact on substantive models
General elections are national events that are studied mainly on the basis of national election studies. However, some developments can be observed in many countries, like the success of populist parties or the demise of formerly important left-wing parties. Such trends suggest applying a comparative approach for finding more general explanations. Using the European Social Survey for electoral research is not trivial, given that the timing of the ESS is not in line with national electoral cycles and information on party positions, candidates and campaign issues are not covered.

On the other hand, the ESS provides variables for measuring of the basic factors of voting behaviour (socio-economic status, ideological position, and party identification) as well as a great variety of basic social and political attitudes and values as well as policy preferences that impact on party choice and may explain electoral behaviour in a comparative and cross-time perspective. Especially the ESS rotating modules (like immigration, energy/climate change, welfare or wellbeing) allow for in-depth exploration of the determinants and correlates of party choice.

Papers are invited that use ESS data for the comparative study of voting behaviour analysing (a) the relative importance of explanatory factors of party choice or (b) factors explaining the electoral support for Europe-wide party families (e.g. green, left-wing, populist) across countries and/or across time.

A3.1. MULTIVARIATE ASSOCIATIONS IN PREDICTING ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: COMPARISON OF CHAID, LOG-LINEAR ANALYSIS, AND MULTIPLE CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS
Svetlana Zhuchkova and Alexey Rotmistrov (Higher School of Economics, Moscow)

Our research is primarily methodological one: it is devoted to the role of multivariate associations in predicting electoral choice. Most of the hypothetical predictors of this choice are categorical variables, and in practice, the multivariate analysis of such variables is quite rare. However, ignoring multivariate associations of categorical features can have negative consequences, such as the Simpson’s paradox, deterioration of the predictive quality of the model and incorrect conclusions about social reality.

Using sociological theoretical approach to the study of electoral behavior, on the example of the Russian sample of the ESS in our study we compare three appropriate methods for search of multivariate associations of categorical variables: log-linear analysis, multiple correspondence analysis, and CHAID. Although the chosen methods are based on the analysis of contingency tables and the calculation of the chi-square criterion, they differ significantly in their implementation, so the results of their application are different.

By bringing the results to a single form of combinations of categories, we show that the most effective method in describing the portrait of the electorate is a multiple correspondence analysis, and the most effective method in forecasting is a log-linear analysis. In addition, the results show that the inclusion of the obtained combinations significantly improves the predictive quality of the model, and therefore, the need to account for multivariate associations in the studies of the electorate is confirmed. Finally, the obtained electorate portraits are substantially correlated with stereotypes about the electorate of certain parties, which are common in Russian society.
MONDAY 15 APRIL | 11.20AM-1PM | ROOM 101

A3.2: RUINING THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC VOTING AND INEQUALITY
Silke Goubin, Marc Hooghe, Martin Okolikj and Dieter Stiers (KU Leuven)

In this article we explain between-country heterogeneity in economic voting by economic inequality. Theories on economic voting and democratic accountability are rooted in the reward-punishment hypothesis, which posits that voters punish incumbent governments for economic decline and reward them in times of economic expansion. This mechanism is, according to the clarity of responsibility hypothesis, conditioned by the political context. In countries where responsibility is clear, like in majoritarian systems, economic voting is more present.

Contrary to the established views in the economic voting literature, we argue that accountability is not only dependent on clarity of responsibility, but is also embedded in the dynamics between the economic elites and the masses. More specifically, when economic inequality is high, we argue that economic parameters of voting become less important, whereas group identity dynamics gain salience. By analysing hierarchical models on the basis of all eight rounds of the European Social Survey, we find that high levels of income inequality, lower the levels of economic voting.

A3.3. (DIS)AFFECTION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR: NEW PARTIES’ EMERGENCE AS A "SAFETY-VALVE"
Manuel Pellicer (Complutense University of Madrid)

From Macron to Sweden Democrats, European national party systems are experiencing an intense process of innovation. This paper addresses this question by focusing on the relationship between "newness" in electoral behaviour and political attitudes, such as political disengagement and institutional disaffection, across thirteen Western Europe countries. Despite the existence of a vast literature covering the voting mechanisms and determinants, from social class to policy preferences, through party identification, there is a remarkable lack of academic research regarding the effects of disaffection on the vote choice, particularly, on the electoral success of new parties.

By means of a combination of ESS data and a 77-election results database, a statistical analysis involving different techniques, not least, Multinomial Logistic Regressions, will be undertaken. In doing so, we will be able to put forward several relationships. Firstly, battery-like electors seem to be progressively "charged" with disaffection without any perceived political effects until a new political actor activates their disengagement, bringing about changes in their political behaviour. Secondly, these political consequences, such as the emergence of new parties, either are dependent on, or related to, national political contexts.

Even though new parties could pose a serious danger to European Democracies, they might, at the same time, be a healthy party system adaptation mechanism conducive to both disaffection level reduction and political participation increases, that is to say, new parties’ electoral success could act as a disaffection safety-valve.
A3.4. IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION AS "FLASH ISSUES": HOW THE REFUGEES CRISIS HAS ALTERED ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN EUROPE
Christian Schnaudt (GESIS) and Christian Stecker (University of Mannheim)

The European refugee crisis has put immigration and integration on top of citizen issue priorities. Both issues touch upon emotionally charged questions of identity and cultural belongings and have, hence, the potential to transform the political landscape. In fact, the increased salience of immigration and integration has not only altered the way many Europeans think about these issues, it has also strongly affected their electoral behavior as evidenced by the recent electoral successes of populist radical right-wing parties (PRRP) in many European countries such as Austria, Germany, Italy, or Hungary. In a longitudinal analysis using ESS data, we show that in the wake of the refugee crisis anti-immigrant sentiments and the rejection of multiculturalism translate much more often into the election of PRRP. Put differently, the refugee crisis has mobilized previously dormant attitudes and channeled them into electoral politics. This general effect is, however, moderated by different factors at the individual and country level. At the individual level, feelings of distrust as well as a perceived lack of political efficacy can be expected to strengthen the effect of anti-immigrant sentiments on the vote for PRRP. At the country-level, the programmatic offers by established parties influence support for PRRP. While support for PRRP is generally stronger among immigration-sceptics across all countries, it is particularly pronounced in countries where established parties have opened a representation gap by converging on moderately pro-immigration positions. Our paper thus illustrates how immigration and integration as ‘flash issues’ disrupt existing party loyalties and transform political competition in Europe.

A3.5. EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF OCCUPATIONAL CLASS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES ON THE VOTE FOR RIGHT-WING POPULISTS IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN
Aki Koivula and Jukka Sivonen (University of Turku)

Finland and Sweden are known as fairly homogenous countries with a tradition of a stable political system including the relatively high degree of class voting by international standards. However, recently discussion on immigration and its consequences have increased considerably in both countries, while creating room among other factors for the rise of the right-wing populist parties, namely the Finns Party (FP) and the Sweden Democrats (SD).

The rise of the Nordic populists has been considered to be based on the votes of the working class and small entrepreneurs. However, international studies have indicated that class of specialists is divided in terms of supporting right-wing populists: technocrats are clearly more supportive to populists in comparison to social and cultural specialists.

The main purpose of this article is to fill the research gap concerning the specialists’ votes for the populists in Finland and Sweden. Also, we evaluate how different kind of immigration perceptions mediate this association, and what kind of differences manifest between the countries.

Our data included four recent waves of ESS that enabled to evaluate the citizens’ voting preferences in Finnish Parliament elections 2011 and 2015 and Swedish general elections 2010 and 2014. To categorize voters’ occupational class, we used Ayse Güveli’s class scheme. In order to obtain the immigration perceptions, we assessed the respondents’ opinions on the cultural and economic impacts of immigration.

We found that the FP and the SD pulled a significant number of votes from the technocrats. Moreover, technocrats’ voting preferences were highly explained by immigration perceptions in both countries. Still, there were remarkable differences between the Finnish and the Swedish populist voters when we considered the cause of immigration perception.

The study provides new insight into intercorrelation between the occupational class, the immigration perceptions, and the populist voting in Nordic context.
Intergenerational social mobility refers to the degree to which individuals’ social origins, i.e. parental characteristics during childhood, are associated with their status in adulthood. For the best part of the post-war period, parents in advanced societies could expect their children to do far better than they themselves did, in terms of occupational attainment, income, and wealth. But in many countries, this is no longer the case - in fact, a growing proportion of individuals experience downward, as opposed to upward, mobility, as compared to their parents. This trend may have some far-reaching implications for the young generations. But what we do not know is how exactly these profound changes in intergenerational social mobility affect individuals, and how far this effect, if there is any, is uniform across societies. Inconclusive findings of the early research on the consequences of intergenerational social mobility can be partially explained by using indicators for measuring individuals’ social positions and their social origins in an interchangeable and haphazard way. This is problematic as the size and nature of the intergenerational transmission of inequalities could be different along different dimensions of social standing.

The proposed session intends to make use of multifaceted data from ESS for understanding how individuals’ intergenerational mobility experiences affect their attitudes and behaviours. Methodologically, it is important to disentangle the effects of the social position of origin, the social position of destination, and intergenerational movement itself between these positions. The proposed session particularly welcomes papers employing diagonal reference models (DRMs) which were designed specifically to study the consequences of intergenerational social mobility in social stratification literature but have not been widely used by scholars in other areas of social research such as welfare state attitudes, political sociology, and immigration. Contrary to the less rigorous linear regression approach, this statistical technique is based on the idea that those individuals who are not socially mobile represent the core of each social stratum and hence to derive the net effects of mobility they should be compared to upward and downward mobile individuals.

B1.1. INTERGENERATIONAL CLASS MOBILITY AND DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS IN EUROPE

Yizhang Zhao (University of Oxford)

Recent research has explored how intergenerational class mobility may affect people’s psychological health but has yielded mixed findings. Depending on the direction of mobility and the type of mechanisms involved, we can expect positive or negative association between the two. In this study, we use data from the 6th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted in 2012 which contains abundant information on depressive symptoms. The main explanatory variable, intergenerational class mobility, is operationalised in terms of class difference between parental and offspring generations. With regard to modelling strategy, we build on diagonal reference models (DRMs) which offers an ideal approach to examining position effect and mobility effect simultaneously. By examining the impact of class mobility on depressive symptoms in 22 European societies, we expect to show both commonalities and differences across different social contexts.
B1.2. STUDENT FUNDING REGIMES AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN ENROLLMENT IN TERTIARY EDUCATION
Sabine van der Veer and Harry BG Ganzeboom (VU University Amsterdam)

Student funding varies dramatically between European welfare states (OECD, 2017), both in coverage (who is entitled to financial support) and amount (how much support is given). In some countries part of funding is provided as transferred income, in others there exist only student loans. Means testing is common, but varies between countries. Moreover, student funding regimes have changed much in the past decades, with most countries developing in the direction of welfare retrenchment. In this study, we examine the consequences of these (changing) macro-level conditions on the social inequality in enrollment in tertiary education, according to data from ESS Rounds 1-8 (2002-2016) combined with macro-level data taken from the EU-SILC income surveys. The ESS is unique in identifying simultaneous participation in education and the labor market, combined with detailed data on social origins, as measured by parental education and occupation. The ESS micro-level data allow us to study changing social inequalities in access to tertiary education, but also prevalence and inequalities in students labor market participation and leaving the family home, around Europe over a period of 14 years. We combine these patterns with macro-level data on student funding regimes constructed from EU_SILC and OECD statistics in a fixed-effect comparative design, using an XT meta-regression. Our provisional results indicate that both smaller coverage and lower amounts of student funding drives up social inequality in access to tertiary education sharply, but that its effects on student labor market employment and independent housing are only small.

B1.3. THE ROLE OF INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY IN SHAPING ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS
Mathew J. Creighton, Daniel Capistrano, Monika da Silva Pedroso, Micheál Collins and Phillip O’Connel (University College Dublin)

Although labour-market position and educational qualifications are considered key determinants of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (positive and negative), little work has considered the role of intergenerational mobility. Theoretically, upward and downward trajectories in terms of occupation and education shape the extent to which immigrants and immigration are seen as economic and social competition. The European Social Survey (ESS) captures the occupation and education of respondents and, importantly, their parents. In addition, the ESS consistently queries respondents’ perception of immigrants and immigration across countries and rounds. The resulting data offer a first step toward the incorporation of mobility, and the opportunities it affords, into standard models of the determinants of attitudes toward immigrants. This paper pursues three goals. First, for the most recent round of the ESS (ESS8), we will assess the role of intergenerational educational mobility in shaping attitudes toward immigrants across countries. Second, the role of occupational mobility will be similarly explored. Third, temporal variation will be considered, incorporating previous rounds of the ESS and, for ESS1 and ESS7, a more robust set of attitudinal measures of anti-immigrant sentiment.
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B1.4. DOES EXPERIENCING INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY SHAPE DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT?
Bettina Schuck (Heidelberg University) and Jennifer Shore (Mannheim Center for European Social Research, MZES)

For the first time in decades intergenerational upward mobility is no longer a given; downward mobility is both a risk and a reality for a growing share of individuals across Europe. Comparably little is known about how these developments impact individual political attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, does intergenerational mobility affect how individuals think about the state and democracy in general? Drawing on conceptions of democratic support which allow for both proximate evaluations and more general assessments of democracy as a legitimate form of government, our paper contributes to this line of research by investigating the relationship between intergenerational mobility and democratic support. We argue that people who experienced intergenerational mobility, particularly downward mobility, may have different expectations about the role of the state than those who have not. Moreover, trust and satisfaction with democracy may also be harmed by a loss of social standing, which may have grave implications for democratic legitimacy. Data from the 6th round of the ESS covering understandings and expectations of democracy allow us to test the effects of intergenerational educational mobility on a variety of support measures. We make use of diagonal reference models that allow distinguishing mobility effects from level effects: We are thereby explicitly interested in how intergenerational mobility, and not status attainment or status origin, affects individuals’ attitudes toward the state and democracy.

B.1.5. AN AGE-PERIOD-COHORT ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRATION IN POLAND
Rosário Mauritti, Nuno Nunes, Susana da Cruz Martins, Maria do Carmo Botelho, António Firmino da Costa (Lisbon University Institute) and Ana Lúcia Romão (University of Lisbon)

This paper presents a set of contributions to identify and establish research questions on social inequality in Europe today. The analysis underpinned by sound theoretical guidelines adopts a multidimensional concept of inequality, focusing in the intersections between distributional inequalities of economic and educational resources, and categorical inequalities between nation states and between social classes. The analysis is empirically supported by data from the European Social Survey 2016 (plus Denmark data, from ESS 2014) – considering most of the European Union countries and three associated countries in the European Economic Area (Iceland, Switzerland and Norway). The ESS microdata allowed us to calculate European income deciles, build a matrix of class-country segments for the European social space, and analyse the intersections of this structural matrix with the European distributions of income and education. The analysis developed allowed the construction of an innovative model in a vision of the main configurations of the social inequality from a comparative and transnational European perspective. The results reveal the marked levels of inequalities that run through Europe. They also show the specific structural configurations of inequality in Europe emerging from the intersection between distributional and categorical inequalities.
In the last decades, the flow of people that cross national borders to live and work in another country has increased, partly because of economic integration and the opening of labour markets, but also be-cause inter-state and internal conflicts resulted in increased numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. In 2010, about one-third of all international migrants lived in Europe, making it one of the largest des-tination regions. Furthermore, mainly due to migration, about five percent of Europe’s population iden-tifies as Muslim, constituting the third-largest religious group, following Christians and the religiously unaffiliated. In 2015 European societies witnessed another increase in the influx of a large number of refugees, mostly with an Islamic background. This and other international developments, such as islam-ic terrorist attacks, stimulates the continued interest in how European societies (should) deal with its Muslim minorities. Indeed, the successful integration of Muslim minorities in European societies is often perceived to be one of the most pressing and most challenging issues of our times.

According to previous research, European Muslims face marginalization, discrimination and exclusion based on being seen as an out-group with a different culture, identity, religion, ethnicity and worldview. Yet, the consequences of this backlash for the socio-political attitudes and well-being among European Muslims are still understudied. Furthermore, it has often been suggested that Muslim immigrants en-dorse beliefs and practices, for example concerning sexual liberalization and gender equality, that are at odds with the prevailing norms of individual autonomy, choice and tolerance in most European socio-ties. Up to date, there is, however, little systematic research, that addresses social attitudes, norms, and values (and their possible determinants) among European Muslims.

To fill this void, this session invites papers that use data from the European Social Survey (exclusively or in conjuncture with other data) that examine the position of European Muslims in their societies, addressing, for example, (1) the consequences of perceived discrimination on socio-political attitudes, behavior, and personal and social well-being; (2) social attitudes, norms and values among European Muslims and comparisons with the non-Muslim majority population; and (3) the role of religion and other potential determinants of these social attitudes, norms and values.

D2.1. EUROPEAN MUSLIMS: PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Jolanda van der Noll (University of Hagen) and Mujtaba Ali Isani (University of Münster)

Previous research has shown that European Muslims face marginalization, discrimination and exclusion because they are perceived as an outgroup with a different culture, identity, religion, ethnicity and worldview. Because of this marginalization, European Muslims may be skeptical of the political context they are living in and European political institutions which are seemingly unable to prevent or protect them from this marginalization. In this paper we address the question to what extent perceived discrimination among European Muslims is related to trust in political institutions. We hypothesize that European Muslims who experienced discrimination have lower levels of political trust. Furthermore, we explore whether the basis upon which Muslims experience discrimination (e. g. nationality, religion, gender) and to what extent this matters for political trust.

To test our expectations, we used the pooled data from the European Social Survey (2002-2016), which included 3,601 respondents who self-identified as Muslim. Preliminary analyses showed that about one-third of the European Muslims included in the ESS data experienced discrimination, mostly based on their religion (62 percent), nationality (44 percent), or skin color (31 percent). Second generation Muslim immigrants were more likely to have experienced discrimination, compared to first generation Muslim immigrants. Furthermore, European Muslims who feel discriminated against are more likely to report lower levels of trust in political institutions. Given that perceptions of discrimination are more strongly distributed among second generation immigrants, this might lead to an increase in Muslim (and immigrant) skepticism toward political institutions in the future.
The modern European welfare state was created to moderate class divisions and cultivate social citizenship. Welfare regimes and publics have changed dramatically since their creation, however. Immigration and increased religious and cultural diversity in Europe have ignited debates about national belonging and multicultural difference. The welfare state often takes center stage in these debates, as commentators equate increased immigration with an erosion of the established welfare state pact. Studies show that welfare regime type and generosity shape preferences to exclude immigrants from the welfare state. Separately, recent research shows that religious frames shape symbolic boundaries between Christian nations and foreign immigrants, and that individual religious characteristics pattern attitudes toward immigrants. With recent increases in Europe’s Muslim population, presumably secular Europe may be experiencing a latent resurgence of religious-national identity. This study asks: How do institutional welfare contexts and religious identity and practice shape attitudes toward immigrants?

This study bridges work on welfare state structures, including their religious antecedents, and the emerging religious boundaries and nationalism literature to investigate patterns of anti-immigrant attitudes across Europe. The study fills a notable gap in the literature considering welfare states themselves have operated under the influence of religious assumptions regarding social relations, under varying strength of ties between state and church, and often with the participation of church-led charity organizations. We use ESS data spanning 2002 to 2016 to test the influence of religious belonging and behavior characteristics, including tradition, religiosity, majority status, and church attendance, on anti-immigrant attitudes. We then merge welfare regime indicators of expenditure and regime type indices to assess whether welfare state context modifies religion’s relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes. We predict the clearest influences on the public’s attitudes for welfare state contexts with the most religiously conservative foundations and for individuals’ membership in the majority religious group.

D2.3. ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS AND INDIVIDUAL RELIGIOSITY IN ITALY: A CUMULATIVE STUDY ON ESS AND EVS DATA
Ferruccio Biolcati Rinaldi, Riccardo Ladini and Cristiano Vezzoni (University of Milan)

Immigration has become an increasingly salient issue in European public opinion. In Italy, among pundits and commentators, immigration has been considered one of the main causes that led to the outstanding success of populist movements in 2018 general elections. Although this explanation appears somehow simplistic, the study on the prevalence of attitudes towards migrants and their main determinants deserves an urgent attention in such turbulent times, when about 600,000 migrants arrived in Italy in the past 4 years.

Data coming from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Values Study (EVS) offer a valuable opportunity to achieve this task. Comparing data from the two surveys, we will consider both a description of attitudes toward immigrants and their association with individual religiosity, a dimension recognized as crucial in defining those attitudes. Notwithstanding the official Catholic discourse in favor of reception and many people volunteering in various services devoted to immigrants, other religious affiliates have taken an adversarial attitude and some anti-immigrant movements have stressed the role of the mainstream Christian heritage as an element of opposition to the acceptance of immigrants of a different religious background.

The joined evaluation of the two surveys allows explicitly considering the quality of the information available. Following a parallel surveys research design, we firstly consider ESS data (round 8). Then, we replicate the analysis on EVS data (2017), exploiting the larger set of items on religiosity of the values study. Possible discrepancies will be discussed. We will speculate on which effects can influence potential biases, considering those aspects that vary between the two surveys.
D2.4. UNWELCOME IMMIGRANTS: DO LEVELS AND SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION VARY ACROSS GROUPS?

Anastasia Gorodzeisky and Moshe Semyonov (Tel Aviv University)

The present paper advances the proposition that the opposition to immigration (i.e. endorsement of closure or exclusion) and its sources vary across immigrant groups. To test this proposition we utilize data from the 2014 European Social Survey for 20 countries and apply the analysis to the following groups of immigrants: immigrants of same race/ethnic group as a majority population, immigrants of different race/ethnic group, Muslim, Jews and Roma immigrants. The analysis reveals that level of opposition to immigration in Europe is hierarchical, being most extreme toward Muslims and Roma and quite minor toward people of the same ethnic/race groups as well as toward Jews. Further analysis reveals that not only the level of opposition varies across groups but also the sources that drive such opposition. In general, the sources of opposition to immigration can be divided into two major categories: universal sources and group-specific sources. The universal sources (sources which increase opposition toward all immigrants regardless of their origin) pertain to perceived threats to economic well-being and to the cultural values of society. The group-specific sources consist of racism, fear of crime and inter-group contact. Racism and lack of inter-group contact tend to increase opposition that is exclusive to Muslim and to Roma immigrants, but not opposition that is exclusive to immigrants that belong to a race/ethnic group that is different from most country people. Fear of crime, however, is likely to prompt opposition that is exclusive to immigrants of different race/ethnic group and to Roma but not toward Muslims.

D2.5. ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION ACROSS AGE COHORTS: ASSESSING COMPOSITIONAL, BEHAVIORAL, AND VALUE-BASED EXPLANATIONS

Anne-Marie Jeannet (Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute and Bocconi University) and Lenka Dražanová (Migration Policy Centre)

Recent research has established that membership of an age-cohort is a social context that systematically explains differences in attitudes towards immigration between younger and older individuals. However, the reasons for this are not well understood and there are several competing explanations for why age might have such an effect. This study sets out to fill this gap by investigating why attitudes towards immigration systematically differ between older and younger generations of Europeans. Applying hierarchical age-period-cohort models using 8 rounds of European Social Survey data (2002-2016) in 25 European countries, we aim to adjudicate between three possible explanations. The value-based explanation portrays the effect of age-cohort as being due to a gradual shift in values such as a rise in post-materialism and multiculturalism. The behavioral explanation argues that whereby cohorts are differently exposed to immigration during their youth, which offers varying levels of contact with foreigners during their formative years. Finally, the compositional explanation maintains the effect is due to differences in the characteristics of the younger cohorts compared to the older cohorts such as a larger proportion of first and second-generation immigrants or the presence of individuals with a lower socio-economic background. Our results shed light on the extent of an inter-generational divide in attitudes towards immigration and untangles the individual and cohort-level forces that underlie it. This research also has implications for broader scholarly debates about socio-political attitudes, in particular, the study of inter-generational dynamics in socio-political orientation, which has garnered a renewed interest in scholars of public opinion.
The Great Recession ended a period of job growth in Europe and resulted in stagnating incomes, increasing social inequalities and acerbated existing insecurities about life prospects for many Europeans. The European welfare states are central in managing these social and economic risks. They have supported democratic stability and have protected most citizens from the social risks of income loss and poverty, in the event of sickness, old age or unemployment. The welfare state enjoys therefore board popularity among the European people, However, even before the Great Recession European welfare states have come under a two-fold reform pressure: one the one hand, new demands for social protection due to structural social and economic changes were voiced and, on the other hand, pressures for financial consolidation and even retrenchment of welfare state spending were mounting. What we observe therefore is a "twin process" of welfare state reforms. Fiscal consolidation of existing welfare state schemes at the one hand, and re-calibration of the welfare state on the other hand to cover "new social risks", expand coverage of existing schemes for previously weakly protected outsiders and the implementation of "social investment policies", i.e. policies that invest in human capital employability, and employment-creation rather than income replacement and job protection focus of the old welfare state. These reform processes create new distributive divides within societies and their success depends crucially on the willingness of voters to accept reforms. So, given the crucial importance of voters in the process of welfare state reforms, we need to improve our understanding of how they evaluate the welfare state, how supportive they are of welfare policies in particular and how this has changed over time. This is the aim of the proposed session.

In particular, we invite papers that study attitudes and preferences towards different branches of the welfare state, broadly understood as the set of institutions to regulate and manage old and new social risks (labor market policies, old age policies, education policies, family policies, health policies). We are particularly interested in papers with a focus on the political implications of these attitudes and preferences, that is their implications for electoral participation, party choice or other forms of political behavior, before and after the crisis. We invite papers that combine preferences for one policy field with preferences towards other policies fields as well as papers taking a single country perspective as well as papers with a broad cross-national perspective.

The expansion of the welfare state owes a great deal to the full support it benefited from the middle class. The latter not only helped ensure its economic and political prominence, but they also guaranteed its relative symbolic success over the market by promoting values connected to social justice.

Over the years, the loyalty of the middle class toward the welfare state has become a major concern. Numerous pundits emphasize that the middle class have lost their previous privileges, beginning with the ones that were operating as class markers, such as household property and job security. This middle-class squeeze also threatens democracy, notably in European countries where the middle class could withdraw from the public sphere as they face increasing economic insecurity.

This presentation challenges the notion that "middle-class loyalty" is currently on the wane. Building on the two Welfare Attitudes modules, it will focus on items tapping governments’ responsibility and the perceived consequences of social benefits. Three hypotheses will be examined at the individual level: Are the middle class less likely than the working class to support a wide scope of government responsibility? Are they more skeptical about government’s ability to reduce inequality? Are they more inclined to think that social benefits are detrimental to the economy and to social cohesion? At the country level, the presentation will address whether these possible negative opinions are mitigated by higher social spending and in countries where government is deemed efficient.

First findings show that the middle class tend to develop mixed views: They remain supportive of social welfare policies but they are at the same time critical vis-à-vis their societal effects, albeit less strongly in more comprehensive welfare states and where government spending is regarded as efficient. In closing, the political implications of this ambivalent loyalty will be discussed.
The main aim of the article is to determine the influence of the socio-structural position of the individual in society on a basic income scheme. Using the inclusion of a question about basic income in the ESS 8 survey questionnaire, we decided to examine the impact of the socio-structural position of the individual on the support (or lack thereof) of the basic income scheme. The very concept of social structural position was determined on the socio-structural module in ESS, which 'should include measures of economic activity, employment relation and occupation for at least the respondent and the spouse' (Erikson & Jonsson 2001). Based on the so-called EGP class scheme, 11 categories of 'social classes' were distinguished, which served as independent variables influencing the support/lack of support for basic income. It was assumed that the less privileged situation of the individual in the structure of social differentiation (e.g. unskilled and agricultural workers), the greater support for the proposal of basic income. On the other hand, in more egalitarian societies (e.g. Scandinavian countries with the exception of Denmark) the support for the proposal of a basic income is higher regardless of the position held in the social structure. Based on data from ESS 8 covering 23 countries, logistic regressions were used to evaluate the EGP class scheme’s impact on basic income support. For inter-country comparisons and differences within particular classes within a given country, an intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) was applied.

E3.3. THE POLITICS OF EMPLOYMENT CENTERED FAMILY POLICY: LINKING PREFERENCES AND ELECTORAL GAINS

Nathalie Giger, University of Geneva, and Hanna Schwander (Hertie School of Governance)

Across advanced democracies, we observe a "twin process" of welfare state reforms. Fiscal consolidation of existing welfare state schemes at the one hand, and re-calibration of the welfare state on the other hand to cover "new social risks", expand coverage of existing schemes for previously weakly protected outsiders and the implementation of "social investment policies", i.e. policies that invest in human capital employability, and employment-creation rather than income replacement and job protection focus of the old welfare state. The recent expansion and re-calibration of family policies are a prime example of this. Across Europe, family policy has been reformed to incentive mothers to remain in employment or to return to the labor market after a short leave. The motivation behind this trend is not only a desire by employers to keep its highly skilled female labor force active but also the desire of parties to win the female vote. At least these are the argument put forward by the literature. Yet, we have only limited insights in the politics of family policy reforms nor about the preferences of voters in general and women and partisan groups in particular about this issue.

This study explores the electoral consequences of reforms to employment-centered family policies in a cross-national and longitudinal perspective by focusing on preferences for family policies over time and across parties. In a second step we link the preference dimension to electoral decision making to delve deeper in the electoral consequences of family policy reforms. The findings indicate that left voters have remained rather stable in their preferences while centrist voters have most pronouncing changed their preferences regarding family policy. These developments have implications for the electoral fortune of social democratic and Christian democratic parties as well.
E3.4. THE SUPPORT OF A BASIC INCOME ACROSS EUROPE: DISENTANGLING MICRO- AND MACRO-LEVEL CORRELATES
Sonja Zmerli (Grenoble Institute of Political Studies)

Conferring social rights to all citizens in order to ensure their full social and political participation irrespective of the availability or shortage of means is the leitmotif of an ideologically inspired demand for a basic income for all. Economic observers concerned with upcoming major changes in the labor market revolving around industrial automation and industry 4.0, by contrast, are less concerned with warranting social rights but claim that the basic income will effectively counteract the specter of rising unemployment in the face of substantive job losses. Not least, the economic and financial crisis has also contributed to reflections about alternative and more effective forms of welfare support. As a matter of fact, public discourse throughout Europe has been rife with supporting and opposing arguments and some countries, regions or communities have already been testing different variants of basic income. And yet, very little is known about the endorsement of such a fundamental welfare policy reform without which a successful implementation would be difficult if not impossible to achieve. This paper aims to elucidate the "state of affairs" across European societies based on the most recent ESS data. In fact, its aim is twofold: from a sociological perspective it investigates whether indicators of social class reliably predict the endorsement of the basic income across Europe. By means of multilevel analysis, the second focus will be on the effect of macro-level indicators, such as GDP per capita, unemployment rate, economic inequality, rate of inflation, and quality of government. In order to account for effects related to the economic and financial crisis, their relative development since the advent of the crisis (2007) will also be taken into account.

E3.5. THE DETERMINANTS OF WELFARE CHAUVINISM - MATERIAL SELF-INTEREST OR VALUE-BASED?
Peter Grand, Marcel Fink and Guido Tiemann (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna)

The welfare state is under permanent austerity for more than three decades now. Consequently, individuals are concerned how politicians allocate their hard-earned tax money across different welfare programs as well as who gets what, when and how. The importance of this question increased all over Europe especially since the beginning of the financial crises in 2008 and more recently the refugee crises since 2015, whereas especially the latter fueled concerns of welfare migration. Attentive commentators witnessed a decreasing level of welfare solidarity in the age of migration. The phenomenon of 'welfare chauvinism', i.e. being in favor of redistribution but excluding immigrants as an eligible claimant group fuels the public discussion as well as scholarly writing. 'Welfare chauvinism' intensified in recent years, whereas some authors differentiate between a 'soft' and 'hard' version, whereas the latter group wants to exclude immigrants entirely from welfare benefits and the former group will grant immigrants access to social security programs after meeting certain requirements, e.g. after working and paying taxes for a minimum of one year (reciprocity). Proponents of 'group threat' theory argue that the distribution of welfare resources is a zero-sum competition and consequently the in-group wants to exclude the out-group from welfare benefits. Scholars more concerned with the value base of welfare attitudes rather argue that changes in the individual value structure are better suited to explain variation in 'welfare chauvinism'. The aim of this paper is to show the explanatory leverage of this two competing theoretical approaches with regard to 'welfare chauvinism' in general. We will use ESS data about welfare attitudes from 2008 and 2016, i.e. from the beginning of the financial crises to the height of the refugee crises, thereby constituting a quasi-experimental research design.
Political efficacy has been extensively used in political and other social sciences since the 1950s and it is a fundamental concept in democratic theory. Besides its theoretical importance, political efficacy has been very often used as a determining indicator to either predict or evaluate when individuals are politically active. Originally perceived to be a unidimensional concept, it is today generally accepted that political efficacy has two related but distinct components: internal and external. The first refers to individual subjective feelings of competence to take part in political activities, while the latter concerns how much individuals consider the political system is open to their demands. Despite its extensive use, the concept of political efficacy itself has not come under rigorous scrutiny in the last years.

The big theoretical and methodological debates regarding internal and external efficacy took place probably more than thirty years ago and even though extensive country specific research has been conducted, there is an evident lack of comparative research regarding this concept.

Recent rounds of the ESS provide the perfect opportunity to revisit the concept of political efficacy as well as to further explore its drivers and consequences in comparative perspective. Following criticisms of the original efficacy measures included in Round 1, new measures of both internal and external efficacy were added to the ESS core questionnaire in Round 7 and repeated in Round 8. Furthermore, ESS Round 7 tested alternative measures and includes experimental data regarding different characteristics of the measurement instruments of both internal and external efficacy.

The main goal of this session is therefore to reexamine the concept of political efficacy using the ESS data. A particular aspect which has been under debate since the early literature is the measurement of political efficacy. Methodological papers focusing on the robustness or alternative formulations of both/either internal and external efficacy measurement models addressing the differences and similarities between internal and external political efficacy are especially welcomed. We also welcome papers which include substantive analysis of the available political efficacy measures, exploring relevant differences in the distribution or correlates of political efficacy across and within ESS countries.

G3.1. THE INTERACTION OF (PERCEIVED) CORRUPTION AND SOCIAL DEPRIVATION ON EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY

Maike Rump (Leipzig University) and Nadine Zwiener-Collins (University College London)

In May 2018 the entrepreneur Francisco Correa and treasurer of the Spanish Partido Popular Luis Bárcenas were found guilty in a dramatic corruption scandal. Additionally, the Partido Popular was convicted of providing the institutional structures that enabled the unlawful acts of politicians and entrepreneurs. The conviction of a catch-all party is unique in the Spanish history and shows that corruption remains a problem in Europe even today.

Apparent cases of corruption like this have pervasive consequences for people’s trust in the functioning of the political system. Previous research has found corruption to play a critical role in shaping citizens’ evaluations of political institutions. For instance, it negatively affects the perception of responsiveness of the political system (external political efficacy). Since high and equally distributed levels of external political efficacy are a key predictor of citizens’ involvement in the political process, this further undermines the functioning of democracy.

However, little is known whether the adverse effect of corruption operates uniformly across different social groups. It is well established, that socioeconomic status affects feelings of efficacy: Socially deprived citizen perceives the political process as less responsive to their input. We argue that (perceived) corruption can aggravate the negative effects of social deprivation. Corruption indicates that political influence directly depends on economic input. Therefore, economically marginalised citizens might experience the system as particularly non-responsive, alienating them even more from the political decision-making.

Indeed, in a multilevel analysis using data from the seventh round of the European Social Survey (2014), we find a weak direct effect of corruption levels on external political efficacy. As expected, the effect of corruption is stronger for those who are socially deprived. As such, our study provides support for a contextual approach to predictors of political efficacy, while emphasising the consequences of (perceived) corruption on existing inequalities.
G3.2. HOW COMPARABLE IS POLITICAL EFFICACY IN EUROPE? A MEASUREMENT INVARIANCE APPROACH
André Pirralha (Pompeu Fabra University), and Sarah Butt (City, University of London)

The concept of political efficacy has played an important role in studies of political behaviour. Since the seminal studies of Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954) and Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960), the political efficacy construct has been regarded as an important predictor of political participation (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982) and as an outcome of participation (Finkel, 1985).

However, it was also soon revealed that political efficacy is based in a two-dimensional structure: internal efficacy or subjective competence, which can be defined as the confidence of the individual in his or her own abilities to understand politics and to act politically, and external efficacy or system responsiveness, the individual's belief in the responsiveness of the political system (Lane 1959; Converse 1972; Balch 1974). More recently, it has been shown that these two dimensions are very different and carry different relationships with other variables. This theoretical debate has implicit the assumption that measurement of political efficacy – and the two-dimensional nature of the construct - is equivalent across different cultural contexts. But is that really the case?

This presentation aims to assess the measurement equivalence of the political efficacy construct using data from the last two rounds of ESS. This ESS data also gives us the opportunity to test alternative models of both internal and external efficacy. In Round 7, internal and external efficacy are measured with three indicators while in the following ESS Round 8, there are only two indicators for each latent concept. The results will help to clarify to what extent political efficacy can be compared across European countries and whether there are relevant differences regarding these alternative models.

G3.3. CHANGING FACTORS OF POLITICAL INTEREST IN TURBULENT TIMES – THE ROLE OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY IN DIFFERENT REGIONS OF EUROPE
Dániel Oross and Andrea Szabó (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Interest in politics is a key factor for political behaviors and beliefs and the main component of political motivation, which is essential for participation in the democratic process. Adherents of elitist theories hold that the combination of low levels of internal efficacy with high levels of external efficacy is most beneficial for the stability of democracy (see Almond and Verba's argument about the development of the "civic culture").

ESS data allows for testing how closeness or openness of a country’s political system influences political interest and what impact it has on citizens' sense of individual competences to influence politics. A specific aim of the paper is to test whether there is evidence to the claim that democratic backsliding of Central and Eastern Europe had a negative effect on citizens' feeling that one’s own political actions can have an impact upon the political process.

In addition to the standard question of political interest, dataset of the 7th and 8th Round of the European Social Survey includes questions about individual political competences and about the perception of the political system. In order to add a Hungarian case study to the analysis, the paper brings results from the project ‘Participation, Representation, Partisanship Hungarian Election Study, 2018’. We use regression models to find out how external factors of political efficacy are related to democratic regression in the region.
The session focuses on political engagement and, more precisely, political participation in elections. In the latter years, many citizens throughout the developed world have become increasingly critical towards politicians, political institutions and even liberal democracy itself. While these developments have had important consequences upon citizens’ voting patterns (most notably, the rise of radical and populist parties at both the right- and the left- side of the political spectrum), as well as upon electoral volatility and the configuration of party systems in many countries, they also pose an important challenge for political participation itself.

Thus, one of the first obvious avenues of research is the following: how do the different (and varying) levels of political efficacy; confidence in institutions; satisfaction with democracy and with the way it works; affect participation in elections? Recent studies have also pointed to a renewal of the importance of socio-demographic factors for electoral behaviour and, most importantly, for the propensity to vote for the so-called new parties, many of which are also radical and populist as well. To what extent can their conclusions be extended to electoral participation?

More generally, this session aims at studying the effects of a wide array of attitudes and beliefs on voting, understood in the participatory sense: to vote, or not to do so. Therefore, proposals will also be welcomed that investigate the relationship between both short-term and long-term factors that are traditionally related to electoral behaviour. On top of the classical ones, such as left-right ideology, studies that deal with attitudes on a wide array of dimensions that can contribute to shape electoral competition also fit in this session. These may include, for instance, studies that analyse the eventual effects of attitudes towards migration (or towards the EU), given the increasing salience that these are reported to have in many countries for the whom-to-vote-for decision.

Finally, work that takes advantage of the wealth of information of ESS surveys to explore more innovative avenues of research (for instance, is there a relationship between attitudes or behaviour driven by environmental concerns and the propensity to vote?) is also fully consistent with the goals of this session.

A1.1. DISSECTING ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR THE FAR RIGHT. A COMPARISON BETWEEN MATURE AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES

Tobias Brils, Jasper Muis and Teodora Gaidytė (VU University Amsterdam)

This paper investigates individual-level explanations for electoral support for the far right in Europe. Its innovative contribution is that we contrast far right voters with voters of centre-right parties, traditional left-wing parties and abstainers. Equally novel is the comparison between mature and post-communist democracies. Using European Social Survey data (2014–2016) and multilevel multinomial regressions, we conclude that the three explanations for far right support – ‘socio-economic grievances’, ‘cultural backlash’ and ‘protest voting’ – are generally similar in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Far right voters most importantly differ from all other groups in their higher perceived ethnic threat. Yet, these differences are smaller in post-communist democracies. Furthermore, far right voters are not the so-called socio-economic ‘losers of globalization’: they are higher educated than abstainers and not more often unemployed. Concerning protest voting, particularly distrust in supranational governance increases the likelihood of far right voting. This effect is strongest in Eastern Europe.
A1.2. ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Jaroslava Pospíšilová (Czech Academy of Sciences)

Democracy is a multidimensional concept and every citizen may, in its approach to accentuate another aspect of the democratic order. According to the results of the ESS R6 we know that the weakness of Czech democracy is the area of accountability according to citizens’ assessment. Accountability is one of the fundamental relationships that constitute a democratic linkage between voters and elites. Accountability is, by itself, a democratic value and is an important element contributing to the consolidation of democracy, or on the other hand to a crisis of citizens’ confidence. The proposed paper therefore addresses the question of whether the gap in the subjective perception of the importance and the evaluation of the real functioning of the dimension of accountability in democracy can influence the electoral behavior?

In a minimalist definition, elections are the main instrument that distinguishes democracy from other regimes. The issue of electoral accountability is, in its basic concept, the ability of voters to punish politicians for poorly executed work. It turns out that the evaluation of the functionality of the accountability instruments has an influence on the electoral behavior in the Czech Republic. While voters of large and of traditional parties do not put such accent on the issue of accountability, voters of smaller parties and non-parliamentary subjects have a greater emphasis on accountability. Also, people who do not participate in the election do not consider the dimension of accountability to be so important, in their attitude is dominant the phenomenon of skepticism.

A1.3. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS COMPETITORS: PATTERNS OF CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATION IN EUROPE
Chris Gaasendam (KU Leuven)

It has become commonplace to argue that socio-cultural professionals have replaced production workers in their role of electoral stronghold of social democratic parties (Gingrich & Hausermann, 2015; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). While it has been suggested that this pattern holds for Western Europe and holds much less for Southern Europe, an in-depth investigation of cross-country variation in Europe has been lacking thus far. We build on the argument that post-industrial societies have a larger new middle class and a smaller industrial working class (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986). This means cross-country variation may be rooted in different class structures and preference structures, with the working class preferring social protection and socio-cultural professionals preferring social investment (Gingrich & Hausermann, 2015). Such preferences may also reflect a deeper intra-EU conflict line regarding austerity. Thus, our primary research question asks in what way cross-country variation of voting social democratic is structured in terms of social class and welfare preferences.

However, fundamental differences may also arise due to a variation in the development of party systems. The most important competitor for the social democratic party preserve of socio-cultural professionals are green parties, which tend to have a heavy focus on universalism and social investment, while the most important competitor for the industrial working class are populist parties – populist radical left parties predominantly with an anti-capitalist program, populist radical right parties increasingly with a welfare chauvinist program. Thus, our second research question asks in which way the presence and strength of electoral competitors affects cross-country variation in social democratic voting for socio-cultural professionals and the industrial working class. In order to investigate these research questions, multilevel logistic regression analyses are performed on the most recent ESS survey data (round 8).
A1.4. DOES CULTURAL LIBERALISM IN POLITICS SHAPE THE EDUCATION GAP IN POLITICAL TRUST?
Kjell Noordzij, Jeroen van der Waal and Willem de Koster (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

It is well-documented that politicians and political parties are generally more culturally liberal than members of the public, with research indicating that this ‘ideological incongruence’ motivates political distrust among the latter. In our international comparative study, we theorize that this is crucial for the well-established education gap in political trust; because the less (more) educated tend to oppose (support) cultural liberalism, we hypothesize that the extent to which cultural liberalism is salient in the political domain affects the education gradient in political trust.

Multilevel regression analyses of three waves (2006; 2010; 2014) of the European Social Survey (62,206 respondents in 55 country-year combinations) support our central argument. The salience of cultural liberalism in the political domain (as measured for: party politics; the governing cabinet; and the prime minister’s party, using two indicators derived from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey) positively impacts the extent to which the more educated show more political trust than the less educated.

As expected, this is because the less educated are less culturally liberal. We conclude our study with a discussion of our findings and potential topics for future research.

A1.5. A REVOLT AGAINST THE CITIES? URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE, SUPPORT FOR RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES, AND TURNOUT IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Andrés Santana and Piotr Zagórski (Autonomous University of Madrid)

Many scholars assume that one of the driving forces behind the recent success of populist parties is a deepening urban-rural divide. In contrast to the liberal and cosmopolitan urban dwellers, citizens living in the countryside tend to have more traditional and nationalist views, and thus they are more supportive of Right-wing Populist Parties (RPP). However, in many cases RPP perform well both in rural and urban constituencies. On top of that, people living in rural areas tend to abstain more. Thus, in order to assess whether the countryside is in fact more populist when compared to the city, it deems necessary to include electoral turnout in the analysis.

This paper aims at assessing the drivers of urban-rural divide, both in RPP voting and abstention, across different types of elections (national and EP), and across distinct political realities of Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Individual-level data from the most recent waves of ESS and EES are used to compare three explanatory approaches: economic deprivation, cultural backlash, and protest vote. The results point to divergent effects of the urban-rural divide on voting for RPP and abstaining in national and EP elections, and also to substantive differences between Western and Central and Eastern Europe with regard to the voting behavior of rural and urban dwellers.
Recent years have experienced important positive as well as negative changes in public climate change attitudes, behaviors and policies. In the aftermath of "Fukushima", the German government decided to move away from nuclear power; in Paris, the countries of the world successfully negotiated the Paris accords; the US voted for a climate change sceptic President who announced to withdraw from the treaty; the "We are still in" movement formed, sending an own delegation to the COP22 negotiations; Chinese and Indian megacities are hidden in smog; the small Pacific island states beg for help in light of rising sea levels; industrial countries ban gas and diesel cars within the next 15 years; disruptive shifts to green energy production; floods, hurricanes and wild fires devastating densely populated areas all around the world. But how have these events influenced climate change attitudes and behaviors? Has the salience of climate change as an issue changed over recent years? Can we observe changes in pro-environmental attitudes or climate skepticism? Are people (finally) ready to change their consumption or driving patterns to save the planet? Are voters supportive of policy changes towards "green energy"? Or are they even demanding changes towards more eco-friendly policies their politicians are not ready for yet?

The most recent Wave 8 (2016) of the ESS contains a special module on "public attitudes to climate change", inviting a broad range of new and unique analyses in the European context.

**C1.1. IMPACT OF BASIC HUMAN VALUES ON THE OPINION ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY ROUND 8**

Piotr Matczak (University of Poznan)

Climate change (CC) entails difficult political, social and individual choices. Disregarding public values and views when taking decisions on climate risk management would undermine CC policies. Public opinion on CC is an important research topic, since engaging varied publics with the issue of climate change remains a pressing policy goal. Recent surveys on this topic show that European societies vary significantly in terms of opinion, beliefs and attitudes towards CC (e.g. Eurobarometer 372). In the Europe major cross-country differences are observed between North and Southern Europe, as well as between the New European Union Member States and the "Old Europe". However, a pattern of differences appears still ambiguous. There are several factors assumed to have a significant influence on CC opinion, e.g.: (a) level of economic development (the hypothesis of post-materialistic values impact on CC opinion), b) cultural traditions, c) experience of climate impacts (disasters, environmental quality, perception of temperature, etc), d) education, e) communication, and e) impact of political leaders. Our analyses are based on the data from the 8th round of the European Social Survey from 2016 (covering 23 European countries with a total sample size over 37 thousand respondents) in which the rotating module on climate change was located. Using standard and additional sets of questions we will present typology of Europeans opinion about CC and its prevention, and we will analyse the impact of different dimensions of normative orientations towards basic human values (Schwartz 2003, 2007) on CC beliefs, CC concern, pro-environmental norms and CC salience.
C1.2. THE POLITICISATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE ATTITUDES IN EUROPE
Stephen D. Fisher (University of Oxford), Gisela Böhm and Charles A. Ogunbode (University of Bergen), Wouter Poortinga (Cardiff University), Linda Steg (University of Groningen) and Lorraine Whitmarsh (Cardiff University)

There is overwhelming evidence that beliefs and concerns about climate change are now heavily influenced by prior partisanship in the United States. Republicans are more likely to be sceptical and unconcerned about climate change while Democrats report high levels of concern.

What about Europe? Thus far evidence is much more limited, and it is far from clear that climate change attitudes and politics are linked in the same way across different European countries. This paper uses the new module on climate change and energy attitudes from round 8 of the European Social Survey to systematically assess the ways in which climate change attitudes are linked to party support.

Furthermore, the paper will investigate the extent to which cross-national differences in the politicisation of climate change attitudes can be accounted for by measurable country-level characteristics.

C1.3. WHEN WORRY ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE LEADS TO CLIMATE ACTION AND POLICY SUPPORT
Thijs Bouman, Mark Verschoor and Linda Steg (University of Groningen), Gisela Böhm (University of Bergen), Stephen D. Fisher (University of Oxford), Wouter Poortinga and Lorraine Whitmarsh (Cardiff University) and Casper J. Albers (University of Groningen)

Given the urgency of global climate change, it is crucial to understand what motivates individuals’ climate actions and climate policy support across countries. Although communication efforts often aim to strengthen feelings of worry about climate change among individuals, it is yet unknown whether such worries will spark the required climate action and policy support.

Data from the European Social Survey in which 44,387 respondents from 23 countries participated, revealed that worries about climate change can motivate concrete climate action (i.e., energy-saving behaviours) and climate policy support, by strengthening feelings of personal responsibility to reduce climate change.

Worry about climate change was rooted in personal biospheric values. Interestingly, worry and biospheric values were also directly positively related to some of the climate actions and policy support. The consistency of our findings across countries provides critical insights for international climate policy.
C1.4. NATIONALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE DENIAL IN EUROPE: HOW NATIONALIST AND RIGHTWING POPULIST PARTIES SHAPE BELIEFS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE
Joakim Kulin and Ingemar Johansson Sevä (Umeå University)

Inference based on casual observation suggests that the recent rise of nationalism in Europe and the US constitute a fundamental threat to the efforts of mitigating climate change, as nationalist politicians and the parties they represent often express doubt or skepticism about the reality of climate change while opposing climate policies. However, public support for nationalist parties relies on the congruity between public beliefs and party stances on critical issues. Hence, the fundamental threat of nationalism to climate change mitigation lies in the extent to which these parties shape public beliefs about these issues.

While previous research has shown that conservative voters are more skeptical about climate change, few studies distinguish nationalist parties and party supporters in this regard. In this study, we use recent data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to investigate how individual nationalist attitudes and party sympathies influence beliefs about climate change across national contexts. Using election and party manifesto data, we also examine how the size and rhetoric of nationalist parties influence climate change beliefs as well as the relationship between individual nationalist orientations and these beliefs. The results reveal a relatively consistent relationship between nationalist orientations and climate change beliefs, as nationalists are more likely to display skepticism about climate change. Furthermore, we find substantial differences in the strength of this relationship across countries. Citizens with nationalist orientations are more likely to display climate skepticism in countries such as Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the UK, which are countries that have experienced a marked rise of nationalist and rightwing populist parties over the last decade.
D3: THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN EUROPE
Session organisers: Liza G. Steele (City University of New York) and Nate Breznau (University of Mannheim)

As Europe becomes increasingly multicultural, the presence of foreigners has become a frequently-debated topic. Why does public opinion about foreign-born residents in European countries vary between countries and across time within countries? While the literature on attitudes towards immigrants continues to grow, there is not yet a scholarly consensus about their key determinants or policy correlates. Are determinants of attitudes towards newcomers consistent within and between countries? Which policies affect attitudes and vice versa? For this panel, we welcome papers analyzing attitudes of native-born residents or other foreign-born residents about all foreign-born European residents or specific ethnic or socioeconomic migrant groups. Cross-national, country-specific, and regional studies are welcome, as are papers using a range of methodological approaches to understand attitudes about foreigners as a dependent or independent variable.

D3.1. TEMPORAL CHANGE IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS ASYLUM SEEKERS: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Anastasia Gorodzeisky (Tel Aviv University)

The article studies over-time changes in attitudes towards asylum seekers within a cross-national comparative perspective. Applying the "hierarchical age-period-cohort" model in a study of seventeen European societies, the article considers the role played by an individual's attributes, contextual characteristics, and cohort replacement in shaping attitudes toward asylum seekers, and in producing changes to such attitudes. The main results reveal that the rise in the level of exclusionary attitudes is associated with the increased inflow of asylum seekers to European countries and vice versa. Moreover, not only exposure to actual high inflow of asylum seekers (i.e. living in a country with an especially high inflow of asylum seekers), but also exposure to a potential inflow (i.e. living in a country bordering countries with an especially high inflow of asylum seekers) tends to prompt exclusionary attitudes toward asylum seekers. Cross-cohort variations barely play a role in the over-time changes in attitudes towards asylum seekers. At the individual level, cultural marginality and prioritizing universalism in one's value system are associated with more inclusionary views. The findings are discussed in light of theoretical considerations and the context of contemporary Europe.
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D3.2. UNIVERSALISM AND SECURITY – NORMATIVE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION

Piotr Cichocki and Piotr Jabkowski (Adam Mickiewicz University)

In the summer of 2015, migration questions turned into sources of major political anxieties as European public attention focused on asylum seekers from the failing or failed states of Northern Africa and the Greater Middle East, who were becoming unsustainably stranded along the Balkan Route. Many European public spheres switched into panic mode, which was followed by major shifts of public opinion and political positioning with respect to migration questions. Thanks to fortunate fieldwork timing of waves 7 (2014) and 8 (2016), the European Social Survey constitutes an important platform for studying this transformation from a cross-country comparative perspective. Our paper aims to investigate the link between crisis-driven changes in European migration attitudes and the underlying normative orientations towards ‘Universalism’ and ‘Security’. On the basis of data from all countries participating in both ESS7 and ESS8, we are going to evaluate the impact of this juxtaposition understood in terms of the ESS scale of basic human values on the scale of anti-immigration attitudes based on three core-module questions (imsmetn, imdfetn, impcntr).

Given that the normative distinction between Universalism and Security directly relates to the well-documented public-sphere struggle between the two competing narratives of responsibility: ‘ethical responsibility towards refugees’ versus ‘responsibility to protect own people’, we hypothesise that a normative orientation towards universal human values should correlate with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments, while normative orientations towards security should be significantly and strongly associated with anti-immigrant attitudes especially after the 2015 crisis.

D3.3. ATTITUDES TOWARDS REFUGEE POLICY IN A DIVIDED EUROPE: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS

Arno Van Hootegem and Bart Meuleman (KU Leuven) and Koen Abts (Tilburg University)

The large inflow of asylum-seekers in recent years has intensified divides between states that have introduced restrictive asylum procedures and nations that have adopted more welcoming policies. Although a growing body of research has addressed these opposing approaches and their implications for the European integration project, insight into the social basis of these restrictive or generous refugee policies remains underdeveloped. Hence, the current study sets out to provide detailed insight into how refugee policy preferences take shape within and between European states. First, we expect that economic and cultural threat perceptions can help understand why some societal groups support more restrictive policies, as they have previously been mobilized to explain attitudes towards foreigners. Second, to take the plausible effect of value structures into account, the roles of two human values, universalism and conformity-tradition, are studied. Third, we aim to explain country-differences in refugee policy preferences by focusing on the influence of unemployment rates, the number of asylum-seekers, the proportion of asylum-seekers from conflict regions and the approval rate of applications.

To explore this, data on 20 countries from the European Social Survey Round 8 (2016) are analysed through a multilevel structural equation modelling approach. Results indicate that, as expected, the value universalism, which emphasises the acceptance of all individuals, fosters support for welcoming policies, while the value conformity-tradition, which includes an attachment to the maintenance of traditions and norms, instigates support for the limited admission of refugees. Simultaneously, economic and cultural threat perceptions strongly impact attitudes towards refugee policy, which illustrates that individuals who perceive migration as detrimental to the economic situation and the cultural institutions are more inclined to reject generous policies. On the contextual-level, only unemployment rates have a significant effect and, rather surprisingly, lower unemployment provokes a more negative opinion climate.
D3.4. "US AND THEM": TRENDS IN SLOVENIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY (2002-2016)
Simona Zavratnik, Živa Broder and Rebeka Falle Zorman (Centre for Public Opinion Research)

The predominant response of European Union countries to current migration movements has been a policy of classification of migrants into more wanted/legitimate and less wanted/illegal, "real" refugees or "just" economic migrants. We will analyze some of the fundamental trends in the public perception of migration issues, migrants and refugees in the period from 2002 to 2016 based on empirical measurements of Slovenian public attitudes, captured in European Social Survey.

In our analysis we will focus on three dimensions on the axis "migration – borders – public opinion": 1. the question of social boundaries, categorization of "us and them" and the exclusion of migrants from "us-communities", 2. ambivalence of differences in attitudes towards economic and cultural dimensions of integration of migrants and 3. question of global vs. locally specific migration, paying attention to the context of global social inequalities.

In a national case study we will observe several examples of social crises in the Slovenian context, for which we assume that the public opinion is unified in a fairly monolithic position towards migrants as "the others". The analysis of data from the ESS - Slovenia has shown that public opinion certainly responds to various social crises; with important difference noted in attitudes towards migrants/refugees in case of so called "migration crisis" in 2000/2001 and the "refugee crisis" in 2015 compared to the economic crisis in 2008. Public opinion is quite synchronized with political perception of migration as a "crisis", especially when migrants are present "on our land" or "on our borders". The data further shows that public perceptions follow public policies that classify migration through conventional categories of more or less wanted or legitimate.

At the end we will try to determine how different demographical and regional characteristics affect attitudes towards migrations and compare Slovenia to some neighbor countries.

D3.5. THE IMPACT OF THE 2013 LAMPEDUSA SHIPWRECK ON ATTITUDES AND POLICY PREFERENCES TOWARDS MIGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL-EXPERIMENT IN ITALY
Nicolo Cavalli and Effrosyni Charitopoulou (University of Oxford)

How do external events shape attitudes towards migration? Does exposure to the death of migrants at Europe's borderlands alter policy preferences and attitudes of European citizens? Individual as well as contextual-level determinants of attitudes towards migration have been extensively studied. However, the ways in which external events impact these preferences have yet to be fully uncovered. In this paper, we build on an emerging literature addressing the role of unexpected shocks, such as terrorist attacks, in determining prejudice and policy preferences towards migration. We identify a set of exogenous events, which we hypothesise may alter the salience of in-group and out-group relations. In particular, we examine the role of the 03.10.2013 Lampedusa shipwreck, when a boat carrying approximately 500 migrants from Libya to Italy sank, leading to the death of 368 people. We use individual-level data procured from the European Social Survey (Wave 6) and exploit administrative information on the timing of each interview to build a pseudo-panel of respondents from the Italian populace. We use the shipwreck as an exogenous source of variation in a set of theoretically-relevant dependent variables and employ a regression discontinuity design. We observe a decrease in negative attitudes as well as increase support for policies to allow more migrants into the country. Importantly, prejudice reveals less volatility compared to policy preferences. Nevertheless, the impact on both dimensions studied fades out over a short period of time. We further claim that it is possible to broaden this identification strategy to other salient events, thus achieving a better characterising of the ways in which the European public has responded to shocks connected to out-group exposure.
Europe is facing times of instability, insecurity, and increasing social inequality. The working conditions of the Europeans are still scarred by the last recession, visible in high unemployment rates especially in the Southern European countries. The refugee crisis divides Northern and Southern Europe; terrorism threats became part of social life. Events as the Brexit referendum, the rise of extreme-right wing parties in many national elections, the polarization of politics, the uncertain government formation in countries like Germany and Italy, cause political uncertainty in many European countries, often fed by populism and skepticism towards political institutions as well towards information sources. In these times of permanent global social change and dramatic transformations in Europe, the question about value changes is imminent. Cross-sectional surveys in Europe such as the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Val-ues Study (EVS), support scholars aiming at studying human values in comparative perspective, both across countries and over time, by providing high quality data concerning several life domains. The ESS collects data through rotating modules every 2 years since 2002 in a varying number of countries (the maximum was 31 participating countries in 2008), while the EVS investigates the Europeans’ values since 1981 in more than 40 countries every 9 years (the maximum was 47 participating countries in 2008).

While keeping their different goals and identities, these two programmes provide measures to investigate common dimensions in the domains of social and institutional trust; political participation; life satisfaction and happiness; national identity; religiosity; attitudes towards immigration, gender roles, climate change, welfare, and others. Scholars often exploit this commonality to enlarge the coverage of their studies, for example combining the datasets to obtain a longer time-series or a larger number of countries.

This session welcomes papers that adopt the combined use of ESS and EVS in the comparative study of values including the domains of family, work, and well-being, religiosity and national identity, politics, environment and climate change, welfare, social inequalities. Particularly appreciated are papers investigating the potential bridging of EVS measures and ESS items from methodological perspective, focusing on issues such as (but not limited to): comparative demographics; data harmonization; measurement equivalence; strategies to combine data from different (individual level) data sets.

F1.1. INFORMING CROSS-SURVEY COOPERATION: EXPLORING PATTERNS OF ACADEMIC USAGE IN FOUR GENERAL PURPOSE SURVEYS
Brina Malnar (University of Ljubljana)

As demonstrated by usage trends, general purpose surveys have become an indispensable source of comparative findings for social scientists, they provide an often superior research framework for developing theories, charting social trends and informing polices. Based on 849 journal articles identified via Google Scholar key-phrase search (193 WVS, 143 EVS, 262 ISSP and 199 ESS), the paper will first compare academic usage of four well established comparative surveys which differ substantially in format, geographic coverage, time span and data volume. It will explore how these differences are reflected in usage patterns, e.g. its general scope, authorship structure, thematic structure, analytical strategies etc.

Considering that the four surveys have a similar goal to support academically driven comparative analysis in a variety of thematic fields, the paper will next examine to what extent and in what ways academic authors combine their data sets to expand epistemological power of their studies (e.g. combine indicators, time points, add missing countries and similar). It will examine particularly closely how ESS and EVS data are combined and how such knowledge could inform top-down initiatives to field joint content.

The concluding discussion will specifically address the possibility for closer cooperation between EVS and ESS, the two main European general purpose surveys. It will provide a rough feasibility assessment for such cooperation in the light of considerable differences in format and operational arrangements between the two programmes. By drawing implications from the comparison of usage patterns, the discussion will outline specific epistemological gains and losses that academic users would likely experience if EVS (the more adaptable partner in the pair) would switch to another format.
Both the European Values Study and the European Social Survey provide measures to investigate common dimensions in several substantive domains. However, the formulation of the questions and of the categories of response may differ. First of all, this contribution aims to provide an overview of the potential overlapping measures between EVS and ESS. A first comparison between the EVS questionnaire and the ESS core module suggests that more than 80 questions cover the same domains. Alongside some cases of different question wordings, recurrent discrepancies concerns the provided formulation of the responses, such as a different metric adopted in the Likert scales, or the number of categories available, or slightly different wording.

To what extent are these measurements compatible? Often scholars pool data from different data sources in order to extend the geographical and temporal coverage of their study. Can this be done with measures from EVS and ESS or do the differences in the formulation affect the data collected too much?

In addition to a general overview of the compatibility between EVS and ESS measures, the current contribution focusses on the most frequent typologies of discrepancy, as the different metric in the Likert scale (i.e. 1 to 10 in EVS, 0 to 10 in ESS), and the different number of categories in the questions where respondents are asked to express their agreement with a statement. By considering these specific cases for those countries included in both the data collections of the same year, we will compare the distributions across response categories, including nonresponse, and the means. We will also assess the external validity through correlations with benchmark items and with explanatory variables.

The variable on the highest educational qualification of the respondents is a key socio-demographic variable which is asked by nearly every survey. Due to the fact that educational qualifications cannot be translated the questionnaire items contain the country-specific names of the qualifications. To allow cross-nationally comparable analyses, the resulting country-specific variables are after data collection recoded into harmonized international education variables, as e.g., the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).

For round 5 in 2010, the ESS revised its harmonized education variable and the EVS did the same regarding the current wave in 2017. In both surveys, a consultation to develop country-specific education variables and their mapping to the harmonized variable was realized with the aim to develop national and international education variables of high-quality. For most countries in the EVS we could re-use the national variables from the ESS, but nevertheless, some changes were needed. Therefore, the country-specific education instruments between the ESS and the EVS differ.

This presentation aims to compare the education variables of the ESS and the EVS. We will first give an overview of the education variables in both surveys. Second, for countries which took part in both surveys, we compare the distributions of the harmonized education variable. Due to the comparable approach and the large overlap of the country-specific instruments as well as the coding process we do not expect to find large differences in the distributions. In case we find inconsistencies we will have a closer look at the country-specific instrument and at the coding of the national qualifications into the harmonized education variable.
F1.4. USING CUMULATIVE DATASETS TO STUDY RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN EUROPE: A FOCUS ON THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY AND THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY
Biolcati Ferruccio and Molteni Francesco (University of Milan)

Despite the long-lasting interest on religious change, debates on the topic have been heated and are far from being settled. For what concern Europe, all the main theories about religious change hypothesize a decrease of religious practice across the countries. One of the main tasks for scholar dealing with this topic is to identify if there is a common pattern of religious decline across European countries. This task is mainly tackled by identifying clusters of countries sharing the same trend and by comparing them. From the methodological point of view, the study of these log-term secularization processes currently under way in Europe as well as their clustering requires reliable data covering the wider possible observation window. To do so, it is possible to count on a cumulating strategy of high-quality comparative studies. CARPE (Church Attendance and Religious change Pooled European dataset) is a cumulative dataset of the main international surveys containing items concerning religiosity (Eurobarometer, ESS, EVS, ISSP, WVS). The dataset covers 46 European countries and the period 1970-2016. Aim of this presentation is to present a way of clustering European countries according to church attendance by mean of a group-based trajectory model. This modelling will be performed on the complete CARPE dataset. While doing so, we will also present the harmonization procedure we have adopted, the strategy we used to combine the datasets and the reliability tests we have performed. In addition, a specific focus on the estimations based on ESS and EVS will be presented paying attention to their reliability and to their mutual consistency.

F1.5. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE IMPORTANCE OF WORK AND FAMILY ROLES IN SLOVAKIA: CONCEPTS ABOUT “IDEAL” FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY AND THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY COMPARISON
Alexandra Matejková (Slovak Academy of Sciences)

The paper deals with gender differences in the perception of gender-based roles of men and women. Changing gender roles and the rise of paid jobs for women in the second half of the twentieth century affect not only the labour market but family life as well. With the decline of the traditional gender roles, reproductive duties are more often shared between the partners. The main aim is to examine the diversity in opinions between men and women related to work and family roles of both sexes between 1991 and 2017. One of the goals is to test the theory of "work in gender-atypical occupations", which expects men performing "women's work" and women performing "man's work" in the labor market to compensate for their "gender deviation" by focusing on their respective traditional gender roles within their households. That means, if men are employed in a feminized sector and women are working in male-dominated sectors, they will spend more time performing purely male / female housework. Our another goal is to explore the relationship between the concepts of the "ideal" family from the point of view of men and women and their employment in dual-earner families with the particular focus on the work-family conflict. We assume that in the case of single-career households, care for the household and children can be transferred to the unemployed partner, regardless of his or her gender. Several decades of high labor market participation of women in Slovakia is reflected in the development of the traditional definition of women's role. This fact leads us to the assumption that over the last 25 years the differences in attitudes towards gender roles between men and women have declined. Data from four waves of the EVS (1991, 1999, 2008, 2017) and two rounds of the ESS (2004, 2010) surveys were used in our research.
The Great Recession led to a significant increase in unemployment in most of the developed world. As a result and in order to increase the competitiveness of the individual economies, labor market institutions have been reformed in a number of countries. The focus of the reforms has been the increase in the flexibility of wage and employment determination. While such measures are thought to have long-term benefits through enhanced job creation, they are likely to create inter alia stress in the short-run, loss in job satisfaction and a sense of loss of control at work.

Associating changes in work organization at the workplace (e.g. chance to influence decisions), job security (e.g. type of contract), changes in job satisfaction, income developments (e.g. assessment of adequacy of household income), work intensity (e.g. hours, unpaid hours) with the implementation of labor market reforms will help us understand the extent to which reforms have caused stress and whether the expected long-term benefits have started materializing.

Trying to identify other factors that could contribute to the positive effects showing up faster is essential in leading to useful policy suggestions. The investigation could be based on a combination of information from the European Social Survey (ESS) with information from other surveys such as the European Company Survey (ECS) and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS).

D3.1. JOB SECURITY IN IRELAND BEFORE AND DURING AUSTERITY
Micheál Collins, Daniel Capistrano, Mathew Creighton and Philip O Connell (University College Dublin)

The European Social Survey (ESS) collected information about perceived job security among more than 20 European countries first in 2004 and again in 2010. In Ireland, these two periods were significantly different in terms of national economic activity, labour regulation and employment/unemployment levels.

The economic crisis, which affected most European countries in the period, also triggered austerity policies and changes in Ireland’s labour laws.

This paper analyses changes to perceived job security in Ireland during these two periods and explores the relationship between these changes and the wider austerity-driven labour market changes that occurred over the period. Furthermore, the results are discussed in comparative perspective observing other European countries where similar policies were adopted.
B3.2. TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AND DEPRESSION IN EUROPE: LOOKING BEHIND THE POOLED DATA
Ioana van Deurzen, Sonja Bekker and Johanna Burkert (Tilburg University)

The present study is framed against the concerns raised by scholars (and not only) regarding the potential negative effects on health and well-being of the increased flexibilization of the labour markets in Europe. We take advantage of the high-quality comparative data collected by the European Social Survey in 2006, 2012, and 2014 and we examine whether having a temporary contract as opposed to a permanent contract is related to a higher level of depressive symptoms. We analysed a sample of 16 countries for which data was collected in all the 3 waves. From our multilevel analyses on the pooled data we conclude that indeed, employees who had a fixed contract reported significantly higher level of depressive symptoms compared to the employees who had an open-ended contract.

In the next step we disaggregate our analyses at the level of the country and wave, in line with arguments that this effect is sensitive to the institutional context within a particular country and year. Our disaggregated results support this idea: we found a great variation between countries, and within a country, also between the included waves, in the effect of temporary employment on depression. For instance, in 2006 and 2012 only in 2 country the effect was significant (Belgium and Germany, and Denmark and Sweden, respectively) while in 2014 the effect was significant in 6 countries. We turn to performing a rich contextual analysis on a few selected countries, with the aim of identifying potential institutional factors that can make the results understandable. Preliminary results suggest that the regulations surrounding the unemployment insurance protection could be a relevant factor that can render the effect of having a temporary contract detrimental for mental health.

B3.3. LIFE-CYCLE APPROACH TO INFORMAL WORK IN EUROPE
Valentinas Rudys (Fordham University)

A non-trivial share of European labor force is employed informally, i.e. without contracts, or engage in informal self-employment. European Commission is aiming to reduce such employment and thus has founded European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work. In this paper, I try to identify ways to reduce informal (undeclared) employment. More specifically, I ask if labor policies such as age-varying hiring subsidies and firing taxes could decrease informal employment? Using European Social Survey (ESS), I find that in most of the European countries across majority of industries age-informality pattern is U-shaped. Informality, defined as uncontracted work, is high among the very young who are queued for formal jobs and among the old. Inspired by these findings, I set up a life-cycle search and matching model with informal work opportunities. I calibrate the model to United Kingdom, a Western European country with relatively high levels of informality among the old, and then consider how age-varying firing costs and hiring subsidies affect the composition of the informal and formal employment. The simulation of the age-varying policies indicates that firing costs targeting older workers have a negative effect to all age groups because employers consider these costs even when hiring younger workers and share them with workers through lower wages. Hiring subsidies targeting older individuals, on the other hand, increase employment not only of the older but also the of the younger workers by creating an upward pressure on wages which incentivize the unemployed to invest more effort into job search instead of choosing informal work. The experiments suggest that besides optimization of unemployment benefits, the goal of informality reduction can be achieved using labor policies that encourage the employment of the older workers assuming non-distortive financing.
**SESSION ABSTRACTS | TUESDAY 16 APRIL | 9-10.40AM**

### B3.4. THE EFFECT OF FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT ON WELL-BEING: DISENTANGLING THE MICRO-MECHANISMS AND THE MODERATING ROLE OF SOCIAL COHESION

**Sonja Scheuring, Sophia Fauser and Michael Gebel (University of Bamberg)**

The incidence of temporary employment seems to be on a rise, although there are large differences across European countries. Against this background, researchers have examined several socio-economic consequences of temporary employment in various countries, of which one important outcome well-being is. Only a few cross-country comparative studies have addressed the effects of temporary employment on well-being and highlighted the moderating role of country-specific characteristics. We complement this literature by testing to which extent the mechanisms of Jahoda’s Latent Deprivation Model (social contacts, activity, status and income) can explain the effect of temporary employment on well-being in different European countries.

The effects will be evaluated in both upwards (permanent employment) and downwards (unemployment) perspective. The ESS 2012 module on personal and social well-being provides a unique comparative dataset for 29 countries for testing the mechanisms. Furthermore, we incorporate the country-specific perspective by examining how social cohesion (measured via Social Cohesion Radar of Bertelsmann Stiftung) moderates the impact of fixed-term employment on well-being. A high degree of social cohesion in societies should substitute the function of social contacts in the work environment of individuals: if there is a strong feeling of affiliation within a society, the individuals do not need a strong social function of paid employment. Instead, even in unemployed phases, they rely on this shared identity. Thus, the greater the social cohesion in a country is pronounced, the less negative (positive) should the impact on well-being be in an upwards (downwards) comparison. We test this using a two-step estimation procedure for the linear multilevel regression, which allows a flexible model specification for the main independent variable of interest and the micro-level control variables. Taking the previous comparative literature into account we control for confounding macro-variables like labor market policies or GDP, which are shown to act as important cross-level moderators.

### B3.5. FORMAL VS. INFORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITY: WHAT IS MORE BENEFICIAL FOR THE MIDDLE-AGED AND ELDERLY SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

**Anna Ermolina and Daria Kareva (Higher School of Economics, Moscow)**

The impact of social activity on personal SWB has been the subject of numerous sociological, gerontological, epidemiological, psychological and even anthropological theories. In older age social activity is likely to substitute middle-aged activities lost by age (Havighurst, 1963). Empirical studies confirm this effect but there is less consistency about the differences between various social roles and activities and their influence on SWB. Besides, recent cross-country studies reveal that the socio-demographic and economic determinants of personal SWB vary between countries (ex., Pichler& Wallace (2007), Sarracino (2010)). Thus, our research question is the following: are there any differences in national patterns of formal and informal social activity that contribute to SWB in older age?

The analysis is based on the 6th ESS wave. SWB is estimated as life satisfaction and happiness for respondents over 50 years from 29 countries. We implement two-level random intercept and random slope models for binary responses with country effects. Besides the frequency of social contacts and volunteering as types of social activity, we also control for elders’ socio-demographic characteristics.

The hypotheses of the study are the following:

1. Informal social activity measured by the frequency of social contacts with friends and relatives has a stronger positive impact on SWB in older age than formal social activity measured by the frequency of volunteering.

2. Formal social activity better predicts life satisfaction while informal social activity mainly defines happiness.

3. Social activity influences differently on the elderly’s SWB in various countries.

We find out that both types of social activity influence positively on SWB, but volunteering is less significant for elders’ level of happiness than social contacts. This influence depends on the frequency of alternative type of activity and varies between countries.
Europe and Russia share a long and eventful common history. After a period of convergence following the fall of the Soviet Union, several conflicts reemerged in the shade of the last financial crisis. In order to explore paths towards peaceful stability in spite of economic insecurity, this session sets out to investigate differences and commonalities between European countries and Russia. We place the focus on attitudes towards two important topics included in the latest data release of the ESS (Round 8): the welfare state and climate change. Both topics play a central role in national and international political agendas and are closely related to the conferences main theme: instability, insecurity and inequality. Solidarity and the provision of welfare services integrate people into societies and aim at reducing inequalities, while climate change and energy security are among the most important threats the world is facing today, potentially leading to instability. At the same time, energy security is one of the main sources of conflict between Europe and Russia. Knowledge on these topics will shed light on how to cope with and reduce instability, insecurity and inequality.

The session will consist of two parts: First, the ERAnet.RUS project entitled "PAWCER" will present its main findings in four presentations focusing on (a) data comparability between Russia and Europe; (b) macro data on welfare and energy issues that enhance the rich ESS database; (c) differences and commonalities regarding public attitudes towards welfare services and solidarity with vulnerable groups; and (d) public attitudes towards climate change, energy security and energy preferences in Europe and Russia. Second, we welcome contributions that explore differences and commonalities in attitudes between Russia and Europe regarding the two topics. Especially welcome are contributions that study the link between attitudes towards welfare services and climate change.

C3.1. SOLIDARITY WITH VULNERABLE GROUPS: DIFFERENCES AND COMMONALITIES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND EUROPE

In many welfare states, the challenges posed by the nearly universal trends of growing inequality, migration, ageing, globalisation and digitalisation of work have been further aggravated by the recent economic crisis. These trends put the sustainability of social policies under pressure – and thus potentially also the solidarity with vulnerable groups. In this presentation, we investigate the differences and commonalities between Russia and Europe regarding the solidarity with vulnerable groups. Despite the mounting challenges, the idea of the welfare state appears to be highly popular, with the majority of people in all ESS countries being strongly in favour of the redistribution principle and the key social protection programmes, including old-age provision, childcare services and to a lesser extent unemployment provision. We also find that with regard to welfare opinions, countries often cluster in line with geographic regions, reflecting the fact that neighbouring countries tend to have similar levels of economic development and welfare systems. Russians’ attitudes, while not radically different from those of Europeans, are nonetheless quite distinctive in some respects. In general, Russians appear to favour universal programmes, but they are considerably less supportive of programmes directed at specific needy people. At the same time, Russians are relatively sceptical about the capacities of their welfare system. This may help to understand why, unlike most European countries, each of the three proposed social policy schemes – i.e. the basic income scheme, activation policies and complete means-testing – has the approval of more than half of Russia’s population.
1 Conference venue (B6)

2 Conference lunch venue (Mensaria)

3 Welcome reception venue (Mittelbau)

4 Conference dinner venue (Eichbaum Brauhaus)

5 Mannheim train station
In this talk, we will present research on comparability and interpretation of two widely used variables from the ESS: the political self-positioning and the question on the government’s responsibility for reducing differences in income. The two questions were selected for scrutiny during a project meeting of the PAWCER project that investigates Public Attitudes towards the Welfare State and Climate Change in Europe and Russia. The hypothesis regarding the left-right positioning (question B26 in ESS8) was that we may deal with conceptual differences in understanding the left-right scale between Russia and Western democracies related to the correspondence between a left-right and a progressive (liberal)-conservative dimension. Regarding the government’s responsibility for reducing differences in income (question B33 in ESS8), the hypothesis was that this question might have an additional dimension of corruption in Russia while in Western democracies, it is often interpreted as just a one-dimensional concept of general welfare attitude.

To investigate whether the common interpretations used in the scientific literature hold also in a Russian context and whether they hold in Western Europe in the first place, we conducted cognitive tests during the pretest-phase of the ESS8 fieldwork in Russia as well as in Switzerland and Germany. Additionally, a set of three test questions were included after the ESS questionnaire in the Swiss fieldwork of the ESS8. The qualitative and quantitative results show that while comparability is not questioned, more prudence regarding interpretation is necessary: On the one hand, some concepts might not make sense to a considerable number of respondents (35% of the respondents did not use the left-right scale the intended way); on the other hand, interpretations should stay close to the original formulation of the item (when answering to B33, respondents consider all kind of regulations against inequalities, including gender inequality and non-governmental measures). It suggests that the regulations surrounding the unemployment insurance protection could be a relevant factor that can render the effect of having a temporary contract detrimental for mental health.

The contribution of Europe to global warming, but also the impact on initiating policies to reduce human influence on global climate is one of the leading in the world. The policy of Russia occupying the fifth place in global carbon gas emission and being one of the largest producer and exporter of energy sources is less consistent and well-formulated. The data of ESS round 8 showed that general public awareness of the issue of climate change and attribution it to human activity reached rather high level in most European countries, and in Russia it is only slightly behind European average. But the strength of opinions as well as skepticism about the impact of climate change on human life and the level of person concerns of this issue are substantially lower in Russia than in most other European countries. Previous research showed rather high role of political parties and ideological division shaping public attitudes toward climate change in some countries (USA, Canada, some European countries). Our analysis confirms that left-right ideological division as well as the support of left/right-right parties have rather strong correlation with attitudes toward climate change in many European countries, mostly in advance democracies of Western Europe, but also in some new democracies. In Russia the role of ideology is much weaker and sometimes goes to the opposite direction than generally in Europe. The place of climate change issue in party programs and their political campaigns, the extensity of public discussion on this issue and the place of climate change among other global problems in Russian national agenda is different from many other European countries. We will propose several hypothesis to explain the reasons of low political mobilization efforts of parties and weak correlation of political ideology with attitudes on global issues in Russia.
TURDAY 16 APRIL | 9-10.40AM | ROOM 102

C3.4. EXPLAINING CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN CONCERN ABOUT ENERGY SECURITY

Christina Demski, Wouter Poortinga and Lorraine Whitmarsh (Cardiff University), Gisela Böhm (University of Bergen), Stephen Fisher (University of Oxford), Linda Steg (University of Groningen), Resul Umit (University of Lucerne), Pekka Jokinen and Pasi Pohjolainen (University of Tampere)

Energy security is an important policy goal for most countries. Here we show that cross-country differences in concern about energy security across 23 countries in Europe and Israel are explained by energy-specific and general national contextual indicators, over-and-above individual-level factors that reflect population demographics.

Specifically, public concerns about import dependency and affordability reflect the specific energy context within countries, such as dependency on energy imports and electricity costs, while higher concerns about the affordability, vulnerability and reliability of energy are associated with higher fossil fuel consumption.

More general national context beyond energy also appears to matter; energy security concerns are higher in countries that are doing less well in terms of economic and human wellbeing. These findings indicate that wider energy, social and economic context influence people's feelings of vulnerability and sense of security, which may inform the development of effective energy security strategies that assuage public concerns.

C3.5. HOW DO ATTITUDES TOWARD CLIMATE POLICY INSTRUMENTS VARY IN EUROPE? AN EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL FACTORS

Jukka Sivonen and Iida Kukkonen (University of Turku)

The "synergy hypothesis" suggests that societal and environmental development mutually reinforce each other; that more comprehensive welfare states offer a better platform for environmental objectives than less extensive welfare states. Nordic welfare state model especially is considered a favourable platform for developing environmental policies. Generally speaking the Nordic welfare state stands out from others due to, for example, higher socio-economic equality.

Evidence supporting the synergy hypothesis is, however, inconclusive. This study uses multilevel regression modelling and European Social Survey Round 8 data to explore the impact of institutional and individual level factors on European citizens' attitudes on climate policy instruments. The study focuses on three policy instruments: increasing taxes on fossil fuels, subsidizing renewable energy, and banning the least energy efficient household appliances.

The results indicate that the effect of institutional structures is significant in attitudes towards taxation, but clearly less significant towards subsidizing and banning. Citizens in Nordic welfare states were more in favour of higher fossil fuel tax than citizens in other welfare regimes.

Moreover, individual-level factors, including socio-demographics, were significant in shaping these attitudes. Higher political trust at both country and individual level predict more supportive attitudes on higher fossil taxation. The results highlight the need to account both institutional and individual factors when studying and implementing climate policy.
Europe continues to become more diverse, with increasing numbers of residents having a migration background, reaching 10 percent or more in several western European countries. There is also increasing diversity in terms of the range of countries from which migrants have come. The 2015/6 refugee crisis has further increased diversity. Meanwhile, most European countries also have long-standing ethnic or cultural minorities, such as Roma, Jews or cross-border groups, and some even regionally concentrated groups striving for independence claiming different nationalities and even discrimination by the majority.

While immigration and diversity bring potential benefits (both to the migrants and minorities themselves and to the host countries), diversity is also widely believed to bring integration challenges. On the one hand, migrants and their descendants tend to experience high unemployment rates and other economic disadvantages, while on the other hand increased migration has been accompanied by something of a backlash among majority populations, exemplified by the rise of populist far-right parties. Some internal minorities such as Roma face systematic and long-standing discrimination, while others are almost invisible and their differentiation from the majority is not very salient. However, there is considerable variation both between countries and between ethnic groups in the extent of these integration challenges. For example, residents of countries and regions with higher stocks of migrants have repeatedly been shown to have more positive attitudes towards migration than others, probably because of higher contact opportunities and extended periods of time (often decades) for oftentimes successful integration of migrants.

The proposed session invites papers which theoretically and empirically explore issues of diversity and integration in a European perspective. We take a multidimensional view of integration, including economic, social, cultural, religious and political dimensions. Papers could focus on ethnic minority populations, both long-standing or migration-related, or on majority populations, or – since integration is a two-way process – on both. Papers could e.g. base their analyses on the recently-developed ESS measure of ethnic and cultural origins (ancestry) available in rounds 7 and 8, or on the measures of own and parents’ country of birth which are available throughout. Methodological papers comparing different approaches to measuring ethnicity and diversity are also welcome.

**D4.1. THE INTEGRATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES**

Anthony Heath (University of Oxford) and Silke Schneider (GESIS)

To what extent is integration a two-way process? This question has both policy and academic interest. Government policy frequently focuses on ways in which migrants and their descendants need to adapt to the norms and values of the ‘host’ country in order to integrate, while academic research has drawn attention to the context of reception and the way in which the ‘warmth of the welcome’ can affect the prospects for integration.

The paper aims to address this question. First, the paper will develop multidimensional measures of integration, examining economic integration (e.g. unemployment rates), social integration (e.g. cross-ethnic friendships), political integration (e.g. political participation) and identificational integration (e.g. feelings of national belonging). To achieve this the paper will draw on the new measure of ethnic and cultural background developed for the ESS and available in rounds 7 and 8.

Second, the paper will relate these patterns to relevant properties of the ethnic group and of the host society. In the case of the ethnic group possible measures are:

- The degree of positive or negative selection of migrants
- The size of the ethnic group
- The cultural distance of the ethnic group’s origin country from that of the destination country
- The recency of the migration (e.g. proportion of first generation members)

In the case of the host society, possible measures are:

- Racist beliefs and attitudes to immigration
- Rates of racial discrimination
- Scores on the MIPEX index

Strength of far right parties In measuring these properties we would draw both on ESS data and on external data (e.g. meta-analyses of field experiments of discrimination, the Barro-Lee dataset on education in the origin countries). Where appropriate (Ns permitting) we would disaggregate both minority groups (using level 1 of the ESCEG) and the host nation states (e.g. distinguishing Flanders from Wallonia).
D4.2. HOW FAR ARE WE APART? A RELATIONAL MAPPING OF SYMBOLIC ETHNIC BOUNDARIES USING OPINION SURVEYS
Xinwei Xu (Cornell University)

Ethnic groups have been conceived as discrete categories to which people belong and have often been used as self-evident analytical units, and the underlying assumptions are (1) each group share a certain level of cultural homogeneity and (2) these ethnic minority groups can be seen as culturally different "others" from the mainstream. However, existing evidence for the myth of the value differences between natives and ethnic minority groups is mixed and fragmented – most studies are only restricted to a specific set of values and sometimes yield conflicting conclusions. More importantly, existing research often overlooks the relationship between different realms of values.

Building on an emerging line of research using network graphic tools to study opinion structures, this paper investigates two aspects of the "symbolic boundaries" with cross-country opinion data from the European Social Survey – (1) whether ethnic categories reveal fundamental differences in cultural values and schemas across ethnic groups, and (2) the extent to which attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minority groups are correlated with attitudes toward other social, political, and moral issues. Ultimately, this paper is intended to invite new thinking into the meanings of ethnic categories in a changing cultural landscape and the relationship between ethnic symbolic boundaries and value differences.

D4.3. MIGRANTS’ HUMAN VALUES IN EUROPE IN THE FIRST AND SECOND GENERATION
Dita Cermakova and Dana Hamplova (Czech Academy of Sciences)

The paper raises the question of whether and how migrant and non-migrant populations differ in the importance they assigned to various values in European countries. Values are considered to be crucial for explaining both social organization and individual attitudes and behaviour. From migrants’ point of view the human values play an important role in the organization of migrants' social and professional life and consequently in processes of adjustment. However, only a few attention has been concentrated on the topic of the immigrants’ value preferences.

Therefore, it is important to answer the question of whether migrants and non-migrants differ in their value preferences and whether some of the differences might be explained in terms of sociodemographic characteristic (gender, age, education, economic status) or by cultural and migratory characteristics (religious background, length of stay). The basic human values are measured by Portrait Value Questionnaire designed by S. Schwartz. The preliminary results show that migrants in 1st generation have stronger conservation values (particularly those with Muslim background), less openness (stronger effect for migrants with Orthodox and Muslim background).

In contrast, the differences in self-enhancement and self-transcendence values are small. The general results for the 2nd generation of immigrants show just little differences with the native population. Nevertheless, the stronger conservation values and less openness persist among the migrants with the Muslim background, among whom the 2nd generation have lower orientation on self-enhancement than the 1st generation. In contrast, the migrants with the Orthodox background in the 2nd generation keep the orientation on self-enhancement as in the 1st generation. We use data from European Social Survey (rounds 2 to 8).
D4.4. RESILIENCE OR CHANGE? POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF INTRA-EUROPEAN MIGRANTS
Eva Krejčová and Nicolas Sauger (Sciences Po)

What is the impact of migration on migrants’ political attitudes? Do they keep the attitudes they developed in their country of origin? Do they adapt to their new environment? Does migration in itself drive people to change their attitudes? The context of migration represents a valuable opportunity to study the influence of the political and societal environment on the change of political attitudes and the political re-socialization during adulthood. The paper arises from a debate between two theories explaining immigrants’ political attitudes and electoral behavior: exposure and transferability. While the former expects immigrants’ attitudes and electoral behavior to change under the influence of the host country’s political context, the latter understands them as being determined by the early socialization in the country of origin and only context-specifically adjusted in the receiving country. The paper builds on the European social survey data. It uses merged data from all the eight rounds of the ESS, making it possible to assemble samples large enough of the population of intra-European migrants. It proposes a series of regression models to estimate the individual political attitudes in order to explore the extent to which the intra-European immigrants vary from their counterparts at home and/or their new compatriots. The study aims to identify and analyze the structural mechanisms that enhance or drain the process of political re-socialization of intra-European migrants, while controlling for the bias of self-selection.

D4.5. SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION: THE ISRAELI CASE
Rebeca Raijman (University of Haifa), Oshrat Hochman (GESIS) and Eldad Davidov (University of Cologne and University of Zurich)

Israel is an immigration country representing a very different context to that of other European countries. Immigration is open to anyone who can prove Jewish ethnicity but is extremely difficult for non-Jews. This makes it particularly interesting to examine whether and to what extent attitudes to different potential immigrant groups form differently. We examine Israelis’ attitudes to three groups of immigrants: ethnic migrants (Jews), non-ethnic migrants (non-Jews), and refugees, and analyze how level of economic and symbolic threat predicts level of opposition to immigration of the three groups. We also examine two predictors of threat. The first taps into respondents’ level of dissatisfaction with Israel’s economy, government, education system and health services as reflecting the level of the individual’s vulnerability (Gorodzeisky and Glikman 2017). The second taps into respondents’ human values such as conservation and universalism. Both human values and vulnerability may exert a direct effect on opposition to immigration of the three groups. For the analysis we use data of the 2014-15 immigration module of the European Social Survey (ESS). Findings can be summarized as follows: vulnerable and conservative Israelis felt significantly more, and universalistic individuals significantly less, threatened by immigration. Threatened respondents opposed immigration more strongly, especially with regard to non-ethnic Jews. While universalist respondents were more supportive of immigration and welcomed immigration of non-ethnic Jews -- refugees in particular, conservative individuals rejected immigration in general, particularly of the latter two immigrant groups. We discuss the implications of the findings for the specific and unique Israeli immigration context.
Cross-national survey data are primarily used to capture characteristics of individuals, and describe or explain their variation within and between countries. However, some of the fundamental social science concepts, such as social cohesion, solidarity, economic inequality, or legitimacy, are properties of groups and not of individuals. These societal characteristics can be operationalized as aggregates of individual characteristics, measured with survey data, and compared across countries and over time.

For example, if social cohesion corresponds to the level of agreement in values, attitudes, and practices among individuals, survey data offer opportunities of describing the extent of this agreement or disagreement among individuals directly. Still, such attempts of constructing country-level measures beyond simple means or proportions are rare. One exception is economic inequality, for which there exist several measures constructed via the aggregation of individual-level data, such as the Gini index, Theil index, percentile ratios, etc., and their properties have been well understood.

This session invites methodological and substantive papers that use theory-informed country-level measures of social phenomena derived from survey data. Welcome contributions include, but are not limited to, papers that (a) make a case for a particular way of measuring a well-defined concept, (b) propose new ways of measuring a concept and discuss differences between them, (c) use one or more measures of societal characteristics derived from survey data as dependent or independent variables in substantive models.

**F3.1. INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND MORTALITY IN EUROPE**

Alexi Gugushvili and Caspar Kaiser (University of Oxford)

In a recent study Venkataramani et al (2016) find that intergenerational income mobility is a significant predictor of county-level mortality rates in the United States. Two theoretical mechanisms can be proposed to explain this link. First, assuming that individuals’ health is at least partly affected by psychological factors, limited opportunities for upward social mobility may be perceived as unfair, cause and hence be detrimental to individual health. Second, perceptions of greater mobility chances in more socially fluid environments may increase aspirations in individuals from less advantaged backgrounds, and thus lead to greater individual investment in health.

Although there is a growing literature on individual-level consequences of intergenerational mobility on health in Europe, the unavailability of reliable cross-national social mobility data so far prevented scholars to investigate an association between the level of intergenerational social mobility and mortality rates across European societies. In this study, we utilize the first five waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2010) to derive estimates of intergenerational social mobility using the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) class schema.

We estimate mobility rates for 5 year age-groups in each country and wave, which yields rates for 1,197 country/wave/age groups. For each of these country/wave/age groups, we obtain mortality rates from Eurostat. Using country- and year-fixed effects models, we empirically investigate if there are significant associations between social mobility and logged mortality rates. We operationalize intergenerational social mobility in absolute and relative terms and also account for a wide range control variables such as marital status, income, unemployment, and education.
Empirical tests of Schwartz’s theory of cultural value priorities have predominantly been performed using the averaging approach—as values of the average individual in a culture. However, from a theory of measurement standpoint there are reasons to believe that such an approach is inadequate. We argue that the averaging approach is an insufficiently accurate methodology in capturing the compatibilities-incompatibilities between values of individuals within cultures.

As an alternative, we propose an approach that is based on the distribution of values of individuals in a given culture—the distribution approach. Concretely, we introduce a way to empirically unfold the theoretically proposed by Schwartz circumplex model of value priorities at the individual level as ‘ideal value types.’ These are then used as threshold indices in the classification of the data-informed ‘observed value types’, a procedure that can be best understood as the strength of fit between two sets of information.

Using data from two rounds of the European Social Survey, we show how frequencies of specific individual value priorities in a culture can be used towards the description of culture-level value preferences. As a consequence of the empirical exemplifications of the new approach, we suggest a re-conceptualization of Schwartz’s culture-level value theory to an orthogonal two-dimensional structure of culture-level value priorities, namely as Preservation vs. Alteration and Dominance vs. Amenability.

An important aspect of politics is "who gets what". That is, redistributive politics and economic (in)equality play an important role in advanced democracies. While scholars pay ample attention to the relationship between inequality and redistribution, we know relatively little about how this relates to citizens’ preferences. This study begins to fill this empirical gap by engaging in a two-folded analysis of the structure and origins of redistributive preferences across advanced democracies.

First, we examine if, when and how the redistributive preferences differ across income groups. A time-series cross-sectional analysis of data on aggregate redistributive preferences from 8 advanced democracies (1980s-2017) questions the common notion of parallel movement between issue publics and establishes a more heterogeneous change pattern between these groups.

We subsequently scrutinise the influence of the redistributive preferences of different income groups on policy. Here, we particularly examine how governments respond to demands for redistribution of different income groups and what the ramifications are in terms of democratic representation. Altogether, these two components allow for critical empirical insights into the democratic puzzle of one of the more salient societal domains, namely redistribution.
The overall opinion climate towards immigrants in Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) has varied considerably between 2002 and 2016. Both countries have experienced different phases of immigration inflows. Whereas the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ beginning in 2015 had Germany faced with the highest immigration influx to date, the UK experienced a significant rise in immigration ten years earlier, in 2004, as a result of the EU Eastern Enlargement. These strong and sudden increases in immigration to both countries had their societies faced with remarkable challenges and caused severe political consequences: In the UK, in 2016, a slim majority voted for the UK to leave the European Union (BREXIT).

In Germany, in 2017, for the first time since WWII a right-wing populist party has entered the German Bundestag. In a comparative approach, I aim at identifying which structural and cultural aspects of social change are responsible for changing attitudes towards immigrants. Theory suggests that ‘hard’ factors such as socioeconomic traits influence the climate of opinion towards immigrants as well as ‘soft’ factors such as value prioritisation within society. Additionally, contextual factors play an important role. Besides economic growth and inequality within a country, immigration rates are considered to trigger changes in the overall opinion climate. Data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and country-level data for Germany and the UK from 2002 to 2016 allow depicting the theoretical assumptions.

Even though the ESS is based on cross-sectional data, the advantages of panel econometric analysis are exploited in the present paper. For this, Deaton’s (1985) method of pseudo-panel analysis is applied. This methodological approach enables the observation of the factors responsible for a change in attitudes towards immigrants on the level of birth-cohorts, gender and region. Additionally, we can draw valuable conclusions about social change.
G2: DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
Session Organisers: Sandy Marquart-Pyatt and Aaron Ponce (Michigan State University)

Political tolerance, defined as the willingness to grant political rights to disliked groups, is central to studies of democratic values given its links with civil liberties and political freedoms. For more than half a century, scholars have tracked public opinion on political tolerance given its role in supporting freedoms of speech and association and the rights to vote, demonstrate publicly, and hold elected office. Perhaps the most significant insight from these works is that establishing and maintaining tolerant publics, even in longstanding democratic nations, remains a challenge.

Although a growing number of studies attest to the importance of investigating tolerance worldwide, research reveals it to be contextually grounded and developing at uneven rates globally, leading to complexities with regard to how it is realized locally, nationally, and globally. Moreover, the extent to which tolerance connects with other political views like anti-immigrant attitudes and views of the welfare state remains underexplored. There is great potential for cross-national, comparative research on these topics using ESS data.

This session invites papers addressing links among democratic values, attitudes, norms, and behaviors using a comparative perspective. We are interested in papers that structure comparisons in a variety of ways including 1) across places, like communities, regions or countries, 2) across aggregate scales or units of analysis, and/or 3) over time, using multiple waves of ESS. We especially encourage papers that utilize advanced statistical techniques to situate the comparisons and examine variability across spatial and temporal scales.

G2.1. CULTURE OF (DIS)TRUST IN THE BALTIC STATES, 1990-2018
Inga Gaižauskaitė (Lithuanian Social Research Centre)

Trust is a social resource that has a special value to the functioning of democracy. Not all political systems need trust or are developed in an atmosphere conducive to trust. Democracy, on the contrary, is a system based on trust. However, trust is the resource that cannot be easily generated. It is much easier to destroy trust than create or regain it. Therefore, it has been observed that democracies established after the demise of communist regime had difficulties accumulating trust.

The presentation aims at tracing the dynamics of levels of social and political trust in the Baltic States under democracy. Based on European Social Survey data and complementing it with data coming from other international comparative surveys (World Values Survey, European Quality of Life Survey, other) it tries to cover period from 1990 to 2018. It asks if levels of social and political trust have been developing similarly or differently in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia?

The data reveals that Estonia is slightly more successful in formation of culture of trust whereas Latvia and Lithuania continuously have lower levels of trust over the period. The presentation also attempts mapping the place of the Baltic States among other European countries regarding levels of social and political trust.
G2.2. CITIZEN-ELITE CONGRUENCE, POLITICAL ALLEGIANCES AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN EUROPE
Caroline Hahn and Christian Schnaudt (GESIS)

The long-term functioning and viability of democratic systems depend on the ability of political parties and governments to adequately represent citizens’ interests and to be responsive to their policy demands. As previous research has repeatedly highlighted, citizen-elite congruence on various policy issues and dimensions is of crucial importance when it comes to citizens’ political support and satisfaction with the way democracy works. If political parties and governments fail to respond to citizens’ policy demands, the resulting representation gap between the governing elite and citizens will be reflected in lower levels of political support and an increased dissatisfaction on the side of the citizenry. In this paper, we argue that the impact of citizen-elite policy congruence on political support varies across different segments of the population as well as different types of electoral systems. More specifically, at the individual-level we contend that the detrimental effect of a widening representation gap on political support is attenuated for citizens with pre-existing political allegiances to governing parties. At the country-level, we maintain that the impact of citizen-elite congruence on citizens’ political support is stronger in majoritarian than proportional electoral systems. We test these general arguments about a moderating role of political allegiances and type of electoral system with the help of hierarchical regression models using individual-level data from several waves of the ESS and elite-level data from the CHES. In doing so, our paper sheds light on the conditional relevance of citizen-elite policy congruence for citizens’ political support in modern European democracies.

G2.3. ERODING TRUST: REGIONAL EFFECTS OF CONSECUTIVE CRISIS
Alexia Katsanidou, Christina Eder and Ann-Kathrin Reinl (GESIS)

Interpersonal trust rates declined in many states during the European Financial and Migration Crises. Former research conducted on political movements in times of crises revealed a connection between strong populist groups and low levels of political trust (Algan et al. 2017; Fieschi & Heywood 2004). Therefore, research on the development of trust is of high relevance considering the current rise of populist parties all over Europe.

By studying political trust as a dependent construct, we want to shed light on the question if the crises hitting the European Union during the last decade had a sustainable effect on public trust rates. To that end, our statistical analyses focus on Germany. During the past years, many comparative studies on the development of various forms of trust have been published (Foster & Frieden 2017; Van Erkel & van der Meer 2016). However, no study to date analyzed the case of Germany in-depth. We think that the German case is of special interest for various reasons. Firstly, some regions were more hit by economic downturn during the Euro Crisis than others. Secondly, regions located on the border to Austria experienced particularly high influx rates of asylum seekers during the Migration Crisis in 2015. We assume that low levels of trust in national and European institutions correlate with the level of crises consternation.

By employing regional data of the European Social Survey from 2008 to 2016 we are able to obtain information on the development of trust rates in Germany, otherwise lost in the national level. To answer our research question, multilevel logistic regression analyses are conducted. Moreover, the impact of political events on trust rates is measured via a quasi-experimental design. Our statistical models control for the effect of political events within the time period of the Euro and the Migration Crises.
For 25 years, research on democracy has routinely produced evidence that citizens of Central European and Baltic states show the highest levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their countries. These countries have undergone triple or quadruple transitions of economy, regime, state institutions, and nationality issues in the last quarter of century. In May 2004 five Central European and three Baltic states have become members of the EU. After four years of membership they faced the effects of the financial crisis of 2007-8, the great recession of 2008-12, and the real estate market crisis. Crises have not affected all European countries equally. While in many of them satisfaction with the functioning of democracy have declined as a result of dissatisfaction with the economy and government performance between 2007-12, in several new EU member states satisfaction with democratic performance has grown significantly.

Before the revolutions in 1989, countries of Central Europe and the Baltic were poor dictatorships. Under the label of democracy citizens of these countries expected not only civil freedoms and free and fair elections, but also a Western standard of living. In most of them living standard has grown but still lagged behind the standard of living of the populations of old democracies. After 2014, only in Slovenia, Czechia, Estonia, and Slovakia was GDP per capita higher than in Greece and Portugal. Using the data from ESS Round 1 and 8 I will show how feelings about the economy and trust in parliament affect satisfaction with democratic performance in Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
The active engagement and political participation of citizens is key to the working of democracy. Yet political behavior research consistently finds that European democracies fall short of the ideal of equal opportunities to raise one’s voice in the political process. The costs associated with political participation seem to be higher for women, young people, immigrants and economically deprived citizens. At the same time, societal transformations as diverse as the increase of cultural diversity and inequality, the expansion of forms of political participation, new technologies and the expansion of social media, or the raise of populist movements, might interact with classical sources of inequalities and provide both new opportunities and new limitations for citizens to raise their voices and participate fully in the political process.

This session will discuss whether and how inequalities in political participation have changed or evolved in Europe in the last 15 years, as well as their origins and consequences. The European Social Survey has now included questions on main forms of political participation in eight waves covering several countries since 2002. Such extensive data provides a unique opportunity to address the origin, evolution or consequences of political inequality across countries and over time.

In light of this, we welcome papers that provide new knowledge about any of the standard sources of inequalities such as gender, age, country of origin, economic conditions or about the interactions among them. Research identifying new sources of inequalities is also welcome. The selection of projects will favor those that systematically address inequality across different forms of political participation, across countries, or over time. In all cases papers are expected to have a solid theoretical background and empirical strategy.

**A2.1. STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE: ANALYSIS OF ESS ROUNDS 4-8**

Marta Kołczyńska, Ilona Wysmulek and Denys Lavryk (Polish Academy of Sciences)

Periods of rapid social change, such as regime transitions, accelerated globalization and large migration flows, often result in increasing the number of individuals with inconsistent status. Status inconsistency, understood as the mismatch between different status dimensions, can cause discomfort and frustration, because of the natural human need for achieving or maintaining cognitive consistency, especially if social norms call for some congruency of status attributes. This discomfort is more pronounced in the case of under-rewarding, where individuals have lower earnings relative to their education, and can be further exacerbated by the precarity experienced by ever higher shares of Europeans.

Although it is recognized that status inconsistency (both under- and over-rewarding) has implications for psychological functioning, the association between the type of inconsistency and political attitudes and participation still leaves many questions unanswered. While most prior empirical studies emphasize the relation between political engagement and educational attainment, income and occupation, the mismatch between these status dimensions is rarely examined.

In this paper we use Rounds 4-8 of the European Social Survey to explore the effects of status inconsistency on political attitudes and participation in Europe in the decade following the global financial crisis. We analyze the prevalence of status inconsistency across European countries over time and examine its effects on political trust and political participation conditional on the political and economic country context. We conclude with a discussion of the possible consequences of the observed patterns for contemporary European democracies.
Patterns of political participation are an important indicator of democratic development and citizen empowerment. Among various determinants of political participation, previous research has indicated that several types of health problems may have a positive impact on non-electoral participation, although the majority of studies have focused mainly on voting and found a largely negative impact of poor health. Yet several research gaps in the literature still exist. First, gender was previously examined mainly as a control variable, but rarely as a potential moderator of the health-participation link. This is especially important since women have lower rates of political participation and also report worse health outcomes. Second, age has also been previously detected as a moderator of the health-turnout link, yet it remains unclear whether its moderating role includes other forms of political participation as well. Third, the simultaneous role of country-level and individual-level characteristics has previously been rarely examined other than for voter turnout. We aimed to address these issues using the 7th round of European Social Survey (2014) data of respondents aged 15 and over, residing in 20 European countries and by applying multilevel modelling. We examined three dimensions of political participation as our main outcome variables: voter turnout, non-electoral conventional political participation, and protest participation.

Controlling for several country- and individual-level characteristics, the results indicate a significant positive impact of good health across all three participation dimension. Between-country differences in the magnitude of health’s impact on participation was found only for women’s turnout. In addition, gender and age moderated the relationship between health and political participation; better health had a stronger positive impact on political participation among women and among the elderly, although the impact varied across different dimensions of political participation. Implications of the results are discussed and future research suggestions are provided.

The childlessness rate has been increased over the decades and previous researchers have analysed its consequences to female life-course, such as health (Kendig et al. 2007) and old-age well-being (Huijts et al. 2013). However, from a demographic perspective, the relationship of childless with political science, especially voting turnout is missing as it was pointed out by Sommer (2018). This is a quite important aspect for demographers. Given the changes in the population structure, which is often understood in the framework of the second demographic transition, the significant question remained largely unexplored: Is there any effect of population structure change on politics? In other words, does the second demographic transition effect on democracy? Thus, in this study, we examine the association of childlessness with voting turnout focusing on individual level mechanism using the round 8 of European Social Survey. Results estimated by logistic regression present that childless people are less likely to report that they voted in the last national election after controlling away several important variables.

This study may give the implication into the future situation of democracy from the perspective of demography. Considering the level of childless rate is estimated to increase (Sobotka 2017), our result suggests that the current system of democracy may not work well in the future. While, in this study, we cannot tell the direction of the relation of childless and voting turnout (childless influences on voting participation or turnout tendencies influence on first birth), our interest is in the future political situation related to population structural change. Thus, we do not need to be worried about the direction of the relationship.
A2.4. IMPACT OF UNEQUAL TURNOUT ON ELECTION RESULTS - EVALUATION OF TRADITIONAL AND NEW APPLICATIONS
Stefan Haßner (University of Duisburg-Essen)

How would election results in the European Union change, if everybody would turn out to vote? This indeed counterfactual question nonetheless has important policy implications and was subject of many research articles in the field of electoral studies - without a clear result. While there is conventional wisdom among media and politics that left leaning parties would benefit from higher turnout rates, empirical political science often failed to confirm this theory. The vast majority of research confirms a strong correlation between socio-economic status and electoral participation. Similarly, the majority of studies believe - not prove - that socio-economically underprivileged groups traditionally lean more towards left-wing parties.

However, only a minority of studies acknowledge major changes of election results with universal turnout. A large part of academic attempts used regression/imputation approaches to predict the party preferences of nonvoters.

The scope of the proposed paper is two-folded: First, it will evaluate existing approaches of empirical political science and discusses why previous attempts failed to confirm changes in election results. Second, using ESS data, the paper introduces and assesses the application of Random Forests as a potential enhancement. Algorithms from the field of machine learning are often more flexible than traditional regression procedures, but therefore less interpretable.

Since the question if election results would differ is more a question of classification rather than interpretation, this - at least for political science - new algorithms might be a fruitful new approach to answer the question of impact of unequal turnout on election results.

The project is placed in a comparative European Union context, covering as many member states as possible using the first and last wave of the ESS. The proposed paper will compare the quality of Multiple Imputation and Random Forests in a concrete application, which is interesting academically and could have a policy impact, as well.

A2.5. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF YOUNG ADULTS IN EUROPE
Julia Weiß (Heidelberg University)

The emergence of the economic crisis that unfolded in 2008 led to the loss of millions of jobs in Europe. Previous studies show that young Europeans have been hit harder by the economic crisis than adults. This situation caused mass protests in some European countries like Spain, where young people have been the worst affected. At the same time researchers often postulate, that there is a lack of engagement of young adults in politics. There seems to be a discrepancy between this conclusion (lack of engagement) and the behavior of young adults in relation to the economic crisis (mass protest).

Drawing from this, the general research question is to what extent and in which form the crisis has had an influence on the political participation of young adults.

Following the grievance theory, which expects that grievances become the impetus for political mobilization, this paper hypothesizes, that the economic crisis led to the occurrence of grievances that stimulate political behavior. Using data from the European Social Survey, the general trend for the connection between the effects of the crisis and the political participation behavior of young adults is investigated. Differentiating between institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political participation, the focus is on the country comparison. To what extent does the impact of the economic crisis differ between more and less crisis affected countries?

The results show that as the consequences of the economic crisis changed also a change in the participation behavior took place. Thus, institutional participation declined, while non-institutionalized participation increased, just as e.g. the unemployment rate did. Apart from that, both significant differences between age groups and between the countries were found.
B5: HOW TO MEASURE THE CHANGES IN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS LESBIANS AND GAYS?

Session Organisers: Judit Takács and Ivett Szalma (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Public attitudes towards gays and lesbians are not homogeneous in Europe. There are societies where same-sex partnerships and adoption by same-sex couples are institutionalized and there are countries where one of those is legally possible (often same-sex partnership) and in some countries neither is institutionalized yet. These different legal frameworks and their changes in the last few decades can also reflect the fact that social attitudes are not at all uniform across Europe and over time.

The European Social Survey (ESS) has had a core question (Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish) since the very beginning (the first wave of ESS in 2002) to measure genderphobic/homophobic attitudes. In the last round of the ESS two new items were introduced (If a close family member was a gay man or a lesbian, I would feel ashamed; Gay male and lesbian couples should have the same rights to adopt children as straight couples), which make it possible to measure other dimensions of attitudes towards gays and lesbians and better understand the nature of gender-phobic/homophobic views across countries.

Among large-scale, randomized sample-based surveys it is not just the ESS that includes attitude questions about gays and lesbians but for example, the European Values Study (EVS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) also use somewhat different items. Using these European data sets can allow us to assess different aspects of problems and to compare the effects of different phrasings of similar questions. Thus there is space for methodological examinations whether different questioning in different surveys can yield comparable results.

The aim of this panel is to highlight the changes in attitudes towards gays and lesbians across countries and over time, and to reveal the key individual and macro level factors that can influence these attitudes. In this session we give priority to papers that use comparative perspectives and focus on the multifaceted nature of attitudes towards lesbians and gays.

B5.1. THE SEXUAL MORES OF CLASS: HOW OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE MOULDS HOMONEGATIVITY

Stef Adriaenssens, Jef Hendrickx and Johanna Holm (KU Leuven)

We go into the hardly researched question as whether occupational or social class positions directly affect homonegativity, or whether the relationship is spurious. Homonegativity in the working class has often been framed as a case of so-called ‘working class conformism’.

Homonegativity indeed has a distinct social class dimension. Manual workers consistently are the least accepting of homosexuality. This evidence is pretty robust. In different countries, with different surveys, differing wording in the survey items, and alternative stratification measures, broadly speaking reveals the same order.

This poses a conundrum: why would socio-economic positions inspire attitudes outside the realm of direct economic interests? Basically there two explanations have been suggested in the literature. On the one hand, some argue that the relationship is spurious because the educational correlate of blue collars (lower education, that is) causally accounts for homonegativity. Others, on the other hand, argue that social class is the actual causal factor. The production of a more homonegative attitude then resides in differences in life chances and occupational experiences, connected to (low-skilled) manual work. For instance: lower job autonomy, more stringent control at work, and a greater social distance to leading society.

We test these opposing explanations for the working class – homonegativity relationship with two designs. First, the evolution in repeated cross-sections of ESS and EVS (from 1980 to 2016) is used to show a stable distance between working class homonegative attitudes and others, against the rate of rising educational attainment in working class respondents. That provides support for the conjecture that not education per se, but occupational and social inferiority experiences foster homonegativity. Second, we exploit the presence of rising levels of educational attainment in the working class in the ESS. Overall, both designs provide strong support for thesis that social class also is a direct causal factor explaining homonegativity.
In this paper, I examine how two religious contexts: level of secularity and religious-secular politicization, could influence the impact of same-sex marriage and partnership legislations on the public attitudes towards homosexuality. Many European countries have legislated to secure the equal rights of homosexual people, especially on rights of marriage or civil partnerships. Meanwhile public attitudes towards homosexuality have also been increasingly tolerant in recent decades. Previous studies show that same-sex rights legislations are not only the consequence of public attitudes, but also influence the attitudes afterwards. However, findings are mixed with positive, negative, or polarized impacts. Religion, as the major opponent to LGBT rights, is often associated to negative attitudes towards homosexuality, and could lead to negative or polarized legislation impacts. Using 8 rounds of European Social Survey (ESS) data (2002-2016) with fixed-effect models, first, I find that the country’s secularity level does not make difference on impacts of legislations. However, for both types of legislations, the impacts have stronger polarizations in more secular countries, with core churchgoers showing more negative attitudes towards homosexuality and diverging from non-religious people after legislations.

Second, combined with the Manifesto Project (CMP) data, I find that in countries where the religious-secular issue is more politicized by political parties, the partnership legislation impact is more negative, and the impact of marriage legislation is more polarizing with core churchgoers becoming more negative. The study adds to the knowledge of same-sex rights legislation impacts and the religious polarization, showing that religious contexts could shape the impacts of legislations, as well as the secular-religious polarized legislation outcomes.

A growing number of countries have opened up civil marriage for same-sex couples and public opinion studies show a general shift towards greater acceptance of LGBT’s in many countries. Yet, there are considerable differences between countries. Most comparative studies however, apply a limited operationalization of such attitudes, often indicative of general acceptance or equality. Yet, studies in other social domains show a gap between support for abstract principles of equality or acceptance and support for specific implementations of these principles. Furthermore, one can distinguish various dimensions of public attitudes towards LGBT’s, e.g. attitudes toward same-sex sexual behavior; toward LGB individuals, and toward LGB civil rights (Kite & Whitley, 1996). In addition, we propose that attitudes are less positive (i) when same-sex relations are more visible; (ii) in intimate circumstances; (iii) and with respect to specific moral issues such as adoption of children.

Our contribution focusses on this multifaceted nature of LGB attitudes. Comparing different facets, we address the following research questions: (i) What are the overall trends and cross-national differences in LGB attitudes? (ii) Do we observe different patterns for different facets of LGB attitudes? (iii) What are the socio-demographic differences in LGB attitudes with regard to these different facets?

Distinguishing between different facets of attitudes towards LGB’s will shed more light on the mechanisms and individual and macro level factors that drive public opinion. We show trends and cross-national differences based on ESS data, and compare these findings with EVS and ISSP data that apply somewhat different items. Next, we focus on the Netherlands – a country known for its overall high level of general acceptance of LGBT’s – for which we have more refined measurements of the multifaceted nature of LGB attitudes available. We discuss the implications of our findings for the conceptualization and measurement of LGB attitudes.
TUESDAY 16 APRIL | 2-3.40PM | ROOM 102

B5.4. SHIFTING ATTITUDES TOWARDS HOMOSEXUALITY IN EUROPE: EXPLORING CHANGES IN INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITIES ACROSS TIME AND SPACE

Giulia M. Dotti Sani and Mario Quaranta (European University Institute, Florence)

Over the past decades, western countries have experienced major changes in public opinion towards homosexuality and diverse family forms, with studies documenting increasing acceptance of the lifestyle of LGBTI couples. Furthermore, previous research suggests important cross-national differences in attitudes towards homosexuality, as well as large variation among individuals with different socio-economic and cultural background. However, the extent to which certain individual characteristics drive changes in attitudes over time in different contexts has not been fully addressed in previous studies.

Therefore, this article contributes to the literature by jointly examining cross-national and cross-temporal differences in citizens’ attitudes towards gays and lesbians in Europe. Specifically, we seek to answer three main questions: i) to what extent have attitudes towards homosexuality changed over the period and across the countries considered? ii) which individual-level variables – such as age, gender, level of education and religiosity – are critical drivers of historical changes in attitudes? iii) are the effects of these individual drivers generalizable across countries or are they context-specific? These questions are addressed by relying on multilevel ordered logistic regression models on data from eight waves of the European Social Survey for 27 countries (from 2001-02 to 2016-17).

The ESS is especially suited for this study, as it includes a repeated item capturing general attitudes towards homosexuality ("Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish") as well as a wealth of individual background information. Preliminary results confirm large cross-national variation in the degree of acceptance of homosexuality as well as an increase in positive attitudes towards the lifestyle of gays and lesbians in most – but not all – countries. Furthermore, while strong associations emerge between crucial individual characteristics and the outcome, there is large heterogeneity across countries and over time.

B5.5. DEMOCRACY DEFICIT AND HOMOPHOBIC DIVIDE IN 21ST CENTURY EUROPE

Judit Takács and Ivett Szalma (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

In the present study we focus on the relationship between democracy deficit and homophobic divide within 21st century European societies. Our main research questions is whether whether the development of democracy can influence the attitudes towards gays and lesbians.

The empirical base of the study is all seven rounds of the European Social Survey dataset (2002 – 2016), focusing especially on a key variable measuring the agreement level with the statement that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.

For data analyses descriptive statistics and explanatory models were constructed by applying multilevel mixed effect linear regression models. Our results show that there are still significant differences between the Eastern and Western parts of Europe regarding social attitudes towards gays and lesbians.
Turbulent times in Europe: Instability, insecurity and inequality

TUESDAY 16 APRIL | 2-3.40PM | ROOM 103

E2: WELFARE SOLIDARITY DURING TURBULENT TIMES: EASTERN VS. WESTERN EUROPE

Session Organiser: Dimitri Gugushvili (University of Leuven)

At present all European welfare states face major challenges stemming from the accelerating trends of ageing, migration, proliferation of non-standard forms of employment, increasing income inequalities and higher preferences for individual protection from social risks. It is feared that gradually these changes may undermine the fundamental relations of solidarity that form the ideational basis of European welfare states, e.g. solidarity between generations, genders, rich and poor, working and non-working, and natives and migrants. Diminished solidarity in turn is likely to have far-reaching consequences for the future of the European welfare states as it can both strengthen the rationale for and weaken opposition to welfare retrenchment.

However, while the challenges may be universal for all European (and other advanced) welfare states, there are strong theoretical reasons why their effects on solidarity may differ substantially between the western and eastern parts of the continent. First, these trends, especially ageing and migration are less pronounced in Eastern Europe. Second, the unique legacy of cradle-to-grave communist welfare and rise in poverty and inequality associated with its retrenchment may have rendered Eastern Europeans more resilient to swings in solidaristic opinions.

Containing a specially designed module on welfare opinions in 2008 and 2016, European Social Survey (ESS) offers a huge potential for exploring the differences in Eastern and Western Europeans’ solidaristic attitudes in relation to multiple groups of vulnerable people, and changes in these attitudes in the past decade. In addition, it allows examining how solidaristic attitudes are influenced by people’s perceptions of various aspects of the welfare state, such as its ability to deliver high quality services and ensure decent living standards of its clientele and the perceived long-term moral, social and economic consequences that public welfare provision may entail.

Eager to exploit this opportunity, the stream encourages academic papers that utilise the ESS data (exclusively or in conjunction with other data) to analyse various types of welfare solidarity in a comparative perspective across Eastern and Western European countries.

E2.1. CULTURE OR CAPITAL? INSTITUTIONS OF WELFARE STATE ATTITUDES IN GREATER EUROPE

Nate Breznau (University of Bremen)

Dimensions of attitudes toward the social welfare state pattern by cultural values, suggesting that culture is a cause of these attitudes. In particular, attitudes pattern after value divergences produced by liberal versus socialist pathways during the industrial revolution and the ensuing Cold War. However, the productivity and wealth gains of societies also follows a similar pattern, likely the institutions of industrialization shaped these cultural values. Therefore, the causes of cross-national differences in attitudes toward the welfare state are endogenous with both culture and capital.

This presents a challenge to research attempting to link cultural values to attitudes. In this paper, I argue that values promoted in former Communist societies versus Western societies in Europe, led to a divergence in shared meanings for the attitude object of the ‘state’ and its ‘ideal role’ in providing social welfare. This is done with multiple group confirmatory factor analysis and testing of measurement noninvariance on survey data from the European Social Survey, Wave 4, conducted around 2008.

The latent attitude for preferred role of government is noninvariant across Europe, but separately invariant within Western, Satellite, and former Soviet societies respectively. However, the economic trajectories of the societies across Europe explain most of the attitude variance patterns. As Weber argued long ago, we cannot speak of (cultural) values or capital in isolation, they operate and develop together and jointly cause attitudes.
E2.2. WELFARE STATE AND GREAT RECESSION: CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS REDISTRIBUTION IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND THE REST OF EUROPE
Kristýna Bašná and Ivan Petrúšek (Czech Academy of Sciences)

This paper analyses citizens’ attitudes towards the welfare state and poses a question about whether public attitudes towards welfare state were influenced by the financial crisis. Its focus is on European countries and in particular on the differences between Eastern and Western European countries.

The paper examines three distinct research questions. Firstly, which individual-level and country-level variables are key determinants of support for income redistribution? Secondly, have Europeans reacted to the changing economic context uniformly, or do the directions of change vary? Thirdly, is there a difference in welfare state attitudes between post-communist European countries and the rest of Europe?

Specifically, the authors of this paper focus on attitudes toward income redistribution. The attitudes are measured on the individual and country level, the specific variables are chosen on the basis of previous scientific research, and they include important predictors such as social class, values, individual risk perception at the individual level, and GDP, or unemployment at the country level.

The paper employs data from Eurostat and the European Social Survey (data from 2008 and 2016, i.e. ESS4 and ESS8 rounds). The nature of the ESS data allows for multilevel regression analysis – both cross-country and longitudinal analysis.

Authors also extend the analysis to more ESS rounds to ensure the pre- and post-recession attitudes are robustly measured. The preliminary results show that there are indeed different attitudes towards redistribution in the post-communist countries and the rest of Europe. However, the differences seem to be decreasing over time. Moreover, the Great Recession appears to have an important influence on the attitudes towards welfare state as well.

E2.3. THE EFFECT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS DIFFERENT TYPES OF SOLIDARITY – A CHANGING EUROPEAN LANDSCAPE
István Grajczjár (Milton Friedman University Budapest), Antal Örkény and Zsófia Nagy (Eötvös Loránd University)

The aim of the paper is to map and contrast recent changes in attitudes towards different types of solidarity in Western- and Central Eastern Europe. A leading perspective of the paper is that the economic and the so called "refugee" crisis and its social and political consequences have fundamentally affected European attitudes towards solidarity. Such times of crisis are often seen as providing ample opportunities for the populist radical right to prosper. Nevertheless, the above developments do not necessarily mean a weakening of solidarity as its forms may change and its meanings become contested.

Therefore, we also suggest that the solidarian/non-solidarian binary is insufficient to address the complexities of the question. Thus we distinguish several types of "inclusive" and "exclusive" forms of solidarity (based on scope and foundation of solidarity – see Stjernø, Steinar. 2005. Solidarity in Europe. The History of an Idea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), allowing us to analyse the contrasts between these different notions.

Based on a comparison of ESS rounds 2008 and 2016 (rotating module welfare attitudes) in selected Central Eastern European and Western European countries the article – with help of k-means cluster and multinomial logistic regression analyses - examines what changes can be observed in welfare attitudes (macro-solidarity) and how could it be linked to 1) changes in solidarity values on the micro level (human values, such as altruism, social trust, tolerance etc.) on the one hand and, 2) to political attitudes, orientations and voting intentions on the other.
Tबुर्बल टाइम्स IN यूरोपियन: Instability, insecurity and inequality

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E2.4. BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR? REGIONAL AND SOCIAL DIVIDING LINES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS A SOCIAL EUROPE
Femke Roosma (Tilburg University) and Wim van Oorschot (Leuven University)

Scholars predict European regional differences in the extent to which people would favour a truly ‘Social Europe’: Where Western European people may fear that the standards of their generous benefits are levelled out in European social policies, Eastern Europeans may be more critical on their own welfare policies and therefore hope for something better coming from Europe. In this article we analyse whether or not positive/negative performance evaluations of the own social benefits lead to the hope/fear (expectation) that an EU-level social policy regulation would improve/worsen social benefits in a country and in this way determines people’s support for the implementation of an EU-wide social benefit scheme.

We use recent ESS 2016 wave 8 data to test this mediation effect in 18 EU member states. Results show that both the performance evaluation of social benefits and the expectation that an EU social policy would lead to higher benefits in a country, predict support for an EU social benefit scheme, and that there are expected regional dividing lines between Northern/Western and Southern/Eastern European countries. However, there is no mediation effect of hope/fear expectations in between performance evaluations and EU policy support.

E2.5. AN OUTLINE OF PERSONAL (PSYCHOLOGICAL) PROFILES OF FOUR WELFARE ATTITUDINAL TYPES BASED ON THE ESS ROUND 8 DATA
Ivana Piterová and Jozef Výrost (Slovak Academy of Sciences)

The comparison of ESS 4th (2008) and 8th (2016) round data showed that welfare attitudes in V4, Northern, and Western European countries are quite stable. Accordingly, social solidarity (as people’s support of the social benefits and services providing by state to the people facing hardship) and social differentiation (as distinction made between people or groups resulting in the assignment of benefits and services within society) scales were created out of 8 Round questionnaire items. Due to low intercorrelation between scales there was a possibility to divide respondents into four clusters which represent four distinct welfare attitudinal types: social democratic, liberal, conservative, and radical.

Sample for the analysis consists of 14294 respondents from Western Europe (FR, BE, NL, UK, IR) and Eastern Europe (CZ, HU, PL, RU, SL). In each group there are all of the welfare attitudinal types present in a quite similar extent. Outline of personal (psychological) profiles of four attitudinal types on the basis of attitudes towards different social topics is under the scope of this paper. Results of the analysis showed that attitudes towards unemployed, immigrants, and LGBTI are significantly different amongst representatives of attitudinal types from Western and Eastern Europe, thus analysis points that social democrats from west are more solidary than those from east.

Moreover, respondents from East Europe are thoroughly orthodox in the controversial topics such as immigration and LGBTI and that is regardless of their affiliation to the group. Differences between respondents from east and west were showed even in topics of political engagement and efficacy beliefs in the effectiveness of personal action contribute to a particular goal. Overview of psychological characteristics, beliefs and behavioral patterns of the aforementioned types and hypothesized differences between Western and Eastern Europe could help in making respectful and thoughtful political and other decisions on a national level.
F4: 2020 VISION: CONCISE RESULTS FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY
Session Organiser: Stefan Swift (City, University of London)

To mitigate against long and overcomplicated conference presentations, this mixed methodology and substantive session will feature up to six speakers presenting for a relatively short amount of time. The session is inspired by a format of presentation - PechaKucha - created in 2003 by Tokyo-based architects, Mark Dytham and Astrid Klein. It means that each speaker will only be allowed a maximum of 20 slides, and will display each slide for no longer than 20 seconds.

Papers will be invited from a carefully chosen selection of speakers who have the ability to meet the requirements of the presentation format. Ideally, the session will include three substantive presentations and three methodological presentations based on the European Social Survey and data from other sources, where relevant. Each speaker will be allocated seven minutes for their presentations and three minutes for questions in an hour long session. As the sessions last longer than one hour, the format will be tweaked slightly.

Substantive papers that will be invited will look to cover diverse topics such as political participation and political trust of natives and immigrants; the results of data on a range of topics collected through an input-harmonised cross-national probability-based web panel in three countries; and the effect of media coverage on survey responses.

Methodology papers that will be invited will look to cover how to include institutionalised populations in social surveys; mitigating for measurement error; the future of fieldwork collection modes; and social desirability bias. Other substantive or methodological topics will be considered following the open call for papers.

Significant time and effort will be allocated to assisting speakers in preparing for what will be a challenging task, especially if some of the topics covered include complicated theory and in such short amount of time. Examples of short presentations are available on the PechaKucha website, and this will be an invaluable resource.

F4.1. WHICH MACRO DETERMINANTS DRIVE THE ACCEPTANCE OF REFUGEES?
EXAMINING EUROPE 2014-17
Christian Czymara (Goethe University Frankfurt)

In the past few years, Europe has witnessed a sharp increase in the number of people that want to immigrate due to war or persecution. Most of these people originate from countries in Africa or the Middle East. The question how to deal with this inflow is currently dominating the political sphere and public debates throughout Europe. I investigate Europeans’ attitudes toward the national refugee policy using data from the last two waves of the ESS.

I model individual attitudes as a function of constant and time-varying macro-level conditions under control of potential individual-level confounders employing three-level hybrid hierarchical linear models. Based on the macro-level panel data, I find that attitudes are not affected by asylum rates in any way. However, the demography of a country does play a role: not only tend natives in countries with a larger share of foreigners to be less open toward refugees but especially does an increase in the foreign population during the period of analysis lead to more exclusionism.

This effect seems to be especially driven by countries that played a key role in the course of the so-called immigration crisis, such as Germany, Austria and Hungary. This indicates that the politicisation of the issue is a crucial factor regarding the formation of public opinion. Such a reasoning is bolstered by the fact that it is primarily conservative individuals who’s attitude are affected by rising inflow of newcomers.
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F4.2. Part-time Employment Among Men: The Interplay Between Country’s Gender Culture, Legal Entitlements to Part-time Work and Individual’s Gender Role Attitudes

Stéfanie André, Gerbert Kraaykamp (Radboud University) and Paul Sellies (University of Groningen)

Although research into part-time employment is not new, the literature has mainly focused on women. However, to understand part-time employment we should also look at the other part of the story: part-time employment of men. The prevalence of male part-time employment in Europe varies largely from country to country. Using data from the second and fifth round of the European Social Survey on 24 countries, this paper wants to examine (1) the effect of a country’s gender culture and legal entitlements to part-time work on men’s employment decision to work part-time, (2) the effect of men’s gender role attitudes on their employment decision to work part-time and (3) to what extent the relationship between men’s gender role attitudes and part-time employment is conditioned by the country context. We use multilevel analyses to assess the impact of as well individual as country characteristics on part-time employment. Results show that a country’s gender culture is related to men’s employment decision to work part-time. Men in countries with a more traditional gender culture are more likely to work part-time compared to men in countries with a more egalitarian gender culture.

Contrary to country-level context, at the individual level, men with more egalitarian gender role attitudes are more likely to work part-time compared to men with more traditional gender role attitudes. The effect of men’s gender role attitudes on working part-time has been found to vary across countries. However, at this moment variation cannot be explained by a country’s gender culture and legal entitlements to work part-time.

F4.3. Working Hours Mismatch and Mental Health in Europe

Andoni Montes Nebreda (Complutense University of Madrid)

The increasing flexibility of labour market and the characteristics of the new economy have altered the power of employees to decide on their working conditions. This could be leading to an increase on the mismatch between actual and preferred working hours of employees in Europe. I examine its impact on their mental health.

The results suggest that the gap between both variables has a negative impact on employees’ mental health, especially in cases of underemployment. However, income and working part time, which are very likely characteristics of this phenomenon, absorb the largest share of this correlation.

Furthermore, underemployment appears to be more harmful for women than for men. In contrast, overworking is found to be more harmful for men’s mental health than for women’s
F4.4. CAN ESS DATA BE USED TO MONITOR THE UN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS?
Daniel Capistrano, Mathew Creighton, Micheál Collins and Philip O’Connell
(University College Dublin)

Monitoring countries’ progress towards the 169 targets of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) will require an unprecedented effort from international organisations, national governments and civil society to produce reliable, comparable and timely data. This study evaluates the extent to which data produced by the European Social Survey (ESS) can be used to monitor countries’ progress towards the SDGs’ targets.

For that, we explore the adequacy of using ESS data for the set of targets that could be related to general attitudes and behaviours. For each of these targets, we assess issues regarding conceptual alignment, comparability, and reliability.

This paper has three main objectives: to provide a preliminary conceptual framework for the use of social survey data to monitor the SDGs; to offer insights for academics and policy makers on how ESS data can be used to monitor countries’ progress; and to identify relevant SDG topics that could be covered by ESS in the future.

F4.5. A BRIEF GUIDE ON IF AND HOW TO SURVEY INSTITUTIONAL RESIDENTS
Jan-Lucas Schanze and Verena Halbherr (GESIS)

In contrast to literature, films and arts, survey research mainly neglects institutional residents. A heterogeneous part of the population consisting of monks, prisoners, students, refugees, or elderly persons will never have a chance to become a respondent in most large social surveys, since surveys are often restricted to the population in private households. Our contribution will touch upon two main questions: Does the deliberate exclusion of the institutionalised minority cause any harm? And are there any ways for surveys to cover this part of the population often labelled as hard-to-survey?

Regarding the first question, we will elaborate on the two parameters of bias: the relative size of excluded residents and their statistical distinctiveness. Taking the example of elderly Europeans, the demographic change leads to a considerable growth of the oldest age cohorts living in institutions. Moreover, previous research reveals significant demographic, socio-economic and health-related differences between community-dwelling and institutional residents. Hence, survey researchers need to ask themselves whether results in some survey topics could be biased when institutionalised elderly are excluded.

In the second part, we stress the existence of many smaller or larger surveys that actually interviewed institutional residents, proving that they might be hard-to-survey, but definitely not impossible-to-survey. We name some important lessons learnt from these practical examples to assist other surveys in the process of extending their coverage and including institutional residents.

Three reasons lead us to conclude that survey researchers might have to reconsider the exclusion of institutional residents: They are growing in size and they are different in many characteristics. There are means to interview them and making the extra effort would also help surveys to cover hard-to-survey respondents living in private households. And finally, no one should lose the right to be bothered by motivated survey interviewers to voice his or her opinion.
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G4: POPULISM IN EUROPE
Session Organiser: Angelika Scheuer (GESIS)

Recent decades have seen a rise in the strength of so-called right-wing, as well as left-wing populist parties. The last national elections in France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany, as well as in Hungary, Poland and other countries all serve as examples for this trend. Among others, this trend has been associated with the rising immigration into Europe, the recent economic crisis, and globalization.

Other explanations refer to the increased political skepticism, frustration, and resentment towards existing political institutions. The aim of this session is to discuss rising populism in Europe using data from the European Social Survey. The session welcomes contributions that explore and test explanations for the increasing power of populist parties, or discuss its potential consequences from a comparative perspective.

G4.1. GATTIG, ALEXANDER & ENGEL, UWE: TWO OF A KIND? SIMILARITIES (AND DISSIMILARITIES) OF LEFT-WING AND RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES ACROSS EUROPE
Alexander Gattig and Uwe Engel (University of Bremen)

Research on right-wing populism has become ubiquitous in the social sciences over the past decades. However, recently a variety of left-wing populist parties have also gained popularity within the electorate, sometimes, e.g., in Spain or Italy, even resulting in government participation of these parties. However, much less research has been devoted to the socio-structural base of these latter parties and even less research has been devoted to comparisons of the respective electorates. This is especially striking since both populist party families similarly propagate their dislike of political and societal elites and similarly present themselves as alternatives to mainstream or center parties in order to capitalize on frustrated and disillusioned voters. We attempt to address this gap in the literature by using ESS data for all waves and countries where either left- or right-wing populist parties are present. Specifically, we firstly compare whether cleavages, e.g. social class measured by the Oesch class schema or by ESS / EGP-classes, are similar for left- and right-wing popular parties. Here, we explicitly distinguish between effects for mobilization, e.g. how cleavages affect turnout, and effects on voting behavior, e.g. how these cleavages affect the likelihood to vote for either populist party family. Secondly, we explore the effect of macro-level characteristics on these preferences. Here we focus on criteria deemed important by Arzheimer (2009, AJPS) and especially on Rodrik’s (2018, JIBP) distinction between open and closed economies.

Our analyses consist of two steps: First, we simultaneously model the effect of individual cleavages on turnout and voting behavior, using Heckman-type regressions. Secondly, we use multi-level models, cross-classified across time and countries.
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G4.2. CLASS VOTING, WORKING CLASS TURNOUT AND THE RISE OF POPULISM

Martin Elff (Zeppelin University)

A common explanation for the decline of social democratic and centre-left parties and the rise of populism is that the traditional working class is shrinking and that new political divides over globalisation and migration cut across historic cleavages between workers and owners of capital. The paper puts these notions to the test.

Using data from the European Social Survey - and thus generalising research based on data from German electoral studies and general social surveys - it examines (1) whether the working class is shrinking towards insignificance or merely changes its character; (2) whether and under what conditions members of the working class defect to non-left parties or, no longer being mobilised by social democratic and centre-left parties, withdraw from electoral politics; (3) the degree to which the recent rise of right-wing populism can be attributed to a return of disenchanted working-class members into politics; (4) what aspects of the social and political context moderate the working-class appeal of populism is strongly dependent on the social and political context.

G4.4. DYNAMIC OF EUROPEANS’ TOLERANCE TO "OTHERS"

Lilia Dimova (Agency for Social Analyses, Bulgaria)

Following conceptional understanding of tolerance as a fair, objective, and permissive attitude toward those whose opinions, beliefs, practices, racial or ethnic origins, etc., differ from one’s own, this report explores some main levels of tolerance at timing and European perspectives. The analyses present cross-dimensions of tolerance by countries, by age, by life satisfaction and by education.

On the basis of ESS data is designed an index of tolerance which combines tolerance levels to: 1) People with different sexual orientation; 2) Immigrants; 3) Different ethnic groups; 4) Different people in general.
It is frequently argued that we live in turbulent social and financial times which often have effects on the way the political system operates in many countries. As the aftereffects of the Global Financial Crisis are still visible in many European countries, and more broadly, it is often alleged that these societies are suffering from a crisis of faith in democracy, with political party membership falling dramatically and citizens finding themselves more and more disillusioned with mainstream politics.

The anger, fury and disgust targeted at members of the elites - whether these are national figures, leaders of financial institutions, the bureaucrats of Brussels or the politicians of leading political parties lead to a renewed wave of political unrest often taking various forms of protest. Issues of instability, insecurity and inequality have encouraged the peoples of Europe to engage in various forms of political participation: people often cast protest votes to populist political parties, participate in intense campaigning or take to the streets to protest violently against established elites.

This session invites papers which offer either a comparative perspective or focus on a particular national context on the topic of political participation in an era of instability, insecurity and protracted inequality (real and perceived) using available data from all rounds of the ESS. We aspire to receive methodological and substantive papers on scales measuring conventional and radical forms of political engagement and participation in Europe, as well as papers investigating alternative ways of measuring the abovementioned phenomena.

A4.1. FORECASTING OF STRUCTURALLY-DEMOGRAPHIC THREATS TO POLITICAL STABILITY IN EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE EU UNTIL 2025
Mykola Polovyi (Donetsk National University)

The presentation devoted to forecasting by the author’s simulation model of threats to political instability. The simulation based on the modified "structurally-demographic" approach of A.Korotayev and J.Goldstone. The model provides the possibility to give the prognosis of threats to political stability till 2025 in every Eastern European member of EU by ESS data. The model predicted that the order parameter, which determines the stability of the political process in contemporary Eastern European members of EU, is advisable to consider the rate of annual growth in the number of young people mostly with higher or incomplete higher education in large and medium cities which is superimposed on dynamics of demand for labor. The actual index of this order parameter for the Eastern European members of EU political process of the first and second decade of the twenty-first century should be considered an annual growth rate of urban youth age range 21 - 30 years.

Algorithm for computing the function of threats to political stability depends on the rate of growth of urban youth were built in such a way that in the result a conditional integer status indicator of political stability was obtained. The author’s forecast of political instability in Eastern European members of EU until 2025 is described. Some problems of the simulation search for adequate predictions of political instability are outlined.
A4.2. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AN ERA OF INSTABILITY, INSECURITY AND INEQUALITY
Afrim Krasniqi (Academy of Albanian Studies)

Over the last decade, the superiority of stability over democracy was written in capital letters in most of the countries of the Western Balkans. The collapse of Greece, the migration crisis and the internal clashes within the EU have heavily affected the form of political representation and citizen participation in the Western Balkans. The emerging social movements have pointed once again at the growing gap between the political establishment and the body of voters. Political elites were accused of limiting public participation and of controlling the system of political representation, by centralizing power and becoming more and more self-centred and corrupt. Elections were contested and gradually abandoned, whilst new parties and activist movements took the stage, asking for substantial corrections of the electoral systems, so as to forestall vote rigging, and to challenge the current monopoly of traditional parties over a growingly alienated public and a ever shrinking body politics.

Recent data on elections, including ESS studies on the region over the last decade provide a comprehensive picture of the developments related to the ups and downs of political representation, of its openness, and of its effectiveness in the Western Balkans.

This paper looks into these data and analyses them from a comparative perspective so as to bring more clarity on the new forms of political engagement and civic participation in the Western Balkans. The paper argues that the promise of stability is meaningless in the absence of functional democracy. Balkans needs more Europe, and this is a vital prerequisite for ensuring actual participatory democracy.

The political systems of the Western Balkans urgently necessitate real reform; to thrive they need tangible democracy for their citizens, as the paramount precondition for garnering more trust and support.

A4.3. DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT, PARTY POLARIZATION, AND ELECTORAL TURNOUT IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (European University Institute, Florence)

Why the rise of extremist parties in Europe - a broader political offer- does not increase electoral turnout? There is a consensus among scholars that party polarization has increased in European democracies since the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, contradictory to some implication of the spatial competition theory of voting, electoral participation has been decreasing since the end of the 1980s. Thus far, the literature on the subject has found contrasted results. It is yet unknown whether party polarization has a real impact on voter’s turnout, and to what extent it is conditional upon other macro or individual level factors.

The aim of this article will be to understand this mismatch by analyzing quantitatively the impact of party polarization on electoral turnout in Western European Democracies between 1996 and 2018. Using Chapel Hill Expert Survey and European Social Survey data, the main contribution of this article will be to consider the development of party polarization not only on the left-right scale but on a bi-dimensional - economic and cultural - scale. Indeed, whilst cultural issues have gained importance and have become more contentious in Western European party systems, parties have converged on economic positions, notably in response to the constraints of European integration.

Furthermore, this study shows how citizens do not react similarly to salient political conflict according to their level of political sophistication and partisanship. Therefore, these distinctions have the potential to explain substantially the contrasted results of previous research on the impact of party polarization on turnout in the case of European democracies.
A4.4. EUROPE AS A BREACH OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A MODEL FOR EXPLAINING THE RISE OF THE FAR RIGHT AT TIMES OF CRISIS
Sofia Vasilopoulou (University of York) and Daphne Halikiopoulou (University of Reading)

Existing explanations of the rise of the far right in Europe focus on the culture versus economy dichotomy, with scholars increasingly agreeing that culture is the strongest predictor of far right party support. This paper contests this view, arguing that it is premised on three false assumptions. First, they assume that immigration is a cultural variable, thus overlooking the overlap between economy and culture. Immigration is multi-dimensional and citizens’ concerns over this policy range from culture to unemployment, crime and terrorism.

Second, they subsume phenomena such as Brexit, the rise of European far right parties and the election of Donald Trump in the US under the ‘right-wing populist’ umbrella, thus overlooking the specific context of Europe; and more specifically the extent to which dissatisfaction with two levels of governance (EU and national) is driving the popular vote. Third, they tend to focus on the core voter profile of the far right, i.e. the culturally insecure voters, while placing less emphasis on the extent to which a party might be need to mobilise voters beyond its secure voting base to be electorally successful.

In order to address these limitations in existing literature, this paper puts forward a model that takes governance into account. Using data from 8 waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2016), we show that the rise of the far right in Europe is better understood within a framework of the social contract, i.e. a broader framework of collective cooperation in which state capacity, institutional trust, compensation and national solidarity are all dimension of good governance. We show that good governance makes it unlikely for far right parties to expand their support beyond their secure voting base.

A4.5. VOTE INTENTION IN HYPOTHETICAL EU MEMBERSHIP REFERENDUMS
Angelika Scheuer (GESIS)

The focus of public attitudes towards European unification is changing with the actual challenges that the EU is facing. Currently, due to the Brexit, the option of withdrawing from membership implies a new perspective on the unification process. The ESS8 has included questions on how the respondents would vote in a hypothetical membership referendum.

This paper investigates what drives the hypothetical voting behaviour in membership referenda. Is it the personal stance on the European dimensions, or is it rather similar to electoral voting behaviour? The analysis first looks at how attitudes on a membership withdrawal interacts with other indicators of European and national dimensions included in the ESS.

In a second step it will be tested how well the position on the European dimension can explain the individual choice in such a hypothetical referendum as compared to ideological or specific policy positions. Country comparison aims at revealing whether other countries too tend towards an exit strategy in European unification and on how is the motivated.
The rise of social inequality is considered one of the most pressing societal issues in Europe. Re-search, for example, detected widening gaps in the distribution of income and wealth but also regarding diverse other domains of life such as education, job security, or individual chances to get ahead. A wide array of social issues such as depression, deviant behavior, or lack of social cohesion are said to be directly linked to social inequality. However, the mere rise of social inequality in a specific domain does not necessarily translate into negative societal outcomes. Indeed, many dominant social norms legitimate social inequalities - at least to a certain extent. For instance, in many societies it is consis-tered legitimate that those with higher education, or those with more responsibilities should receive higher earnings. Hence, rising earnings inequalities can be considered legitimate if they are in line with a dominant social norm such as the principle of meritocracy or equity. Social inequality research should therefore not only describe the rise in inequalities but should also consider whether the degree of so-cial inequality is considered legitimate. Attitude research may help to understand why (or why not) the observed inequalities translate into societal consequences. The general idea of attitude research on social inequality is that individual attitudes - for example those on preferences on redistribution, subjective well-being, fairness perceptions, or trust - mirror whether people consider certain inequalities as problematic or not. The ESS - with its wide range of questions on individual attitudes - provides a great resource for cross comparative research that uses attitudes as both dependent and intermediate variables. In addition to the rich pool of existing attitude measures, the forthcoming Round 9 of the ESS will put special emphasis on the perceived fairness of the earnings and wealth distribution as well as the fairness of chances regarding the access to jobs and education. First data on these concepts are already available from the CRONOS web survey administered to Round 8 ESS participants in the UK, Slovenia, and Estonia.

In this thematic session we want to bring a group of scholars together that investigate individual atti-tudes as consequences of social inequality making use of ESS data. We further encourage contribu-tions that use data of the CRONOS web survey as an additional data source that allows for the inclu-sion of indicators of social inequality and its consequences that will be featured in the upcoming ESS Round 9 data collection.

**B2.1. CLASS AND CRISIS**

Peter Egge Langsæther (University of Oslo), Silke Goubin (KU Leuven) and Atle Haugsgjerd (University of Oslo and Institute for Social Research)

This study empirically investigates how austerity policies affect political legitimacy feelings among different social classes and whether this effect is moderated by who’s in power. When Europe was hit by the 2008 economic and financial crisis and its consequences, most govern-ments implemented austerity policies to deal with the budgetary challenges imposed by the crisis. We argue that the working class is more likely to be affected by austerity policies than the service (middle) classes, as they have lower income higher risk of unemployment, social security dependence, etc. Hence, we expect blue collar workers to react more strongly to austerity measures than middle class people, which we empirically measure by a stronger reduc-tion in feelings of political legitimacy. We furthermore argue that it matters who implements these policies. Where austerity measures were introduced (or implemented) by governments where labour parties participated, we expect workers to react more strongly in terms of both satisfaction with democracy and trust in political parties. The theoretical reasoning is simply that labour parties are traditionally seen as the representatives of the working class, which may feel "backstabbed" by these parties. A case in point would be Hollande, who promised in the 2012 campaign to stop austerity, and then instead implemented it. When liberal/conservative parties implement such measures, on the other hand, this is "as expected" and should not to the same extent reduce satisfaction with democracy, trust in political parties or (in particular) support for Labour parties. We base our analyses on pooled European Social Survey data (2004-2016), and employ a semi-panel approach: we aggregate average levels of trust in par-ties and satisfaction with democracy among the different social classes in Europe (based on the EGP schema). We analyse fixed effects models and compare the developments in countries with austerity implemented by labour parties and by other right-wing parties.
Since the onset of the 2008/09 economic crisis about a decade has passed. Whereas some countries have recovered comparatively well, others have undergone a deterioration of their labor market situation. Apart from that, many countries have taken welfare measures to enhance their levels of social security. Against this background, we ask for socio-economic and welfare-institutional determinants of perceived social risks among Europeans (2008/09 vs. 2016/17).

In order to answer this research question, we use individual-level data from the 4th and 8th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) as well as suitable country-level data. The sample consists of 19 countries which took part in both ESS rounds.

Our dependent variable is an additive index composed of two items and asking for an assessment of substantial social risks: the risk of becoming unemployed and the risk of having not enough money to cover for household necessities.

At the individual-level we take seven independent variables: gender; age; years of education; EGP class position; equivalized household net income; type of labor contract; previous unemployment experience. At the country-level we use six independent variables: GDP per capita; Gini coefficient; unemployment rate; social expenditures (as percentage of GDP); expenditures for active labor market policies (as percentage of GDP); OECD Employment Protection Index.

To determine the degree to which individual-, country-year- and country-level characteristics explain the variance in perceived social risks, we perform three-level multilevel modeling. We further conduct cross-level interactions to capture the interplay between country-year-level contexts and individual-level socio-economic positions.

Our results show that, overall, Europe is better off now than during crisis years. A country’s good socio-economic situation, indeed, absorbs perceived social risks. However, the effect of welfare interventions turns out to be partly different than might be expected. These results suggest that macro contexts affect perceived social risks in various ways.

The paper discusses how inequalities in access to adult education affect national and individual well-being by studying their influence on the construction of impersonal and institutional trust. Building upon the capability approach, it is argued that both equity in access to education and social trust are important dimensions of people’s well-being. The analysis focuses on non-formal job-related adult education. Regarding trust, the paper refers to both impersonal trust and institutional trust, and uses various indicators for measuring the two, such as generalized trust, generalized fairness, trust in parliament, and trust in the legal system.

More specifically, two indexes for measuring inequalities in access to non-formal job-related adult education are developed: 1) an Index of inclusion and 2) an Index of fairness. The study draws on data from the European Social Survey and explores the problem at both individual and national level and applies descriptive statistics and multilevel modeling for the analysis of data.

Our preliminary findings show that, at the individual level, inequalities in access to non-formal job-related adult education are associated with decreased degrees of both impersonal and institutional trust.

They demonstrate that the influence of inequalities in access to non-formal job-related adult education on both impersonal and institutional trust differs across European countries being stronger in countries with flawed democracy than in those with a full democracy. The results also suggest that, at national level, the relationship between inequalities in access to non-formal job-related adult education and impersonal trust is stronger than the relationship between the inequalities in access to non-formal job-related adult education and institutional trust.
After the Great Recession, distrust and negative images towards the European Union (EU) have spread enormously among European citizens (vgl. Nancy, 2016). At the same time, income and labour market inequality has increased within and between the countries of the European Union (Heidenreich, 2016). European integration is increasingly politicised (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Kriesi, 2016) and there seems to be a gap between European elites and the national population in the support of integration (Spanje and Vreese, 2011). Europeanisation has been diagnosed to create new divides between winners and losers of the integration process (Fligstein, 2008).

Similarly, Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) have identified the demarcation caused by globalisation and Europeanisation as new cleavages in European societies. Therefore, we raise the question: Which social milieus support or oppose European integration? In the present study, social milieu is understood as a group which is characterised by relatively similar social positions, shared values and a common lifestyle (Bennett et al., 2009; Bourdieu, 1984; Lepsius, 1993: 38). Using the European Social Survey, we concentrate on socio-economic indicators, human values and political attitudes. We operationalize support for European integration by referring to the ongoing debate about Euroscepticism. Although many authors have studied Euroscepticism, it is still unclear how socio-economic inequality and both cultural and political values are associated with anti-European narratives.

In our study, we use data from the 8th wave of the European Social Survey and employ correspondence analysis (Greenacre, 2017; Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010) which can be used for investigating the association of disparate concepts. In a second step, we map how these social milieus are distributed over European countries using cluster analysis (Everitt et al., 2011). Thereby, our study contributes to recent debates concerning the impact of social inequality for European integration.
Since the 1970ies, profound changes in family lives took place all over Europe. Western European countries saw a substantial increase of female labour force participation. Women do not withdraw anymore from the labour market after marriage or motherhood but remain employed until retirement. The trajectory in Central-Eastern European was different due to their state-socialist past and the high female labour participation that came with it. However, during the economic restructuring in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, these countries experienced a substantial decline of female labour participation. Today, in both regions, families face growing difficulties of work-family reconciliation. This has increased the risk of work-life conflict for men and women across Europe. In Western Europe, this is due to women’s additional commitment to work without the necessary structures to support family-related work. In the post-socialist countries, the transition brought a rise in work pressure and cuts in welfare services, leaving more burden of care on the families.

Even though there is a wealth of research about work-life conflict, we still know very little about how micro and macro level variables influence work-life conflict across countries and across individuals within countries due to scarcity of cross-national research on work-life conflict. Especially how differences in policy and cultural norms between countries affect work-life conflict of couples remains uncharted territory. The aim of this session is to examine how the gender norms and cultural factors influence the perceived work-life conflicts among men and women across European countries. We welcome contributions that take a comparative approach to work-life conflict among couples. We especially encourage papers that explore how cultural and gender norms might interact with family policies regarding work-life conflict.

Work-life conflict is an important issue in today’s society and there is abundant research about this topic. A major finding of the previous research projects suggests that most of the variation in work-life conflict can be explained in terms of differences in working conditions. At the same time, welfare states shape working conditions as well as measures to cope with them.

Therefore, the conclusion seems valid that there are different patterns of work-life conflict across different welfare regime types. However, most research on work-life examined single countries or small selections of countries. This paper thus aims to better understand the effects of working conditions and welfare regimes on work-life conflict focusing on a broad range of European countries, especially focusing on the rarely examined CEE countries and their similarities and differences related to the other country groups.

In order to analyse these questions, we use the fifth round of the European Social Survey (ESS), which was carried out in 2010.

While some studies showed that Southern European and post-communist countries are similar because of the traditional gender norms and bad working conditions, we found the opposite outcome regarding work-life conflict: Southern and Eastern European countries can rather be regarded as opposite pairs and it seems that Southern European countries are closest to Liberal Welfare countries while post-communist countries are similar to the Northern countries.
B4.2. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AS A DETERMINANT OF DIVISION OF WORK-LIFE BALANCE WITHIN COUPLES ACROSS EUROPE: A GENDER ANALYSIS IN A CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE

Theocharis Kromydas (University of Glasgow)

One major determinant of labour market outcomes, such as employment and wages, is educational attainment. On average, the more educated someone is, the more likely is to find a well-paid job and one of a better quality (Kalleberg and Vaisey 2005; Kalleberg 2011; Kromydas 2015). Though evidence is abundant on the positive effect education has on employability and wages, there is still very limited knowledge on how higher educational attainment affect work–life balance (WLB) and whether this differs between genders. This article investigates the division of work within couples across Europe using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) for 2004 and 2010 from 17 European countries, focusing on the educational attainment of heterosexual partners and the external economic climate they live in. Particularly, the concept of WLB, presented as a binary index, is used. WLB is a complex concept, as it can be determined by factors related to both work and outside work settings. The current article responds to calls in the literature for further research on various dimensions of WLB and their gender differences, using relevant data from ESS. In terms of future research, the upcoming ESS module in Round 9 on the ‘Timing of life: The Organisation of the Life Course in Europe” will allow conclusions stemming from this research to be updated and replicated. Results showed that WLB determinants within couples are not the same for male and female spouses, and they also differ considerably across Europe. More importantly, educational attainment can have an adverse effect on female spouses’ WLB, whereas for men, this is rarely the case. Finally, women seem more sensitive to fluctuations in the economic climate, which is captured using three different variables: GDP growth and unemployment rates as well as subjective perceptions of the state of economy as a whole.

B4.3. GENDER ATTITUDES AND ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION ACROSS EUROPE (THE EVIDENCE OF ESS DATA)

Natalia Soboleva (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia)

Nowadays, in Europe, women do not have lower education as compared to men, but they are often less advantaged in making their careers. The reasons for this reside in the gender discrimination prevalent in the labour market, the unequal distribution of household chores, cultural differences, and self-discrimination in both the public and private spheres. The study aims to reveal the association of gender attitudes, achievement motivation and the realisation of this achievement motivation among working women in Europe. The dataset is the fifth wave of the European Social Survey (2010). The sample is limited to employed women and men. Multilevel regression modelling is used. According to the results, women and men with more egalitarian gender attitudes in general have higher achievement motivation and are more likely to be able to influence policy decisions in their organisations. For men, the effect of gender attitudes is weaker, and the association between achievement motivation and influencing policy decisions is stronger. At the same time, both these effects were not universal for all the countries. The effect of gender attitudes on achievement motivation is stronger for countries with higher female involvement in the labour market, both for women and for men. The effect of gender attitudes on the assessment of influencing policy decisions is weaker and not true for all the countries. The impact of achievement motivation on the possibility to influence decisions is very strong in all the countries but is the strongest in countries with higher female involvement (especially for men). The current research brings us to the question of whether reaching full gender equality is a realistic and right (rational) goal. From my point of view, it would be better to strive not for equal male and female participation in the labour market but for the situation when both men and women feel comfortable. Male and female values and aspirations should be taken into account while elaborating social policy. Increasing female participation in the labour market can also generate more egalitarian gender role attitudes.
B4.4. DISENTANGLING THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN THE GENDER DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR. EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE'S IMMIGRANTS
Renzo Carriero (University of Turin)

The importance of national contexts in shaping the gender division of household labor has been highlighted by several studies in the last years. However, the role of institutional (e.g. social policies) and cultural factors (social norms) is difficult to disentangle as they are inevitably confounded in national contexts. To address this issue, I apply the emerging "epidemiological approach" which focuses on international migrants as individuals who bring cultures differing from the one prevalent in the national contexts in which they live.

I analyze the gender division of housework of first and second generation immigrants living in countries covered by the second and fifth round of European Social Survey. Applying cross-classified multilevel models and using several indicators of gender culture at both origin and destination, I found that the female share of housework increases in couples when the man or the woman come from a gender traditional cultural background.

However, the effect of culture disappears among second generation women, suggesting that they are more likely than men to reject the disadvantageous aspects of their ancestry culture. The findings have implications for the social policies aiming to redress gender imbalances in paid and unpaid work.

B4.5. IMMIGRANT WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF GENDER IDEOLOGIES
Agnieszka Kanas (University of Amsterdam) and Katrin Muller

Foreign-born women have much lower labour force participation rates (LFP) than native-born women and foreign-born men, with women coming from less developed and more traditional countries having the lowest LFP. Key candidate explanations:
- human capital and family structure
- cannot explain these differences. Research on native-born women suggests that cultural factors such as religiosity and traditional gender ideology are important for women's LFP.

A novel contribution of this study is the examination of how macro-level religiosity and gender ideology of the receiving context affect immigrant women’s LFP. Given that majority of migration flows is from traditional to egalitarian countries, an important question is what happens to immigrant women’s LFP when origin- and destination-country attitudes towards gender roles differ, e.g., when women who have traditional gender-role attitudes move to more egalitarian countries?

Using the European Social Survey data and logistic multilevel regression analyses, we find that individual religiosity is negatively related to immigrant women’s LFP, and this is mainly because religiosity is associated with traditional gender-role attitudes. Moreover the negative relationship between having traditional gender-role attitudes and LFP is stronger for women in more traditional contexts. These results suggest that changes in individual-level attitudes may not be enough to increase immigrant women LFP without addressing macro-level attitudes towards traditional gender roles.
D5: ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS IN EUROPE
Session Organiser: Alice Ramos (University of Lisbon)

After eight rounds of European Social Survey an extremely rich amount of data on immigration has been gathered. Two rotating modules (Round 1 and Round 7) and a core block of questions on attitudes towards immigration in all rounds have originated a multitude of studies on different dimensions of relevant issues related to attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. However, a common denominator oriented all these studies: the hosting populations’ perspective.

The session under proposal intends to change the analytical focus and understand migrants’ attitudes and opinions about the hosting populations and communities. Albeit the considerable number of qualitative, ethnography based, research projects on this topic, we lack extensive work and longitudinal trends on immigrants’ own experience of immigration, their opinions and attitudes.

From a substantive point of view, research on how immigrants relate to the local citizens, how they evaluate the social, political and economic functioning of the hosting society, what are their feelings and opinions about immigration public policies, what experiences of discrimination are reported, are just some examples of what can be explored.

However, the nature of this analysis may raise methodological challenges. In fact, ESS samples are designed to be representative of the resident populations and migrants constitute a minority.

Moreover, in countries that use individual or address sampling frames only legal immigrants are covered. To what extent does this aspects represent a problem? What specific methodological precautions, if any, should be addressed? The novelty of this perspective allows a wide range of substantive and methodological issues that, in our opinion, justify the organization of a specific session.

D5.1. AN AGE-PERIOD-COHORT ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRATION IN POLAND
Andrew Bell and Aneta Piekut (University of Sheffield)

Many studies on attitudes towards immigration in Europe demonstrate that younger generations are more accepting of difference than older ones, as a result of increasing ethnic diversification of societies and more equality legislations. Yet, not all European countries follow this pattern of change in terms of ethnic and religious make-up (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018). In this paper we consider a number of European countries but focus on Poland as a case study – a country which in 20th Century has gone through a period of social upheaval, changes in territorial borders and massive populations shifts. While the 2nd Polish Republic (1918-1945) was an ethnically diverse country, during the subsequent Socialist period (1945-89, from 1952 as People’s Republic of Poland) achieving population homogeneity was an official aim of the State as part of a nationalist ideology, as well as encounters with people who are ethnically different were much limited. This was followed by the re-emergence of democracy after 1989 and contact with ‘others’ becoming more commonplace again.

As argued by Mannheim (1952) generations are bound together by significant historical events or periods of societal transformations, which shape their values and might contribute to development of shared identity. There has been a lot of controversy recently about methods that aim to disentangle age, period and cohort (APC) effects (Bell and Jones 2018); we address this controversy using a version of the Hierarchical APC model with clear and strong assumptions that allow for the identification of APC effects. We will show whether attitudes towards immigration in Poland are related to ageing, period effects related to contemporary societal changes, or cohort effects related to societal transformations in individuals’ formative years.
D5.2. ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRANTS IN IRELAND: TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Philip J O’Connell, Daniel Capistrano, Micheál Collins and Mathew Creighton (University College Dublin)

Ireland experienced the ups and downs of a full business cycle in the twenty-first century, from boom up to 2008, to deep recession between 2008 and 2012, and recovery since 2013. The boom led to a sharp increase in inward migration, the recession to some decline in the immigrant population, and the recovery to renewed immigration. Ireland thus represents an interesting case in which to examine macro-level explanations of changes in the attitudes of the indigenous population to immigrants. This paper focuses on two such explanations for patterns and trends in attitudes to immigrants: (1) the ‘economic competition’ approach, which emphasises the impact of macro-economic trends in general, and labour market conditions in particular; and (2) the ‘ethnic/cultural conflict’ approach, which asserts the importance of the scale of immigration or the relative size of the immigrant population. The paper draws on a range of questions about people’s perceptions and attitudes to immigrants collected in each wave of the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2016. We develop multivariate models of attitudes to migration, controlling for relevant covariates from the ESS data. Our models also combine the ESS data with macro-level indicators to capture the business cycle (unemployment and economic growth) as well as trends in the scale of immigration (flows and stocks differentiated by region of origin).

D5.3. LABOR MARKET COMPETITION AND OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION
Sebastian Barfort, Sara B. Hobolt and Toni Rodon (London School of Economics)

What shapes individuals’ opposition to immigration? Studies have consistently shown a strong effect of cultural concerns and identities on immigration attitudes. In contrast, there is much weaker evidence to support the argument that the economic threat of competition for jobs explains opposition to immigration. In this paper, we revisit the labor market competition thesis and argue that only those natives who are most vulnerable to threat of migrants, due to the low language barriers in their in occupation, respond to immigration inflows by opposing immigration.

To test this proposition, we use a novel identification strategy that exploits differences in occupation-specific language requirements that assign immigrants into some occupations, while other, otherwise similar, occupations are less affected. Analyzing data on Europeans’ attitudes towards immigration from the ESS, we demonstrate that when immigrants enter a broadly defined labor market, individuals employed in low-language barrier occupations belonging to this labor market respond more negatively than individuals in similar occupations with higher language barriers.

We further show that the same individuals are more likely to support far right parties. This study thus provides robust cross-national evidence that labor market competition from immigrants shapes natives’ immigration attitudes and voting behavior. This has significant implications for the debate on the determinants of immigration attitudes and populist voting.
D5.4. IMMIGRATION BY THE LENS OF NATIONALS AND IMMIGRANTS: SELF-INTEREST, SOLIDARITY, AUTOCHTHONY AND MORAL DETERMINANTS

Alice Ramos (University of Lisbon)

By looking at the ‘e’ side of immigrants, this presentation explores the opposition towards migration from a multi-layered angle that offers novel insights beyond the common antagonism between migrants and nationals as two homogeneous groups. Taking into account the diversity of immigrants’ profiles living in European countries, three groups are considered – nationals, immigrants from European countries, and immigrants from non-European countries. Based on the literature on the determinants of opposition to immigration, four hypotheses are contrasted: 1) Former immigrants are more open to newcomers than the other two groups (the solidarity hypothesis); 2) People living under more fragile socio-economic conditions oppose more to immigration (the self-interest hypothesis); 3) Long-standing immigrants develop a sense of primo-occupancy that makes them reject newcomers (the autochthony hypothesis); 4) Values, as moral guiding principles, contribute over and above the other three dimensions to explain opposition/openness to immigration (the morality hypothesis). The main conclusions, drawn from ESS R7 data, suggest that migrants are not a homogeneous group and that the socio-cultural specificities that divide them request distinctive models to interpret their attitudes towards immigration.
Over the past decade, European societies have experienced the 2008 banking crisis, which was quickly followed by an economic recession in 2009, which in turn invoked a fiscal and debt crisis in many of them. In reaction, most European countries implemented fiscal consolidation programs, including significant welfare retrenchment and labour market reforms. Combined with longer-term structural societal changes (e.g. population ageing, globalization), the crises and reforms generated intensified discussions about the necessity, feasibility and fairness of redistributive welfare arrangements. Amidst this turmoil, it is important to have a broad and deep insight in the social legitimacy of European welfare states and their (reformed) policies. This social legitimacy, indicated by the degree to which the general public supports the welfare state and its provisions, is recognized to play a role in the democratic politics of the welfare state, either as an ex-ante factor informing policy makers about the welfare preferences of citizens, or as an ex-post factor informing them about citizens’ evaluations of policies. Given that the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath has intensified the structural, ideological and social pressures that were already put on the shoulders of the European welfare states, it has become pertinent to know how Europeans’ welfare attitudes developed since then.

This session aims to shed light on (changes in) the social legitimacy of present-day European welfare states by addressing the question how the welfare attitudes of Europeans have reacted to the economic recession, the consequent welfare reforms and the on-going debates. To this end, we welcome two types of studies. A first type involves studies that make use of the welfare attitudes module in the 2016 wave of the ESS to examine European citizens’ opinions towards some of the newer policy orientations that are being discussed and implemented in contemporary European welfare states – such as activation policies, welfare selectivism, and the basic income. A second type concerns studies that analyze the differences and similarities in welfare attitudes of Europeans in 2016 and 2008, combining data of the ESS4 and ESS8. Questions that can be addressed in this regard are: (1) To what extent have levels (e.g. the level of welfare chauvinism) or patterns (e.g. the polarization in welfare chauvinism) of welfare state support changed between 2008 and 2016?, and (2) To what extent are welfare attitudes related to (changes in) the national contexts people live in?.

E1.1. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS A EUROPEAN MINIMUM INCOME BENEFIT: DIVERGING INTERESTS WITHIN AND ACROSS EU MEMBER STATES?
Sharon Baute and Bart Meuleman (KU Leuven)

The economic crisis and the unequal degree to which it has impacted EU member states, has fueled the debate on whether the EU should take responsibility for the living standards of European citizens. Although political leaders of the EU increasingly believe that a ‘Social Europe’ is indispensable for the continuation of the European project, little is known about the public attitudes towards European social policy instruments. This is the first study that investigates public support for an EU-wide social benefit targeted at the poor, using data of the European Social Survey 2016 of 18 EU member states.

Results of the multilevel analyses show that Europeans stand quite divided on the implementation of a European minimum income benefit. A lower socio-economic status, left ideology and a sense of European identity are important drivers of citizens’ support for this policy proposal. Furthermore, in strong welfare states, citizens are less likely to support an EU-wide minimum income benefit, suggesting that they assess the desirability of such a scheme against the generosity of the social provisions they have at home.

Results further reveal that fear that European integration will erode social protection levels mediates the effects of socio-economic status and welfare state generosity on support for a European minimum income benefit. This indicates that citizens’ perceived threat of the EU’s impact on social security as well as the national climate of this perceived threat are key to understand potential contestation over the future development of Social Europe.
E1.2. TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN, OR MORE? EUROPEANS’ PREFERRED BALANCE BETWEEN SOCIAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNEMPLOYED
Federica Rossetti (KU Leuven)

The shift towards an 'activating' welfare state, no longer based only on passive transfers to welfare beneficiaries, has brought welfare attitude scholars to develop the idea that support for social rights and for social obligations are 'two sides of the same coin' (Laenen, 2017). However, this black-and-white approach might veil more nuanced opinions on what benefit recipients should get and under which conditions. Since activation policies are based on obligations attached to social rights, they are part of a larger debate on the balance between these two aspects in people's eyes. Despite an increasing number of studies aimed to reveal the link between attitudes towards social rights and obligations, still little is known about individuals’ preferences in articulating these attitudes, and what determines this balance, both at the individual and at the country-level.

This paper contributes to this debate by elaborating on a previously identified fourfold typology of citizens’ preferred balance between social rights and obligations referred to diverse policy groups (Jeene & van Oorschot, 2015). The European Social Survey 2016 offers the chance to empirically test whether Europeans differ in their combination of support for social rights and obligations of a specific target group, namely the unemployed, and to investigate what determines people’s preferred balance. This unique cross-national survey allows to study which socio-structural and ideological characteristics determine people’s preferences, and whether this preferred balance is related to economic and institutional characteristics of the country of residence. We expect that preferences are related to personal interests in receiving benefit with low obligations, such as being unemployed. Moreover, we investigate whether cross-national differences in preferences are associated with the activation policy legacy of the country.

E1.3. ALLOWED TO TURN DOWN. THE DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMANDING ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
Peter Grand, Marcel Fink and Guido Tiemann (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna)

Activation policies are very common in the toolbox of labour market instruments. These policies shall "motivate" unemployed individuals to get as quickly as possible back to work. However, some countries have introduced certain "obstacles" to a rapid reintegration into the labour market, e.g. rules regarding job protection or payment protection. However, how popular are decisions of unemployed individuals to reject a job offer because it pays a lot less than they earned previously or because it needs a much lower level of education than the person has? And do these attitudes change according to certain characteristics of those who turn down such a job offer? These questions tap a strand of research on welfare attitudes dealing with 'deservingness', the notion that people held some individuals as more eligible compared to others. The concept of 'deservingness' has been measured mostly indirectly with questions tapping the perceived responsibility of the government to care for the living standard of certain groups. Using ESS round 8 data it is for the first time possible to measure attitudes towards unemployed individuals rejecting a job offer directly and, furthermore, within a quasi-experimental setting. Employing a three-level hierarchical linear modeling approach we not only show individual characteristics responsible for the differences in attitudes but show also differences between specific groups rejecting a job offer and between different countries.
In order to cope with population ageing and high unemployment rates in the aftermath of the economic crisis, pension and labour market systems across Europe have been undergoing significant reforms. Governments increased the retirement age and shifted towards private funded pillars. Unemployment benefits have been retrenched and activation measures introduced. Nevertheless, politicians’ room for manoeuvre to enact reforms is partly shaped and sometimes restricted by public opinion. We explore public attitudes towards retirement income and towards unemployment benefits and how these have changed across 18 European countries between 2008 and 2016.

We are interested in how contextual factors, the reforms of pension and labour market regulations and their outcomes shape trends in public attitudes.

In order to better understand how reform pressures and policies affect individual reform preferences it is crucial to focus first on subjective perceptions of these trends. We argue that changes in subjective performance evaluations are a prerequisite for individual attitude change of policy preferences. Therefore, we explore how the evaluation of pensioners’ standard of living and the evaluation of the standard of living of the unemployed has changed over time.

In particular, we are interested in how far objective indicators of the standard of living (e.g. poverty risk, replacement levels) relate to individuals’ subjective evaluation of and satisfaction with their old age and unemployment benefit system.

In a second step, our analysis examines whether changes in the objective income situation of pensioners and the unemployed or rather its subjective evaluation are related to altered policy preference. Do people continue to see the government responsible for the elderly and the unemployed or do we observe an erosion of support in reaction to increased reform pressures and reform attempts?
For many decades the equal opportunities and the notion of upward mobility have been associated strongly with the features of many European countries and the European social model. The economic growth witnessed up until early 2000s has lifted living standards and the quality of life for many individuals across countries in Europe and beyond. However, concerns over the extent to which the next generation will be similarly better off have increased following the global financial crisis and widening inequalities. However this implies not only to widening income inequality. There are growing class-related gaps in family structure, parenting styles, school test scores, university attendance, access to the labour market and neighbourhood conditions. Consequently, policy attention has started to shift towards addressing this lack of equal opportunities as well as the transmission of (dis)advantage across generations.

Proposals related to the following themes are welcomed:

- Measurement of social mobility that takes into account changes taking place on the labour market (for example new forms of employment, changing job structure) or address broader societal developments (such as growing importance of wealth).

B6.1. STRATIFICATION OF EDUCATION SYSTEMS - DIRECT EFFECT OF SOCIAL ORIGIN ON OCCUPATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Claudia Traini (University of Bamberg)

This paper’s research question is does stratification affect the intergenerational transmission of occupation net of education? Only Hadjar and Becker’s (2016) study has addressed this topic finding no statistically significant effect. However, no substantive explanations are suggested to guide the analysis and education systems are clustered according to different levels of stratification.

Thus, the hypothesis reads the more students’ ability matters during the first selection the weaker the ODJE link.

The second contribution of this paper is an improvement in the operationalization of the indicators of education systems. These have been directly measured by means of a web survey questioning 207 national experts on 34 countries. The hypothesis is tested on the pooled first 5 rounds of the ESS employing estimated dependent variable models.
B6.2. BEYOND INCENTIVES: WHY WE WANT TO KEEP ON WORKING EVEN IF WE DON'T NEED THE MONEY
Rudi Wielers and Peter H. Van der Meer (University of Groningen)

Against the background of increasing flexible labour markets and precarious labour, failing incentive income systems and debates about a basic income, we try to answer the question what binds workers to paid work, except for the wage. We answer this question relying on the non-financial employment commitment question in ESS 2010, i.e. the question whether the respondent would go on working if (s)he would not need the money. The employment commitment question measures the place assigned to work in life. In this paper, we search for its determinants and its relation to well-being. In market societies paid work is for most people their main way of participation and mean of self-development. We argue that for those reasons a high level of employment commitment can be expected in market societies. On the other hand, because work often is physically and psychologically burdening, we expect that experiences of work-related strains and stress trigger workers' wishes to leave the labour market. We elaborate that strains, such as financial scarcity, job and work uncertainty, number of work hours, and work-family conflict affect employment commitment negatively. We also test for macro-level indicators, such as generosity of the welfare state, GNP per capita. In addition, we argue that employment commitment is positively related to well-being.

Results show that employment commitment is high. Only about 25% indicate that with sufficient means they would leave the labour market. Employment commitment shows an independent positive effect on life satisfaction. Main determinants of low employment commitment are bad health, financial stress and job and work uncertainty. On the other hand, autonomy on the work floor and in decision making, strengthens employment commitment. We conclude that quality of the job is a main determinant of employment commitment, and elaborate on implications of this conclusion for the debate about the basic income.

B6.3. FROM INSECURITY TO VULNERABILITY? AN ANALYSIS OF LIMITED CONTRACTS, RECURRENT UNEMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AS DRIVERS OF HEALTH PROBLEMS AMONG YOUNG ADULTS
Sabine Israel (GESIS)

Inequality is strongly driven by the chances given to youth and those youth from lower socio-economic backgrounds in particular. In many European countries however, the youth employment opportunities and chances look dire in the aftermath of the European economic crisis.

Given dual labour markets, young adults are exposed to greater social risks than other groups, leading to a fragmentation of the transition from education to employment associated with more uncertainty. Even though the importance of investing in youth has been recognized by social investment political discourse, European social security systems treat young people often still as outsiders and shift the financial responsibility on the families, thereby increasing inequality.

Financial or employment instability or the inability to reach much desired personal freedom can cause high levels of stress which can reduce health and trigger mental disorder, lowering in turn the emerging adults’ likelihood to successfully enter the labour market. The youth’s social safety net provided through welfare institutions therefore determines if the uncertainty associated with young adults’ trajectories turns into vulnerabilization with associated problems of (mental) health.

This contribution will analyse how insecurities related to job (limited contracts), recurrent unemployment and financial difficulties influence the mental health of young adults. Moreover, it will explore the link between the subjective health of young adults in Europe and social institutions by analyzing the impact of different youth transition regimes on youth general well-being and the well-being of vulnerable groups in particular. The analysis is carried out using the 2014 wave of the ESS for the individual analysis of mental health of 18-24 year olds and 25-34 year olds and data from both the 2014 and 2016 version for the multi-level analysis on subjective health.
In recent decades, much attention has been paid to well-being, and the determinants of well-being have been frequently examined in several fields, such as sociology, economics, psychology and epidemiology. Additionally, more recent research has focused on well-being inequality within countries. However, little is known about how well-being inequality with respect to stratification in education, class and income varies among countries and about the factors that contribute to reducing well-being inequality due to stratification. To fill this gap, with a focus on three dimensions of stratification, including education, class and income and the moderation effect of social trust, this study examines whether social trust reduces well-being inequality due to stratification.

This research employs repeated cross-sectional international comparative data from eight waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2016. The pooled data contain 191,222 individuals nested in 141 country-year units, and the country-year units are also nested in 27 countries. The dependent variable in this study is a score of well-being derived from happiness and life satisfaction, and the independent variables are dummies of education and EGP classes and a scale of household income. Additionally, this study uses the average score of social trust at country-year units as a moderator variable. This analysis utilizes a three-level multilevel modeling to examine the cross-level interaction effects of the average score of social trust at country-year units and three dimensions of stratification on well-being.

The results in this study show that the average score of social trust at country-year units has a positive effect on well-being and weakens the associations between three dimensions of stratification and well-being. These results indicate that high social trust increases well-being in general and reduces well-being inequality related to stratification by improving the well-being of citizens with a lower position.
Climate change and energy security are among the most important threats the world is facing today and are expected to become important drivers of future insecurity and conflict. Warming of the climate system is now considered unequivocal and poses serious risks to both natural and economic systems. Decisions about decarbonising energy supplies to mitigate climate change need to be considered in relation to other energy challenges. Ensuring a reliable and secure supply of energy has become increasingly important in the light of a decline in global oil and gas production, as well as geopolitical tensions arising from increased energy interdependencies at regional and international scales. Action that different governments may take in response to these issues is however dependent on public perceptions in different countries, as policy makers may be less likely to act if their electorates do not think they are a priority. The session will consist of presentations covering different aspects of public perceptions of climate change and energy security, using data from the Climate Change and Energy module of ESS round 8. The module was designed to create a comprehensive theoretically-grounded dataset of public attitudes to climate change, energy security and energy preferences; and involved a conceptual framework covering beliefs about climate change; climate and energy security concerns; personal norms, efficacy and trust; and energy preferences regarding energy-supply sources and energy-demand reduction. Papers are invited that will contribute to a better understanding of the situated nature of attitudes to energy and climate change, including papers that (1) provide detailed cross-national (and regional) comparative analyses, in particular those that consider both differences and communalities in attitudes to energy and climate change; (2) develop and test individual-level theoretical models regarding the topic; and (3) examine how national-level socio-political, economic and environmental factors shape attitudes across Europe. In addition, papers are invited that (4) explore methodological issues in cross-cultural research, for example regarding measurement equivalence of core concepts of the module.

C2.1. GENERATION OF CHANGE? SOUTH AFRICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Benjamin Roberts, Jarè Struwig and Thobeka Radebe (Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa)

As the risks posed by climate change become increasingly apparent, the South African government has introduced various policies and measures directed at mitigating the effects. These include the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2017), a carbon tax, and a draft Climate Change Bill. On the energy front, there has also been significant recent momentum in relation to renewable energy technologies as a core component of the country’s energy mix. As one of world’s top twenty aggregate CO2 emitters, this reflects a political commitment to ensuring that the country transitions to a low carbon economy, as well as concerns over the reliability of the coal-dominant electricity supply in a context of rising consumer demand, rapidly escalating prices and appreciable energy poverty. Successfully navigating this energy transition in the country will require a nuanced understanding of public opinion and behaviour, in order for policy processes to take account of individual preferences, concerns and lived realities. The incorporation of citizen voice in energy security policy has similarly become a pressing global priority (Poortinga et al, 2018).

Despite this emphasis, a significant knowledge gap remains. In response, we use data from the climate change and energy module included in Round 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2016/17), as well as its replication in Round 15 of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS, 2017), to test aspects of the Stern Value-Belief-Norm model (VBN, 2000). The pattern and individual-level predictors of South African beliefs and concerns about climate change and energy security will be examined, together with related energy preferences, in order to develop a comparative understanding of how these approximate or differ from European countries. The paper will conclude with a discussion on the implications of these findings for crafting effective climate change and energy policy interventions in South Africa in coming years.
C2.2. CLIMATE CHANGE PERCEPTIONS AND THEIR INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS: A CROSS-EUROPEAN ANALYSIS

Wouter Poortinga and Lorraine Whitmarsh (Cardiff University), Linda Steg (University of Groningen), Gisela Böhm (University of Bergen) and Stephen Fisher (University of Oxford)

There is now an extensive literature on the question of how individual-level factors affect climate change perceptions, showing that socio-political variables, notably values, worldviews and political orientation, are key factors alongside demographic variables. Yet little is known about cross-national differences in these effects, as most studies have been conducted in a single or small number of countries and cross-study comparisons are difficult due to different conceptualisations of key climate change dimensions.

Using data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (n=44,387), we examine how different individual-level factors are associated with climate change perception across 23 European countries. We show that human values and political orientation are important predictors of climate change beliefs and concern, as are the demographics of gender, age, and education. Certain associations, such as the ones for political orientation, education and human values, are more consistent across countries than others.

We further demonstrate that the strength of relationships is generally weaker in Eastern Europe, in particular for human values, political orientation and age; and that some relationships (e.g. for human values and education) are stronger in Northern Europe as compared to Western Europe. This suggests that findings from one country do not always generalize to other national contexts.

C2.3. CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY VIEWS AND ACTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY

Sandra T. Marquart-Pyatt, Hui Qian, Aaron M. McCright (Michigan State University) and Matthew K. Houser (Indiana University)

More than three decades of social science research demonstrates environmental issues like climate change as important social problems commanding international attention. Although an emerging body of scholarship examines emerging patterns of climate views of publics world-wide, precisely how these connect to attitudes supportive of renewable energy and conservation-minded actions across nations is less well understood. We use 2016 data from the European Social Survey (ESS Wave 8) to investigate how climate change views, energy attitudes, political ideology, and socio-demographics shape energy policy preferences, behavioral intention, and actions. We estimate our empirical models across more than two dozen countries using structural equation modeling with latent variables. Our findings reveal striking similarities regarding consistent predictors of green energy policy preferences, energy efficient behavioral intention, and political actions across two axes of comparison: across welfare regime types and across individual countries. Our results show continued regional distinctiveness for Former State Socialist nations. We also examine within-region variability in our discussion. This study joins a growing body of research seeking to discuss promising avenues through which future research may inform key gaps in our understanding of environmental and political views.
Climate policy is essentially based on international cooperation, and as a major emitter of greenhouse gases Europe bears a global responsibility to play its part in reducing emissions. Also, the notable internal variation in Europe concerning both the carbon emissions and the material and socio-political resources for clean energy solutions calls for better understanding of how these differences are connected to public perceptions of climate change. These in turn can be seen as pivotal for shaping effective and efficient international policies. Public climate change views include issues such as climate concerns, perceived responsibilities and efficacies, and form an important basis for environmental citizenship. This, in turn, is a cornerstone of the policy process, as citizen initiatives, participation, voting and consumption behavior jointly contribute to the agenda-setting and formulation of climate policy.

In this study we examine how affluence, carbon emissions and socio-political structures shape environmental citizenship in 23 European countries, including Russia. We use data from the latest ESS8 module on "Climate Change and Energy" and selected macro-level context variables. Our preliminary analyses show that there are notable national differences in how environmental citizenship is structured in terms of different nations' views on climate change, feelings of responsibility and willingness to engage in environmentally significant actions. Also, the substantial role played by carbon emissions, affluence, and socio-political structures in defining environmental citizenship highlights the importance of taking into account both the discussions on national responsibilities and capabilities in environmental policies.

The analysis of provides a new view of the environmental citizenship by suggesting that it may be challenging to promote climate policies without addressing national economic, environmental and socio-political issues at the same time.
The recent waves of ESS samples include sufficient numbers of immigrants allowing reliable statistical analyses of the immigrant population in many European countries. The main goal of the proposed session is to present and discuss results of research papers that focus on the immigrant population in European societies. The immigrant population can be broadly defined including the foreign-born populations (first-generation), second-generation (sons and daughters of immigrants), or foreign populations (non-nationals). We seek papers that focus only on the immigrant population or provide comparisons between immigrant groups and the native-born population.

We also welcome comparisons of first-generation immigrants with second-generation or between sub-groups of immigrant populations classified by ethnic or regional origin or by religious affiliation. Studies can be in the form of country-specific analysis or cross-national comparative analysis (including regions in Europe or subset of countries). Potential topics for papers in the session are: attitudes of immigrants toward immigration, social, economic and political integration of immigrants in the host society, patterns of residential segregation and causes and consequences of residential segregation; standard of living, human values, social and national identities, life satisfaction and happiness, health and quality of life, social capital, welfare attitudes, family, work and well-being and the like.

D1.1. LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME AND INTEGRATION ACROSS MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS AMONG THE EUROPEAN SECOND GENERATION
Elina Kilpi-Jakonen and Minna Tuominen (University of Turku)

The paper explores the ways in which different dimensions of integration are interlinked among the second generation across Europe, with a particular focus on the role played by the language spoken at home. Language is purported to play an important role in integration yet evidence on the matter is inconsistent. On the one hand, findings from various fields of research suggest that continued use of the language of origin (L1) and/or bilingualism is beneficial for a variety of outcomes from cognitive processing to emotional well-being. At the same time, others suggest that the use of L1 at home hinders educational and labour market performance. The aim of the paper is to reconcile these research findings by providing a thorough examination of the contexts under which different language choices are linked to integration across multiple dimensions. The contexts taken into consideration are the family (parents), community (co-ethnic group) and country-level institutions.

The paper uses pooled data from ESS rounds 2–8. The second generation is classified into three groups: those speaking the language of destination at home and whose parents come from a country where this language is also spoken (no presumed language switching), those speaking only the language of destination at home but whose parents come from a country where this language is not spoken (presumed language switching), and those continuing to speak a language that is not the language of destination at home (no or only partial language switching). Integration outcomes include educational and occupational attainment, social and political participation, emotional wellbeing and values.

First results suggest, for example, that individuals who continue to speak the origin language at home are less likely to be in paid work but more likely to be socially active and interested in politics compared with those who have switched home language.
WEDNESDAY 17 APRIL | 11.20AM-1PM | ROOM 103

D1.2. HORIZONTAL TRANSMISSION OF ELDERLY STEREOTYPES FROM NATIVE POPULATION TO IMMIGRANTS: A MULTI-THEORY EXPLORATION ACROSS 29 COUNTRIES

Adrian Stanciu (Vechta University)

The world population is aging and is more mobile than ever. People typically stereotype senior citizens as incompetent and sociable however, although the stigma attached to them is pervasive across cultures, old people enjoy a better image in some countries compared to others. Furthermore, some individuals emigrate and thereby become new members of their host countries. The literature suggests that while adapting socio-culturally to their host cultures, immigrants come in contact with country natives, which triggers a process of cultural information transmission between them. One challenge for immigrants is therefore to learn and incorporate the novel stereotype-relevant information concerning the elderly learned in the host cultures into preexisting beliefs. However, there is no evidence in the literature for the horizontal transmission (in one generation) of elderly stereotypes between host country natives and immigrants. Findings based on the 4th round of the ESS are presented. Participants who were not born in their country of residence were considered immigrants (N = 5,014), which made possible a multi-level analysis across 29 countries. I operationalized horizontal transmission as Euclidean distances from immigrants’ personal stereotypes (own beliefs) to cultural stereotypes (meta-perceptions of the native population) in their host cultures and tested five mutually exclusive hypotheses stemming from literature on stereotype accommodation, social identity theory, intergroup contact theory, acculturation framework, and demographics. The core findings are that a longer stay in the host culture and fewer cross-cultural differences between immigrants’ home and host cultures predicted a stronger horizontal transmission of elderly stereotypes. Furthermore, this effect was stronger in the more individualistic host cultures. I discuss implications for immigrants’ socio-cognitive adaptation and contributions to old age research.

D1.3. COMPATIBILITY OF ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTIFICATIONS UNDER MULTICULTURAL POLICIES

Akira Igarashi (Rikkyo University)

Immigrants’ national and ethnic identifications have been assumed to contradict each other. However, while studies in psychology generally support this association, under the condition in which national identifications are conceptualised as inclusive, ethnic identifications do not necessarily contradict national identifications. The author hypothesises that in a country where tolerant multicultural policies are introduced, immigrants’ ethnic and national identifications are compatible. To test this hypothesis, respondents with the immigrant background from the European Social Survey 2014 are analysed with multilevel modelling. The results support the hypothesis: in a country with tolerant multicultural policies, ethnic and national identifications are positively associated, while in a country with strict policies, the identifications are negatively associated. This study indicates that the association between ethnic and national identifications is not always negative, but context-dependent.
D1.4. LONELINESS AMONG IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Keming Yang (Durham University)

Loneliness is not merely a painful emotion. During the past decade medical and health researchers have produced a large amount of evidence showing that loneliness, when it becomes chronic and severe, is associated with a variety of illnesses, including heart attack, cancer, dementia, depression, etc. Major media agents have produced reports highlighting these findings to the general public, and the UK government has set up a Ministry for Loneliness, the first in the world. Loneliness is a social problem as well because its origins are the absence of desired social relations or the presence of undesired ones.

In addition, the prevalence of loneliness varies considerably across social groups and countries. After presenting the background information, this study focuses on the prevalence of loneliness among immigrants and compares it with the prevalence among the native residents in a particular country. Are immigrants lonelier than native residents in Europe? Does the prevalence of loneliness vary significantly across countries in Europe? Who among the immigrants are the loneliest and need support? The empirical analyses will draw on the data collected from the third, the fifth, the sixth, and the seventh Rounds of the European Social Survey in which loneliness was measured.

As the percentage of immigrant respondents in each Round is very small, the cases defined as immigrants in these four Rounds will be merged into a new sample of immigrants in Europe. After comparing the percentages of those ‘frequently lonely’ among the immigrants and those among the native residents, ordinal logistic regression models will be constructed using Stata 15 in order to control the effects of age, gender, subjective health, and three variables measuring the respondent’s social life. Explanations for any differences found will be explored and implications for policies and practitioners will be discussed.
**WEDNESDAY 17 APRIL | 11.20AM-1PM | ROOM 104**

**G1: OPINION, POLICIES AND POLICYMAKING. THE RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND POLICY OUTCOMES SINCE 2002**

Session Organisers: Nate Breznau (Univeristy of Bremen) and Lyle Scruggs (University of Connecticut)

This session targets the theoretical and empirical relationship between public opinion and social policy. It calls for any research using theories of endogeneity and feedback between opinion and policy such as thermostatics, increasing returns, positive returns, institutional theory, self-undermining feedback or democratic decay (just to name a few), that might explain the nature of the opinion-policy relationship.

Some scholars argue that public policies increasingly favor those with high socio-economic status. In liberal democracies this is evidenced in the literature on plutocracy; in more corporatist democracies, it has been associated with "partyocracy." What is generally missing in this line of thought is whether the distributional impact of democratic (popular) policies exacerbates inequality, or whether, despite the formal mechanisms of democratic selection (i.e., free and fair elections, universal civil and political rights), policy itself has become less representative of opinion. Other scholars have focused on whether procedural democratic institutions themselves are in decline. Since the 2000s, for example, some of the most democratic countries in the world have slipped in their democratic rankings. Populist governments often justify non-democratic means as an effective way to pursue more popular policies. Meanwhile, skeptics of populism worry that anti-democratic procedures further undermine democratic policy representation. Whether or not procedural changes affect the opinion-policy nexus needs more scrutiny. Proposed papers for this session should focus on opinion-policy linkages, not merely assessing change in inequality or democratic deficits.

Investigating opinion-policy relationships is methodologically challenging. More technical or alternative approaches to standard uni-directional models (instrumental variables modeling, cross-lagged time-series models, qualitative comparative analysis, simultaneous feedback models, etc.) are encouraged as appropriate. Given the plethora of modules in the ESS, we welcome papers that investigate one or more areas of the opinion-social policy nexus, including environment, immigration, welfare state, health, and European integration. Finally, we encourage innovative strategies to measure the output side of the opinion-policy linkage: e.g., spending commitment, program features, regulatory effort, etc.

**G1.1. SIMULTANEOUS FEEDBACK AND POSITIVE RETURNS ACROSS EUROPE: PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL POLICY**

Nate Breznau (Univeristy of Bremen)

The theory of positive returns suggests institutional feedback between opinion and policy whereby each exerts a positive influence on the other simultaneously. This paper tests this theory in the context of Europe using European Social Survey data in 20 countries. Simultaneous feedback models using structural equation modeling demonstrate that the positive returns theory explains the European data. The models explain about 5% of the reciprocally causal loop between opinion and policy. The implications support an extension of Pierson’s increasing returns theory to apply to the case of declining returns as well, a phenomenon occurring in the post liberalization and retrenchment phase of welfare states. Part of this declining returns, appears to be policy driven, where social policy retrenchment takes place but support for the welfare state remains high. Other factors in the opinion-policy process and the limitations of this theory and the methods supporting it are discussed.
The reemerging of radical right populist parties (RRP) as electoral forces in Western Europe has spurred media and scholarly attention to this phenomenon (Eger & Valdez, 2015; Rydgren, 2007). However, the impact of these parties on anti-immigrant attitudes among the general public remains understudied. The few studies that have touched upon this matter provided inconclusive results; either finding some effect (Sprague-Jones, 2010), or no substantive impact (Bohman & Hjerm, 2016; Dunn & Sing, 2011). Polarization of anti-immigrant attitudes among citizens is surprisingly ignored in most of these studies. An exception is Bohman and Hjerm (2016), who assess polarization as deviations of respondents to the country and year specific mean in attitudes. However, polarization can be measured in many ways (DiMaggio, Evans & Bryson, 1996).

Using 8 waves of ESS data (2002-2016), we assess whether polarization in attitudes towards migration has indeed occurred among the general public across Europe. After dealing with several ways to measure polarization (e.g. dispersion, bimodality) in a descriptive way, we will also employ heteroskedastic fixed effects regression analyses in which both the mean and the dispersion around the mean (variance) in anti-migration attitudes are simultaneously modeled.

We then try to explain differences in polarization between countries and across time by studying the impact of a country’s changing political climate, as indicated by the rising influence of anti-immigrant parties. Politicians offer cues that can act as information shortcuts and heuristic processing aids, which influence the opinions of citizens on complex issues, especially the opinions of those citizens that are less informed about the issue (Hellström, 2009). This might be particularly the case if the information is in line with previous held beliefs (Careja, 2015). Data of the Comparative Manifesto Project will be used to measure the influence of radical right populist parties on polarization in anti-immigrant attitudes.

It is well established that populist parties successfully mobilize economically disadvantaged voters. Despite the stable electoral pattern, scholarly work on populist party support tends to focus on socio-cultural cleavages, and much less is known about the economic basis of populist party support. This article fills the gap in the literature. We argue that under the condition of opposition to economic redistribution by mainstream parties, populist parties that support income redistribution are likely to attract economically disadvantaged voters. This prediction is tested by combining data on 84,186 individuals in 14 countries from the European Social Survey and content analytical data on 45 elections in these countries from the Manifesto Project. We find that support for redistribution by both left- and right-wing mainstream parties decreases the effect of unemployment’s duration on populist support. In addition, the prioritization of economic over value issues by mainstream left-wing parties decreases the effect of the initial transition in unemployment. Against our predictions, however, we find that the use of populist discourse by mainstream right-wing parties decreases the effect of unemployment on populist right support. Our results suggest that strategic positioning of parties within the cultural and economic issue spaces should be analyzed jointly to gain a better understanding of populist party support.
The polarization of opinion about climate change is well known in the United States and widely cited as a barrier to policy reforms that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But this view is not based on extensive cross-national comparative evidence of opinion polarization or policy responsiveness. At least one study links polarization to a greater policy responsiveness cross-nationally (Tvinnereim 2015).

A related, but still largely unstudied question is whether differences in attitudes about climate change (and associated political polarization) are motivated by citizens’ vulnerability to the economic costs of addressing climate change. In this paper, we use data from the 2016 European Social Survey to assess the degree of partisan polarization about climate change in Europe.

We evaluate whether this polarization at the subnational/subregional level is related to comparative policy success in addressing climate change and climate vulnerability. We also assess whether opinion and policy variation is mediated by concern about the short run costs of addressing climate change stemming from differences in individual and regional/national dependence on fossil fuel industries and to differences in economic vulnerability and social protection.
Session Organisers: Rory Fitzgerald and Gianmaria Bottoni (City, University of London)

The CROss-National Online Survey Panel (CRONOS) was the world's first input-harmonised cross-national probability-based web panel to be undertaken. It has been piloted in three countries - Estonia, Great Britain and Slovenia - by following up with respondents who took part in Round 8 (2016) of the European Social Survey (ESS). The panel was coordinated by ESS ERIC.

The CRONOS project capitalised on an existing probability-based face-to-face survey to establish a probability-based sample for the web panel. After completing the ESS Round 8 face-to-face interview, respondents in Estonia, Great Britain and Slovenia aged over 18 were invited to participate in six 20 minutes online surveys over a period of 12 months.

The questions included in the CRONOS web panel were a mixture of items previously fielded in face-to-face surveys conducted by the ESS and other SERISS project members: the Generations and Gender Programme (GGP), the European Values Study (EVS) and the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE ERIC). Representatives from those survey programmes will be encouraged to give papers that utilised this data. However now that the data are publicly so a wider author-ship is anticipated.

The data collected online now form part of a larger dataset containing data from the ESS face-to-face interview, allowing for new analyses that were not previously possible.

This session invites papers that use data from the web interviews in combination with the main ESS data. The CRONOS panel gives the opportunity to analyse a wide range of substantive topics dealing with for example family structure, gender roles, subjective wellbeing, timing of life, attitudes to marriage, justice and fairness, environment, national pride, trust and social capital, income fairness and fairness of society. In addition to drawing new substantive findings authors will also be invited to draw on methodological insights gained and discuss their impact on the substantive research questions. Papers discussing new methodological insights are also welcome.

F2.1. WHY YOUNG PEOPLE DO (NOT) PARTICIPATE IN PANEL SURVEYS?
Mare Ainsaar, Indrek Soidla (University of Tartu), Tina Vovk, Slavko Kurdija, May Doušak (University of Ljubljana), Alun Humphrey (NatCen Social Research) and Ana Villar (Facebook)

Age-specific attrition has been researched considerably well for longitudinal surveys in modes other than the web, but less for probability-based web panels. For web panels, Lugtig, Das and Scherpenzeel (2014) show that whereas there is higher attrition among older respondents during recruitment, younger respondents are more likely to attrite in the course of the panel, so that the initial age bias decreases over time. In a recent study, Cheng, Zamarro and Orients (2018) find that unit nonresponse in a web panel is more likely to occur among less conscientious individuals, individuals who are more open to new experiences, and individuals from higher socioeconomic backgrounds.

We use data from the CRONOS multinational web panel to expand our knowledge about age-specific attrition in younger age groups. The CRONOS panel allows adding also a comparative dimension by the example of Estonia, United Kingdom and Slovenia. Initial results show declining response rates among younger age groups in Estonia and the UK, whereas response rates for younger people increased in Slovenia. The combination of CRONOS and ESS Round 8 data + careful study of the survey design allows us to study the role of a wide range of possible attrition-related factors in addition to basic socio-demographic variables, e.g. social status, individual personality characteristics, the role of incentives, etc. The combination of ESS8 and CRONOS data also allows us to find the impact of these factors in different waves and analyse it in combination of different attrition types (early/late, complete/partial attriter) during the web panel.
**F2.2. PREDICTING PARTICIPATION RATES IN WEB PANEL (ESS-CRONOS CASE)**
May Doušak and Slavko Kurdija (University of Ljubljana)

Running a longitudinal panel on the general population is time- and resource consuming endeavour. Predicting odds of respondent participation based on a simple pre-recruitment questionnaire or even basic socio-demographic variables could save a lot of time, effort and money as well as increase quality of final longitudinal data due to less missing data due to attrition or nonresponse.

One thing made clear by just simple descriptive statistics is that including hesitant and (albeit softly) refusing respondents into the panel is not fruitful. The rate of full response in such groups is less than half of those who agreed to participate in the first place.

Additionally, the lowest response rate (12.5 % full participants versus 80.6 %), can be expected from converted refusals of non-internet users (those who needed an internet device) which are the most "expensive" group in the first place.

Machine learning feature selection algorithms provide a good starting point for data exploration and identification of predictors for panel cooperation rates in general survey data. A few lines of R code can return a list of features that may predict the odds of participation in the panel. Such algorithm can provide lists of predictors a human researcher would rarely think about.

While not perfect, they can be combined (e.g. Boruta with GLMnet) and then further assessed using classical methods such as statistical regression.

The presentation will demonstrate that the researcher should not blindly depend on feature selection algorithms and provides a foundation for further, more in-depth research about panel participation predictors. Such research is needed as it could give valuable information on where to focus at the time of panel survey design with striving to assemble the highest quality web panel possible within limited resources available.

**F2.3. CHALLENGING ITEMS FOR SMARTPHONE SURVEY COMPLETION IN THE PROBABILITY-BASED CROSS-NATIONAL ONLINE SURVEY (CRONOS) PANEL**
Elena Sommer (Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy) and Gianmaria Bottoni (City, University of London)

With the recent widespread use of mobile devices to go online, completing online surveys on smartphones has become relatively common (Dillman 2017). In the probability-based CROss-National Online Survey (CRONOS) panel recruited at the back of the European Social Survey Round 8 in Great Britain, Estonia and Slovenia, about one third of respondents completed online surveys on a smartphone.

Empirical studies conducted in the beginning of the current decade (e.g. Mavletova 2013; Peytchev & Hill 2010; Struminskaya et al. 2015) usually reported a lower quality of survey data collected via mobile devices. The more recent studies (e.g. Antoun et al. 2017; Matthews et al. 2018; Sommer et al. 2016), however, report that smartphone survey completion does not necessarily result in lower data quality. This can be partly attributed to rapid improvement of smartphone technology in the last few years making survey completion on mobile devices more intuitive as well as to the assumption that general population became more used to completing different online tasks on a smartphone.

As it can be expected that the proportion of respondents completing online surveys on a smartphone will further increase in near future, rather than discouraging participants to complete surveys on smartphones, online surveys should be designed taking into consideration potential challenges of smartphone completion that can have an impact on substantive findings.

Empirical studies addressing these potential challenges, for example by identifying patterns that result in quality differences across device modes, could be beneficial for guiding survey practitioners that are aiming at designing high quality online surveys. In our contribution we compare respondents who completed CRONOS surveys on a smartphone with respondents who completed them on a desktop computer in terms of survey data quality (e.g. item non-response, satisficing, break-offs). We further identify and discuss types of items with significant non-response discrepancies across devices and closely look at survey break-offs to identify items that were associated with high break-off among smartphone respondents.
According to the theoretical and empirical literature, the measurement of gender role attitudes is controversial in many ways. Alongside issues of content validity, instruments used by survey programmes to measure attitudes towards gender roles appear to be particularly sensitive to cultural bias, increasing the risk of measurement non-equivalence. Based on previous empirical studies on EVS2008, we suspect that the measurement could be sensitive also to priming effects, in particular when previous stimuli ask the respondent to express normative beliefs concerning family relations. We adopt the theoretical perspective of the construal model of attitudes, which argues that respondents make use of the most recent available information to interpret the question and express their judgment. Accordingly, the adjacent questions constitute the context for interpreting the scale on gender roles, and could therefore influence the answers.

Our study aims at assessing the priming effect of the family norms question on the measurement of gender role attitudes by employing data from two experiments fielded in Waves 1 and 5 of the CROss-National Online Survey (CRONOS) panel.

Firstly, we will focus on Wave 5, which proposes the same set of items of EVS2008. We will adopt several techniques to explore the differences between the two experimental settings. Some tests will focus only on the gender role attitudes scale, to assess its reliability and construct validity. We are going to test the effect of the family norms scale on the gender role attitudes scale by using regression models. We will also compare the measurement model across experimental settings and countries by assessing whether the model fits the data. Finally we will perform multi-group confirmatory factor analysis to investigate whether the order of the questions affects the measurement equivalence. We will then replicate the analyses using data from Wave 1, as a robustness check.

There is a growing interest in using probability-based online panels in place of face-to-face surveys and it is important to establish whether the substantive findings generated by such a web panel would be equivalent to those obtained via a high-quality face-to-face survey. The CRONOS web panel was fielded in Estonia, Slovenia and Great Britain as a follow-up to Round 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS) and represented the world’s first probability-based, input harmonised, cross-national on-line panel. This paper uses data from the face-to-face ESS questionnaire to compare the predictive models obtained for three attitudinal outcomes (social trust, attitudes towards homosexuality and attitudes towards immigration) when using the entire ESS achieved sample versus just the subsample of respondents who later participated in the CRONOS web panel.

Some differences in representativeness between the CRONOS sample and the main ESS sample have already been identified and we test whether these have an impact on the substantive findings.
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The European Social Survey is a European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ESS ERIC) that provides cross-national data about public attitudes, beliefs and behaviours.

If you have a general enquiry about the European Social Survey or would like to find out more, please contact the ESS team based at City, University of London:

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